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All our political values were invented in ancient times. Social contract, for example, was invented, though not developed philosophically. Western/European thought drew the idea of nation from the Old Testament, of monarchy and the state from Rome as well, and of liberty from Greece and Rome. Democracy was long forgotten and only revived in different form. Both Confucianism and, implicitly, the political realism of ‘Legalism’ have remained imporant in China.

This chapter discusses the emergence of downgraded and informal sectors of European labour markets staffed by socially marginal migrants and ethnic minorities. These parts of the economy and the labour market seem to represent a ‘pre-modern’ regression in terms of organization and management. Yet the processes through which this occurs are part and parcel of advanced capitalist strategies of deregulation for the enhancement of ‘flexibility’ in terms of a networked economy and society and a fragmented labour market. This point is illustrated by case studies of industrial restructuring from Britain, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. These examples exhibit advanced corporate strategies heading the ongoing restructuring of the political economy and European societies, and reflect processes typical for different economic sectors. The cases also demonstrate the impact of the different national institutional contexts and welfare regimes in which these strategies of restructuring are embedded.

A business contract between a marketing services company and a company that sells infomercial products contained an exclusivity rights clause, providing that the sales company “will not contract with any other contractors or service providers for the procurement of comparable services during the term of this agreement.” The dispute was over the meaning of the verb “to contract” and whether it meant that a contract could be made before the last day of the existing contract even though the new work would not start until that contract had ended. Semantic analysis of the verb “contract” along with what the exclusivity agreement did not say, framed the linguistic contribution to this case.

This chapter examines the principles that liberal democrats, including liberal nationalists, should use when choosing between the constitutional and federal options discussed in the preceding chapter. Instead of envisaging a completely novel set of principles for multinational federal constitutionalism, it explores the normative resources available in some of the major theories typically used in uni-national states, including ‘classical’, ‘deliberative’, and ‘consequentialist’ theories of democracy; and ‘classical’ and ‘contractualist’ theories of constitutionalism. It argues for seven principles of recognition that would be appropriate for justifying certain design features in a multinational federal constitution.

The two papers in Ch. 5 examine how lawyers and law professors, operating in private arenas, successfully revived a pre-modern legal system, the Lex Mercatoria – the international body of trade law derived from merchant practice. Shapiro’s paper, which was originally published in The State and Freedom of Contract (ed. Harry Scheiber, Stanford University Press) in 1998) first introduces the Lex Mercatoria (the law of merchants) in relation to freedom of contract and contract law, and then discusses globalizing tendencies in contract law, doctrine, and jurisprudence, before moving on to globalizing tendencies in contract practice, using the legal doctrine of conflict of laws as a baseline for measurement of globalization tendencies. Here, Lex Mercatoria (or general principles of law) often play a substantial part in the resolution of contract disputes, particularly where arbitration is involved. Shapiro goes on to deal with the unification of private law in the United States in the 1920s (the trans-state harmonization of contract law), which he uses as a benchmark to assess the massive post-Second World War movement to a global law of contract. Aspects addressed include the globalization of contracting practice and law, the American-style contract (in relation to franchising law and mineral (non-oil) development contracts), and developments in business organization and law institutions.

This concluding chapter contains some lessons from experience and conclusions regarding what is already known about contracting out, and how much more still needs to be found out. Four ‘lessons’ from the contracting theory and experiences discussed in the book are worth noting: first, one of the most powerful effects of the switch from in‐house production to external supply is the change in incentives; second, there is a link that is not always clearly visible between the way that contractual arrangements are implemented and the benefits that are subsequently derived; third, contracts are relationships, and as such are governed by the factors that affect all relationships; and last, contractual relationships can be thought of as lying along a spectrum that runs from spot transactions at one end to vertical integration at the other.

This chapter discusses forward and futures contracts. It considers a fixed simple T-claim, □, at a time t. It shows that forward and futures contracts have the same claim □ as their underlying object, but differ from the standard contract by way in which payments are made. Practice exercises are included.

This chapter presents an overview of issues of concurrent liability. Topics covered include concurrent liability within unjustified enrichment, unjustified enrichment and contract law, unjustified enrichment and negotiorum gestioun, justified enrichment and tort law, and unjustified enrichment and property law.

This introductory chapter starts off the discussion on financial derivatives by explaining the European call option. It formulates the two main problems that will be the focus of the entire volume: What is a “fair” price for the contract? How does one protect (hedge) against the financial risks resulting from the sale of a derivative? The definition of financial derivative is then presented.

This is an introductory chapter to the book, and it addresses the need for a new look at the welfare state in Europe. The different sections of the chapter are: The new welfare challenge; Emerging blueprints for reform; Towards a viable new European welfare architecture—the need for a more effective methodology, the principles of justice, welfare as social investment, and rethinking security in old age; The three welfare pillars —markets, families, and government; Similar challenges for different welfare regimes— the Scandinavian welfare model, the ‘liberal’ welfare model, and the continental European welfare model; From national regimes towards a European model; and Rewriting the social contract—a new family policy, a new gender contract, social inclusion through employment, the generational contract.

The psychological contract, as reported by both employers and employees, provides the main focus of this chapter. It starts by reviewing some of the main conceptual and operational issues in exploring the psychological contract. Analysis reveals that both employers and employees agree that permanent workers have a broader content of the psychological contract than temporary workers. Initial comparison also suggests that there is some imbalance of the psychological contracts of temporary works who promise more than they get in return while employers admit that they do not always fulfil their promises and obligations, particularly to temporary workers.

This book examines standardized form contracts, also known as boilerplate. In the past, “contract” was interpreted as a bargained-for exchange transaction between two parties who each consent to the exchange. Bargained-for exchange represents contract in a world of voluntary agreement—World A (for Agreement). Standardized form contracts, on the other hand, belong to World B (for Boilerplate). World B doesn't fit the theory, the rationale, of contract law. This book explores judicial oversight of boilerplate through the legal doctrines of unconscionability and voidness as against public policy, among others. It also considers the problem of boilerplate rights deletion schemes as well as attempts to bring such schemes under the aegis of traditional contract theories. This chapter provides an overview of worlds A and B as well as varieties of World B contracts, boilerplate as a method of contract formation, and two problems arising from boilerplate: normative degradation and democratic degradation.

Focuses on how and why parliamentary systems of governance have accommodated constitutional review. The American and European models of constitutional review are contrasted, and the history, structure, and function of European constitutional courts are surveyed. The necessity of review in defending human rights and its conceptualization as a means of completing the constitution over time are found to be particularly important across these cases, but factors explaining the variance in the judicialization of European law‐making are also identified. The chapter ends with a discussion of the main determinants of European constitutional politics.