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The three constitutional crises examined are that caused by the rejection by the House of Lords of Lloyd George's `People's Budget’ of 1909; that caused by the Home Rule Act of 1914; and the abdication in 1936. Each of these crises posed difficult problems for the sovereigns involved—George V and Edward VIII—and for their Prime Ministers—Asquith and Baldwin. In 1914, George V seriously contemplated refusing royal assent to legislation passed by Parliament. In 1936, abdication, a voluntary renunciation, seemed a threat to the very institution of monarchy, which depends upon automatic hereditary descent. But, paradoxically, the abdication heralded a vote of confidence for monarchy and the new style of limited, constitutional monarchy, as represented by George VI.

Purpose of a head of state. Executive and non‐executive heads of state in some democratic constitutions. Australian constitutional crisis 1975. Sir David Smith fails to wake the Queen's Private Secretary. Argument for monarchy: certainty. Arguments against: democracy; quality of head of state. The Hanoverian dynasty as UK heads of state. How to elect a head of state?. What would happen to the Royal Prerogative in a democracy. The George V—Asquith exchange of letters in autumn 1913.

The first of two case studies of Lloyd George. Discusses his successes at widening the social base of the Liberal Party and at provoking the House of Lords into fighting and losing the constitutional crisis of 1909–11. Considers why he failed to construct a hegemonic centre party after the First World War, or to stifle the rise of the Labour Party.

Malaysia and Pakistan were created from the rump of British colonialism in India and Southeast Asia. Both states lacked national identity or a unified polity that preceded independence. Both confronted social divisions that were the legacy of the colonial era. In fact, in both countries the struggle for independence was not directed against the British, but was a competition of racial, religious, and ethnic rivals. As weak states, they were unable to proceed with effective state formation. Economic Disparities in Malaysia led to racial and ethnic tensions. Weak state institutions and constitutional crises led to ethnic tensions in Pakistan.

Constitutions work by constraining, constructing, and constituting politics. Constitutions constrain politics when citizens and governing officials subordinate their policy preferences to constitutional norms. Constitutions construct politics when citizens and governing officials follow the rules that determine whose policy preferences and constitutional understandings at any time are the official law of the land. Constitutions constitute politics when citizens and elected officials are socialized in ways that lead them to internalize constitutional values and regard constitutional processes as the only legitimate means for resolving legal and policy disputes. The common obsessive focus on constitutional constraints ignores alternative means by which the Constitution of the United States works to protect fundamental rights and limit government, disregards entirely how the Constitution of the United States promotes vital constitutional purposes that cannot be reduced to legal norms, and provides an impoverished account of the constitutional crises that have wracked American constitutionalism

Dysfunctional politics in the United States and Donald Trump’s presidency have caused many people to worry that the country is in the middle of a constitutional crisis. That is not the case. A constitutional crisis occurs when a constitution is about to fail at its central purpose—to keep struggles for power within the boundaries of law and the Constitution. Constitutional crises are rare in American history, and the United States is not currently in a constitutional crisis, although it is facing a series of worrisome political crises. When Americans talk about constitutional crisis they are really describing constitutional rot, which is discussed in the next chapter.

This chapter concerns the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland. It places the Tribunal within the context of Poland’s turbulent political history and shows how the Constitutional Tribunal had to take on a role that reached far beyond the traditional competences of constitutional courts during a period of political change. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal has undergone a significant evolution during its thirty years of existence. Founded in the communist state as a dependent institution, it has become an independent constitutional court on the basis of the current constitution. In addition, the chapter gives an overview of the Constitutional Tribunal as an institution and lays out the proceedings and judgments the Tribunal carries out. It takes a closer look in particular at how judicial review is conducted under the Tribunal. To conclude, the chapter discusses the constitutional crisis in Poland.

This chapter focuses on the constitutional crisis of Athens and the reforms that followed it. After the collapse of democracy four distinct governments—three oligarchic and one democratic—rose and fell in the span of roughly a decade. As the Athenians responded to the failures of these governments, they came to identify, collectively, the basic features that a governmental structure had to display to command their consent. The process of consensus-building revolved around the notion of patrios politeia. The meaning of patrios politeia evolved during the struggles. If under the first oligarchic government the notion expressed a vague connection with Athens' past, by the end of the civil war, it became closely associated with the concept of legality, particularly as embodied by Athens' archaic lawgiver Solon. When the constitutional struggles came to an end, the consensus on Solonian legality inspired a set of reforms, which created a new self-enforcing democratic constitution. The reforms were self-enforcing in the sense that they made both the oligarchs and the democrats better off.

This chapter discusses the various emergency powers of the late Roman Republic. Emergencies provide the context for the invocation of higher-level constitutional norms. When ordinary legislation does not seem to suffice, and extra-legal measures are said to be needed, these are both defended and argued against in the name of rules that have a higher degree of validity than mere laws. For this reason the many arguments waged about the bestowal of extraordinary powers that are so typical of the late Republic offer an ideal window into the inchoate constitutionalism of late republican political thought and practice.

This chapter explores the recent constitutional history of Turkey, describing reform attempts made during the period from 1982 up to the present. It highlights the transition from an approach of consensual constitution making to a majoritarian effort, which plunged the political order of the country into an extended constitutional crisis. The Turkish constitutional experience from 1982 stands out as a case that refutes the thesis that it does not matter how one organizes original constitution making, how one begins in the beginning. The making of the Constitution of 1982 was severely pathological; it had important consequences for the constitutional result; and all this matters down to this day, despite a series of impressive procedural and substantive attempts to improve on that result. These problems are the result of constitutional dualism, which leaves part of the state outside the constitution.

This introductory chapter begins with brief discussions of the constitutional crisis generated by the machinery of government itself, and the potential impact of the decision in Bush v. Gore. It then provides an overview of the subsequent chapters. The book is divided into two parts. Part One focuses on a tightly interconnected set of questions: Does Bush v. Gore have a solid—or even plausible—foundation in legal principle? If not, how are we to reestablish the nation's confidence in the rule of law? Part Two confronts this legalistic focus with a series of political issues.

This chapter supplies the necessary context for the discussion of institutional change. First, it provides an account of the early development of Athens' laws and legal institutions. Second, it reconstructs Athens' political and economic structure in the period that preceded the constitutional crisis. Third, it offers an analysis of the reasons behind the collapse of democracy: namely, a combination of external pressures and a crisis of legitimacy rooted in the Assembly's inability to credibly commit to policy. The chapter also selectively reviews elements of Athens' archaic development, focusing in particular on the work of the early lawgivers. It focuses on the polis' fifth-century political system and economy. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the reasons behind the collapse of the fifth-century democracy.

This chapter examines the nature of legislative deliberation and the political sources of legislative majorities as dominant themes of American constitutional thinking. Drawing on James Madison's insights based on his memorandum ‘Vices of the Political System of the U. States’, it considers how the American conception of the rule of law developed amid the republican innovations of the late eighteenth century. It looks at the constitutional crisis of the late 1780s and the underlying aspects of governance in the colonies-becoming-commonwealths of Anglophone North America, with reference to Madison's arguments regarding the ‘impotence of the laws of the states’ and ‘perspicuity’ in the realms of law and politics. It also discusses Madison's innovative approach to republican constitutionalism as well as his conception of the effect of popular opinion and interest on the pursuit of public good and private rights.

This chapter explains the conditions under which constituent assemblies emerge. As others have argued, more than one condition seems necessary, mostly having to do with pressures on the state to address a governance crisis. And yet, new constituent assemblies are more likely to emerge when the Incumbent feels he or she has the power advantage. The chapter makes two points. First, compelling structural conditions (exceptional circumstances) triggered constitutional assemblies in combination with the rise of the Opposition. Second, a strong desire by the Incumbent to seek new powers also triggered constituent assemblies, but only when the Incumbent anticipated a large power. This chapter offers as well a discussion of several cases of aborted constituent assemblies to further illustrate the role of power asymmetry as an explanatory factor.