Helen Beebee and Julian Dodd (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199283569
- eISBN:
- 9780191712708
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Many contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of language commit themselves to some version or other of the truthmaker principle: the thesis that truths must be made true by something. Such ...
More
Many contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of language commit themselves to some version or other of the truthmaker principle: the thesis that truths must be made true by something. Such truthmaker theorists have sought to justify their approach in various ways. Many have claimed that the truthmaker principle is a distillation of what is worth salvaging in the correspondence theory of truth; others have suggested that an adherence to the truthmaker principle enables us to avoid pernicious strains of idealism; yet others have argued that the principle has an essential explanatory function, such as that of enabling us to properly formulate the problem of universals. This volume sees both established leaders in the field and up-and-coming philosophical voices contribute to an examination of the claims made on behalf of truthmaker theory. An introductory essay by the editors introduces the reader to the key issues raised in the papers that follow. The said papers consider, amongst other matters, how the truthmaker principle is best formulated, whether it is well motivated, whether it genuinely has the explanatory roles claimed for it, and whether various more modest principles might serve equally well.Less
Many contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of language commit themselves to some version or other of the truthmaker principle: the thesis that truths must be made true by something. Such truthmaker theorists have sought to justify their approach in various ways. Many have claimed that the truthmaker principle is a distillation of what is worth salvaging in the correspondence theory of truth; others have suggested that an adherence to the truthmaker principle enables us to avoid pernicious strains of idealism; yet others have argued that the principle has an essential explanatory function, such as that of enabling us to properly formulate the problem of universals. This volume sees both established leaders in the field and up-and-coming philosophical voices contribute to an examination of the claims made on behalf of truthmaker theory. An introductory essay by the editors introduces the reader to the key issues raised in the papers that follow. The said papers consider, amongst other matters, how the truthmaker principle is best formulated, whether it is well motivated, whether it genuinely has the explanatory roles claimed for it, and whether various more modest principles might serve equally well.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199263288
- eISBN:
- 9780191603631
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263280.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter surveys standard theories of truth, and argues that they are all compatible with dialetheism.
This chapter surveys standard theories of truth, and argues that they are all compatible with dialetheism.
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205233
- eISBN:
- 9780191709302
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205233.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the correspondence theory of truth is false. However this chapter defends realism about truth: it insists that that the Trojans were conquered is true if and only if the ...
More
This chapter argues that the correspondence theory of truth is false. However this chapter defends realism about truth: it insists that that the Trojans were conquered is true if and only if the Trojans really were conquered. It insists that that hobbits do not exist is true if and only if hobbits really do not exist; and so on. Moreover, the chapter refutes not only the correspondence theory of truth, but every version of the claim that being true is a relation that holds between, on the one hand, primary truth-bearers and, on the other, that in virtue of which those truth-bearers are true. Thus, the chapter attacks the coherence theory of truth and also the identity theory of truth. It also defends the claim that there is a property of being true. So it concludes that being true is a monadic property of truth-bearers.Less
This chapter argues that the correspondence theory of truth is false. However this chapter defends realism about truth: it insists that that the Trojans were conquered is true if and only if the Trojans really were conquered. It insists that that hobbits do not exist is true if and only if hobbits really do not exist; and so on. Moreover, the chapter refutes not only the correspondence theory of truth, but every version of the claim that being true is a relation that holds between, on the one hand, primary truth-bearers and, on the other, that in virtue of which those truth-bearers are true. Thus, the chapter attacks the coherence theory of truth and also the identity theory of truth. It also defends the claim that there is a property of being true. So it concludes that being true is a monadic property of truth-bearers.
William Idsardi and Eric Raimy
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199226511
- eISBN:
- 9780191710193
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226511.003.0005
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Phonetics / Phonology
This chapter discusses the relation between representation and learnability in different approaches to reduplication. We show that Correspondence Theory (McCarthy and Prince 1995) and Raimy (2000) ...
More
This chapter discusses the relation between representation and learnability in different approaches to reduplication. We show that Correspondence Theory (McCarthy and Prince 1995) and Raimy (2000) both increase the representational possibilities for phonological theory but that only the Raimy (2000) approach has a natural simplicity metric which helps constrain the hypothesis space a language learner is confronted with. The least complex representation that maps to a surface reduplicated form in the Raimy (2000) theory can be identified based on the number of segments and precedence links. This unique least complex representation can then serve as the null hypothesis for a learner who will only consider more complex representations if confronted with positive evidence. Correspondence Theory on the other hand does not have any natural complexity metric to distinguish between phonetically identical but representationally distinct candidates which leads to an explosion in the hypothesis space for the learner. We conclude that the Raimy (2000) approach to reduplication is more representationally constrained than the Correspondence Theory approach and thus should be preferred.Less
This chapter discusses the relation between representation and learnability in different approaches to reduplication. We show that Correspondence Theory (McCarthy and Prince 1995) and Raimy (2000) both increase the representational possibilities for phonological theory but that only the Raimy (2000) approach has a natural simplicity metric which helps constrain the hypothesis space a language learner is confronted with. The least complex representation that maps to a surface reduplicated form in the Raimy (2000) theory can be identified based on the number of segments and precedence links. This unique least complex representation can then serve as the null hypothesis for a learner who will only consider more complex representations if confronted with positive evidence. Correspondence Theory on the other hand does not have any natural complexity metric to distinguish between phonetically identical but representationally distinct candidates which leads to an explosion in the hypothesis space for the learner. We conclude that the Raimy (2000) approach to reduplication is more representationally constrained than the Correspondence Theory approach and thus should be preferred.
Michael Morris
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199283569
- eISBN:
- 9780191712708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
This chapter questions the view that correspondence theories of truth are a paradigm of realism, and raises the possibility of a non-correspondence account that is more thoroughly realist. The ...
More
This chapter questions the view that correspondence theories of truth are a paradigm of realism, and raises the possibility of a non-correspondence account that is more thoroughly realist. The problem is that correspondence theories require an isomorphism between truth-bearers and the world, which is too neat to be easily motivated from a realist point of view: the world has to have a kind of propositional structure, which is hard to understand as anything other than a projection of the structure of sentences. It is then argued that a non-correspondence realism is preferable to an idealism that continues to accept the correspondence theory. The chapter ends by attempting to defend the claim that it is possible to describe the world as it is in itself, even if the world is not in itself propositional.Less
This chapter questions the view that correspondence theories of truth are a paradigm of realism, and raises the possibility of a non-correspondence account that is more thoroughly realist. The problem is that correspondence theories require an isomorphism between truth-bearers and the world, which is too neat to be easily motivated from a realist point of view: the world has to have a kind of propositional structure, which is hard to understand as anything other than a projection of the structure of sentences. It is then argued that a non-correspondence realism is preferable to an idealism that continues to accept the correspondence theory. The chapter ends by attempting to defend the claim that it is possible to describe the world as it is in itself, even if the world is not in itself propositional.
Trenton Merricks
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205233
- eISBN:
- 9780191709302
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205233.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The thesis known as ‘Truthmaker’ says that each truth has a truthmaker. That is, it says that, for each claim that is true, there is some entity that, by its mere existence, makes that claim true. ...
More
The thesis known as ‘Truthmaker’ says that each truth has a truthmaker. That is, it says that, for each claim that is true, there is some entity that, by its mere existence, makes that claim true. Truthmaker purports to articulate the idea that truth depends substantively on being. So it is primarily motivated by the intuition that truth does indeed depend substantively on being and, similarly, by the desire to rule out theories that violate that dependence. Truthmaker is also sometimes motivated by the belief that it is identical with the correspondence theory of truth, a belief which this chapter shows to be mistaken. This chapter defends a partial account of making true: x makes p true only if, necessarily, if both x and p exist, then p is true.Less
The thesis known as ‘Truthmaker’ says that each truth has a truthmaker. That is, it says that, for each claim that is true, there is some entity that, by its mere existence, makes that claim true. Truthmaker purports to articulate the idea that truth depends substantively on being. So it is primarily motivated by the intuition that truth does indeed depend substantively on being and, similarly, by the desire to rule out theories that violate that dependence. Truthmaker is also sometimes motivated by the belief that it is identical with the correspondence theory of truth, a belief which this chapter shows to be mistaken. This chapter defends a partial account of making true: x makes p true only if, necessarily, if both x and p exist, then p is true.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246298
- eISBN:
- 9780191715181
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246297.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: Davidson, who ...
More
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: Davidson, who assumes a partial and primitive understanding of the truth predicate, reverses Tarski who had succeeded in elucidating the concept of truth by taking the notion of ‘translation’ (preservation of meaning) for granted. In the first of five subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson develops the systematic constraints a theory of meaning has to meet and shows how an approach to semantics based on the concept of truth meets these demands better than any rival approach. Sect. 2 explores whether one can give semantic analyses of quotation, intensional contexts, and force within the extensional limitations of the truth‐theoretic framework. Viewing the theories of meaning developed in the first section as empirical, Sect. 3 inquires into their testability: can we verify these theories without presupposing concepts too closely aligned to that of meaning, interpretation, and synonymy? Davidson develops constitutive constraints on applying truth theories to interpret the speech behaviour of others: we have to view utterances for the most part as assertions of the speaker's beliefs and those beliefs as largely true and consistent (he terms this the ‘Principle of Charity’). Sect. 4 combines these interpretative constraints with the semantic concept of truth developed in Sect. 1 to tackle metaphysical issues. Davidson claims that truth is not relative to conceptual schemes but only to languages that can be shown to be largely correct about the world; consequently, by studying those languages via the semantic concept of truth we can derive ontological conclusions. Sect. 5 explores aspects of linguistic usage that form a particular threat to theories of meaning (such as Davidson's) that focus on the literal meaning of sentences: for truth theory to be adequate as a general theory of language, it must give valid accounts of sentence mood, illocutionary force, and metaphorical meaning.Less
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: Davidson, who assumes a partial and primitive understanding of the truth predicate, reverses Tarski who had succeeded in elucidating the concept of truth by taking the notion of ‘translation’ (preservation of meaning) for granted. In the first of five subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson develops the systematic constraints a theory of meaning has to meet and shows how an approach to semantics based on the concept of truth meets these demands better than any rival approach. Sect. 2 explores whether one can give semantic analyses of quotation, intensional contexts, and force within the extensional limitations of the truth‐theoretic framework. Viewing the theories of meaning developed in the first section as empirical, Sect. 3 inquires into their testability: can we verify these theories without presupposing concepts too closely aligned to that of meaning, interpretation, and synonymy? Davidson develops constitutive constraints on applying truth theories to interpret the speech behaviour of others: we have to view utterances for the most part as assertions of the speaker's beliefs and those beliefs as largely true and consistent (he terms this the ‘Principle of Charity’). Sect. 4 combines these interpretative constraints with the semantic concept of truth developed in Sect. 1 to tackle metaphysical issues. Davidson claims that truth is not relative to conceptual schemes but only to languages that can be shown to be largely correct about the world; consequently, by studying those languages via the semantic concept of truth we can derive ontological conclusions. Sect. 5 explores aspects of linguistic usage that form a particular threat to theories of meaning (such as Davidson's) that focus on the literal meaning of sentences: for truth theory to be adequate as a general theory of language, it must give valid accounts of sentence mood, illocutionary force, and metaphorical meaning.
Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199290932
- eISBN:
- 9780191710445
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290932.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter discusses the relation of theories of truth to the program of truth-theoretic semantics. It reviews briefly three traditional theories of truth and their relation to Tarski-style ...
More
This chapter discusses the relation of theories of truth to the program of truth-theoretic semantics. It reviews briefly three traditional theories of truth and their relation to Tarski-style axiomatic truth theories: the coherence theory, the redundancy theory, and the correspondence theory. It also discusses Davidson's views about the relation of Tarski-style truth theories and traditional correspondence theories.Less
This chapter discusses the relation of theories of truth to the program of truth-theoretic semantics. It reviews briefly three traditional theories of truth and their relation to Tarski-style axiomatic truth theories: the coherence theory, the redundancy theory, and the correspondence theory. It also discusses Davidson's views about the relation of Tarski-style truth theories and traditional correspondence theories.
Michael P. Lynch
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218738
- eISBN:
- 9780191711794
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218738.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
This chapter examines and criticizes the two most plausible traditional theories of truth: the correspondence and pragmatist/coherence accounts. Traditional theories of this sort are species of ...
More
This chapter examines and criticizes the two most plausible traditional theories of truth: the correspondence and pragmatist/coherence accounts. Traditional theories of this sort are species of alethic monism: the view that there is one and only one way for beliefs to be true. Particular attention is paid to developing the most plausible versions of either view. It is argued such theories are plausible when applied to some particular kinds of beliefs, but face insurmountable objections when applied to every kind of belief.Less
This chapter examines and criticizes the two most plausible traditional theories of truth: the correspondence and pragmatist/coherence accounts. Traditional theories of this sort are species of alethic monism: the view that there is one and only one way for beliefs to be true. Particular attention is paid to developing the most plausible versions of either view. It is argued such theories are plausible when applied to some particular kinds of beliefs, but face insurmountable objections when applied to every kind of belief.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238201
- eISBN:
- 9780191597527
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238207.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter surveys several philosophical approaches to the meaning or nature of truth, including instrumentalism, epistemic or verificationist approaches, deflationism, and the correspondence ...
More
This chapter surveys several philosophical approaches to the meaning or nature of truth, including instrumentalism, epistemic or verificationist approaches, deflationism, and the correspondence theory. Different versions of the first three approaches are examined, and each faces serious difficulties. The virtues of the correspondence theory are emphasized, including its up‐front acceptance of “worldly” truth‐makers. However, deflationism is also compatible with a realist conception of truth, and if it could surmount its technical problems, it might be acceptable.Less
This chapter surveys several philosophical approaches to the meaning or nature of truth, including instrumentalism, epistemic or verificationist approaches, deflationism, and the correspondence theory. Different versions of the first three approaches are examined, and each faces serious difficulties. The virtues of the correspondence theory are emphasized, including its up‐front acceptance of “worldly” truth‐makers. However, deflationism is also compatible with a realist conception of truth, and if it could surmount its technical problems, it might be acceptable.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246298
- eISBN:
- 9780191715181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246297.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Davidson explores whether the semantic concept of truth utilized in Essay 2 (i.e. a theory of truth recursively defined on satisfaction) can be developed into a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth, i.e. ...
More
Davidson explores whether the semantic concept of truth utilized in Essay 2 (i.e. a theory of truth recursively defined on satisfaction) can be developed into a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth, i.e. into a theory that explains the property of being true ‘by a relation between a statement and something else.’ He shows how reducing truth to either its disquotational function (the redundancy theory of truth associated with Ramsey) or to a notion of correspondence insensitive to more advanced semantic considerations both fail. In the former case, idioms such as ‘everything he said was true’ cannot be analysed without universally quantifying over propositions and defining truth for them recursively on satisfaction; in the latter case, the position of q in the sentential predicate ‘corresponds to the fact that q’ allows coextensive redescriptions to the effect of collapsing all q into one fact (the ‘One Great Fact’, as Davidson calls it). Davidson adds that traditional correspondence theories of the latter sort invariably suffer from assigning distinct entities, such as facts, to sentences as a whole (entities with which to compare sentences); whereas on his preferred theory, such assignments take place at the subsentential level via the apparatus of satisfaction and denotation ( Essay 15).Less
Davidson explores whether the semantic concept of truth utilized in Essay 2 (i.e. a theory of truth recursively defined on satisfaction) can be developed into a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth, i.e. into a theory that explains the property of being true ‘by a relation between a statement and something else.’ He shows how reducing truth to either its disquotational function (the redundancy theory of truth associated with Ramsey) or to a notion of correspondence insensitive to more advanced semantic considerations both fail. In the former case, idioms such as ‘everything he said was true’ cannot be analysed without universally quantifying over propositions and defining truth for them recursively on satisfaction; in the latter case, the position of q in the sentential predicate ‘corresponds to the fact that q’ allows coextensive redescriptions to the effect of collapsing all q into one fact (the ‘One Great Fact’, as Davidson calls it). Davidson adds that traditional correspondence theories of the latter sort invariably suffer from assigning distinct entities, such as facts, to sentences as a whole (entities with which to compare sentences); whereas on his preferred theory, such assignments take place at the subsentential level via the apparatus of satisfaction and denotation ( Essay 15).
Penelope Maddy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199273669
- eISBN:
- 9780191706264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Opponents of a ‘scientistic’ approach as austere as Second Philosophy often imagine that philosophy just becomes science, that there's nothing left for the philosopher to do. The book as a whole aims ...
More
Opponents of a ‘scientistic’ approach as austere as Second Philosophy often imagine that philosophy just becomes science, that there's nothing left for the philosopher to do. The book as a whole aims to demonstrate that this isn't true, that questions traditionally regarded a philosophical can be effectively addressed from a second-philosophical perspective. This chapter points out the heuristic value of training in the historical and contemporary practice of philosophy, and introduces the topic of word-world connections to trace second-philosophical and un-second-philosophical themes in the current debate between correspondence and disquotational theories of truth.Less
Opponents of a ‘scientistic’ approach as austere as Second Philosophy often imagine that philosophy just becomes science, that there's nothing left for the philosopher to do. The book as a whole aims to demonstrate that this isn't true, that questions traditionally regarded a philosophical can be effectively addressed from a second-philosophical perspective. This chapter points out the heuristic value of training in the historical and contemporary practice of philosophy, and introduces the topic of word-world connections to trace second-philosophical and un-second-philosophical themes in the current debate between correspondence and disquotational theories of truth.
Michael D. Resnik
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250142
- eISBN:
- 9780191598296
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250142.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Talk of truth plays a major role in formulating realism, to the point that realist theories are often criticized by attacking the correspondence theory of truth that they are presumed to defend. In ...
More
Talk of truth plays a major role in formulating realism, to the point that realist theories are often criticized by attacking the correspondence theory of truth that they are presumed to defend. In this chapter, I claim that there is an alternative theory of truth, which is both non‐epistemic and not based on correspondence relation that suffices to support mathematical realism. I describe the theory as a logical conception of truth because the truth predicate will turn out to be simply a logical operator. The theory has two main features: it is disquotational, and immanent, in that it specifies the extension of the term ‘true’ only for the language in which it applies.Less
Talk of truth plays a major role in formulating realism, to the point that realist theories are often criticized by attacking the correspondence theory of truth that they are presumed to defend. In this chapter, I claim that there is an alternative theory of truth, which is both non‐epistemic and not based on correspondence relation that suffices to support mathematical realism. I describe the theory as a logical conception of truth because the truth predicate will turn out to be simply a logical operator. The theory has two main features: it is disquotational, and immanent, in that it specifies the extension of the term ‘true’ only for the language in which it applies.
J. L. Austin
J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1979
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780192830210
- eISBN:
- 9780191597039
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019283021X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This text collects all Austin’s published articles plus a new one, ch. 13, hitherto unpublished. The analysis of the ordinary language to clarify philosophical questions is the common element of the ...
More
This text collects all Austin’s published articles plus a new one, ch. 13, hitherto unpublished. The analysis of the ordinary language to clarify philosophical questions is the common element of the 13 papers. Chapters 2 and 4 discuss the nature of knowledge, focusing on ‘performative utterances’. The doctrine of ‘speech acts’, i.e. a statement may be the pragmatic use of language, is discussed in Chs 6 and 10. Chapters 8, 9, and 12 reflect on the problems the language encounters in discussing actions and consider the cases of excuses, accusations, and freedom. The ‘correspondence theory’, i.e. a statement is truth when it corresponds to a fact, is presented in Chs 5 and 6. Finally, Chs 1 and 3 study how a word may have different but related senses considering Aristotle’s view. Chapters 11 and 13 illustrate the meaning of ‘pretending’ and a Plato’s text respectively.Less
This text collects all Austin’s published articles plus a new one, ch. 13, hitherto unpublished. The analysis of the ordinary language to clarify philosophical questions is the common element of the 13 papers. Chapters 2 and 4 discuss the nature of knowledge, focusing on ‘performative utterances’. The doctrine of ‘speech acts’, i.e. a statement may be the pragmatic use of language, is discussed in Chs 6 and 10. Chapters 8, 9, and 12 reflect on the problems the language encounters in discussing actions and consider the cases of excuses, accusations, and freedom. The ‘correspondence theory’, i.e. a statement is truth when it corresponds to a fact, is presented in Chs 5 and 6. Finally, Chs 1 and 3 study how a word may have different but related senses considering Aristotle’s view. Chapters 11 and 13 illustrate the meaning of ‘pretending’ and a Plato’s text respectively.
Christopher Hookway
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256587
- eISBN:
- 9780191597718
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256586.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Talk of truth as ‘correspondence to reality’ can be a platitude or a substantial and controversial philosophical theory. The chapter argues that pragmatists can accept the platitude of ...
More
Talk of truth as ‘correspondence to reality’ can be a platitude or a substantial and controversial philosophical theory. The chapter argues that pragmatists can accept the platitude of correspondence, but that they reject the substantial metaphysics or truth as correspondence and metaphysical realism. The second half of the chapter argues that Peirce's account of the role of iconic representations, such as diagrams—in cognition and ordinary language—can capture some important insights of the traditional correspondence theory of truth.Less
Talk of truth as ‘correspondence to reality’ can be a platitude or a substantial and controversial philosophical theory. The chapter argues that pragmatists can accept the platitude of correspondence, but that they reject the substantial metaphysics or truth as correspondence and metaphysical realism. The second half of the chapter argues that Peirce's account of the role of iconic representations, such as diagrams—in cognition and ordinary language—can capture some important insights of the traditional correspondence theory of truth.
Penelope Maddy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199273669
- eISBN:
- 9780191706264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter lays out the background to the current debate between correspondence theorists and disquotationalists in the theory of truth: from Tarski, to Field, to Leeds. The disquotationalist's ...
More
This chapter lays out the background to the current debate between correspondence theorists and disquotationalists in the theory of truth: from Tarski, to Field, to Leeds. The disquotationalist's idea is that we don't need a robust theory of reference (like a causal theory) or truth (like typical correspondence theories), that the role of truth in our account of the world can actually be filled by a simple logical device of disquotation, as proposed by Quine among others. The Second Philosopher develops a pair of diagnostics to differentiate disquotational from correspondence theories (according to which Tarski turns out to have been a disquotationalist), and ends with a discussion of Field's notion of an ‘indication relation’ (in favourable cases, one's beliefs are good indicators of the facts).Less
This chapter lays out the background to the current debate between correspondence theorists and disquotationalists in the theory of truth: from Tarski, to Field, to Leeds. The disquotationalist's idea is that we don't need a robust theory of reference (like a causal theory) or truth (like typical correspondence theories), that the role of truth in our account of the world can actually be filled by a simple logical device of disquotation, as proposed by Quine among others. The Second Philosopher develops a pair of diagnostics to differentiate disquotational from correspondence theories (according to which Tarski turns out to have been a disquotationalist), and ends with a discussion of Field's notion of an ‘indication relation’ (in favourable cases, one's beliefs are good indicators of the facts).
Gregory Mitchell
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195367584
- eISBN:
- 9780199776917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367584.003.0014
- Subject:
- Psychology, Forensic Psychology
Much of the interest in empirical studies of judges lies in the comparison of actual to ideal behavior to reach conclusions about judicial competence. We may decompose any empirical study that ...
More
Much of the interest in empirical studies of judges lies in the comparison of actual to ideal behavior to reach conclusions about judicial competence. We may decompose any empirical study that attempts to address the competence of judges or the quality of judging into three basic components: (1) the specification of a normative benchmark; (2) the conversion of the benchmark into testable form and judicial behavior into measurable units; (3) the interpretation of the results of any comparison to draw appropriate conclusions about the descriptive-normative gap. This chapter considers complications at each stage in the comparison process, with illustrations from existing studies of judicial competence and studies from psychology that examine the gap between behavior and norms of rational judgment and decision making.Less
Much of the interest in empirical studies of judges lies in the comparison of actual to ideal behavior to reach conclusions about judicial competence. We may decompose any empirical study that attempts to address the competence of judges or the quality of judging into three basic components: (1) the specification of a normative benchmark; (2) the conversion of the benchmark into testable form and judicial behavior into measurable units; (3) the interpretation of the results of any comparison to draw appropriate conclusions about the descriptive-normative gap. This chapter considers complications at each stage in the comparison process, with illustrations from existing studies of judicial competence and studies from psychology that examine the gap between behavior and norms of rational judgment and decision making.
Penelope Maddy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199273669
- eISBN:
- 9780191706264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Up through the early 1970s, Putnam was another conspicuous naturalist, e.g., he suggested that a correspondence theory of truth might emerge from an ordinary empirical investigation of the ...
More
Up through the early 1970s, Putnam was another conspicuous naturalist, e.g., he suggested that a correspondence theory of truth might emerge from an ordinary empirical investigation of the effectiveness of human language use. By the late 1970s, he comes to regard the correspondence theory as emblematic of an extra-scientific ‘metaphysical realism’, which he rejects in favour of an equally extra-scientific account of truth in terms of idealized rational warrant. As with Kant and Carnap, the Second Philosopher finds this two-level view unmotivated and its methods unclear. The chapter goes on to examine Putnam's various objections to ‘naturalism’ as he understands it and to show how they miss the mark if addressed to Second Philosophy.Less
Up through the early 1970s, Putnam was another conspicuous naturalist, e.g., he suggested that a correspondence theory of truth might emerge from an ordinary empirical investigation of the effectiveness of human language use. By the late 1970s, he comes to regard the correspondence theory as emblematic of an extra-scientific ‘metaphysical realism’, which he rejects in favour of an equally extra-scientific account of truth in terms of idealized rational warrant. As with Kant and Carnap, the Second Philosopher finds this two-level view unmotivated and its methods unclear. The chapter goes on to examine Putnam's various objections to ‘naturalism’ as he understands it and to show how they miss the mark if addressed to Second Philosophy.
John J. McCarthy
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199267712
- eISBN:
- 9780191708213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267712.003.0008
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Phonetics / Phonology
This chapter introduces a novel formalization of surface resemblance through shared paradigm membership, couched within Optimality Theory (OT) and correspondence theory. In this Optimal Paradigms ...
More
This chapter introduces a novel formalization of surface resemblance through shared paradigm membership, couched within Optimality Theory (OT) and correspondence theory. In this Optimal Paradigms model (OP), an OT constraint hierarchy evaluates candidates consisting of entire paradigms. Within a paradigm qua candidate, every output realization of a lexeme stands in correspondence with every other output realization of that lexeme. Faithfulness constraints on this intraparadigmatic Output–Output correspondence relation resist alternation within the paradigm. Through interaction with markedness and standard faithfulness constraints, they account for surface resemblance and failure of resemblance among members of a paradigm. The OP model is illustrated and supported by a type of data that has not figured in previous discussions of the surface-resemblance problem. The chapter argues that certain properties of Classical Arabic root-and-pattern morphology cannot be satisfactorily explained without the OP model. This argument also shows how OP supports the minimalist goals of Generalized Template Theory (GTT), which seeks to eliminate templates and similar stipulations from linguistic theory, replacing them with independently motivated constraints. The analysis of Arabic templates sets in clear contrast the differences between OP and serial-derivational models, including proposals for melding OT with Lexical Phonology.Less
This chapter introduces a novel formalization of surface resemblance through shared paradigm membership, couched within Optimality Theory (OT) and correspondence theory. In this Optimal Paradigms model (OP), an OT constraint hierarchy evaluates candidates consisting of entire paradigms. Within a paradigm qua candidate, every output realization of a lexeme stands in correspondence with every other output realization of that lexeme. Faithfulness constraints on this intraparadigmatic Output–Output correspondence relation resist alternation within the paradigm. Through interaction with markedness and standard faithfulness constraints, they account for surface resemblance and failure of resemblance among members of a paradigm. The OP model is illustrated and supported by a type of data that has not figured in previous discussions of the surface-resemblance problem. The chapter argues that certain properties of Classical Arabic root-and-pattern morphology cannot be satisfactorily explained without the OP model. This argument also shows how OP supports the minimalist goals of Generalized Template Theory (GTT), which seeks to eliminate templates and similar stipulations from linguistic theory, replacing them with independently motivated constraints. The analysis of Arabic templates sets in clear contrast the differences between OP and serial-derivational models, including proposals for melding OT with Lexical Phonology.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242894
- eISBN:
- 9780191597381
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242895.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and ...
More
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.Less
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.
