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This chapter explores the role of intellectual property rights in the process of soft innovation, and the extent to which the standard analysis is appropriate and can provide insight or requires modification. Analysis usually applied to patents is extended to copyrights, trade marks and design rights. The functioning of the UK (and European) IPR system is also discussed, as is the benefit of contestable markets.

This chapter considers policy issues. Given the potential benefits of soft innovation it is natural to consider whether government can speed up or extend such activity. However, this is not necessarily welfare desirable. The real issue concerns whether markets will or will not, unaided, produce the welfare optimal outcome. The literature considered shows that this question cannot be answered irrefutably in either direction. Market failure is thus not a strong ground on which to base policy intervention. Alternatively, international comparisons of soft innovation performance may be used by governments as a basis for policy. The chapter shows that the UK is not the international leader in soft innovation. Looking at returns to the Community Innovation Survey provides some insight into barriers to innovations and may be argued to support certain policy interventions. There is also only limited evidence on the potential effectiveness of policies.

Examines the advent of logical positivism, the development of conceptual analysis, ordinary language philosophy, the so‐called death of political theory, the impact of linguistic philosophy and the influence of Wittgenstein's thought on political theory, and particularly the idea of ‘essential contestability’.

The previous chapter examined some of the conflicting approaches to the analysis ideology and explored several boundary problems of ideology and philosophy, and in the wake of that examination, this chapter starts in the realization that ideologies are, in terms of their forms and the meanings they contain, relatively untouched. It has been a feature of the ‘black box’ approach to suggest what objects of research can do, even to predict their behaviour accurately, while remaining agnostic as to what they are, and what the inside of the box looks like. That reticence or quiescence often reflects apprehension in the face of the great complexity of both the structure and the mechanisms assumed to prevail inside the black box. This chapter is an endeavour to open the black box of ideology and assess its contents. There are six sections: (a) Political words and political concepts; (b) Reassessing essential contestability; (c) The morphology of political concepts; (d) Logical and cultural adjacency; (e) The morphology of ideologies; and (f) The escape from strong relativism.

Explores further the consequences of conceptual contestability and determinacy in conjunction with questions of ideological meaning. The eight sections of the chapter are: (a) The inevitability of [the contribution of] history [to the meaning of ideology]; (b) Contextual history and intentionality; (c) Ideology and hermeneutics; (d) The contribution of Begriffsgeschichte [the school of conceptual history]; (e) Competing viewpoints and the path to integration; (f) Structure and morphology; (g) Meeting some objections; and (h) Ideologies as vehicles of political theory.

Abstractly drawn to William Bennett’s invocation of national unity, civic virtues, and the reformation of mediating institutions, Sandel skates too lightly over the connection between Bennett’s quest to reinstate old unities and his conversion of republican virtues into contemporary weapons of cultural war in the domains of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexuality. If Sandel, in the early pages of Democracy’s Discontent, pursued pluralist reservations about the republican vision he expresses in the last chapter, he would be required to rework significantly his history of the republican impulse in America. Sandel concedes that the court’s civic concerns for the welfare of the family and heterosexual normality previously functioned to criminalize homosexuality, but a voluntarist defense of legalization, as Sandel reads it, supports sexual freedom in private without interrogating the larger cultural tendency to demean homosexual unions. Contemporary civic pluralism needs citizens who affirm comparative elements of contingency and contestability in those identities–those “encumbrances”–that define them most dramatically; who establish relations of agonistic respect with faiths, even those of a philosophic and non-theistic bent, that challenge their own sources of moral inspiration; who cultivate critical responsiveness to surprising social movements that propel new identities into being out of old injuries, differences, and energies; and who acknowledge the state to be but one site of political identification among several others in the late-modern age. The silent struggle of Michael Sandel between civic republicanism and civic pluralism is more fundamental than the explicit debate he stages between republicanism and voluntarism, for the most urgent task of political thought today is to pursue the agenda Sandel belatedly sets in the last chapter: to articulate a vision of civic pluralism appropriate to the distinct conditions of contemporary life.

Focuses on the concept of electoral and party competition as the key mechanism leading party elites to respond to the preferences of voters. While competition is of central importance in both democratic theory and in empirical studies of party behaviour, the concept (as operationalized in many studies) is vague and ambiguous; in particular, it has very different meanings in the real world of electoral and parliamentary behaviour, on the one hand, and in the formal models of rational‐choice scholars, on the other. Discusses the unintended by‐product (social value) of competition, and gives an overview of the intellectual origins (from Simmel, Schumpeter, and Downs) of this approach. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to an original criticism of the problems inherent in applying this import from economic theory to the study of electoral competition, first focusing on key dimensions of this competition—contestability, availability, decidability, and vulnerability, and then arguing that these four crucial dimensions of competition interact with one another in ways that are fundamentally incompatible with the simplifying assumptions upon which the economic model depends. Each of the dimensions of electoral competition impinges on the others in an interactive, if not sometimes contradictory manner, and as a result of these multidimensional interaction effects, party competition cannot be conceived of as a linear process that unfolds between minimum and maximum points on a single continuum, but rather as a moving point shifting about in a four‐dimensional space within which no equilibrium point can be identified; accordingly, electoral preferences cannot be regarded as exogenous to party competition, but are decisively influenced by parties and party elites.

This chapter discusses the role of industry groups and NGOs in the formulation of trade policies at the national and global level, and the importance of transparency and openness in policy formation in ensuring that governments are accountable. Information is a necessary condition for the ‘contestability’ of policy in national political markets, which in turn is a necessary condition for the ‘coherence’ of such policies, as well as the legitimacy of whatever multilateral rules are negotiated. The sections of the chapter are as follows: Industry and trade policy formation; NGOs and civil society; Governance of the WTO (World Trade Organization); Coherence of national policies; and Conclusion.

This chapter establishes that Green's republicanism overcomes the limitations of contemporary philosophical attempts to reinvigorate the republican tradition. Green avoids the contemporary dichotomy between ‘protective’ (Pettit) and ‘civic humanist’ (Sandel, Honohan) republicanism. The chapter begins by highlighting Green's self-identification as a republican, with the second section sketching the contemporary republican landscape. Section three establishes that Green's conceptions of ‘independence’ and ‘true freedom’ are superior to those used by contemporary philosophers. Green's conceptualisations of true freedom and intersubjective recognition are also explored. Section four analyses Greenian ‘civic virtue’ and its interrelationships with freedom. Section five explores the democratic contestability of the ‘common good’ in Green's republicanism, something that causes significant difficulties for contemporary republicans. Section six critically assesses Green's decentralised political structure, before section seven explores his radical theory of patriotism and civil disobedience. The conclusion argues that Green's republicanism is more coherent, integrated, and compelling than the leading contemporary versions.

This chapter argues that economic competition and political contestability are two key determinants of the successful development of the Swiss economy in the nineteenth and twentieth century. We describe how Switzerland evolved from a relatively poor country with no natural resources and net emigration in 1800 to one of the richest countries of the world two hundred years later. Based on quantitative and qualitative evidence, we argue that early internationalization, open and flexible markets as well as a high degree of competition were crucial for the development of the Swiss economy. In addition, the Swiss political system with its direct democratic elements and the implemented principle of subsidiarity created political contestability that maintained government efficiency and led to political stability throughout history. The combination of these elements seems to explain the Swiss success, but also to make it difficult for other countries to adopt.

Policy bureaucrats have been the main providers of public policy advice in modern Australia. But this central role has been seriously challenged by the rise of alternative (non-government) sources of policy analysis and advice. This chapter examines the policy advice capacities within government; the key processes at national level for policy development in Australia, including inter-governmental forums; competitive sources of policy advice; and the likely future requirements for addressing complex policy issues in an era of uncertainty and fiscal constraint. Within public sector agencies, the policy function comprises analytical, administrative and relational roles, which in practice are closely connected. The new economic, social and environmental problems facing government now require policy and governance innovations. These challenges have stretched the policy capacity of managers and leaders to design, implement and evaluate new approaches and to manage new risks.

Recent years have witnessed an extraordinary worldwide growth in procurement regulation at both national and international level. The concepts contained in these regulations such as efficiency, transparency, equality of treatment, non-discrimination, contestability, and value for money, have gained such currency that their universality is accepted without question. This book examines why, rather than only how, procurement is regulated. Three abstracted regulatory models and their interrelationships are considered. The economic model refers to the significance of the market order to the regulation of procurement and highlights the issue of economic efficiency and instances of market failure. The political model is a recognition of the fact that governments have long used procurement as a tool to pursue a number of other (‘socially desirable’) policies. The international model brings an added dimension to the regulation of procurement in the national context given that the government may bind itself to a number of international trade obligations which may limit its scope of action in the field of procurement.

Michael Freeden approaches freedom as an essentially contestable concept—one that necessarily has a number of possible meanings. After covering this methodological assumption, the chapter discusses freedom’s development within the liberal tradition. An overview of Locke’s account of freedom is given, and it is argued that the ideological developments that had occurred by John Stuart Mill’s day were substantive enough to classify these two belief systems as distinct ideologies. From here the interview covers the competition between individualist, or libertarian, conceptions of freedom, and progressive liberal ones. It is argued that the latter played a key role in the development of welfare states, and the former in arguing against them. Freeden concludes with an argument against the possibility, or even desirability, of any permanent consensus in politics.

Merger control has been marked by two major changes to both procedural and substantive law; the mandatory pre-merger notification regime was becoming increasingly burdensome for both businesses and the Commission. In 1990, the pre-merger notification system was abruptly abolished in favour of a voluntary notification system. The so-called “strike down” system already existed in Australia, but the change was probably due less to harmonization and more to some effective lobbying by big business. Regarding the substantive test, the “dominance” standard proved to be highly permissive. Few mergers were halted and the presence of very large market shares post-merger could still be overcome by an unduly generous view of the likelihood of new entry disciplining the merged firm. An idealized version of potential competition (contestability theory) held sway. In 2001, the test in s 47 was changed to the SLC threshold in an effort to toughen up the law. Horizontal mergers, increasing the likelihood of collusion (due to increased market concentration), could now be caught. Yet it is doubtful that the sterner test actually resulted in more mergers being prohibited. This chapter briefly explores the experience of vertical and conglomerate mergers as well as a new section (s 47A) that addresses overseas mergers that have effects upon New Zealand markets.

This chapter summarizes the main arguments and findings of the book by defining two key principles that guide political change in Europe. These two principles are the principle of contestability and the principle of appropriability. The principle of contestability focuses on the likelihood that a party can gain a larger share of the political market if it offers a product of greater value to voters. The principle of appropriability concerns the extent to which a successful innovator can capture the benefits resulting from its innovation. The chapter then outlines three different scenarios for the future of European politics. It also highlights topics which were not addressed in this book, but are nonetheless important areas for future research. Finally, the chapter discusses important normative considerations about the stability and resilience of democratic institutions.

Being pluralist about the concept of power does not mean that all definitions are equally valid. Many definitions are non-rival and gain their utility from the specific contexts in which they are applied. Others are rival and their relative utility derives from how good an explanation is provided by the theory of which they are part. Such explanation is constrained by the world, because good explanation is constrained by the expectations it engenders. Some conceptions of power and related terms do similar explanatory work, but hold different normative values. The contestability of ‘power’ derives from the normative work it does in different contexts and explanations. By making our concepts as non-normative as possible, we can ensure that moral or political disagreement is brought into the open. How we define social and political power does matter in some contexts for both explanatory and normative reasons.

The chapter explains that political power is fundamental to politics and thus of foremost interest to those interested in political science and political theory. Power is implicated in causation but is more problematic as it concerns the capacities of agents and how they choose to wield them. The chapter discusses the contestability of concepts and dismisses those who think that power cannot be analysed since it is essentially contested concept. It utilizes what has become known as the subscript gambit to overcome the contestability of concepts. It argues we need not think concepts are contested even though we acknowledge that there is social normative pluralism. It concludes by arguing that the lens of rational choice is the most useful tool for understanding the concept of power and providing tools for analysing it in concrete political situations

Chapter 10 discusses conceptual analysis. It argues we should try to define terms in as non-normative a manner as possible. Whilst defining terms for specific purposes is justified we cannot expect to define important political concepts in a universal manner without acknowledging the research question that is being posed as part of that analysis. Whilst defining terms by necessary and sufficient conditions will always seem desirable, given that society changes and morality develops normative terms will evolve and change over time much like species. The chapter returns the essential contestability and suggests that some concepts are actually incoherent once we try to bring precision. This incoherence is hidden by their vagueness in application. It argues that power is not a vague term in the sense that freedom or democracy are. The analyses of power in this book is designed to give a scientific account of our folk understandings and enable a scientific description and analysis of the power and luck structure. It returns to the type-token distinction bringing out how important the distinction is to the analysis of power in the book, which is directed at type-level explanations. The analysis is comparative statics, but dynamic game theory can provide a way to examine token power struggles as they unfold. It shows how the analysis offered in the book is structural despite seeing power as measured by the resources of agents – their capacity is given by the power and luck structure. It acknowledges that deep structure goes right into the heart of the formation of human preferences.

Despite the impressive amount of scholarly attention devoted to power analysis since World War II—and partially because of it—a number of questions remain unsettled or problematic. This chapter begins with a review of the fundamentals of power analysis, including the difference between relational and property concepts, the multiple dimensions of power, and the relevance of counterfactual conditions. It then considers twelve contentious “problems” in the power literature. These include theory-laden concepts, interests, essential contestability, zero-sum power, potential power, fungibility, intentions, measurement, reciprocal power, structural power, “power over” versus “power to,” and the role of costs in power analysis.

This chapter, which offers a synthetic assessment of how the lessons of the economics of innovation inform merger analysis, contrasts two dominant perspectives that inform merger analysis: Arrow versus Schumpeter. Where the Arrow approach suggests the positive impact of product market competition on innovation, the Schumpeter perspective focuses instead on the innovation inducements due to scale, and looks upon the prospects of market power. Innovation is enhanced when (1) firms have the prospect of either gaining or protecting sales by providing additional value to consumers (the Contestability Principle), (2) the level of intellectual property protection is higher (the Appropriability Principle), and (3) complementary assets can be combined to enhance innovative capabilities (the Synergy Principle). Illustrating the role of these principles in clarifying the innovation impact of mergers in particular cases and circumstances, careful economic analysis helps to clarify policy analysis and how long-standing conceptual frameworks can be enriched by careful, formal reconsideration.