Robert Schütze
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199238583
- eISBN:
- 9780191716539
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238583.003.02
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
The constitutional battle over the nature of sovereignty and federalism in America produced a compromise in the late nineteenth century: dual federalism. The philosophy of dual federalism suggested a ...
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The constitutional battle over the nature of sovereignty and federalism in America produced a compromise in the late nineteenth century: dual federalism. The philosophy of dual federalism suggested a particular constitutional structure for the idea of duplex regimen: the tasks of government would be divided between two - mutually exclusive – spheres. The federal government and the States were seen as “equal” and “co-ordinate” within their respective spheres. This constitutional solution appeased moderate “Nationalists” and “Statists” for more than a century. The shift away from dual federalism took place in the 1930s and is linked to the American “New Deal”. Modern “New Deal” jurisprudence abandons the conceptual duality between commerce versus police power. The demise of the exclusive spheres equally takes place at the legislative level. Federal pre-emption abandons automatic field pre-emption. The principal exception to the rise of cooperative federalism is foreign affairs. The exclusion of the States from international treaty-making preserves an enclave of dual federalism.Less
The constitutional battle over the nature of sovereignty and federalism in America produced a compromise in the late nineteenth century: dual federalism. The philosophy of dual federalism suggested a particular constitutional structure for the idea of duplex regimen: the tasks of government would be divided between two - mutually exclusive – spheres. The federal government and the States were seen as “equal” and “co-ordinate” within their respective spheres. This constitutional solution appeased moderate “Nationalists” and “Statists” for more than a century. The shift away from dual federalism took place in the 1930s and is linked to the American “New Deal”. Modern “New Deal” jurisprudence abandons the conceptual duality between commerce versus police power. The demise of the exclusive spheres equally takes place at the legislative level. Federal pre-emption abandons automatic field pre-emption. The principal exception to the rise of cooperative federalism is foreign affairs. The exclusion of the States from international treaty-making preserves an enclave of dual federalism.
Erin Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199737987
- eISBN:
- 9780199918652
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737987.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Chapter three reviews the history of American federalism as a story of competition between compelling principles in tension with one another, stretching the legal framework in one direction and then ...
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Chapter three reviews the history of American federalism as a story of competition between compelling principles in tension with one another, stretching the legal framework in one direction and then overcorrecting in another. Visualizing operative federalism theory as a four-dimensional pendulum, the chapter describes it swinging freely over time among the independent federalism values—pointing to a favorite at one period in history and another in a different era. Ongoing uncertainty about how judicial doctrine should resolve these issues is reflected by the Court’s vacillating case law over this time period. Chapter three traces the swing of the pendulum through American history, casting its arc in terms of shifting theories about how best to balance competing values. Its fluidity reflects the combined forces of gradual ideological oscillation and occasionally violent tug of war as social events impact the evolution of interpretive federalism theory. The chapter begins with the difficulties that the pioneers of American federalism faced in deciphering what their new concept of dual sovereignty would mean in practice, from the national bank to the southern nullification challenges to the Civil War. Dual federalism emerged as the theoretical touchstone of the nineteenth century, establishing the classical idealism for which later dualist models would yearn. Even so, the challenges of jurisdictional overlap were clear as early as the Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention’s replacement of the Articles of Confederation. The chapter then explores federalism’s tug of war during the second half of American history, focusing on the twentieth century. It reviews the Progressive and Lochner eras, the Great Depression and the New Deal, the Civil Rights Movement and Great Society eras that led to the entrenchment of cooperative federalism under the Warren Court, and finally the New Federalism challenge under the Rehnquist Court.Less
Chapter three reviews the history of American federalism as a story of competition between compelling principles in tension with one another, stretching the legal framework in one direction and then overcorrecting in another. Visualizing operative federalism theory as a four-dimensional pendulum, the chapter describes it swinging freely over time among the independent federalism values—pointing to a favorite at one period in history and another in a different era. Ongoing uncertainty about how judicial doctrine should resolve these issues is reflected by the Court’s vacillating case law over this time period. Chapter three traces the swing of the pendulum through American history, casting its arc in terms of shifting theories about how best to balance competing values. Its fluidity reflects the combined forces of gradual ideological oscillation and occasionally violent tug of war as social events impact the evolution of interpretive federalism theory. The chapter begins with the difficulties that the pioneers of American federalism faced in deciphering what their new concept of dual sovereignty would mean in practice, from the national bank to the southern nullification challenges to the Civil War. Dual federalism emerged as the theoretical touchstone of the nineteenth century, establishing the classical idealism for which later dualist models would yearn. Even so, the challenges of jurisdictional overlap were clear as early as the Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention’s replacement of the Articles of Confederation. The chapter then explores federalism’s tug of war during the second half of American history, focusing on the twentieth century. It reviews the Progressive and Lochner eras, the Great Depression and the New Deal, the Civil Rights Movement and Great Society eras that led to the entrenchment of cooperative federalism under the Warren Court, and finally the New Federalism challenge under the Rehnquist Court.
Jim Rossi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195368321
- eISBN:
- 9780199867509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368321.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter demonstrates the conceptual payoff in the context of the interplay between state and national legislative and executive power by focusing on two recurring problems of cooperative ...
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This chapter demonstrates the conceptual payoff in the context of the interplay between state and national legislative and executive power by focusing on two recurring problems of cooperative federalism: state implementation of federal programmatic directives, and state administrative borrowing of federal regulatory standards. In both of these situations, the state constitution may constrain the ability of state agencies to administer programs in the way they desire, most commonly through a strict nondelegation doctrine purportedly rooted in the state constitutional separation of powers. The chapter rejects the approaches to these problems worked out by both federal and state courts in favor of an approach based on comparative institutional analysis, informed by the dual enforcement model. On this view, state constitutions should not be construed to bar state administrative compliance with or adoption of federal legal norms because state constitutional nondelegation doctrines are better understood as responses to governance failures peculiar to state-level democracy; failures that have no relevance when a state legislature indirectly delegates power to the national government rather than to an organ of state government. This helps to shed light on the nature of executive power at the state level, particularly where national goals are at issue.Less
This chapter demonstrates the conceptual payoff in the context of the interplay between state and national legislative and executive power by focusing on two recurring problems of cooperative federalism: state implementation of federal programmatic directives, and state administrative borrowing of federal regulatory standards. In both of these situations, the state constitution may constrain the ability of state agencies to administer programs in the way they desire, most commonly through a strict nondelegation doctrine purportedly rooted in the state constitutional separation of powers. The chapter rejects the approaches to these problems worked out by both federal and state courts in favor of an approach based on comparative institutional analysis, informed by the dual enforcement model. On this view, state constitutions should not be construed to bar state administrative compliance with or adoption of federal legal norms because state constitutional nondelegation doctrines are better understood as responses to governance failures peculiar to state-level democracy; failures that have no relevance when a state legislature indirectly delegates power to the national government rather than to an organ of state government. This helps to shed light on the nature of executive power at the state level, particularly where national goals are at issue.
Thomas Poguntke
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199252015
- eISBN:
- 9780191602375
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252017.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The political process of the Federal Republic has always been characterized by two seemingly contradictory attributes. Germany was said to be a Chancellor democracy and party state at the same time. ...
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The political process of the Federal Republic has always been characterized by two seemingly contradictory attributes. Germany was said to be a Chancellor democracy and party state at the same time. Yet, this chapter shows that both features are not mutually exclusive. While political parties continue to occupy a central position in the political process of the Federal Republic, particularly when as regards political recruitment, they have been weakened when it comes to controlling the chief executive and the legislative process. The specific nature of German cooperative federalism furnishes the Chancellor with a central role in the decision-making process that makes him structurally more independent of his own party and of his coalition partners. This tendency has been augmented by the growing resources for the chancellor’s office, the internationalization of politics, the increasing tendency of the electronic media to focus on leaders, and the general decline of cleavage-based politics. At the same time, political parties have become leadership-dominated. While there are clear tendencies towards the presidentialization of the political process in the Federal Republic, parties continue to control the access to the chief executive office, and they still hold the power to remove their leaders.Less
The political process of the Federal Republic has always been characterized by two seemingly contradictory attributes. Germany was said to be a Chancellor democracy and party state at the same time. Yet, this chapter shows that both features are not mutually exclusive. While political parties continue to occupy a central position in the political process of the Federal Republic, particularly when as regards political recruitment, they have been weakened when it comes to controlling the chief executive and the legislative process. The specific nature of German cooperative federalism furnishes the Chancellor with a central role in the decision-making process that makes him structurally more independent of his own party and of his coalition partners. This tendency has been augmented by the growing resources for the chancellor’s office, the internationalization of politics, the increasing tendency of the electronic media to focus on leaders, and the general decline of cleavage-based politics. At the same time, political parties have become leadership-dominated. While there are clear tendencies towards the presidentialization of the political process in the Federal Republic, parties continue to control the access to the chief executive office, and they still hold the power to remove their leaders.
Erin Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199737987
- eISBN:
- 9780199918652
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737987.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This book explores how constitutional interpreters struggle to reconcile the competing values that undergird American federalism, with real consequences for governance that requires local and ...
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This book explores how constitutional interpreters struggle to reconcile the competing values that undergird American federalism, with real consequences for governance that requires local and national collaboration. Drawing examples from the response to Hurricane Katrina, climate governance, health reform, nuclear waste, and other problems that implicate both state and federal authority, it shows how federalism theory can inhibit effective multijurisdictional governance by failing to navigate the tensions within federalism itself. The book argues that American federalism is best understood through the “tug of war” between the good-governance principles that dual sovereignty fosters—including checks and balances, accountable governance, local autonomy, and interjurisdictional synergy. Instability in the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence reflects its ongoing attempt to reconcile the tension through successive theories of federalism, each privileging different values in the federalism constellation. It traces federalism’s internal struggle through history and into the present, critiquing the Rehnquist Court and Tea Party’s embrace of greater jurisdictional separation, the limits of New and Cooperative Federalism approaches, and the growing disjuncture between federalism theory and practice. The book then outlines a Balanced Federalism alternative, mediating federalism’s tensions on three separate planes: (1) fostering balance among the competing federalism values, (2) leveraging the functional capacities of all three branches of government in interpreting federalism, and (3) maximizing the wisdom of both state and federal actors in so doing. It articulates distinct judicial and political roles in navigating jurisdictional overlap, including strong and weak judicial constraints in Tenth Amendment contexts and deference to intergovernmental bargaining. Forging new territory in the federalism safeguards debate, it provides theoretical justification for the political safeguards already in operation while preserving a role for judicial review. The resulting dynamic model fosters a healthier dialectic between the core principles and functional capacities that—though in tension—have made the American system of government so effective and enduring.Less
This book explores how constitutional interpreters struggle to reconcile the competing values that undergird American federalism, with real consequences for governance that requires local and national collaboration. Drawing examples from the response to Hurricane Katrina, climate governance, health reform, nuclear waste, and other problems that implicate both state and federal authority, it shows how federalism theory can inhibit effective multijurisdictional governance by failing to navigate the tensions within federalism itself. The book argues that American federalism is best understood through the “tug of war” between the good-governance principles that dual sovereignty fosters—including checks and balances, accountable governance, local autonomy, and interjurisdictional synergy. Instability in the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence reflects its ongoing attempt to reconcile the tension through successive theories of federalism, each privileging different values in the federalism constellation. It traces federalism’s internal struggle through history and into the present, critiquing the Rehnquist Court and Tea Party’s embrace of greater jurisdictional separation, the limits of New and Cooperative Federalism approaches, and the growing disjuncture between federalism theory and practice. The book then outlines a Balanced Federalism alternative, mediating federalism’s tensions on three separate planes: (1) fostering balance among the competing federalism values, (2) leveraging the functional capacities of all three branches of government in interpreting federalism, and (3) maximizing the wisdom of both state and federal actors in so doing. It articulates distinct judicial and political roles in navigating jurisdictional overlap, including strong and weak judicial constraints in Tenth Amendment contexts and deference to intergovernmental bargaining. Forging new territory in the federalism safeguards debate, it provides theoretical justification for the political safeguards already in operation while preserving a role for judicial review. The resulting dynamic model fosters a healthier dialectic between the core principles and functional capacities that—though in tension—have made the American system of government so effective and enduring.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226736624
- eISBN:
- 9780226736648
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226736648.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter investigates the failure of the dualist conception of federalism still dominant on the United States Supreme Court and in the halls of the academy. It outlines the dualist underpinnings ...
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This chapter investigates the failure of the dualist conception of federalism still dominant on the United States Supreme Court and in the halls of the academy. It outlines the dualist underpinnings of the current Supreme Court doctrine and the unfortunate results of the Court's dualist approach. The Court's dualist approach has narrowed the scope of both federal and state authority in important areas. The New Federalism of the Supreme Court constrains the power of the federal government. The anti-commandeering and sovereign immunity doctrines illustrate the difficulty in executing the dualist project. American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi reflects the power of a dualist approach to federalism. Constitutional federalism provides an important check on the states and the federal government colluding in promulgating national regulations. Furthermore, the process federalism, empowerment federalism, and cooperative federalism are elaborated. Cooperative federalism marks the end of dual federalism, but does not itself provide a replacement.Less
This chapter investigates the failure of the dualist conception of federalism still dominant on the United States Supreme Court and in the halls of the academy. It outlines the dualist underpinnings of the current Supreme Court doctrine and the unfortunate results of the Court's dualist approach. The Court's dualist approach has narrowed the scope of both federal and state authority in important areas. The New Federalism of the Supreme Court constrains the power of the federal government. The anti-commandeering and sovereign immunity doctrines illustrate the difficulty in executing the dualist project. American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi reflects the power of a dualist approach to federalism. Constitutional federalism provides an important check on the states and the federal government colluding in promulgating national regulations. Furthermore, the process federalism, empowerment federalism, and cooperative federalism are elaborated. Cooperative federalism marks the end of dual federalism, but does not itself provide a replacement.
Stephen Howes and M. Govinda Rao
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780198092001
- eISBN:
- 9780199082513
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198092001.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
For large countries, an agenda of economic integration, deregulation and natural resource management reform typically cannot be effectively pursued without the active participation of subnational ...
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For large countries, an agenda of economic integration, deregulation and natural resource management reform typically cannot be effectively pursued without the active participation of subnational governments. While most of the literature about federalism and reform is about the reform of federalism, this volume is about reform through federalism. It explores federal reform strategies, that is, ways in which central governments can motivate, incentivise, influence and ensure coordination of subnational policies. It covers such mechanisms as the imposition of conditions on specific-purpose grants to subnational governments, the provision of grants if certain reforms are undertaken, the development of cross-government agreements, and the centralization of power from subnational to the central government. By exploring a range of case-studies, drawn mainly from India and Australia but also covering Indonesia and China, it fills the existing gap in the literature relating to federal reform strategies. This overview provides a conceptual framework, including a typology of strategies, summarizes the case-studies, and draws out some lessons learnt.Less
For large countries, an agenda of economic integration, deregulation and natural resource management reform typically cannot be effectively pursued without the active participation of subnational governments. While most of the literature about federalism and reform is about the reform of federalism, this volume is about reform through federalism. It explores federal reform strategies, that is, ways in which central governments can motivate, incentivise, influence and ensure coordination of subnational policies. It covers such mechanisms as the imposition of conditions on specific-purpose grants to subnational governments, the provision of grants if certain reforms are undertaken, the development of cross-government agreements, and the centralization of power from subnational to the central government. By exploring a range of case-studies, drawn mainly from India and Australia but also covering Indonesia and China, it fills the existing gap in the literature relating to federal reform strategies. This overview provides a conceptual framework, including a typology of strategies, summarizes the case-studies, and draws out some lessons learnt.
Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780691202129
- eISBN:
- 9780691202136
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691202129.003.0003
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Political Economy
This chapter describes Cooperative Federalism, which replaces Economic Federalism's nationally elected president with a “council” of locally elected representatives. Again there are multiple ...
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This chapter describes Cooperative Federalism, which replaces Economic Federalism's nationally elected president with a “council” of locally elected representatives. Again there are multiple provincial and local governments with important, possibly concurrent, policy responsibilities and revenues, but now national goods, services, and regulations are the responsibility of a locally elected national council. To ensure that each city's, state's, or nation's preferences are accommodated, Cooperative Federalism imposes a supermajority, often unanimity, voting rule. The resulting governments are known as confederal when representation is by geography, or consociational when representation is allowed more generally—say, from ethnic, religious, or economic groups. The primary virtue of Cooperative Federalism is its potential to protect the interests of minorities from Economic Federalism's tyranny of a majority under presidential governance. Since the stakes for minority citizens are potentially so high and the influence of each elected representative to the national council so decisive, democratic participation may be encouraged. It is on the dimension of economic efficiency in the provision of national goods and regulations that Cooperative Federalism is likely to fall short.Less
This chapter describes Cooperative Federalism, which replaces Economic Federalism's nationally elected president with a “council” of locally elected representatives. Again there are multiple provincial and local governments with important, possibly concurrent, policy responsibilities and revenues, but now national goods, services, and regulations are the responsibility of a locally elected national council. To ensure that each city's, state's, or nation's preferences are accommodated, Cooperative Federalism imposes a supermajority, often unanimity, voting rule. The resulting governments are known as confederal when representation is by geography, or consociational when representation is allowed more generally—say, from ethnic, religious, or economic groups. The primary virtue of Cooperative Federalism is its potential to protect the interests of minorities from Economic Federalism's tyranny of a majority under presidential governance. Since the stakes for minority citizens are potentially so high and the influence of each elected representative to the national council so decisive, democratic participation may be encouraged. It is on the dimension of economic efficiency in the provision of national goods and regulations that Cooperative Federalism is likely to fall short.
Arthur B. Gunlicks
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- July 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780719065323
- eISBN:
- 9781781700464
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719065323.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The most commonly cited characteristic of American federalism is ‘dual federalism’. This refers to constitutionally delegated powers for the federal government and reserve powers for the states, with ...
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The most commonly cited characteristic of American federalism is ‘dual federalism’. This refers to constitutionally delegated powers for the federal government and reserve powers for the states, with each level administering its own policies. In case of conflict, federal law is supreme so long as the federal government is authorised to act by the constitution. In Germany, federalism is also sometimes described by German scholars as ‘dual federalism’, but sometimes this means the same as above (Trennsystem) and at other times something quite different. That is, it often means ‘dualism’ in the sense that the federal level is responsible for passing most legislation, and the Länder for implementing this legislation on their own responsibility, usually with only legal supervision by the federation. This chapter discusses several types of German federalism, including functional federalism, cooperative federalism, participatory federalism, executive federalism, administrative federalism, unitary federalism and competitive federalism. It also examines the characteristics of German federalism and their implications for German politics, finally addressing some of the challenges confronting the German model of federalism.Less
The most commonly cited characteristic of American federalism is ‘dual federalism’. This refers to constitutionally delegated powers for the federal government and reserve powers for the states, with each level administering its own policies. In case of conflict, federal law is supreme so long as the federal government is authorised to act by the constitution. In Germany, federalism is also sometimes described by German scholars as ‘dual federalism’, but sometimes this means the same as above (Trennsystem) and at other times something quite different. That is, it often means ‘dualism’ in the sense that the federal level is responsible for passing most legislation, and the Länder for implementing this legislation on their own responsibility, usually with only legal supervision by the federation. This chapter discusses several types of German federalism, including functional federalism, cooperative federalism, participatory federalism, executive federalism, administrative federalism, unitary federalism and competitive federalism. It also examines the characteristics of German federalism and their implications for German politics, finally addressing some of the challenges confronting the German model of federalism.
Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780691202129
- eISBN:
- 9780691202136
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691202129.003.0011
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Political Economy
This epilogue addresses the question of who should be federal. While there is much to recommend it, Democratic Federalism may not be for everyone. Any new nation-state seeks to do what smaller and ...
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This epilogue addresses the question of who should be federal. While there is much to recommend it, Democratic Federalism may not be for everyone. Any new nation-state seeks to do what smaller and spatially diffuse communities cannot: provide for mutually beneficial public goods, most notably collective security; control intercommunity spillovers; and enforce the rules needed for wider market exchange. Each new state must choose how best to run its affairs. Whether designed as Economic or Cooperative or Democratic Federalism, federal governance is one alternative. But so is a single, unitary government, or perhaps even to remain as separately governed jurisdictions and then manage shared interests by bilateral agreements. There are strengths and weaknesses to each form of governance. While numerous “fundamentals” will be important to the choice of governance—technology, geography, language, ethnicity—the chapter suggests two attributes that may be the most important: heterogeneity of tastes for government services and a willingness to compromise when there is disagreement. Democratic Federalism will be most appropriate for that middle ground where tastes are different but compromise still possible.Less
This epilogue addresses the question of who should be federal. While there is much to recommend it, Democratic Federalism may not be for everyone. Any new nation-state seeks to do what smaller and spatially diffuse communities cannot: provide for mutually beneficial public goods, most notably collective security; control intercommunity spillovers; and enforce the rules needed for wider market exchange. Each new state must choose how best to run its affairs. Whether designed as Economic or Cooperative or Democratic Federalism, federal governance is one alternative. But so is a single, unitary government, or perhaps even to remain as separately governed jurisdictions and then manage shared interests by bilateral agreements. There are strengths and weaknesses to each form of governance. While numerous “fundamentals” will be important to the choice of governance—technology, geography, language, ethnicity—the chapter suggests two attributes that may be the most important: heterogeneity of tastes for government services and a willingness to compromise when there is disagreement. Democratic Federalism will be most appropriate for that middle ground where tastes are different but compromise still possible.
Chad J. McGuire
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199368747
- eISBN:
- 9780199368761
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199368747.003.0020
- Subject:
- Law, Environmental and Energy Law, Public International Law
This chapter focuses on the role of federalism in creating adaptation strategies along the coast. Emphasis is placed on the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) and its role as the primary federal ...
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This chapter focuses on the role of federalism in creating adaptation strategies along the coast. Emphasis is placed on the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) and its role as the primary federal planning statute that outlines the rights and responsibilities between coastal states and the federal government. Examples are used to highlight difficulties in fully implementing climate change adaptation strategies through the CZMA, particularly when coastal state and federal government interests diverge. The chapter concludes by highlighting suggestions to overcome federalism issues when they interfere with climate change adaptation strategies, and further identifies ways in which cooperative federalism can help achieve meaningful and proactive adaptation strategies along the coast.Less
This chapter focuses on the role of federalism in creating adaptation strategies along the coast. Emphasis is placed on the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) and its role as the primary federal planning statute that outlines the rights and responsibilities between coastal states and the federal government. Examples are used to highlight difficulties in fully implementing climate change adaptation strategies through the CZMA, particularly when coastal state and federal government interests diverge. The chapter concludes by highlighting suggestions to overcome federalism issues when they interfere with climate change adaptation strategies, and further identifies ways in which cooperative federalism can help achieve meaningful and proactive adaptation strategies along the coast.
Ben Merriman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780226620282
- eISBN:
- 9780226620459
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226620459.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Conservative state-level executive officeholders devised a remarkably successful resistance to key Obama administration policies. This chapter describes the basic goals and commitments of those ...
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Conservative state-level executive officeholders devised a remarkably successful resistance to key Obama administration policies. This chapter describes the basic goals and commitments of those officials, as well as deeper historical processes that enabled their success. The officials studied in this book endorse familiar conservative goals: low taxation, limited regulation, and increased state control of policy. They pursued those goals through an innovative, improvisational combination of administrative and legal behaviors. Several circumstances made this possible. First, the long-term development of a cooperative model of federalism drove enormous growth in the relative power of state executive branches. Second, shifting judicial doctrines have increased scrutiny of the federal administrative state, and made it easier for states to sue the federal executive. Third, ideological and geographic polarization produced persistent single party control of most state governments, but routinely divided national government. Under these conditions, the Obama administration’s turn toward a unilateral, executive model of policymaking after the Tea Party mobilization left its major policies highly vulnerable to concerted state opposition. State executives could take an uncooperative stance in implementation or invoke a wide range of legal objections. Conservative ideological convergence and expanded state executive power, coupled with a galvanizing national opponent, simplified multistate cooperation.Less
Conservative state-level executive officeholders devised a remarkably successful resistance to key Obama administration policies. This chapter describes the basic goals and commitments of those officials, as well as deeper historical processes that enabled their success. The officials studied in this book endorse familiar conservative goals: low taxation, limited regulation, and increased state control of policy. They pursued those goals through an innovative, improvisational combination of administrative and legal behaviors. Several circumstances made this possible. First, the long-term development of a cooperative model of federalism drove enormous growth in the relative power of state executive branches. Second, shifting judicial doctrines have increased scrutiny of the federal administrative state, and made it easier for states to sue the federal executive. Third, ideological and geographic polarization produced persistent single party control of most state governments, but routinely divided national government. Under these conditions, the Obama administration’s turn toward a unilateral, executive model of policymaking after the Tea Party mobilization left its major policies highly vulnerable to concerted state opposition. State executives could take an uncooperative stance in implementation or invoke a wide range of legal objections. Conservative ideological convergence and expanded state executive power, coupled with a galvanizing national opponent, simplified multistate cooperation.
K. Sujatha Rao
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- February 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199469543
- eISBN:
- 9780199087617
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199469543.003.0006
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health
Four areas have been identified for immediate policy attention: a) decentralization and cooperative federalism, b) revamping of the delivery system, c) strengthening of the people’s sector, and d) ...
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Four areas have been identified for immediate policy attention: a) decentralization and cooperative federalism, b) revamping of the delivery system, c) strengthening of the people’s sector, and d) use of technology. Decentralization and cooperative federalism need to be accompanied with consensus-building on national health goals that all states are committed to and central funding to the poorer states for bridging the gap in supply. Likewise, the three-tier primary healthcare setup needs to be revamped with the capacity to provide primary healthcare services in a comprehensive manner. Strengthening public sector presence in the secondary and tertiary markets, people’s participation, and increased use of technology are vital for building a sustainable health system.Less
Four areas have been identified for immediate policy attention: a) decentralization and cooperative federalism, b) revamping of the delivery system, c) strengthening of the people’s sector, and d) use of technology. Decentralization and cooperative federalism need to be accompanied with consensus-building on national health goals that all states are committed to and central funding to the poorer states for bridging the gap in supply. Likewise, the three-tier primary healthcare setup needs to be revamped with the capacity to provide primary healthcare services in a comprehensive manner. Strengthening public sector presence in the secondary and tertiary markets, people’s participation, and increased use of technology are vital for building a sustainable health system.