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In order to establish the correlation between interdisciplinary approach and cooperation, the authors devised a questionnaire and sent a copy to three educational organizations. Collaborative and cross-departmental behaviors are captured through the proportion of scientists whose methods came from scientific inquiries as opposed to those whose approaches came from the problem statement. Findings indicate that association is present with interdisciplinary study and co-authorship and cooperative manifestations. Although there are dilemmas in the identification of problems and the appropriate strategies to employ, these attempts result in the evaluation of research programs and in the resolution of field concerns. Also, the significance of an investigator's competence and knowledge, as well as that person's working relationship with others (not only participants, but also other researchers), is recognized.

The Ultimatum Game was played with a group of traditional big game hunters: the Lamalera whalers of Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, whose community is described in the first section of the chapter. The methods used for the study are then outlined and the results presented and discussed. The results were consistent in some ways with those from trials in western societies, with the primary difference that there were a number of cases of hyper‐fairness: one interpretation offered of these cases is that the whale hunters made strategic decisions when they made fair offers, but other explanations are also examined on the basis of the results of various cross‐cultural studies (including those in this book). These focus on the rejection of both fair and hyper‐fair offers in the Ultimatum Game (which have been interpreted as indicating an unwillingness to punish), and the issue of the variance seen in the cross‐cultural sample in this book in relation to fairness, for which strategic risk reduction is one explanation, but reputation effects are another, and the best model incorporates market integration and payoff to cooperation. The final section of the chapter discusses evolutionary theory and adaptive responses in relation to human cooperative behaviour.

Argues that localized technological change cannot be seen in isolation from national systems of innovation and the firm itself. It is shown how the often‐misunderstood role of standards as economic institutions plays an important part in the dynamics of technological change. Far from being only something of a public good, the adoption of standards poses a dilemma for an individual firm: should it stick to the local, monopolistic position built on proprietary knowledge or should it adhere to standards for better dissemination? There is also a cost for the firm associated with adopting standards. The author incorporates the emergence of standards into a formal model of a standardization club with both switching costs and network externalities, which then yields incentives for cooperative behaviour among firms for the adoption of standards.

This chapter analyses the pessimistic view implied by the ‘tragedy of commons’, that uncoordinated human behaviour leads to the destruction of the commons. It identifies the limitations of Ronald Coase’s theory that agents may get involved in voluntary exchanges of their rights to impose externalities on the others. The possibility of spontaneous cooperative behaviour in a strategic framework is examined based on recent developments in non-cooperative game theory. It is argued that many of the problems encountered in unregulated common property are problems of coordination and leadership, thus not adequately represented by the prisoner’s dilemma.

This chapter examines the main mechanisms leading to positive feedbacks, that is, self-reinforcement, such as imitative behavior and herding between investors. It shows that positive feedbacks contribute to the development of speculative bubbles, preparing the instability for a major crash. After providing an overview of feedbacks and self-organization in economics, the chapter explains how positive feedback on prices can arise due to hedging of derivatives and investment strategies with an “insurance portfolio.” It then describes a general mechanism for positive feedback, known as the “herd” or “crowd” effect, based on imitation processes. It also presents empirical evidence of herding by financial analysts and the relationship between “anti-imitation” and self-organization before concluding with an analysis of cooperative behaviors resulting from imitation, focusing on the Ising model of cooperative behavior and the complex evolutionary adaptive systems of boundedly rational agents.

This chapter reviews the study of cooperative behavior between species, with emphasis on examples of cooperative hunting found in a wide range of species. Seen in this context, the idea of cooperative hunting between humans and wolves that evolved into present relationships with dogs does not seem unusual or surprising. The chapter then critiques the proposal that competition between species is more important than cooperation in structuring ecological communities, discussing how this notion leads to a suite of ideas philosophically separating humans from the rest of the natural world. In many ways Western science is unintentionally complicit in such thinking. The chapter concludes by discussing complex cooperation, including long-term relationships between members of different species.

The ability to communicate fluently with others is surely the direct and obvious result of humans being conscious. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first explains how far one can get in explaining subjective experience in terms of neuronal activity, and why this approach must ultimately be abandoned. The second is on what consciousness does. This section is formed around two reports. The first points out that the success of the human species depends largely on the unique pattern of humans’ cooperative behaviour, while the second suggests that this depends upon what people call consciousness. Finally, the third section compares the characteristics of consciousness that would be expected if it had evolved to expand social communication with its ‘particulars’, as described by William James and others.

Recent years have seen a large outpouring of research by economists on the role of punishment in supporting voluntary collective action. This research parallels increased interest within biology and psychology about the role that propensities to engage in punishment may have played in the evolution of cooperative behaviors. Following the initial demonstration that opportunities to punish dramatically altered well-known stylized results in voluntary contribution experiments without punishment, research focused on a number of topics including (a) the impact of punishment on efficiency, as opposed to its impact on cooperative decisions per se; (b) how punishment’s cost affects its efficacy; (c) the extent to which punishment is strategically motivated; (d) what explains “misdirected” punishment; (e) the impact of opportunities to engage in counter-punishment and in other punishment of higher order; and (f) the circumstances under which subjects opt to allow punishment to be given. This chapter discusses all of these issues, but focuses more on (d)—(f) in which many of the investigations are more recent.

If groups are strange to each other and therefore fearful or hostile, why not bring them together so they can get to know each other and become friendly? This plausible approach is more complicated than it looks at first glance. Under what conditions will intergroup contact be helpful? Can it sometimes be harmful? A variety of field and laboratory experiments support the hypothesis that intergroup competition tends to strengthen social relations within each group and to disrupt relations between the groups. If the experiments are arranged in a way that deliberately fosters competition between the groups, these effects are heightened. But even in the absence of such direct instruction or arrangement, potent factors favor interpersonal attraction or mutual attachment within a group: frequency of social interaction, proximity to each other, familiarity, and similarity of attitudes and values. Almost any sort of interaction within a group tends to promote in-group favoritism. Actually, it seems rather difficult to avoid this effect even if one tries to do so. Humans are highly susceptible to invidious in-group/out-group distinctions. Extensive experimental work strongly confirms the rich variety of observations from fieldwork in many cultures over extended times and in a variety of societies. This does indeed seem to be a profound and pervasive human characteristic—one of great practical significance throughout history. We will return to this theme and examples throughout the book. Findings of this sort have led some psychologists to formulate a principle of social identity, which emphasizes the powerful effects of social categorization in its own right. Such categorization seems to highlight an important aspect of the individual self-concept (and self-esteem) based on group membership. Such membership has, from the evolutionary and historical record, been an important feature in human survival over the millennia. In contemporary people—at least, in those who participate in psychological experiments—the cognitive delineation into an in-group and out-group, even without invidious attributions, tends to set in motion a process by which there is an accentuation of similarities within groups and differences between groups. It seems very convenient, easy, and somehow natural for people to deal with these via simple schemas or stereotypes.

Although it is common to find competition for mates in many animal species, similar competitive capabilities are rarely recognised in plants. However competition for the fittest mates in plants occurs through a variety of discriminating chemical and developmental mechanisms, notably pollen competition to first enter the ovary, to self/non-self-incompatibility mechanisms and others. Potential cooperative behaviour between plant species has been observed in which pairs of species seem to prefer to grow adjacent to each other. The use of volatiles in cooperatively helping protect neighbours against herbivore attack has been reported. Competition for space between trees occurs particularly with close neighbours and leads to crown asymmetry. The strong indications are that crown asymmetry is adaptive behaviour and thus can be regarded as intelligent behaviour. Root systems in a number of species have been shown to have the unusual properties of self-recognition. It is thought that self-recognition operates through physiological coordination. Recognising one’s self is of value in that with a plastically developing plant, self-competition amongst growing roots is reduced and internal resources saved.

In the past several decades, the study of the behavior of nonhuman primates—monkeys and apes—has made rapid progress. We can learn from the dimly perceived past when our ancestors confronted the problems of survival without the sophisticated technological aids so inextricably linked to human adaptation in recent times. Our past is inaccessible to direct study. But by careful observation of our closest living relatives, monkeys and apes, we can begin to understand the nonhuman primate heritage from which our ancient ancestors took a long route over millions of years toward humanity. Nonhuman primates live in groups that are held together by strong and enduring bonds between individuals. These bonds may be reflected in a variety of ways: relationships between adult males and females, between adults of the same sex, between juveniles, and between adult males or females and their young. Altogether, in their natural habitats they have a rich social life. Compared with most other mammals, primates have fewer young at a time. Rather than litters, all Old World monkeys and apes have only one offspring at a time, and they give each one a great deal of attention. The young have longer periods of immaturity than other mammals, including prolonged nutritional dependence on the mother. A corollary of the prolonged physical immaturity and nutritional dependence of the primate infant is a longer and more intense mother- infant relationship and a longer period of tutelage and learning the customs and survival skills of the group. In all higher primates except humans, infants cling reflexively to their mothers from birth, and mother-infant contact is maintained virtually all of the time until the much older infant develops the ability to keep up with the mother on its own. Nursing occurs in many short bouts around the clock; in early infancy, it is initiated and terminated by the infant, an easy process, because the infant is always clinging to the mother’s body, anyway. This combination of clinging, carrying, continuous contact, and frequent nursing is characteristic of all higher nonhuman primates.