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As part of the ending of the Cold War, a summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe agreed the Charter of Paris in 1990. Amongst other things, it expressed a commitment to democracy ‘as the only system of government of our nations’. If international society is considered to be pluralistic, this was a puzzling development: it was making an international principle of legitimacy out of a form of internal government. The chapter attempts to explain this development in terms of the role of world society, in the context of the dramatic events of the end of the Cold War. It shows that the commitment to democracy served obvious state purposes, but also responded to a wider social constituency of expectations. This case was pressed by a transnational network acting in support of democratic principles, and which organized parallel summits to shadow the CSCE process. This also responded to developments in international law where some theorists, such as Thomas Franck, claimed to have identified an emerging democratic entitlement.

An examination is made of US policy towards and participation in several key regional multilateral organizations in the Asia–Pacific area, with the aim of establishing how central these organizations are to the overall development of US policy and the extent to which, and how, they influence or constrain US behaviour. The first section of the chapter reviews US strategic goals and briefly discusses some of the domestic and external factors that have led to the development and implementation of these goals in East Asia. The next section discusses multilateral security cooperation in the region, and gives an overview of regional multilateral security organizations, focusing primarily on the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), given its all‐encompassing nature and relatively advanced (by Asian standards) stage of development; other US‐instigated multilateral institutions and initiatives (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) are touched upon briefly to assess how these more narrowly focused approaches also serve American interests. The third section looks at Asia–Pacific multilateral economic cooperation, and here the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) provides the centrepiece of the discussion; its role both in creating an Asia–Pacific economic community and, more recently, as a vehicle for political cooperation through the institutionalization of the US‐instigated Leaders’ Meetings, which bring many of the region's heads of state and government together annually, ostensibly for economic discussions. The conclusion to the chapter briefly evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of these organizations from a US perspective in order to understand better how security and economic multilateralism fits with the largely bilaterally oriented US national security strategy.

This introductory chapter describes the problem studied in the remainder of the book: what happens when a group of agents get together to write one or more agreements. If a subgroup forms a coalition, they act cooperatively by choosing and implementing a joint course of action. However, the actions of different coalitions are chosen independently and non-cooperatively. This book is interested in the equilibrium of coalition formation. Which coalitions will come about? Is there a presumption that such coalition formation will be efficient? If so, under what circumstances will they be efficient? If not, can one place bounds on the extent of inefficiency that may occur?

This chapter contains an extensive discussion of cooperation, including accounts of both I-mode and we-mode cooperation. I-mode cooperation concerns the participants relevantly “shifting” their I-mode goals and actions toward their partnersʼ goals and actions so that a shared goal outcome is reached. We-mode cooperation amounts to we-mode joint action. These two modes are compared and illustrated in terms of a simple game-theoretical public good acquisition model. It is shown that in some situations we-mode cooperation is preferable to both “progroup” and “plain” I-mode cooperation also on grounds of instrumental rationality. We-mode cooperation, by generally being more holistic and ingrained, gives more stability and order, involves respect-based trust, and also allows for more speed, creativity, and flexibility and better applicability to the large-group case. Because of the ingredient of collective commitment we-mode cooperation entails “strong,” group-sanctioned reciprocity, which helps to escape collective action dilemmas. From the group's point of view such dilemmas ideally do not even arise, although in real life people often do not act as proper group members but free-ride.

Charts the changes that occurred in American–Western European relations during the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations of 1984–1993, which marked a change in the Cold War (largely as a result of Gorbachev's policy changes in the Soviet Union), and its eventual end, which could be marked as the year 1989 (the year of the American–Soviet summit in Malta and of the collapse of Eastern European communist regimes). The first section of the chapter examines the Reagan and Gorbachev ‘Lovefest’: the change of Ronald Reagan's hardline anti‐Soviet policies to a policy of American–Soviet cooperation under the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev, and discusses Reagan's other foreign policies and Western European attitudes toward these. The second section, ‘The Liberation of Eastern Europe, the Unification of Germany, and the New World Order’, looks at the foreign policies of George Bush (who became President in January 1989) during this time of immense change in Europe, and at the increasing East–West cooperation that he presided over; the Gulf War strengthened American–European relations considerably during this period. The third section of the chapter shows that American–EU relations improved markedly under Bush, although the attitudes of the various European countries to a role for America in Europe varied, with the French being notably anti‐American. The last section of the chapter briefly considers the survival of the American–European relationship through this period and the changes that occurred in it.

The chapter examines the effect of a number of changes in the international order on the Northern Ireland conflict. Its central argument is that while globalization and European integration have done little to transform Northern Ireland's rival identities in the way that some integrationists hope or claim, the internationalisation of Northern Ireland's conflict has had important and positive effects on conflict management.

This chapter analyses the main activities and policies of the EU new centre in the light of their capacity to remove internal boundaries (among member states), and to set external boundaries to the new enlarged system. It focuses on the economic and the coercion boundary (with its external and internal dimensions), and then moves on to analyse those other crucial boundaries that preside over the creation of a ‘system’: identity building, participation rights, and social sharing institutions. It argues that internal boundary removal proceeded at a much higher speed and scope than external boundary setting; that the EU produced a progressive disjoining and lack of coincidence of the previously highly coterminous economic, cultural, coercion and politico-administrative boundaries of the nation states; and that while the centre consolidated economic and legal integration, it did not create a ‘system’. This configuration can be interpreted in an institutional perspective (focussing on the relationship between the institutional structure of the new centre and its strategy of boundary control) and in a political perspective (focussing on the political elites preference for externalizing the pressure for domestic change, setting external constraints that ‘objectify’ the need for internal discipline).

Once the EU developed its active leverage, noncompliance with EU membership requirements became visible and costly for governments in candidate states. This chapter illustrates the effectiveness of the EU’s active leverage in compelling Hungary to moderate its foreign policy towards neighbouring states, and it explores the EU’s vigorous attempts to improve the treatment of ethnic minorities in Romania and Slovakia. The EU’s active leverage was usually ineffective in directly pressuring ruling elites in Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia to change key domestic policies. But the relationship between the EU and credible future members gradually changed the domestic balance of power in illiberal states against rent-seeking elites by making the political systems more competitive. It did so by working through society to change the information environment and the institutional environment to the advantage of more liberal political forces. This helped undermine the ‘democratic monopoly’ that had allowed rent-seeking elites to use ethnic nationalism and economic populism to win and maintain power. In states where no united, organized liberal opposition existed before 1989, the EU’s active leverage—in cooperation with other international actors and in synergy with domestic forces—helped to create one, shaping the more liberal political parties that took power in 1996 in Romania, in 1997 in Bulgaria and in 1998 in Romania.

Focuses on the third landmark decision in the history of the empowerment of the European Parliament, the decision by the member state governments to delegate legislative powers to the European Parliament that became effective with the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA). In this context, the chapters also sheds light on the question why the European Parliament had to wait until the mid-1980s to be bestowed with legislative decision-making power.

This chapter considers a number of remaining questions following the arguments of the previous chapters: Does one owe reparations for causing foreseen harm? How (considering cases Quinn proposes) does double effect apply in cases of allowing? Can one employ double effect to evaluate one’s otherwise good act that becomes problematic due to another’s wrongful conduct (material cooperation)? While the i/f distinction has independent ethical relevance, must the law accord it similar independent legal import? How does the Roman Catholic Church receive DER? The chapter also indicates how jurists in constitutional legal systems that incorporate exceptionless legal norms (such as the U.S. Bill of Rights) employ a legal analogue to double effect.