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In the first section, the analysis defines the general feminist aims and parameters of the sub‐area of Political Representation Policy. It then discusses the range and timing of policies found in the 13 countries and closes with a discussion of the criteria for selecting the four policy cases covered in the chapter. Political Representation policies include symbolic and material policies that enable women to achieve positions in elected and appointed office, semi‐public and public advisory boards, political parties, trade unions, and, more recently, organizations in the private sector. In the second section, the results of the analysis of the policy case literature on the dynamics of feminist policy formation is presented for the following four cases: The 1982 Affirmative Action Resolution of the ONDP in Canada; Institutionalising Pre‐Election Campaigns in Norway; The 1999 Constitutional Parity Amendment in France; and 1993 and 1995 Quota Legislation in Italy. The analysis concludes that the most important factors in determining feminist policy success in this particular sub‐sector of feminist policy may be strategic partnerships between women's policy agencies, women's movement actors in political parties, and women in political offices, the presence of a constitutional culture, and non‐feminist allies

This chapter highlights two important features distinguishing Germany and England: the differing weights of fundamental rights within contemporary constitutional culture and the divergent conception of the prisoners' fundamental rights status. In contrast to Germany's faith in fundamental rights and its systematic and comprehensive approach to fundamental rights protection, England experiences a cultural tension between an emergent rights culture and an established tradition of rights scepticism and respect for parliamentary sovereignty. The English and European conception of the prisoner's fundamental rights status also does not include any explicit articulation of the prisoner's administrative rights status or any positive conception of prisoners' rights.

Constitutions work by constraining, constructing, and constituting politics. Constitutions constrain politics when citizens and governing officials subordinate their policy preferences to constitutional norms. Constitutions construct politics when citizens and governing officials follow the rules that determine whose policy preferences and constitutional understandings at any time are the official law of the land. Constitutions constitute politics when citizens and elected officials are socialized in ways that lead them to internalize constitutional values and regard constitutional processes as the only legitimate means for resolving legal and policy disputes. The common obsessive focus on constitutional constraints ignores alternative means by which the Constitution of the United States works to protect fundamental rights and limit government, disregards entirely how the Constitution of the United States promotes vital constitutional purposes that cannot be reduced to legal norms, and provides an impoverished account of the constitutional crises that have wracked American constitutionalism

This chapter discusses the processes for amending state constitutions, the origin and evolution of these processes, and the varying use of these processes across the 50 states. All states provide for legislature-generated amendments, whereby legislators can propose amendments, which in all but one case have to be ratified by voters. Every state also allows for constitutional conventions to be called to propose amendments or wholesale revision of state constitutions. Eighteen states permit citizen-initiated amendments, where citizens can place amendments on the ballot and then vote to approve them. In some states, constitutional revision commissions can also generate amendments. The chapter also shows that the 50 states vary in how often they make use of these processes, in that some state constitutions are amended once every few years, whereas in other states several amendments are adopted each year. These differences in amendment rates are attributable to various factors, including differences in the rules for amending constitutions and the prevailing state constitutional cultures.

This essay applies new developments in complex systems theory to understand how constitutional change can occur informally, without amendment. The chapter develops a three-part theory of constitutional dynamics by analyzing the the complex interaction of the federal system's varied building blocks: the national government, the state governments, and the auxiliary institutions of governance (such as a judiciary), and the non-governmental institutions, including the party system. First, constitutional innovation derives from constitutional ambiguity and institutional imperfection. Second, complementary institutions constrain informal constitutional change to an incremental path, preventing radical ruptures from past practice. Third, through a model of behavioral spillovers and cross-domain influences, the chapter offers a theory of the emergence of constitutional trends. These dynamics may help us to to understand how periods of centralization and decentralization emerge, even as the constitutional text remains constant.

This chapter presents a detailed and explicit short-term reform package to help protect traditional freedoms in our new world. These reforms are (1) strengthening national constitutional institutions for democratizing global policies; (2) extending national bills of rights to apply extraterritorially, giving priority to the international flow of information and ideas; (3) creating bills of rights for international organizations, beginning with administrative procedure rights; (4) developing interparliamentary cooperation among democracies; (5) creating an international organization watch-dog agency; and (6) creating a global constitutional culture.

This chapter explores the relationship between counterinsurgency and constitutional design. Counterinsurgency recognizes powerful individuals and groups vying for political power through force and fear. Constitutional design assumes equal individuals creating a social contract through reflection and choice. In Afghanistan and Iraq, counterinsurgency and constitutional design occurred at the same time. Both enterprises required high-level political agreement and ground-level acceptance, and both involved politics, law, and security. In general, counterinsurgents shape constitutional design by influencing the choice of constitution-makers, the constraints or parameters they face, and the underlying constitutional culture in the society. In a similar manner, the design of the constitution can influence the course of counterinsurgency operations by entrenching bottom-up, evolutionary, and fragmented structures that embrace the organic approach.