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This chapter concludes the discussion of the ticking bomb question as a one of pure individual morality. For the purpose of defending an absolute prohibition on torture a minimal absolutist position, rather than a wider moral theory, is sufficient. The overwhelming strength of the ‘numbers’ in the torture-justifying argument is also its moral downfall, among other things because it must allow the torture of the innocent, making each of us, potentially, a victim of torture — as well as a torturer. The qualities of character needed for one person to inflict unimaginable cruelty upon another cannot sit easily with our concept of a good character. A torture-justifier would indeed commit atrocities, where necessary, to save us, but only if we belong to a large enough number of potential victims. The minimal absolutist, in contrast, would always do anything humanly possible to save innocent lives.

This chapter provides the book's conclusions. The consequentialist morality of extreme situations, as advocated by those who justify interrogational torture in a ‘pure’ theoretical ticking bomb situation (TBS), is reflected in the actual legal positions and practices of states facing terrorism that have chosen to torture. However, such states face moral, practical and legal obstacles, some of them insurmountable. The words of a UK diplomat, a Palestinian would-be suicide bomber, and an international terrorist are quoted to illustrate everyone's freedom to make — even facing emergencies, danger, and oppression — minimal absolutist choices, rejecting totally both terrorism and torture. Such choices are not fanatic, impractical, or defeatist. In facing a TBS, we must do anything humanly possible to save the lives at risk, which means doing everything in our power that does not involve losing our own humanity. Which in turn means never to torture or otherwise ill-treat another human being.

This chapter introduces the methodology and structure of Part I, which addresses the question of whether it is morally justifiable for an individual to torture a terrorist when it is the only way to obtain information that would save many innocent lives. This scenario — the ticking bomb situation (TBS) — is to be discussed in a ‘pure’ form, free from factual doubts and society-wide or long term consequences. The chapter outlines the parameters for discussing the question, and defines the features of the presumed situation. It explains the methodological approach to be adopted in this Part: the scope is to be kept limited; positions put forward are required to maintain strict logical form; a dialogic, conversational style is to be used; and an open, eclectic approach to content is to be maintained.

This chapter addresses the wider issue that a moral agent facing a ticking bomb situation (TBS) should consider: whether ultimately a decision to torture the terrorist or not should be determined by consequences or by absolute moral prohibitions. First, the consequences of not torturing in the scenario and the planned terrorist attack occurring are described, illustrated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and a terrorist attack in Jerusalem. Then the two prominent moral-philosophical views clashing over the morality of action, including in such extreme emergencies, are outlined: on the one hand consequentialism (or utilitarianism), advocated by the likes of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, and determining the morality of actions by their consequences; on the other deontology, whose main advocate was Immanuel Kant, which emphasizes duties to oneself and others, and stipulates that certain types of acts must be prohibited absolutely (‘no-go areas’).

This chapter details the consequentialist arguments for torturing the terrorist in a ticking bomb situation. Consequentialist/utilitarians argue that a moral cost-benefit analysis needs to be made, pitting the suffering of the one terrorist under torture against the suffering of so many innocent civilians if the terrorist bomb were to explode. Such analysis would necessarily lead to a lesser evil choice in favour of torturing the terrorist. Deontologists with a ‘disastrous consequences clause’, allowing for consequentialist considerations to prevail, albeit only in extreme emergencies, raise arguments for torture that are identical. Therefore it is concluded that their approach to the ticking bomb dilemma is indistinguishable, for the purposes of this discussion, from that of consistent consequentialists.

This chapter outlines the author's minimal absolutist view, a ‘bare-boned’ moral view that certain acts must be prohibited absolutely, i.e., must never be performed, whatever the consequences. Reviewing questionable candidate acts for such prohibition, including lying and killing, and explaining the ‘slippery surface‘ method of logically testing the scope of moral views, the chapter then argues that the opposing view — anti-absolutism — cannot logically allow the prohibition of any act, however horrendous. Thus, it must allow torturing babies to death for fun if this would save thousands of other babies. Two real-life examples of minimal absolutism are provided: the prohibition of cruel death penalty in the West and the universal rejection of experiments on humans without informed consent, even if, used to develop a vaccine for HIV/AIDS, it would save millions of lives. It is concluded that anti-absolutism must justify atrocities, including terrorism, and is morally corrupting and enslaving.