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The police shooting death of Michael Brown Jr. in Ferguson, Missouri, in August 2014 set off a policing crisis that reverberated across the world. The United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (DOJ) intervened in this crisis, initiating a pattern-or-practice investigation of the Ferguson Police Department. This investigation resulted in a transformative Findings Report and federal consent decree. To fully assess the impact of DOJ’s intervention, it is helpful to conceptualize America’s policing crisis as a dual crisis: one acute, the other chronic. When assessing DOJ’s intervention in Ferguson through this lens, readers can see that DOJ’s work is an important, albeit partial, response to the chronic crisis and has only an ancillary impact on the acute crisis.

This chapter examines the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) leadership's change of heart after signing a settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its resistance to the consent decree that formalized the settlement. The settlement in US v. IBT did not guarantee eradication of Cosa Nostra's influence in the IBT. From August 1989 to September 1992, the IBT placed Judge David Edelstein and the court-appointed officers under legal siege. In the months following issuance of the consent decree, the international union and a number of IBT locals repeatedly challenged or refused to comply with the court officers' decisions, prompting the court officers to seek judicial orders. This chapter considers the IBT's counterattacks after signing the consent decree as well as Edelstein's opinion on the All Writs Act injunction requested by US Attorney Otto Obermaier prohibiting anyone from filing any lawsuit pertaining to the consent decree in any forum other than Edelstein's courtroom.

This chapter examines the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) leadership's change of heart after signing a settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its resistance to the consent decree that formalized the settlement. The settlement in US v. IBT did not guarantee eradication of Cosa Nostra's influence in the IBT. From August 1989 to September 1992, the IBT placed Judge David Edelstein and the court-appointed officers under legal siege. In the months following issuance of the consent decree, the international union and a number of IBT locals repeatedly challenged or refused to comply with the court officers' decisions, prompting the court officers to seek judicial orders. This chapter considers the IBT's counterattacks after signing the consent decree as well as Edelstein's opinion on the All Writs Act injunction requested by US Attorney Otto Obermaier prohibiting anyone from filing any lawsuit pertaining to the consent decree in any forum other than Edelstein's courtroom.

This chapter reflects on the lessons that can be learned from US v. IBT and speculates about how the case will conclude. It places US v. IBT, a government lawsuit that charged the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) with racketeering and being associated with organized crime through Cosa Nostra, in political context. It also examines the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), enacted by Congress in 1970 to combat Cosa Nostra's infiltration of the legitimate economy, including labor unions, as well as the US v. IBT consent decree. Finally, it outlines the US v. IBT lessons for union democracy and for court-supervised institutional reform, along with the issue of who should bear the case's remediation costs.

This chapter examines the challenges faced by municipal governments in managing their water resources, as rapidly growing urban populations and aging infrastructure contribute to sewer overflows, contaminated storm water runoff, flooding, and other problems. The federal Clean Water Act establishes the regulatory framework in which cities must operate. Having faced recent litigation for regulatory violations, three Kentucky cities—Lexington, Louisville, and Northern Kentucky (Cincinnati)—provide examples of urban areas grappling with these problems. Their subsequent experiences under consent decrees also showcase innovations in water management policies, including green infrastructure and watershed-based approaches, which will aid communities in rising to these challenges.

This chapter reflects on the lessons that can be learned from US v. IBT and speculates about how the case will conclude. It places US v. IBT, a government lawsuit that charged the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) with racketeering and being associated with organized crime through Cosa Nostra, in political context. It also examines the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), enacted by Congress in 1970 to combat Cosa Nostra's infiltration of the legitimate economy, including labor unions, as well as the US v. IBT consent decree. Finally, it outlines the US v. IBT lessons for union democracy and for court-supervised institutional reform, along with the issue of who should bear the case's remediation costs.

This chapter focuses on the disciplinary cases prosecuted by the court-appointed investigations officer and adjudicated by the independent administrator against International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) officials from 1989 to 1992. It begins with an overview of sources of IBT disciplinary law and the steps involved in a disciplinary case before turning to a discussion of how officers involved in US v. IBT laid down a comprehensive administrative law of IBT's disciplinary violations. It then considers how the consent decree made administrative prosecution of violations of the IBT's constitution, IBT locals' bylaws, federal criminal and labor laws, and the consent decree itself the primary means of ridding the union of organized crime's influence.

This chapter focuses on the disciplinary cases prosecuted by the court-appointed investigations officer and adjudicated by the independent administrator against International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) officials from 1989 to 1992. It begins with an overview of sources of IBT disciplinary law and the steps involved in a disciplinary case before turning to a discussion of how officers involved in US v. IBT laid down a comprehensive administrative law of IBT's disciplinary violations. It then considers how the consent decree made administrative prosecution of violations of the IBT's constitution, IBT locals' bylaws, federal criminal and labor laws, and the consent decree itself the primary means of ridding the union of organized crime's influence.

This chapter examines how the Department of Justice's (DOJ) lawyers adapted the civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) law for use against entrenched corruption and racketeering in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). It begins with an overview of RICO and its provisions that are relevant to the US v. IBT civil RICO complaint. It then looks at the defendants in US v. IBT, which include Cosa Nostra in addition to IBT and goes on to discuss various reactions to the case. It also considers the pretrial motions, discovery, and depositions related to the case and concludes with an assessment of settlement signed by the IBT with the DOJ providing for three court-appointed officers to enforce a consent decree imposing strong disciplinary and election remedies.

Not until the Rampart Scandal (the exposure of wide- spread corruption in the LAPD’s Rampart anti-gang Community Resources against Street Hoodlums unit) in the late 1990s led to a federal consent decree did the LAPD face rigorous oversight. While leading to a new era in the LAPD’s history, such oversight also opened possibilities for expanded police authority because decades of get-tough policies embedded police power in urban politics. As the conclusion to Policing Los Angeles, this chapter demonstrates the continued operation of the police power as well as the ways activists and residents in Los Angeles have continued to push for reform and restructuring of the Los Angeles Police department.

This chapter examines how the Department of Justice's (DOJ) lawyers adapted the civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) law for use against entrenched corruption and racketeering in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). It begins with an overview of RICO and its provisions that are relevant to the US v. IBT civil RICO complaint. It then looks at the defendants in US v. IBT, which include Cosa Nostra in addition to IBT and goes on to discuss various reactions to the case. It also considers the pretrial motions, discovery, and depositions related to the case and concludes with an assessment of settlement signed by the IBT with the DOJ providing for three court-appointed officers to enforce a consent decree imposing strong disciplinary and election remedies.

This chapter focuses on the watershed 1991 election of International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) international officers, the first election supervised by the court-appointed election officer. In negotiating the US v. IBT consent decree, US Attorney Rudolph Giuliani accepted the suggestion that, given free and fair elections, the IBT would elect candidates who opposed corruption and racketeering. The consent decree thus mandated election procedures that were more democratic than those of any other labor union in the United States. This chapter first provides an overview of the 1991 election rules before looking at the candidates for general president and their slates. It then considers the election campaigns, the preballoting election protests, and balloting and results, which saw insurgent candidate Ron Carey winning in the one-man-one-vote, secret mail-ballot election.

This chapter focuses on the watershed 1991 election of International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) international officers, the first election supervised by the court-appointed election officer. In negotiating the US v. IBT consent decree, US Attorney Rudolph Giuliani accepted the suggestion that, given free and fair elections, the IBT would elect candidates who opposed corruption and racketeering. The consent decree thus mandated election procedures that were more democratic than those of any other labor union in the United States. This chapter first provides an overview of the 1991 election rules before looking at the candidates for general president and their slates. It then considers the election campaigns, the preballoting election protests, and balloting and results, which saw insurgent candidate Ron Carey winning in the one-man-one-vote, secret mail-ballot election.

This chapter focuses on the enforcement of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters's (IBT) administrative discipline during Ron Carey's tenure as general president from 1992 to 1997. It describes how, soon after Carey took office, disciplinary authority under the US v. IBT consent decree shifted from the investigations officer and independent administrator to an independent review board (IRB). It also considers the IRB phase of the remediation that gives the IBT a role in charging, adjudicating, and punishing disciplinary offenses, along with Carey's resistance to the IRB. Finally, it examines Carey's initiatives aimed at eradicating corruption at IBT, including the creation of the Ethical Practices Committee and his imposition of trusteeships.

The epilogue explores the impact of the Trump administration on policing in America. While New York City moved to strengthen ties between police and the community, the same cannot be said of the federal government. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, with the support of President Donald Trump, has seemed keen on a return to the very same “tough on crime” policies that marred previous decades.

This chapter focuses on the scandal that marred the International Brotherhood of Teamsters's (IBT) 1996 election for general president. It first provides an overview of the three candidates for the 1996 election, namely: Ron Carey, Sam Theodus, and James P. Hoffa. It then considers the election rules and the IBT's Philadelphia convention held on July 15–19, 1996 before moving to a discussion of the election campaigns by the candidates. It also examines Carey's victory and the post-election discovery that IBT funds were used to finance his reelection campaign, along with the court-appointed officers' decision to declare the 1996 election null and void, the hearings before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on the invalidated 1996 election and the upcoming 1998 rerun election, the disqualification of Carey from the rerun election, and his expulsion from the IBT. Finally, it analyzes reactions to the election scandal and suggests that the US v. IBT consent decree had a role in Carey's rise and fall.

This chapter focuses on the enforcement of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters's (IBT) administrative discipline during Ron Carey's tenure as general president from 1992 to 1997. It describes how, soon after Carey took office, disciplinary authority under the US v. IBT consent decree shifted from the investigations officer and independent administrator to an independent review board (IRB). It also considers the IRB phase of the remediation that gives the IBT a role in charging, adjudicating, and punishing disciplinary offenses, along with Carey's resistance to the IRB. Finally, it examines Carey's initiatives aimed at eradicating corruption at IBT, including the creation of the Ethical Practices Committee and his imposition of trusteeships.

This chapter focuses on the scandal that marred the International Brotherhood of Teamsters's (IBT) 1996 election for general president. It first provides an overview of the three candidates for the 1996 election, namely: Ron Carey, Sam Theodus, and James P. Hoffa. It then considers the election rules and the IBT's Philadelphia convention held on July 15–19, 1996 before moving to a discussion of the election campaigns by the candidates. It also examines Carey's victory and the post-election discovery that IBT funds were used to finance his reelection campaign, along with the court-appointed officers' decision to declare the 1996 election null and void, the hearings before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on the invalidated 1996 election and the upcoming 1998 rerun election, the disqualification of Carey from the rerun election, and his expulsion from the IBT. Finally, it analyzes reactions to the election scandal and suggests that the US v. IBT consent decree had a role in Carey's rise and fall.

This chapter covers affirmative action as it applies to equal employment opportunity (EEO). The authors begin with an overview of the Office of Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) and Executive Order 11246 (EO 11246, as amended). The bulk of the chapter focuses on voluntary affirmative action programs and the important cases that have shaped the legal landscape in this arena. Many of the cases that are covered involve so-called reverse discrimination, where members of a majority group challenge the legality of affirmative action. The chapter also includes sections on affirmative action with respect to consent decrees and set-aside programs. The authors also note the distinction of how an applicant is defined by the OFCCP and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Best practices regarding affirmative action programs are provided as well as a list of supplemental readings.