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A Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics

Karen Neander

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
January 2018
ISBN:
9780262036146
eISBN:
9780262339865
Item type:
book
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262036146.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

How do thoughts get to be about the world, how do they refer to their contents? This book tackles the most tractable part of this ancient problem by offering a theory of original intentionality for ... More


The Psychological Realization of Fregean Sense

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis

in The Rules of Thought

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199661800
eISBN:
9780191748325
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter addresses Quinean worries about the version of the analytic-synthetic distinction developed in the two previous chapters. Attention is paid to a potential objector who, for the sake of ... More


Distal and Distant Red Squares

Karen Neander

in A Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
January 2018
ISBN:
9780262036146
eISBN:
9780262339865
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262036146.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The final chapter is about the notoriously difficult problem of distal content (the sixth of the content determinacy challenges listed in chapter 7). In relation to causal theories of reference, the ... More


Functional Role Theories and Tracking Theories Again

Angela Mendelovici

in The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190863807
eISBN:
9780190863838
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter considers functional role theories of intentionality, on which original intentionality is a matter of a representation's functional roles. According to short-arm functional role ... More


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