Search Results

This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection, according to which one has introspective access to the fact that one is in a certain mental state just by virtue of being in that mental state. This raises two questions. First, there is a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible? And second, there is an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, the chapter argues that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only if it is phenomenally individuated. And in response to the explanatory question, the chapter argues that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only if it is among the determinants of justification. This provides the basis of an argument for a phenomenal conception of justification, according to which a mental state is among the determinants of justification if and only if it is phenomenally individuated.

The chapter investigates the way in which our conscious judgments can be a guide to our beliefs, a topic discussed by Gareth Evans, Richard Moran, Christopher Peacocke, and Alex Byrne, among others. The chapter argues that our conscious judgments can give us a kind of justification to self-ascribe beliefs which is (i) distinctively first-personal, (ii) non-inferential, and (iii) fallible. The chapter then defends my view from a challenge from ‘constitutivist’ views in the epistemology of introspection, defended by philosophers such as Sydney Shoemaker, according to which only our beliefs themselves give us justification to self-ascribe beliefs.

This chapter develops a theory of categorical normativity, of those principles that have authority over us regardless of our ends and interests. It argues that there is an intimate connection between these norms and the conditions of agency. In this respect, it offers a version of constitutivism. But the version of constitutivism defended is unique in a few respects. First, it is naturalistic: agency is an emergent property, like the properties of biology and economics. Second, it is social: agency is something constructed by the complex interaction of agents. And third, it supports the normativity of a particular contractualist procedure: adhering to Kant’s Formula of the Realm of Ends is a condition on agency, and so a categorical requirement.

The paper presents and defends a specific variety of the constitutive account of self-knowledge of our propositional attitudes, labeled “constructivism”. It claims that such an account is suitable only for a limited amount of propositional mental states—those as commitments, as opposed to those as dispositions. It is argued that far from making the account irrelevant, its specificity points out that a complete account of our knowledge of our own mental states will have to be pluralistic, so as to respect the differences between various kinds of mental states in general and of propositional attitudes in particular, and of the diverse ways in which we do know them. In passing, it addresses the topic of self-deception, of psychological concepts’ mastery and of the role and semantic status of so-called “avowals”.

This chapter uses a roughly Nietzschean account of agency to argue that action has a second constitutive aim: power. It begins by offering a novel interpretation of Nietzsche’s obscure claim that all actions manifest, and are to be evaluated in terms of, “will to power.” In particular, it argues that Nietzsche’s will to power thesis can be read as a version of constitutivism. This Nietzschean version of constitutivism is based on a series of subtle claims about the psychology of willing and the nature of satisfaction, which jointly imply that all actions aim at encountering and overcoming resistance (this is what Nietzsche means by “will to power”). After arguing that we should accept the Nietzschean points about willing and satisfaction, the chapter concludes that action constitutively aims at power.

This chapter discusses several further views about normative judgements and properties. It argues that cognitivist expressivism and descriptive fictionalism face the symmetry objection, that Kantian constructivism faces a version of the regress objection, that Humean constructivism faces the false guarantee objection, that Kantian constitutivism faces either the reduction argument or the false guarantee and regress objections, and that quietism faces the symmetry objection. The chapter then considers different views about what makes a judgement or property normative, and explains how the book’s arguments are compatible with all of these views. It ends by showing that the conclusions of the previous chapters entail that the error theory is true.

This concluding chapter summarizes the book’s argument and reviews the ways in which Nietzschean constitutivism differs from Korsgaard’s and Velleman’s versions of constitutivism. The chapter shows that the chief differences are that the Nietzschean theory is a posteriori or empirical, that it is non-foundationalist, and that it is bipartite. These aspects of the theory render it particularly appealing: they enable it to avoid certain problems that plague alternative versions of constitutivism. The chapter concludes by contending that a Nietzschean version of constitutivism can answer the foundational question in ethics by showing how normative claims are justified. In particular, normative claims are grounded in the fact that human action aims jointly at agential activity and power.

This chapter develops a view according to which there is a constitutive aim of intention that parallels the constitutive aim of belief, and both of these constitutive aims can be used to explain some of the rational requirements governing intentions and beliefs. The chapter first considers in what sense there is an “aim of intention.” It begins by looking at many of the philosophical ideas associated with the “aim of belief,” noting that some of these won’t easily carry over to the “aim of intention” in the relevant way. However, if we understand constitutive aims in terms of the “job descriptions” of attitudes, there is room for optimism here. It then considers how the constitutive aims might explain certain consistency and coherence requirements, including means–ends coherence. The chapter critiques Michael Bratman’s suggestions for how these explanations might go, and offers an alternative view, which it calls “Non-normative Disjunctivism.”

Normative claims purport to have a certain authority over us: they tell us how we ought to live, or which actions we ought to perform, or which ends we ought to pursue. But what justifies this authority? In its general form, this is the foundational question in ethics: how is the authority of normative claims to be justified? This book defends constitutivism, the idea that we might answer this foundational question by turning to the philosophy of action. According to constitutivism, action has a certain structural feature—a constitutive aim—that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. The book argues that action has two constitutive aims: agential activity and power. These aims generate substantive normative results. This introductory chapter reviews the structure of the following chapters and provides a brief outline of the overall argument.

How can ethical claims be justified? This chapter argues that traditional attempts to answer this question encounter metaphysical, practical, and epistemological challenges. It argues that a new strategy in ethics—constitutivism—can avoid these challenges, and therefore offers the best prospect for justifying normative claims. Constitutivism is based on the idea that every action shares a common, higher-order aim, whose presence generates a standard of success for action. As this aim is present in every action, it generates universal reasons: every agent has reason to perform those actions that meet the standard of success. The chapter examines constitutivism in isolation from any particular view about the nature of action. It explains what is essential to the constitutivist approach and shows what would be necessary in order to derive normative claims from facts about the nature of action.

Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account of the nature of action. Recently, a number of objections have been levied at the very possibility of constitutivism. This chapter argues that these objections can be answered by clarifying the structure of the constitutivist theory. The constitutivist maintains that certain aims or standards have a privileged normative status precisely because they are inescapable. The chapter argues that this is constitutivism’s core idea: the authority of universal normative claims arises from a certain kind of inescapability. Once we appreciate the way in which this claim about inescapability functions, apparent objections to constitutivism can be dispelled.

David Velleman defends a constitutivist theory according to which action constitutively aims at self-knowledge, self-understanding, or intelligibility. This chapter reconstructs Velleman’s argument and contends that his theory encounters an insuperable difficulty: even if we grant Velleman his theory of action, his account of practical reason does not follow. In particular, the chapter argues that Velleman is unable to generate any claims about what there is more or most reason to do. Accordingly, his constitutivist theory is unsuccessful.

Christine Korsgaard defends a constitutivist theory according to which action’s constitutive standard is self-constitution. This chapter reconstructs Korsgaard’s argument for this conclusion and contends that her theory encounters an insuperable difficulty. The problem encountered by Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory is structurally analogous to the one that the previous chapter raised for Velleman’s theory. In particular, even if we grant Korsgaard her theory of action, her account of practical reason does not follow. Korsgaard’s arguments about the nature of action establish that we must act on principles that unify us to some extent; yet, in order to generate her account of practical reason, Korsgaard needs to show that must act on principles that fully unify us. The chapter argues that Korsgaard cannot establish this latter point. Accordingly, Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory is unsuccessful.

This chapter argues that action constitutively aims at agential activity. But what is agential activity? According to standard accounts, agential activity is associated with deliberative or reflective activity. The chapter argues on philosophical and empirical grounds that the active/passive distinction has nothing to do with whether the action was brought about in a reflective or deliberative manner. The chapter defends a new account of agential activity, according to which an agent is active in the production of her action iff two conditions are met: (i) the agent approves of her action, and (ii) further knowledge of the motives figuring in the etiology of this action would not undermine her approval of the action. By drawing on a psychologically realistic account of motivation and agency, we can show that agents constitutively aim at this form of agential activity.

The previous chapter argued that action has a constitutive aim of power. To aim at power is to aim at encountering and overcoming resistance. This chapter explains how the constitutive aim of power generates normative conclusions about what we have reason to do and what we have reason to value. The chapter also considers the way in which the constitutive aim of power interacts with the constitutive aim of agential activity. It argues that the bipartite structure of this constitutivist theory enables it to overcome two important objections. The first objection is this: why should we treat inescapable tendencies as normative rather than as deplorable accidents? The second objection is this: even if we are committed to aiming at some end, why should we strive to fulfill this aim maximally?

The previous chapters argued that action has two constitutive aims: agential activity and power. This chapter investigates the specific, substantive normative conclusions entailed by these aims. First, it considers the way in which Nietzschean constitutivism undermines a central claim present in ordinary ethical thought: the insistence that the same set of values is appropriate for all rational agents. Second, it asks how egalitarian values fare in the Nietzschean version of constitutivism. Finally, it examines the individuals who Nietzsche presents as ethical exemplars. In sum, the chapter provides an overview of some of the central normative implications of Nietzschean constitutivism.