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The two truths (satyadvaya), conventional and ultimate, originated as a construct for reconciling scriptural statements; conventional truths were taken as a skillful method (upāyakauśalya) leading to the ultimate. Yet the two truths are also taken as standpoints and often as the two classes of things that those two standpoints present to view. For some, the conventional is the only actual basis for the ultimate, emptiness. When instead conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) is understood as merely “truth for the benighted,” then it will carry no normative force. Previewing the chapters, they are seen to address four questions: What is conventional truth? What sort of truth theory would best fit it? Can such truths be criticized and improved? How should one act in a world of conventional truth?

Mādhyamika philosophers in India and Tibet distinguish between two truths—the conventional and the ultimate. It is difficult, however, to say in what sense conventional truth is indeed a truth as opposed to a falsehood. Indeed, many passages in prominent texts suggest that it is entirely false. This chapter explains the sense in which, for Candrakīrti and Tsongkhapa, conventional truth is truth.

Tibetan Mādhyamikas devote considerable attention to debates concerning the object of negation (Tib. dgag bya) in deconstructive Madhyamaka analysis. This chapter argues that this attention is warranted because any account of conventional truth depends upon an account of the object of negation. The chapter focuses on the debate between Tsongkhapa and Gorampa regarding whether the object of negation is intrinsic nature or existence.

Emptiness is understood via analysis interrogating how things ultimately exist––usually leaving the conventional as nonanalytical. However, for Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), knowledge arising from conventional analysis, critical to ethics and liberation, is not superseded by ultimate realization—as illustrated via analogy with academic disciplines, each with insights and oversights. Since all things exist as mere mental imputations, diverse observers may have correct but seemingly contradictory perspectives. Yet things are not imputed every instant; there are effective but as yet unobserved conditions, just as a pound of butter “weighs a pound” even before being weighed. Testimony about how things exist may by rebutted by deeper analysis, but when their perceptions are unimpaired, all diverse beings have equal right to testify to what things exist from their perspectives. Thus, what is true about conventional truth is just that which cannot be falsified even through the fullest use of an observer’s unimpaired faculties.

Some argue that a Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika is committed to rejecting all epistemic instruments (pramāṇa) because they reject intrinsic natures (svabhāva) and intrinsic characteristics (svalakṣaṇa). This chapter argues that Candrakīrti accepts both conventional and rationally warranted epistemic instruments and develops a cogent account of their respective roles in our cognitive lives. While any Mādhyamika rejects intrinsic nature, Candrakīrti shows that epistemic instruments give us access to epistemic objects (prameya) precisely because they lack such nature and that each has its appropriate sphere of use simply because, relative to the standards appropriate to those spheres, each apprehends its respective object.

This chapter explores the limits of the sayable in the context of Zen stories, arguing that the very fact that Zen addresses our mode of prereflective engagement with the world—a mode of engagement that is in important ways precognitive—means that much of what Zen has to teach us must be shown, and not said. This language, of course, is redolent of the Tractatus.

From the Madhyamaka claim that nothing has intrinsic nature it follows that nothing could be ultimately real. It is sometimes said to be a further consequence of emptiness that conventionally real entities exist in thoroughgoing interconnection. This seems to be consistent with the Prāsaṅgika claim that intrinsic natures are problematic even if they are posited only at the level of the conventional reals. It likewise seems to cohere with the stance that Candrakīrti takes on the conventionally valid epistemic instruments. Here it is argued, however, that this sort of package would leave the Mādhyamika unable to account for the kind of epistemic progress that comes with the use of scientific methods. An alternative Madhyamaka stance is sketched that might avoid the problem of flattening conventional truth. According to this way of understanding emptiness, the Mādhyamika does not hold it to be conventionally true that everything is connected to everything else.

Conventional truth describes things as delivered by ordinary experience; ultimate truth captures the way that things are independent of our interests, practices, and cognitive faculties. It is notoriously difficult to provide an adequate analysis of either conventional or ultimate truth, however. This chapter develops a previous scholarly suggestion to understand conventional truth in Madhyamaka as deflationary truth. It points out that this suggestion is a good one only if a supplementary theory of meaning, which the deflationary theory of truth presupposes, can be given in a way that is consistent with both the limitations of the deflationary theory of truth and with Madhyamaka antirealist metaphysics. It then offers a presentation of Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha in order to argue that the resources necessary to give the required account of meaning can be found in Dharmakīrti’s account of intentional mental content.

This chapter argues that there is no special problem in Buddhist ethics. Instead of solving a problem about ethics in the context of conventional truth, it seeks to eliminate an apparent problem. It does so by analyzing the ethical thought of four important Madhyamaka philosophers: Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva.

The focus of this chapter is Purchok Ngawang Jampa’s response to Taktsang, Diamond Slivers: A Rejoinder to Taktsang Lotsawa. We begin with a biographical sketch of Purchok’s life and times, followed by a discussion of the philosophical issues at stake in the text. Of particular importance is Purchok’s claim that Mādhyamikas are indeed antifoundationalist, although they employ the standard epistemic instruments: perception, inference, testimony, analogy, and so on. But they adopt what we characterize as an “anthropological approach” to epistemology: they are coherentists and merely describe how epistemic warrant practice works in the world without endorsing any particular stance themselves. Practices that work will tend to persist, while those that consistently lead to negative functioning or obvious error will be discarded. Purchok’s analysis is a nuanced and sophisticated defense and reformulation of Gelukpa epistemology that provides a compelling alternative to Taktsang’s characterization of Madhyamaka.

The book Moonshadows investigated the nature of Madhyamaka ethics. Specifically, it examined the nature of Madhyamaka ethics in the context of conventional truths, and identified a problem with ethics based on conventional truths. This difficulty arises from Nāgārjuna’s identification of conventional truth/reality and the ultimate truth/reality, while an understanding of the distinction between ultimate and conventional is also necessary for the understanding of the Buddha’s teachings. This chapter revisits the concerns raised in Moonshadows. In so doing, it connects the present book with Moonshadows and sets the stage for what follows. It is argued that one cannot account for Madhyamaka ethics if Mādhyamikas cannot account for justified moral claim and conduct.

The Sanlun thinker Jizang constructed a hierarchy of ultimate and conventional truths by alternately applying the third and fourth corners of the cateṣkoṭi. This chapter discusses the significance of the hierarchy and shows how to make precise formal sense of it.

This chapter analyzes the two truths. Buddhists care deeply about getting at the truth and as a result have thought a lot about what truth is. One of the most important philosophical ideas to emerge from Buddhism is that of the two truths. Though it is more commonly known as the two truths, it could also be called the Two Realities. What is really true, not just within a set of conventions, is called ultimate truth. This does not entail that conventional truth is always bad or to be abandoned. Conventional truth can be useful as long as it does not blind one to what is really happening. This idea plays two different roles in Buddhism: One is as a philosophical idea about the nature of reality; the other is as an interpretive strategy to make sense of a variety of Buddhist texts.

This chapter attempts to make sense of karma within a Madhyamaka conception of conventional truth, focusing on the tradition running from Nāgārjuna through Candrakīrti to Tsongkhapa. It begins by discussing why understanding emptiness is essential to understanding the possibility of ethics, and how the Madhyamaka doctrine of the two truths illuminates the consistency of a conventional ethical framework with ultimate emptiness. It then turns to Tsongkhapa’s analysis of how to understand karma within this framework—an analysis that relies on Candrakīrti's understanding of Nāgārjuna's account of causality. It considers Gorampa’s critique of Tsongkhapa’s analysis and argues that this critique misses the mark. It concludes by reflecting on what can be learned from philosophical engagement with Buddhist notions about karma.

This chapter details how the two truths and emptiness hold the key to living a more compassionate and engaged life. First, it is worth reflecting on the importance of conventions: Conventional truths are still truths and are relevantly different from conventionally false things. Realizing emptiness does not preclude genuine interaction with others on a conventional level. More important, internalizing the emptiness of all things brings with it an important ethical shift. It helps an individual to break out of the confines that the idea of a self imposes, allowing that individual to live a life that is less isolated and more compassionate. This ethical shift is central to a very important concept in many forms of Buddhism: the bodhisattva. This term is used to characterize a particular selfless ideal. The bodhisattva becomes someone who works toward helping others better see reality and live in accordance with it. They aim to solve the problem not just for themselves, but for all beings.

The second of two chapters on the central Buddhist thesis of non-self, this chapter explores the Buddhist claim that the person, as the mereological sum of a causal series of sets of psychophysical elements, is a mere conceptual fiction, something thought to exist only due to our use of an opaque enumerative expression. Buddhists use the doctrine of the two truths to express this: persons are only conventionally and not ultimately real, and it is conventionally but not ultimately true that there are persons. The device of the tetralemma as a tool for surveying all the logical possibilities on a given issue is introduced; denial of all four lemmas is shown to involve presupposition failure. The heterodox Buddhist position known as Personalism is introduced, and its refutation explored.

This concluding chapter narrates the events following Drimé Özer's death, in order to describe how Sera Khandro's love for her guru prevails over death. After his death, a ḍākinī consoled Sera Khandro, telling her that their parting was only an illusion of conventional truth and “in the ultimate sphere of great bliss, method and insights are indivisible.” Two other ḍākinī reminded her that the “adamantine relationship is not different the mind of Pema Landrel.” During one of her visits to Drimé Özer's grave, she prayed “that in this life and all my future incarnations, I will be without separation from you.” This event suggests that Sera Khandros vision for her relationship with Drimé Özer stretched back from a distant past and looked forward to reiterating their mutual commitment in successive births.