Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151250
- eISBN:
- 9781400838837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151250.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
This chapter focuses on the evolution of strong reciprocity. A predisposition to cooperate and a willingness to punish defectors is known as strong reciprocity, and it is the combination of the two ...
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This chapter focuses on the evolution of strong reciprocity. A predisposition to cooperate and a willingness to punish defectors is known as strong reciprocity, and it is the combination of the two that is essential to human cooperation. Punishment reduces the gain to free-riding, and may induce even entirely self-interested individuals to cooperate. Before explaining how a willingness to punish those who violate social norms even at personal cost could have evolved, the chapter considers how punishment is coordinated among group members so that it is contingent on the number of others predisposed to participate in the punishment. It also shows that punishment is characterized by increasing returns to scale, so the total cost of punishing a particular target declines as the number of punishers increases. Finally, it discusses the results of simulations that illustrate the emergence of strong reciprocity and examines why coordinated punishment succeeds.Less
This chapter focuses on the evolution of strong reciprocity. A predisposition to cooperate and a willingness to punish defectors is known as strong reciprocity, and it is the combination of the two that is essential to human cooperation. Punishment reduces the gain to free-riding, and may induce even entirely self-interested individuals to cooperate. Before explaining how a willingness to punish those who violate social norms even at personal cost could have evolved, the chapter considers how punishment is coordinated among group members so that it is contingent on the number of others predisposed to participate in the punishment. It also shows that punishment is characterized by increasing returns to scale, so the total cost of punishing a particular target declines as the number of punishers increases. Finally, it discusses the results of simulations that illustrate the emergence of strong reciprocity and examines why coordinated punishment succeeds.
Barak D. Richman (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785716
- eISBN:
- 9780804787925
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785716.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Competition Law
It has become conventional wisdom that effective competition policy is a necessary ingredient to economic development. But sometimes competition policy is at odds with the pressing priority of ...
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It has become conventional wisdom that effective competition policy is a necessary ingredient to economic development. But sometimes competition policy is at odds with the pressing priority of securing contract rights. This is because in undeveloped legal systems, cartels are sometimes necessary to enforce contracts. When courts and other public instruments are unable to reliably enforce contracts, private ordering systems often arise to mobilize a group of affiliated merchants to direct coordinated punishments against parties who breach contracts. Yet such coordinated punishments are akin to group boycotts, which normally invite antitrust scrutiny. This chapter focuses on the tension between the well-understood harms of group boycotts as restraints on competition and the unappreciated benefits of group boycotts as pro-competitive solutions to court failures.Less
It has become conventional wisdom that effective competition policy is a necessary ingredient to economic development. But sometimes competition policy is at odds with the pressing priority of securing contract rights. This is because in undeveloped legal systems, cartels are sometimes necessary to enforce contracts. When courts and other public instruments are unable to reliably enforce contracts, private ordering systems often arise to mobilize a group of affiliated merchants to direct coordinated punishments against parties who breach contracts. Yet such coordinated punishments are akin to group boycotts, which normally invite antitrust scrutiny. This chapter focuses on the tension between the well-understood harms of group boycotts as restraints on competition and the unappreciated benefits of group boycotts as pro-competitive solutions to court failures.
