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Relevant Alternatives and Closure

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199557912
eISBN:
9780191743290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter begins with a discussion of the closure principle and the problem it poses for the relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge. It then turns to a new position known as ... More


Introduction: Contextualism, Invariantism, Skepticism, and What Goes On in Ordinary Conversation

Keith DeRose

in The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2009
ISBN:
9780199564460
eISBN:
9780191721410
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

In this initial exposition of contextualism, the view is explained and distinguished from other views, and especially from its rival, invariantism, whose two main forms, classical invariantism and ... More


Moral Skepticisms

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195187724
eISBN:
9780199786121
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195187725.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Moral Skepticisms provides a detailed overview of moral epistemology, addressing such profound questions as: Are any moral beliefs true? Are any justified? Is moral knowledge possible? ... More


Contrastive Reasons

Justin Snedegar

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
April 2017
ISBN:
9780198785934
eISBN:
9780191835711
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785934.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of ... More


On Folk Epistemology: How we Think and Talk about Knowledge

Mikkel Gerken

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780198803454
eISBN:
9780191841637
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198803454.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

On Folk Epistemology is a book about how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since such knowledge ... More


Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense

Peter Baumann

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780198754312
eISBN:
9780191815980
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754312.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book develops and defends a version of epistemic contextualism, that is, of the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form “S knows that p” can vary with ... More


Cases that threaten transitivity

L. A. Paul and Ned Hall

in Causation: A User's Guide

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199673445
eISBN:
9780191751899
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673445.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Transitivity seems to underlie basic features of our causal reasoning: it is typical to justify a claim that C causes E by pointing out that C causes D, which in turn causes E. Preserving ... More


Moral Disagreements with Psychopaths

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

in Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199669776
eISBN:
9780191778650
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669776.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

Despite disagreements on some moral issues, almost all individuals and cultures agree on certain basic moral judgments, such as that theft, rape, and murder of peers for personal gain are immoral. ... More


Arguments for Strict Purist Invariantism

Mikkel Gerken

in On Folk Epistemology: How we Think and Talk about Knowledge

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780198803454
eISBN:
9780191841637
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198803454.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A number of arguments against the epistemological views motivated by the salient alternative, contrast and practical factor effects are set forth. The negative arguments suggest that these effects ... More


Contrastivism and Reasons

Justin Snedegar

in Contrastive Reasons

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
April 2017
ISBN:
9780198785934
eISBN:
9780191835711
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785934.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter motivates and introduces contrastivism about reasons at a general level. Both the concept of a normative reason and then the nature of a contrastivist theory of some concept are ... More


Reason Claims

Justin Snedegar

in Contrastive Reasons

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
April 2017
ISBN:
9780198785934
eISBN:
9780191835711
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785934.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues for a contrastive treatment of discourse about reasons, beginning from a puzzle about claims employing ‘rather than’, of the form ‘R is a reason for A rather than B’. Various ... More


Favoring

Justin Snedegar

in Contrastive Reasons

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
April 2017
ISBN:
9780198785934
eISBN:
9780191835711
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785934.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter considers a shallow contrastivist view, according to which it is only our talk about reasons that is contrastive. Reasons themselves, or, more precisely, the normative favoring relation, ... More


Promotion

Justin Snedegar

in Contrastive Reasons

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
April 2017
ISBN:
9780198785934
eISBN:
9780191835711
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785934.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter raises a problem for contrastivism: we should capture certain entailments between reasons relative to different sets of alternatives, but the theory as developed to this point lacks a ... More


Intransitivity

Justin Snedegar

in Contrastive Reasons

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
April 2017
ISBN:
9780198785934
eISBN:
9780191835711
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785934.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter applies contrastivism to an important debate in normative ethics. Contrastivism about reasons seems initially well placed to accommodate the supposed intransitivity of normative ... More


Withholding

Justin Snedegar

in Contrastive Reasons

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
April 2017
ISBN:
9780198785934
eISBN:
9780191835711
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785934.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter applies contrastivism to an issue in epistemology, and a parallel issue in the theory of practical reasoning. This is the rationality of withholding or suspending belief or intention. ... More


Alternatives?

Peter Baumann

in Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780198754312
eISBN:
9780191815980
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754312.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This final chapter discusses alternatives to contextualism. Since classical invariantism has been a foil for the whole discussion in the book, it needs no special, repeated treatment here. Rather, ... More


Weighing Reasons Against

Chris Tucker

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 17

Published in print:
2022
Published Online:
May 2022
ISBN:
9780192865601
eISBN:
9780191956355
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780192865601.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Ethicists increasingly reject the scale as a useful metaphor for weighing reasons. Yet they generally retain the metaphor of a reason’s weight. This combination is incoherent. The metaphor of weight ... More


Causal Idealism

Sara Bernstein

in Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
January 2018
ISBN:
9780198746973
eISBN:
9780191863622
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198746973.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that causal idealism, the view that causation is a product of mental activity, is at least as attractive as several contemporary views of causation that incorporate human thought ... More


Character and Consequences

Ben Bradley

in Questions of Character

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780199357703
eISBN:
9780199357734
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357703.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in ... More


Logical Form

Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp

in Semantics for Reasons

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780198832621
eISBN:
9780191871184
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198832621.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Chapter 2 presents the particular reasons locutions on which the book focuses, and argue that one of them is fundamental. The chapter identifies the logical form of this fundamental reasons locution ... More


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