Heinrich Parthey
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195062526
- eISBN:
- 9780199854905
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195062526.003.0015
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Public Management
In order to establish the correlation between interdisciplinary approach and cooperation, the authors devised a questionnaire and sent a copy to three educational organizations. Collaborative and ...
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In order to establish the correlation between interdisciplinary approach and cooperation, the authors devised a questionnaire and sent a copy to three educational organizations. Collaborative and cross-departmental behaviors are captured through the proportion of scientists whose methods came from scientific inquiries as opposed to those whose approaches came from the problem statement. Findings indicate that association is present with interdisciplinary study and co-authorship and cooperative manifestations. Although there are dilemmas in the identification of problems and the appropriate strategies to employ, these attempts result in the evaluation of research programs and in the resolution of field concerns. Also, the significance of an investigator's competence and knowledge, as well as that person's working relationship with others (not only participants, but also other researchers), is recognized.Less
In order to establish the correlation between interdisciplinary approach and cooperation, the authors devised a questionnaire and sent a copy to three educational organizations. Collaborative and cross-departmental behaviors are captured through the proportion of scientists whose methods came from scientific inquiries as opposed to those whose approaches came from the problem statement. Findings indicate that association is present with interdisciplinary study and co-authorship and cooperative manifestations. Although there are dilemmas in the identification of problems and the appropriate strategies to employ, these attempts result in the evaluation of research programs and in the resolution of field concerns. Also, the significance of an investigator's competence and knowledge, as well as that person's working relationship with others (not only participants, but also other researchers), is recognized.
Michael S. Alvard
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199262052
- eISBN:
- 9780191601637
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199262055.003.0014
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
The Ultimatum Game was played with a group of traditional big game hunters: the Lamalera whalers of Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, whose community is described in the first section of the chapter. The ...
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The Ultimatum Game was played with a group of traditional big game hunters: the Lamalera whalers of Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, whose community is described in the first section of the chapter. The methods used for the study are then outlined and the results presented and discussed. The results were consistent in some ways with those from trials in western societies, with the primary difference that there were a number of cases of hyper‐fairness: one interpretation offered of these cases is that the whale hunters made strategic decisions when they made fair offers, but other explanations are also examined on the basis of the results of various cross‐cultural studies (including those in this book). These focus on the rejection of both fair and hyper‐fair offers in the Ultimatum Game (which have been interpreted as indicating an unwillingness to punish), and the issue of the variance seen in the cross‐cultural sample in this book in relation to fairness, for which strategic risk reduction is one explanation, but reputation effects are another, and the best model incorporates market integration and payoff to cooperation. The final section of the chapter discusses evolutionary theory and adaptive responses in relation to human cooperative behaviour.Less
The Ultimatum Game was played with a group of traditional big game hunters: the Lamalera whalers of Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, whose community is described in the first section of the chapter. The methods used for the study are then outlined and the results presented and discussed. The results were consistent in some ways with those from trials in western societies, with the primary difference that there were a number of cases of hyper‐fairness: one interpretation offered of these cases is that the whale hunters made strategic decisions when they made fair offers, but other explanations are also examined on the basis of the results of various cross‐cultural studies (including those in this book). These focus on the rejection of both fair and hyper‐fair offers in the Ultimatum Game (which have been interpreted as indicating an unwillingness to punish), and the issue of the variance seen in the cross‐cultural sample in this book in relation to fairness, for which strategic risk reduction is one explanation, but reputation effects are another, and the best model incorporates market integration and payoff to cooperation. The final section of the chapter discusses evolutionary theory and adaptive responses in relation to human cooperative behaviour.
Lee Cronk and Beth L. Leech
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154954
- eISBN:
- 9781400845484
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154954.001.0001
- Subject:
- Sociology, Comparative and Historical Sociology
From the family to the workplace to the marketplace, every facet of our lives is shaped by cooperative interactions. Yet everywhere we look, we are confronted by proof of how difficult cooperation ...
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From the family to the workplace to the marketplace, every facet of our lives is shaped by cooperative interactions. Yet everywhere we look, we are confronted by proof of how difficult cooperation can be—snarled traffic, polarized politics, overexploited resources, social problems that go ignored. The benefits to oneself of a free ride on the efforts of others mean that collective goals often are not met. But compared to most other species, people actually cooperate a great deal. Why is this? This book brings together insights from evolutionary biology, political science, economics, anthropology, and other fields to explain how the interactions between our evolved selves and the institutional structures we have created make cooperation possible. The book begins with a look at the ideas of Mancur Olson and George C. Williams, who shifted the question of why cooperation happens from an emphasis on group benefits to individual costs. It then explores how these ideas have influenced our thinking about cooperation, coordination, and collective action. It persuasively argues that cooperation and its failures are best explained by evolutionary and social theories working together. Selection sometimes favors cooperative tendencies, while institutions, norms, and incentives encourage and make possible actual cooperation. This book should inspire researchers from different disciplines and intellectual traditions to share ideas and advance our understanding of cooperative behavior in a world that is more complex than ever before.Less
From the family to the workplace to the marketplace, every facet of our lives is shaped by cooperative interactions. Yet everywhere we look, we are confronted by proof of how difficult cooperation can be—snarled traffic, polarized politics, overexploited resources, social problems that go ignored. The benefits to oneself of a free ride on the efforts of others mean that collective goals often are not met. But compared to most other species, people actually cooperate a great deal. Why is this? This book brings together insights from evolutionary biology, political science, economics, anthropology, and other fields to explain how the interactions between our evolved selves and the institutional structures we have created make cooperation possible. The book begins with a look at the ideas of Mancur Olson and George C. Williams, who shifted the question of why cooperation happens from an emphasis on group benefits to individual costs. It then explores how these ideas have influenced our thinking about cooperation, coordination, and collective action. It persuasively argues that cooperation and its failures are best explained by evolutionary and social theories working together. Selection sometimes favors cooperative tendencies, while institutions, norms, and incentives encourage and make possible actual cooperation. This book should inspire researchers from different disciplines and intellectual traditions to share ideas and advance our understanding of cooperative behavior in a world that is more complex than ever before.
Cristiano Antonelli
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296041
- eISBN:
- 9780191596070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296045.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Argues that localized technological change cannot be seen in isolation from national systems of innovation and the firm itself. It is shown how the often‐misunderstood role of standards as economic ...
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Argues that localized technological change cannot be seen in isolation from national systems of innovation and the firm itself. It is shown how the often‐misunderstood role of standards as economic institutions plays an important part in the dynamics of technological change. Far from being only something of a public good, the adoption of standards poses a dilemma for an individual firm: should it stick to the local, monopolistic position built on proprietary knowledge or should it adhere to standards for better dissemination? There is also a cost for the firm associated with adopting standards. The author incorporates the emergence of standards into a formal model of a standardization club with both switching costs and network externalities, which then yields incentives for cooperative behaviour among firms for the adoption of standards.Less
Argues that localized technological change cannot be seen in isolation from national systems of innovation and the firm itself. It is shown how the often‐misunderstood role of standards as economic institutions plays an important part in the dynamics of technological change. Far from being only something of a public good, the adoption of standards poses a dilemma for an individual firm: should it stick to the local, monopolistic position built on proprietary knowledge or should it adhere to standards for better dissemination? There is also a cost for the firm associated with adopting standards. The author incorporates the emergence of standards into a formal model of a standardization club with both switching costs and network externalities, which then yields incentives for cooperative behaviour among firms for the adoption of standards.
Jean‐Marie Baland and Jean‐Philippe Platteau
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198290612
- eISBN:
- 9780191601613
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198290616.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter analyses the pessimistic view implied by the ‘tragedy of commons’, that uncoordinated human behaviour leads to the destruction of the commons. It identifies the limitations of Ronald ...
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This chapter analyses the pessimistic view implied by the ‘tragedy of commons’, that uncoordinated human behaviour leads to the destruction of the commons. It identifies the limitations of Ronald Coase’s theory that agents may get involved in voluntary exchanges of their rights to impose externalities on the others. The possibility of spontaneous cooperative behaviour in a strategic framework is examined based on recent developments in non-cooperative game theory. It is argued that many of the problems encountered in unregulated common property are problems of coordination and leadership, thus not adequately represented by the prisoner’s dilemma.Less
This chapter analyses the pessimistic view implied by the ‘tragedy of commons’, that uncoordinated human behaviour leads to the destruction of the commons. It identifies the limitations of Ronald Coase’s theory that agents may get involved in voluntary exchanges of their rights to impose externalities on the others. The possibility of spontaneous cooperative behaviour in a strategic framework is examined based on recent developments in non-cooperative game theory. It is argued that many of the problems encountered in unregulated common property are problems of coordination and leadership, thus not adequately represented by the prisoner’s dilemma.
Didier Sornette
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780691175959
- eISBN:
- 9781400885091
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691175959.003.0004
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Finance, Accounting, and Banking
This chapter examines the main mechanisms leading to positive feedbacks, that is, self-reinforcement, such as imitative behavior and herding between investors. It shows that positive feedbacks ...
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This chapter examines the main mechanisms leading to positive feedbacks, that is, self-reinforcement, such as imitative behavior and herding between investors. It shows that positive feedbacks contribute to the development of speculative bubbles, preparing the instability for a major crash. After providing an overview of feedbacks and self-organization in economics, the chapter explains how positive feedback on prices can arise due to hedging of derivatives and investment strategies with an “insurance portfolio.” It then describes a general mechanism for positive feedback, known as the “herd” or “crowd” effect, based on imitation processes. It also presents empirical evidence of herding by financial analysts and the relationship between “anti-imitation” and self-organization before concluding with an analysis of cooperative behaviors resulting from imitation, focusing on the Ising model of cooperative behavior and the complex evolutionary adaptive systems of boundedly rational agents.Less
This chapter examines the main mechanisms leading to positive feedbacks, that is, self-reinforcement, such as imitative behavior and herding between investors. It shows that positive feedbacks contribute to the development of speculative bubbles, preparing the instability for a major crash. After providing an overview of feedbacks and self-organization in economics, the chapter explains how positive feedback on prices can arise due to hedging of derivatives and investment strategies with an “insurance portfolio.” It then describes a general mechanism for positive feedback, known as the “herd” or “crowd” effect, based on imitation processes. It also presents empirical evidence of herding by financial analysts and the relationship between “anti-imitation” and self-organization before concluding with an analysis of cooperative behaviors resulting from imitation, focusing on the Ising model of cooperative behavior and the complex evolutionary adaptive systems of boundedly rational agents.
Raymond Pierotti and Brandy R. Fogg
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780300226164
- eISBN:
- 9780300231670
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300226164.003.0003
- Subject:
- Environmental Science, Nature
This chapter reviews the study of cooperative behavior between species, with emphasis on examples of cooperative hunting found in a wide range of species. Seen in this context, the idea of ...
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This chapter reviews the study of cooperative behavior between species, with emphasis on examples of cooperative hunting found in a wide range of species. Seen in this context, the idea of cooperative hunting between humans and wolves that evolved into present relationships with dogs does not seem unusual or surprising. The chapter then critiques the proposal that competition between species is more important than cooperation in structuring ecological communities, discussing how this notion leads to a suite of ideas philosophically separating humans from the rest of the natural world. In many ways Western science is unintentionally complicit in such thinking. The chapter concludes by discussing complex cooperation, including long-term relationships between members of different species.Less
This chapter reviews the study of cooperative behavior between species, with emphasis on examples of cooperative hunting found in a wide range of species. Seen in this context, the idea of cooperative hunting between humans and wolves that evolved into present relationships with dogs does not seem unusual or surprising. The chapter then critiques the proposal that competition between species is more important than cooperation in structuring ecological communities, discussing how this notion leads to a suite of ideas philosophically separating humans from the rest of the natural world. In many ways Western science is unintentionally complicit in such thinking. The chapter concludes by discussing complex cooperation, including long-term relationships between members of different species.
HORACE BARLOW
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198524144
- eISBN:
- 9780191689147
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524144.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The ability to communicate fluently with others is surely the direct and obvious result of humans being conscious. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first explains how far one can get in ...
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The ability to communicate fluently with others is surely the direct and obvious result of humans being conscious. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first explains how far one can get in explaining subjective experience in terms of neuronal activity, and why this approach must ultimately be abandoned. The second is on what consciousness does. This section is formed around two reports. The first points out that the success of the human species depends largely on the unique pattern of humans’ cooperative behaviour, while the second suggests that this depends upon what people call consciousness. Finally, the third section compares the characteristics of consciousness that would be expected if it had evolved to expand social communication with its ‘particulars’, as described by William James and others.Less
The ability to communicate fluently with others is surely the direct and obvious result of humans being conscious. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first explains how far one can get in explaining subjective experience in terms of neuronal activity, and why this approach must ultimately be abandoned. The second is on what consciousness does. This section is formed around two reports. The first points out that the success of the human species depends largely on the unique pattern of humans’ cooperative behaviour, while the second suggests that this depends upon what people call consciousness. Finally, the third section compares the characteristics of consciousness that would be expected if it had evolved to expand social communication with its ‘particulars’, as described by William James and others.
John C. Norcross (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199737208
- eISBN:
- 9780199894635
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737208.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Clinical Psychology
The second edition of this book identifies effective elements of therapy relationships (what works in general) as well as effective methods of tailoring or adapting therapy to the individual patient ...
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The second edition of this book identifies effective elements of therapy relationships (what works in general) as well as effective methods of tailoring or adapting therapy to the individual patient (what works in particular). Each chapter features a specific therapist behavior (e.g., alliance, empathy, support, collecting feedback) that demonstrably improves treatment outcomes or a nondiagnostic patient characteristic (e.g., reactance, preferences, culture, attachment style) by which to effectively tailor psychotherapy. Each chapter presents operational definitions, clinical examples, comprehensive meta-analyses, moderator analyses, and research-supported therapeutic practices. New chapters in this book deal with the alliance with children and adolescents, the alliance in couples and family therapy, and collecting real-time feedback from clients; more ways to tailor treatment; and adapting treatments to patient preferences, culture, attachment style, and religion/spirituality.Less
The second edition of this book identifies effective elements of therapy relationships (what works in general) as well as effective methods of tailoring or adapting therapy to the individual patient (what works in particular). Each chapter features a specific therapist behavior (e.g., alliance, empathy, support, collecting feedback) that demonstrably improves treatment outcomes or a nondiagnostic patient characteristic (e.g., reactance, preferences, culture, attachment style) by which to effectively tailor psychotherapy. Each chapter presents operational definitions, clinical examples, comprehensive meta-analyses, moderator analyses, and research-supported therapeutic practices. New chapters in this book deal with the alliance with children and adolescents, the alliance in couples and family therapy, and collecting real-time feedback from clients; more ways to tailor treatment; and adapting treatments to patient preferences, culture, attachment style, and religion/spirituality.
George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, and Peter L. Lindseth (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198298922
- eISBN:
- 9780191685545
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198298922.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
International regulatory relations have commonly been viewed through the prism of international organizations on the one hand, and international trade disputes on the other. However, neither of these ...
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International regulatory relations have commonly been viewed through the prism of international organizations on the one hand, and international trade disputes on the other. However, neither of these perspectives offer an adequate understanding of the ways in which international regulatory relations are managed or may be managed more effectively. While one risks overstating the readiness of states to cede regulatory authority to international institutions, the other risks ignoring the reality of and prospects for cooperative behavior. Transatlantic regulatory cooperation comprises a highly differentiated ‘bundle’ of techniques for reconciling the needs of international trade with the diversity of national regulatory environments and public demands. The processes involved are still poorly understood, due partly to the fact that they have been very largely improvisational, with the result that the framework of regulatory cooperation is still very much a work in progress. Moreover, the main protagonists in this arena – the US and EU – have their own well-established domestic regulatory processes with which international initiatives may not readily be integrated, either in terms of values or institutions. While focusing on illustrative sectoral examples of transatlantic regulatory cooperation, this book thus also explores the more general challenge of accommodating regulatory cooperation with domestic legal and political institutions. The volume closes by calling attention to inescapable legitimacy questions (e.g. reconciliation with principles of democracy and demands for public accountability), and by exploring certain strategic directions and institutional implications for the future.Less
International regulatory relations have commonly been viewed through the prism of international organizations on the one hand, and international trade disputes on the other. However, neither of these perspectives offer an adequate understanding of the ways in which international regulatory relations are managed or may be managed more effectively. While one risks overstating the readiness of states to cede regulatory authority to international institutions, the other risks ignoring the reality of and prospects for cooperative behavior. Transatlantic regulatory cooperation comprises a highly differentiated ‘bundle’ of techniques for reconciling the needs of international trade with the diversity of national regulatory environments and public demands. The processes involved are still poorly understood, due partly to the fact that they have been very largely improvisational, with the result that the framework of regulatory cooperation is still very much a work in progress. Moreover, the main protagonists in this arena – the US and EU – have their own well-established domestic regulatory processes with which international initiatives may not readily be integrated, either in terms of values or institutions. While focusing on illustrative sectoral examples of transatlantic regulatory cooperation, this book thus also explores the more general challenge of accommodating regulatory cooperation with domestic legal and political institutions. The volume closes by calling attention to inescapable legitimacy questions (e.g. reconciliation with principles of democracy and demands for public accountability), and by exploring certain strategic directions and institutional implications for the future.
Louis Putterman
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199300730
- eISBN:
- 9780190221041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300730.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Recent years have seen a large outpouring of research by economists on the role of punishment in supporting voluntary collective action. This research parallels increased interest within biology and ...
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Recent years have seen a large outpouring of research by economists on the role of punishment in supporting voluntary collective action. This research parallels increased interest within biology and psychology about the role that propensities to engage in punishment may have played in the evolution of cooperative behaviors. Following the initial demonstration that opportunities to punish dramatically altered well-known stylized results in voluntary contribution experiments without punishment, research focused on a number of topics including (a) the impact of punishment on efficiency, as opposed to its impact on cooperative decisions per se; (b) how punishment’s cost affects its efficacy; (c) the extent to which punishment is strategically motivated; (d) what explains “misdirected” punishment; (e) the impact of opportunities to engage in counter-punishment and in other punishment of higher order; and (f) the circumstances under which subjects opt to allow punishment to be given. This chapter discusses all of these issues, but focuses more on (d)—(f) in which many of the investigations are more recent.Less
Recent years have seen a large outpouring of research by economists on the role of punishment in supporting voluntary collective action. This research parallels increased interest within biology and psychology about the role that propensities to engage in punishment may have played in the evolution of cooperative behaviors. Following the initial demonstration that opportunities to punish dramatically altered well-known stylized results in voluntary contribution experiments without punishment, research focused on a number of topics including (a) the impact of punishment on efficiency, as opposed to its impact on cooperative decisions per se; (b) how punishment’s cost affects its efficacy; (c) the extent to which punishment is strategically motivated; (d) what explains “misdirected” punishment; (e) the impact of opportunities to engage in counter-punishment and in other punishment of higher order; and (f) the circumstances under which subjects opt to allow punishment to be given. This chapter discusses all of these issues, but focuses more on (d)—(f) in which many of the investigations are more recent.
David A. Hamburg and Beatrix A. Hamburg
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780195157796
- eISBN:
- 9780197561980
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780195157796.003.0012
- Subject:
- Education, Educational Policy and Politics
If groups are strange to each other and therefore fearful or hostile, why not bring them together so they can get to know each other and become friendly? This ...
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If groups are strange to each other and therefore fearful or hostile, why not bring them together so they can get to know each other and become friendly? This plausible approach is more complicated than it looks at first glance. Under what conditions will intergroup contact be helpful? Can it sometimes be harmful? A variety of field and laboratory experiments support the hypothesis that intergroup competition tends to strengthen social relations within each group and to disrupt relations between the groups. If the experiments are arranged in a way that deliberately fosters competition between the groups, these effects are heightened. But even in the absence of such direct instruction or arrangement, potent factors favor interpersonal attraction or mutual attachment within a group: frequency of social interaction, proximity to each other, familiarity, and similarity of attitudes and values. Almost any sort of interaction within a group tends to promote in-group favoritism. Actually, it seems rather difficult to avoid this effect even if one tries to do so. Humans are highly susceptible to invidious in-group/out-group distinctions. Extensive experimental work strongly confirms the rich variety of observations from fieldwork in many cultures over extended times and in a variety of societies. This does indeed seem to be a profound and pervasive human characteristic—one of great practical significance throughout history. We will return to this theme and examples throughout the book. Findings of this sort have led some psychologists to formulate a principle of social identity, which emphasizes the powerful effects of social categorization in its own right. Such categorization seems to highlight an important aspect of the individual self-concept (and self-esteem) based on group membership. Such membership has, from the evolutionary and historical record, been an important feature in human survival over the millennia. In contemporary people—at least, in those who participate in psychological experiments—the cognitive delineation into an in-group and out-group, even without invidious attributions, tends to set in motion a process by which there is an accentuation of similarities within groups and differences between groups. It seems very convenient, easy, and somehow natural for people to deal with these via simple schemas or stereotypes.
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If groups are strange to each other and therefore fearful or hostile, why not bring them together so they can get to know each other and become friendly? This plausible approach is more complicated than it looks at first glance. Under what conditions will intergroup contact be helpful? Can it sometimes be harmful? A variety of field and laboratory experiments support the hypothesis that intergroup competition tends to strengthen social relations within each group and to disrupt relations between the groups. If the experiments are arranged in a way that deliberately fosters competition between the groups, these effects are heightened. But even in the absence of such direct instruction or arrangement, potent factors favor interpersonal attraction or mutual attachment within a group: frequency of social interaction, proximity to each other, familiarity, and similarity of attitudes and values. Almost any sort of interaction within a group tends to promote in-group favoritism. Actually, it seems rather difficult to avoid this effect even if one tries to do so. Humans are highly susceptible to invidious in-group/out-group distinctions. Extensive experimental work strongly confirms the rich variety of observations from fieldwork in many cultures over extended times and in a variety of societies. This does indeed seem to be a profound and pervasive human characteristic—one of great practical significance throughout history. We will return to this theme and examples throughout the book. Findings of this sort have led some psychologists to formulate a principle of social identity, which emphasizes the powerful effects of social categorization in its own right. Such categorization seems to highlight an important aspect of the individual self-concept (and self-esteem) based on group membership. Such membership has, from the evolutionary and historical record, been an important feature in human survival over the millennia. In contemporary people—at least, in those who participate in psychological experiments—the cognitive delineation into an in-group and out-group, even without invidious attributions, tends to set in motion a process by which there is an accentuation of similarities within groups and differences between groups. It seems very convenient, easy, and somehow natural for people to deal with these via simple schemas or stereotypes.
Anthony Trewavas
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199539543
- eISBN:
- 9780191788291
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539543.003.0018
- Subject:
- Biology, Plant Sciences and Forestry
Although it is common to find competition for mates in many animal species, similar competitive capabilities are rarely recognised in plants. However competition for the fittest mates in plants ...
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Although it is common to find competition for mates in many animal species, similar competitive capabilities are rarely recognised in plants. However competition for the fittest mates in plants occurs through a variety of discriminating chemical and developmental mechanisms, notably pollen competition to first enter the ovary, to self/non-self-incompatibility mechanisms and others. Potential cooperative behaviour between plant species has been observed in which pairs of species seem to prefer to grow adjacent to each other. The use of volatiles in cooperatively helping protect neighbours against herbivore attack has been reported. Competition for space between trees occurs particularly with close neighbours and leads to crown asymmetry. The strong indications are that crown asymmetry is adaptive behaviour and thus can be regarded as intelligent behaviour. Root systems in a number of species have been shown to have the unusual properties of self-recognition. It is thought that self-recognition operates through physiological coordination. Recognising one’s self is of value in that with a plastically developing plant, self-competition amongst growing roots is reduced and internal resources saved.Less
Although it is common to find competition for mates in many animal species, similar competitive capabilities are rarely recognised in plants. However competition for the fittest mates in plants occurs through a variety of discriminating chemical and developmental mechanisms, notably pollen competition to first enter the ovary, to self/non-self-incompatibility mechanisms and others. Potential cooperative behaviour between plant species has been observed in which pairs of species seem to prefer to grow adjacent to each other. The use of volatiles in cooperatively helping protect neighbours against herbivore attack has been reported. Competition for space between trees occurs particularly with close neighbours and leads to crown asymmetry. The strong indications are that crown asymmetry is adaptive behaviour and thus can be regarded as intelligent behaviour. Root systems in a number of species have been shown to have the unusual properties of self-recognition. It is thought that self-recognition operates through physiological coordination. Recognising one’s self is of value in that with a plastically developing plant, self-competition amongst growing roots is reduced and internal resources saved.
David A. Hamburg and Beatrix A. Hamburg
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780195157796
- eISBN:
- 9780197561980
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780195157796.003.0007
- Subject:
- Education, Educational Policy and Politics
In the past several decades, the study of the behavior of nonhuman primates—monkeys and apes—has made rapid progress. We can learn from the dimly perceived past when ...
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In the past several decades, the study of the behavior of nonhuman primates—monkeys and apes—has made rapid progress. We can learn from the dimly perceived past when our ancestors confronted the problems of survival without the sophisticated technological aids so inextricably linked to human adaptation in recent times. Our past is inaccessible to direct study. But by careful observation of our closest living relatives, monkeys and apes, we can begin to understand the nonhuman primate heritage from which our ancient ancestors took a long route over millions of years toward humanity. Nonhuman primates live in groups that are held together by strong and enduring bonds between individuals. These bonds may be reflected in a variety of ways: relationships between adult males and females, between adults of the same sex, between juveniles, and between adult males or females and their young. Altogether, in their natural habitats they have a rich social life. Compared with most other mammals, primates have fewer young at a time. Rather than litters, all Old World monkeys and apes have only one offspring at a time, and they give each one a great deal of attention. The young have longer periods of immaturity than other mammals, including prolonged nutritional dependence on the mother. A corollary of the prolonged physical immaturity and nutritional dependence of the primate infant is a longer and more intense mother- infant relationship and a longer period of tutelage and learning the customs and survival skills of the group. In all higher primates except humans, infants cling reflexively to their mothers from birth, and mother-infant contact is maintained virtually all of the time until the much older infant develops the ability to keep up with the mother on its own. Nursing occurs in many short bouts around the clock; in early infancy, it is initiated and terminated by the infant, an easy process, because the infant is always clinging to the mother’s body, anyway. This combination of clinging, carrying, continuous contact, and frequent nursing is characteristic of all higher nonhuman primates.
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In the past several decades, the study of the behavior of nonhuman primates—monkeys and apes—has made rapid progress. We can learn from the dimly perceived past when our ancestors confronted the problems of survival without the sophisticated technological aids so inextricably linked to human adaptation in recent times. Our past is inaccessible to direct study. But by careful observation of our closest living relatives, monkeys and apes, we can begin to understand the nonhuman primate heritage from which our ancient ancestors took a long route over millions of years toward humanity. Nonhuman primates live in groups that are held together by strong and enduring bonds between individuals. These bonds may be reflected in a variety of ways: relationships between adult males and females, between adults of the same sex, between juveniles, and between adult males or females and their young. Altogether, in their natural habitats they have a rich social life. Compared with most other mammals, primates have fewer young at a time. Rather than litters, all Old World monkeys and apes have only one offspring at a time, and they give each one a great deal of attention. The young have longer periods of immaturity than other mammals, including prolonged nutritional dependence on the mother. A corollary of the prolonged physical immaturity and nutritional dependence of the primate infant is a longer and more intense mother- infant relationship and a longer period of tutelage and learning the customs and survival skills of the group. In all higher primates except humans, infants cling reflexively to their mothers from birth, and mother-infant contact is maintained virtually all of the time until the much older infant develops the ability to keep up with the mother on its own. Nursing occurs in many short bouts around the clock; in early infancy, it is initiated and terminated by the infant, an easy process, because the infant is always clinging to the mother’s body, anyway. This combination of clinging, carrying, continuous contact, and frequent nursing is characteristic of all higher nonhuman primates.