Manuel García-Carpintero and Max Kölbel (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199234950
- eISBN:
- 9780191715846
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
The truth of an utterance depends on various factors. Usually these factors are assumed to be: the meaning of the sentence uttered; the context in which the utterance was made; and the way things are ...
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The truth of an utterance depends on various factors. Usually these factors are assumed to be: the meaning of the sentence uttered; the context in which the utterance was made; and the way things are in the world. Recently however, a number of cases have been discussed where there seems to be reason to think that the truth of an utterance is not yet fully determined by these three factors, and that truth must therefore depend on a further factor. The most prominent examples include utterances about values, utterances attributing knowledge, utterances which state that something is probable or epistemically possible, and utterances about the contingent future. In these cases, some have argued, the standard picture needs to be modified to admit extra truth-determining factors, and there is further controversy about the exact role of any such extra factors. All the essays in this volume are about this issue. It is a narrowly defined issue in the philosophy of language, but one with important connections to other areas of philosophy, such as metaethics, metaphysics, and epistemology.Less
The truth of an utterance depends on various factors. Usually these factors are assumed to be: the meaning of the sentence uttered; the context in which the utterance was made; and the way things are in the world. Recently however, a number of cases have been discussed where there seems to be reason to think that the truth of an utterance is not yet fully determined by these three factors, and that truth must therefore depend on a further factor. The most prominent examples include utterances about values, utterances attributing knowledge, utterances which state that something is probable or epistemically possible, and utterances about the contingent future. In these cases, some have argued, the standard picture needs to be modified to admit extra truth-determining factors, and there is further controversy about the exact role of any such extra factors. All the essays in this volume are about this issue. It is a narrowly defined issue in the philosophy of language, but one with important connections to other areas of philosophy, such as metaethics, metaphysics, and epistemology.
Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is; a feature of the way we represent ...
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Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is; a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? Assuming standard logical principles, Sorites' arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for our understanding of natural languages. If our reasoning involves any vague concepts, is it safe from contradiction? Do vague concepts really lack any sharp boundary? If not, why are we reluctant to accept the existence of any sharp boundary for them? And what rules of inference can we validly apply, if we reason in vague terms? This book presents the latest work towards a clearer understanding of these old puzzles about the nature and logic of vagueness. The collection offers a stimulating series of original chapters on these and related issues by some of the world's leading experts.Less
Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is; a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? Assuming standard logical principles, Sorites' arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for our understanding of natural languages. If our reasoning involves any vague concepts, is it safe from contradiction? Do vague concepts really lack any sharp boundary? If not, why are we reluctant to accept the existence of any sharp boundary for them? And what rules of inference can we validly apply, if we reason in vague terms? This book presents the latest work towards a clearer understanding of these old puzzles about the nature and logic of vagueness. The collection offers a stimulating series of original chapters on these and related issues by some of the world's leading experts.
Sven Bernecker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577569
- eISBN:
- 9780191722820
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The view that past environmental conditions fix the contents of our memory states (in conjunction with the conceptual replacement view) has the consequence that an environmental shift brings about a ...
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The view that past environmental conditions fix the contents of our memory states (in conjunction with the conceptual replacement view) has the consequence that an environmental shift brings about a conceptual shift which, in turn, can rob us of the ability to remember some of our past thoughts. Some may find this idea rather implausible. Boghossian's memory argument purports to show that externalism about memory yields the absurd consequence that a subject can know the contents of his current thoughts only if the environmental conditions determining these contents will not change in the future. This chapter shows that worries concerning the externalist thesis that environmental switching can cause memory failures are misplaced because there are neither philosophical nor psychological reasons to substantiate them. Pastist externalism corresponds with psychological data (context dependence, state dependence) and is compatible with the psychological criterion of personal identity.Less
The view that past environmental conditions fix the contents of our memory states (in conjunction with the conceptual replacement view) has the consequence that an environmental shift brings about a conceptual shift which, in turn, can rob us of the ability to remember some of our past thoughts. Some may find this idea rather implausible. Boghossian's memory argument purports to show that externalism about memory yields the absurd consequence that a subject can know the contents of his current thoughts only if the environmental conditions determining these contents will not change in the future. This chapter shows that worries concerning the externalist thesis that environmental switching can cause memory failures are misplaced because there are neither philosophical nor psychological reasons to substantiate them. Pastist externalism corresponds with psychological data (context dependence, state dependence) and is compatible with the psychological criterion of personal identity.
Max Kölbel
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199234950
- eISBN:
- 9780191715846
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter provides a systematic overview of the issue of contemporary truth-relativism. It first outlines the standard approach to semantics, modifications of which have been ...
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This introductory chapter provides a systematic overview of the issue of contemporary truth-relativism. It first outlines the standard approach to semantics, modifications of which have been demanded. Then it looks at one of the cases, matters of taste, and examines what the motivations for modifying standard semantics are. The chapter then outlines the parallel reasoning in some of the other cases, among them: epistemic modals, knowledge attributions, moral values, and future contingents. Finally, it gives a brief overview over the contributions to the volume.Less
This introductory chapter provides a systematic overview of the issue of contemporary truth-relativism. It first outlines the standard approach to semantics, modifications of which have been demanded. Then it looks at one of the cases, matters of taste, and examines what the motivations for modifying standard semantics are. The chapter then outlines the parallel reasoning in some of the other cases, among them: epistemic modals, knowledge attributions, moral values, and future contingents. Finally, it gives a brief overview over the contributions to the volume.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237075
- eISBN:
- 9780191598456
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237073.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
It is argued that externalism about the contents of propositional attitudes is supported not only by examples and thought experiments, but also by an intuitively plausible theoretical account of ...
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It is argued that externalism about the contents of propositional attitudes is supported not only by examples and thought experiments, but also by an intuitively plausible theoretical account of intentionality: the idea that the contents of intentional mental states should be explained in terms of the information that those states are disposed to carry. The theoretical account helps to bring out what is paradoxical about the externalist's thought experiments, and to show why attributions of content are essentially context‐dependent.Less
It is argued that externalism about the contents of propositional attitudes is supported not only by examples and thought experiments, but also by an intuitively plausible theoretical account of intentionality: the idea that the contents of intentional mental states should be explained in terms of the information that those states are disposed to carry. The theoretical account helps to bring out what is paradoxical about the externalist's thought experiments, and to show why attributions of content are essentially context‐dependent.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237075
- eISBN:
- 9780191598456
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198237073.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
It is argued that belief attributions are context‐dependent. To interpret the sentential clauses embedded in statements attributing belief, we need a derived context, different from the basic context ...
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It is argued that belief attributions are context‐dependent. To interpret the sentential clauses embedded in statements attributing belief, we need a derived context, different from the basic context relative to which the statement as a whole is interpreted. Derived contexts are defined, and the apparatus is used to defend a pragmatic account of de re belief attributions.Less
It is argued that belief attributions are context‐dependent. To interpret the sentential clauses embedded in statements attributing belief, we need a derived context, different from the basic context relative to which the statement as a whole is interpreted. Derived contexts are defined, and the apparatus is used to defend a pragmatic account of de re belief attributions.
Isaac Levi
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199270705
- eISBN:
- 9780191601774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270708.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The justification of deliberate expansion is the topic of this chapter, and it is argued that any possible expansion should be assessed with respect to two desiderata: the enquirer should seek to ...
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The justification of deliberate expansion is the topic of this chapter, and it is argued that any possible expansion should be assessed with respect to two desiderata: the enquirer should seek to avoid error by adding new information that is false; and the enquirer should seek to acquire new, valuable information. The ways in which the legitimacy of an inductive expansion is heavily dependant on contextual parameters are set out, and five such parameters are identified. The notions of “degrees of surprise” and “degrees of belief” (plausibility) are defined and discussed.Less
The justification of deliberate expansion is the topic of this chapter, and it is argued that any possible expansion should be assessed with respect to two desiderata: the enquirer should seek to avoid error by adding new information that is false; and the enquirer should seek to acquire new, valuable information. The ways in which the legitimacy of an inductive expansion is heavily dependant on contextual parameters are set out, and five such parameters are identified. The notions of “degrees of surprise” and “degrees of belief” (plausibility) are defined and discussed.
Jason Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695362
- eISBN:
- 9780191729768
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Knowing how to do something is, like knowing whether or not to do something, knowing who came to the party knowing when the party is, a kind of knowing-wh. This chapter provides an introduction to ...
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Knowing how to do something is, like knowing whether or not to do something, knowing who came to the party knowing when the party is, a kind of knowing-wh. This chapter provides an introduction to some of the standard semantic theories of embedded questions by Karttunen and Groenendijk and Stokhof. It argues that marrying such theories with the correct account of quantifier domain restriction explains most of the context-dependence associated with sentences that ascribe states of knowing-wh. The resulting morals are applied to recent challenges to standard theories of knowing-wh by Jonathan Schaffer and Jonathan Ginzburg.Less
Knowing how to do something is, like knowing whether or not to do something, knowing who came to the party knowing when the party is, a kind of knowing-wh. This chapter provides an introduction to some of the standard semantic theories of embedded questions by Karttunen and Groenendijk and Stokhof. It argues that marrying such theories with the correct account of quantifier domain restriction explains most of the context-dependence associated with sentences that ascribe states of knowing-wh. The resulting morals are applied to recent challenges to standard theories of knowing-wh by Jonathan Schaffer and Jonathan Ginzburg.
Alexis Wellwood
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- November 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198804659
- eISBN:
- 9780191842870
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198804659.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
This book re-imagines the compositional semantics of comparative constructions with words like “more”. It argues for a revision of one of the fundamental assumptions of the degree semantics framework ...
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This book re-imagines the compositional semantics of comparative constructions with words like “more”. It argues for a revision of one of the fundamental assumptions of the degree semantics framework as applied to such constructions: that gradable adjectives do not lexicalize measure functions (i.e., mappings from individuals or events to degrees). Instead, the degree morphology itself plays the role of degree introduction. The book begins with a careful study of non-canonical comparatives targeting nouns and verbs, and applies the lessons learned there to those targeting adjectives and adverbs. A primary distinction that the book draws extends the traditional distinction between gradable and non-gradable as applied to the adjectival domain to the distinction between “measurable” and “non-measurable” predicates that crosses lexical categories. The measurable predicates, in addition to the gradable adjectives, include mass noun phrases, plural noun phrases, imperfective verb phrases, and perfective atelic verb phrases. In each of these cases, independent evidence for non-trivial ordering relations on the relevant domains of predication are discussed, and measurability is tied to the accessibility of such orderings. Applying this compositional theory to the core cases and beyond, the book establishes that the selection of measure functions for a given comparative depends entirely on what is measured and compared rather than which expression introduces the measurementLess
This book re-imagines the compositional semantics of comparative constructions with words like “more”. It argues for a revision of one of the fundamental assumptions of the degree semantics framework as applied to such constructions: that gradable adjectives do not lexicalize measure functions (i.e., mappings from individuals or events to degrees). Instead, the degree morphology itself plays the role of degree introduction. The book begins with a careful study of non-canonical comparatives targeting nouns and verbs, and applies the lessons learned there to those targeting adjectives and adverbs. A primary distinction that the book draws extends the traditional distinction between gradable and non-gradable as applied to the adjectival domain to the distinction between “measurable” and “non-measurable” predicates that crosses lexical categories. The measurable predicates, in addition to the gradable adjectives, include mass noun phrases, plural noun phrases, imperfective verb phrases, and perfective atelic verb phrases. In each of these cases, independent evidence for non-trivial ordering relations on the relevant domains of predication are discussed, and measurability is tied to the accessibility of such orderings. Applying this compositional theory to the core cases and beyond, the book establishes that the selection of measure functions for a given comparative depends entirely on what is measured and compared rather than which expression introduces the measurement
Sylvain Sirois, Denis Mareschal, and Gert Westermann
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198529934
- eISBN:
- 9780191689727
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198529934.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The real challenge for developmental psychology is to understand the how of development, and not just the what of development. Such causal theories need to explain behaviours at multiple timescales. ...
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The real challenge for developmental psychology is to understand the how of development, and not just the what of development. Such causal theories need to explain behaviours at multiple timescales. They must explain how and why behaviours unfold online, as observed in real time, as well as how they unfold in developmental time — across the lifespan of the individual. Volume 1 of this book briefly tackled the importance of models in several places, and even sketched a few key models that illustrated the processes. In this book, Volume 2, nine different research labs with objectives broadly consistent with the neuroconstructivist approach present their computational modelling work.Less
The real challenge for developmental psychology is to understand the how of development, and not just the what of development. Such causal theories need to explain behaviours at multiple timescales. They must explain how and why behaviours unfold online, as observed in real time, as well as how they unfold in developmental time — across the lifespan of the individual. Volume 1 of this book briefly tackled the importance of models in several places, and even sketched a few key models that illustrated the processes. In this book, Volume 2, nine different research labs with objectives broadly consistent with the neuroconstructivist approach present their computational modelling work.
Denis Mareschal, Mark H. Johnson, Sylvain Sirois, Michael W. Spratling, Michael S. C. Thomas, and Gert Westermann
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198529910
- eISBN:
- 9780191689710
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198529910.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter summarizes all the material dealt with so far to attempt to determine the central principles that guide the emergence of representations. It specifically discusses some general lessons ...
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This chapter summarizes all the material dealt with so far to attempt to determine the central principles that guide the emergence of representations. It specifically discusses some general lessons that will guide the way for future approaches to the study of brain and cognitive development. Based on the conclusions of the previous chapters, it discovers the underlying principle of neuroconstructivist development; namely context-dependence. In addition, it reports each of the three domain-general and level-independent mechanisms, namely cooperation, competition and chronotopy, and processes. The processes that are omnipresent in development include proactivity and progressive specialization. The operation of one mechanism does not prevent the operation of others. Indeed, it is thought that development frequently implies the operations of all these mechanisms. Moreover, both the mechanisms and processes that are determined can function on several levels. Finally, at this stage, it is better to report these mechanisms and processes as a ‘collection’ of different animals rather than as part of a systematic hierarchy. It can be concluded from exploring the development at three levels of description (single cells, brain systems, and the whole child) that the primary principle guiding development is context-dependence.Less
This chapter summarizes all the material dealt with so far to attempt to determine the central principles that guide the emergence of representations. It specifically discusses some general lessons that will guide the way for future approaches to the study of brain and cognitive development. Based on the conclusions of the previous chapters, it discovers the underlying principle of neuroconstructivist development; namely context-dependence. In addition, it reports each of the three domain-general and level-independent mechanisms, namely cooperation, competition and chronotopy, and processes. The processes that are omnipresent in development include proactivity and progressive specialization. The operation of one mechanism does not prevent the operation of others. Indeed, it is thought that development frequently implies the operations of all these mechanisms. Moreover, both the mechanisms and processes that are determined can function on several levels. Finally, at this stage, it is better to report these mechanisms and processes as a ‘collection’ of different animals rather than as part of a systematic hierarchy. It can be concluded from exploring the development at three levels of description (single cells, brain systems, and the whole child) that the primary principle guiding development is context-dependence.
Delia Bentley
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198745266
- eISBN:
- 9780191806230
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198745266.003.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology, Historical Linguistics
This chapter discusses various existing definitions of existential sentence or existential construction and introduces the definition adopted in the volume. This is McNally’s (2011) definition, which ...
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This chapter discusses various existing definitions of existential sentence or existential construction and introduces the definition adopted in the volume. This is McNally’s (2011) definition, which is enriched with an explicit reference to the context-dependence of existentials. The chapter then outlines the principal semantic and morphosyntactic features of existential and locative there sentences in Romance, and in typological perspective, providing examples of such constructions from a wide variety of languages. It explains the scope and objectives of the volume, alongside the methodology adopted in the Manchester project on existentials, from which the volume stems. It offers a reader-friendly introduction to Role and Reference Grammar, the linguistic framework in which the analysis is couched. The acknowledgements and an outline of the volume conclude the chapter.Less
This chapter discusses various existing definitions of existential sentence or existential construction and introduces the definition adopted in the volume. This is McNally’s (2011) definition, which is enriched with an explicit reference to the context-dependence of existentials. The chapter then outlines the principal semantic and morphosyntactic features of existential and locative there sentences in Romance, and in typological perspective, providing examples of such constructions from a wide variety of languages. It explains the scope and objectives of the volume, alongside the methodology adopted in the Manchester project on existentials, from which the volume stems. It offers a reader-friendly introduction to Role and Reference Grammar, the linguistic framework in which the analysis is couched. The acknowledgements and an outline of the volume conclude the chapter.
John Kekes
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226359458
- eISBN:
- 9780226359595
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226359595.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This is an introduction that sets out the problems, the aim, and the approach of the book. The problem is that most of us are more or less dissatisfied with how we live and want to make it better ...
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This is an introduction that sets out the problems, the aim, and the approach of the book. The problem is that most of us are more or less dissatisfied with how we live and want to make it better than it is. We are uncertain about how to make it better because we are committed to conflicting economic, legal, moral, personal, political, religious, and other modes of evaluation of the available possibilities of life. The aim is to find a fit between our personal attitude to how we think we should live and the evaluative framework of our society that limits how we can live. The approach is to compare what we take to be our possibilities with possibilities as they are conceived in different anthropological, historical, and literary contexts. In that way we can deepen our understanding and enrich the possibilities of life we might pursue.Less
This is an introduction that sets out the problems, the aim, and the approach of the book. The problem is that most of us are more or less dissatisfied with how we live and want to make it better than it is. We are uncertain about how to make it better because we are committed to conflicting economic, legal, moral, personal, political, religious, and other modes of evaluation of the available possibilities of life. The aim is to find a fit between our personal attitude to how we think we should live and the evaluative framework of our society that limits how we can live. The approach is to compare what we take to be our possibilities with possibilities as they are conceived in different anthropological, historical, and literary contexts. In that way we can deepen our understanding and enrich the possibilities of life we might pursue.
John Kekes
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226359458
- eISBN:
- 9780226359595
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226359595.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The widely held assumption in our evaluative framework is that the reasonable way of making difficult choices between valued and conflicting possibilities of life is to make a personal commitment to ...
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The widely held assumption in our evaluative framework is that the reasonable way of making difficult choices between valued and conflicting possibilities of life is to make a personal commitment to living in a particular way and then act accordingly. In the Hindu and Balinese evaluative frameworks there is limited scope for conflicting possibilities, difficult choices, and personal commitments. How individuals should live is decided by the roles into which they are born or by the burden of their inheritance. Comparing these evaluative frameworks with ours allows us to understand that our problems involved in having to make personal commitments, difficult choices, and cope with conflicts are the unavoidable by-products of our evaluative framework. We may come to understand that the burdens we carry in our evaluative framework are the price we have to pay for living as we do.Less
The widely held assumption in our evaluative framework is that the reasonable way of making difficult choices between valued and conflicting possibilities of life is to make a personal commitment to living in a particular way and then act accordingly. In the Hindu and Balinese evaluative frameworks there is limited scope for conflicting possibilities, difficult choices, and personal commitments. How individuals should live is decided by the roles into which they are born or by the burden of their inheritance. Comparing these evaluative frameworks with ours allows us to understand that our problems involved in having to make personal commitments, difficult choices, and cope with conflicts are the unavoidable by-products of our evaluative framework. We may come to understand that the burdens we carry in our evaluative framework are the price we have to pay for living as we do.
John Kekes
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780226359458
- eISBN:
- 9780226359595
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226359595.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The object of fear is the loss of the meaning of life. It threatens if our evaluative framework is called into question. This chapter is about the prudent strategy for coping with this fear. A ...
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The object of fear is the loss of the meaning of life. It threatens if our evaluative framework is called into question. This chapter is about the prudent strategy for coping with this fear. A reasonable strategy is exemplified by the cases of the Azande, the Kalabari, Montaigne, Descartes, and Hume. These cases show that there may be good reasons for prudently decentering the fear. An unreasonable strategy that avoids facing the fear is exemplified by Reid. The difficult question is how to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable strategies for coping with the fear. The answer is context-dependent. There can be no ideal theory of a reasonable prudent strategy that should be followed in all contexts. Our vulnerability to this fear is an unavoidable problem in our evaluative framework. The search for an ideal theory that would enable us to avoid the fear is doomed to failure.Less
The object of fear is the loss of the meaning of life. It threatens if our evaluative framework is called into question. This chapter is about the prudent strategy for coping with this fear. A reasonable strategy is exemplified by the cases of the Azande, the Kalabari, Montaigne, Descartes, and Hume. These cases show that there may be good reasons for prudently decentering the fear. An unreasonable strategy that avoids facing the fear is exemplified by Reid. The difficult question is how to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable strategies for coping with the fear. The answer is context-dependent. There can be no ideal theory of a reasonable prudent strategy that should be followed in all contexts. Our vulnerability to this fear is an unavoidable problem in our evaluative framework. The search for an ideal theory that would enable us to avoid the fear is doomed to failure.
Jakob Hohwy
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199682737
- eISBN:
- 9780191766350
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
If perception is a matter of prediction error minimization, then the mechanism must have resources to deal with the fact that the noise and uncertainty is state-dependent. That is, the prediction ...
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If perception is a matter of prediction error minimization, then the mechanism must have resources to deal with the fact that the noise and uncertainty is state-dependent. That is, the prediction error minimization mechanism must be able to learn and evaluate the levels of uncertainty in the different contexts it finds itself in — it must engage in second order statistics. This chapter describes this key ingredient of prediction error minimization in terms of expected precisions of prediction error. It also discusses other issues pertaining to context-dependence; in particular, cases of non-linear interaction between causes (such as occlusion) are discussed. This gives a richer account of the statistical inference that is needed for perception to be possible. The chapter ends with a presentation of issues that arise now that a more full description of the mechanism is available; these issues will inform discussion in later chapters.Less
If perception is a matter of prediction error minimization, then the mechanism must have resources to deal with the fact that the noise and uncertainty is state-dependent. That is, the prediction error minimization mechanism must be able to learn and evaluate the levels of uncertainty in the different contexts it finds itself in — it must engage in second order statistics. This chapter describes this key ingredient of prediction error minimization in terms of expected precisions of prediction error. It also discusses other issues pertaining to context-dependence; in particular, cases of non-linear interaction between causes (such as occlusion) are discussed. This gives a richer account of the statistical inference that is needed for perception to be possible. The chapter ends with a presentation of issues that arise now that a more full description of the mechanism is available; these issues will inform discussion in later chapters.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199645169
- eISBN:
- 9780191761379
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645169.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter discusses the intuitive idea of context, and two contrasting theoretical representations of context: first, a notion of context as a representation of the concrete situation at a point ...
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This chapter discusses the intuitive idea of context, and two contrasting theoretical representations of context: first, a notion of context as a representation of the concrete situation at a point in time at which a discourse is taking place, modeled by a centered possible world (a representation that contains all of the information that might be relevant to the interpretation of any context-dependent expressions); second, the notion of context as common ground: a body of information that is presumed to be shared (at a particular time) by the participants in a discourse. The chapter considers the relation between the two notions of context, and some tensions between them.Less
This chapter discusses the intuitive idea of context, and two contrasting theoretical representations of context: first, a notion of context as a representation of the concrete situation at a point in time at which a discourse is taking place, modeled by a centered possible world (a representation that contains all of the information that might be relevant to the interpretation of any context-dependent expressions); second, the notion of context as common ground: a body of information that is presumed to be shared (at a particular time) by the participants in a discourse. The chapter considers the relation between the two notions of context, and some tensions between them.
Todd M. Palmer, Elizabeth G. Pringle, Adrian Stier, and Robert D. Holt
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199675654
- eISBN:
- 9780191809422
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675654.003.0009
- Subject:
- Biology, Ecology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
There are two broad questions that can be asked about the relationship of mutualism and community ecology: What do community interactions do for mutualisms? Conversely, what do mutualisms do for ...
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There are two broad questions that can be asked about the relationship of mutualism and community ecology: What do community interactions do for mutualisms? Conversely, what do mutualisms do for communities? This chapter addresses both questions, using examples ranging from giraffes nibbling on ant-laden acacias, to rapidly shifting coral-algal symbioses, to models of stage-structure interactions among mutualists. For an interaction between a pair of species to be mutualistic, benefits must exceed costs for each partner. Yet any benefits or costs often depend upon interactions with species outside just the interacting pair. This leads to context dependence in mutualisms, since the presence and abundance of these third (or more) parties change over space and time. Evaluating costs and benefits requires accounting for shifting suites of interactions over the lifetimes of focal species. Mutualisms can arise between guilds, not just species pairs, and guild diversity can influence mutualism functioning in ways analogous to the routes by which biodiversity impacts ecosystem functioning. Mutualisms influence communities in many ways. For starters, maintenance of diversity within mutualist guilds is itself an important slice of the general issue of biodiversity maintenance. Moreover, mutualisms modulate other mechanisms that influence diversity, at times enhancing dominance of some species over others (thus reducing diversity), and at times by providing additional avenues for niche differentiation, enhancing diversity. Mutualisms can alter species range limits and thus define the species pool available for local community assembly, and even alter community stability. The chapter ends with key open questions.Less
There are two broad questions that can be asked about the relationship of mutualism and community ecology: What do community interactions do for mutualisms? Conversely, what do mutualisms do for communities? This chapter addresses both questions, using examples ranging from giraffes nibbling on ant-laden acacias, to rapidly shifting coral-algal symbioses, to models of stage-structure interactions among mutualists. For an interaction between a pair of species to be mutualistic, benefits must exceed costs for each partner. Yet any benefits or costs often depend upon interactions with species outside just the interacting pair. This leads to context dependence in mutualisms, since the presence and abundance of these third (or more) parties change over space and time. Evaluating costs and benefits requires accounting for shifting suites of interactions over the lifetimes of focal species. Mutualisms can arise between guilds, not just species pairs, and guild diversity can influence mutualism functioning in ways analogous to the routes by which biodiversity impacts ecosystem functioning. Mutualisms influence communities in many ways. For starters, maintenance of diversity within mutualist guilds is itself an important slice of the general issue of biodiversity maintenance. Moreover, mutualisms modulate other mechanisms that influence diversity, at times enhancing dominance of some species over others (thus reducing diversity), and at times by providing additional avenues for niche differentiation, enhancing diversity. Mutualisms can alter species range limits and thus define the species pool available for local community assembly, and even alter community stability. The chapter ends with key open questions.
Alexis Wellwood
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- November 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198804659
- eISBN:
- 9780191842870
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198804659.003.0003
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter begins the book’s survey of non-canonical comparatives, and suggests a degree-based interpretation of the expression “much” which occurs implicitly as a morphosyntactic part of “more”, ...
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This chapter begins the book’s survey of non-canonical comparatives, and suggests a degree-based interpretation of the expression “much” which occurs implicitly as a morphosyntactic part of “more”, and explicitly in phrases like “as much” and “too much”. Focusing on comparatives targeting mass nouns like “mud” and atelic verb phrases like “run (in the park)”, a primary goal of this analysis is to capture both the variability and constraints (especially a hypothesized “monotonicity constraint”) on measure function selection in such cases. In line with the central thesis of the book, this chapter emphasizes the role that the order-theoretic properties (when present) of a predicate plays in fixing the available dimension(s) for comparison in a given nominal or verbal comparative. The success of this analysis suggests considering whether it can apply to the canonical comparatives, which is explored in the subsequent chapter.Less
This chapter begins the book’s survey of non-canonical comparatives, and suggests a degree-based interpretation of the expression “much” which occurs implicitly as a morphosyntactic part of “more”, and explicitly in phrases like “as much” and “too much”. Focusing on comparatives targeting mass nouns like “mud” and atelic verb phrases like “run (in the park)”, a primary goal of this analysis is to capture both the variability and constraints (especially a hypothesized “monotonicity constraint”) on measure function selection in such cases. In line with the central thesis of the book, this chapter emphasizes the role that the order-theoretic properties (when present) of a predicate plays in fixing the available dimension(s) for comparison in a given nominal or verbal comparative. The success of this analysis suggests considering whether it can apply to the canonical comparatives, which is explored in the subsequent chapter.
Alexis Wellwood
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- November 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198804659
- eISBN:
- 9780191842870
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198804659.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter extends the theory developed in the previous chapter in which an expression like “much” (implicitly as part of “more”, explicitly as part of phrases like “too much” when combined with ...
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This chapter extends the theory developed in the previous chapter in which an expression like “much” (implicitly as part of “more”, explicitly as part of phrases like “too much” when combined with nouns and verbs) uniformly introduces measure functions into the compositional semantics of comparatives. The present focus is on adjectival comparatives, which are typically analyzed as involving lexical specification of measures by the adjectival target. Exploring both novel and familiar data, drawn from the morphosyntactic and semantic literatures, this chapter suggests that the balance of evidence diagnoses the relevance of order-theoretic properties at the lexical level rather than the presence of lexically-specified measures. The positive proposal offered is that adjectives express properties of states, and the distinction between gradable and non-gradable is on a par with that between mass and count nouns: the former introduce non-trivial ordering relations while the latter do not.Less
This chapter extends the theory developed in the previous chapter in which an expression like “much” (implicitly as part of “more”, explicitly as part of phrases like “too much” when combined with nouns and verbs) uniformly introduces measure functions into the compositional semantics of comparatives. The present focus is on adjectival comparatives, which are typically analyzed as involving lexical specification of measures by the adjectival target. Exploring both novel and familiar data, drawn from the morphosyntactic and semantic literatures, this chapter suggests that the balance of evidence diagnoses the relevance of order-theoretic properties at the lexical level rather than the presence of lexically-specified measures. The positive proposal offered is that adjectives express properties of states, and the distinction between gradable and non-gradable is on a par with that between mass and count nouns: the former introduce non-trivial ordering relations while the latter do not.
