Richard Swinburne (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264898
- eISBN:
- 9780191754074
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the ...
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Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the processes in our brains which accompanying our decisions. The pioneer work of Benjamin Libet has led many neuroscientists to hold the view that our conscious intentions do not cause our bodily movements but merely accompany them. Then, Quantum Theory suggests that not all physical events are fully determined by their causes, and so opens the possibility that not all brain events may be fully determined by their causes, and so maybe — if neuroscience does not rule this out — there is a role for intentions after all. Finally, a theorem of mathematics, Gödel's theory, has been interpreted to suggest that the initial conditions and laws of development of a mathematician's brain could not fully determine which mathematical conjectures he sees to be true. The extent to which human behaviour is determined by brain events may well depend on whether conscious events, such as intentions, are themselves merely brain events, or whether they are separate events which interact with brain events (perhaps in the radical form that intentions are events in our soul, and not in our body). This book considers what kind of free will we need in order to be morally responsible for our actions or be held guilty in a court of law. Is it sufficient merely that our actions are uncaused by brain events?Less
Do humans have a free choice of which actions to perform? Three recent developments of modern science can help us to answer this question. First, new investigative tools have enabled us to study the processes in our brains which accompanying our decisions. The pioneer work of Benjamin Libet has led many neuroscientists to hold the view that our conscious intentions do not cause our bodily movements but merely accompany them. Then, Quantum Theory suggests that not all physical events are fully determined by their causes, and so opens the possibility that not all brain events may be fully determined by their causes, and so maybe — if neuroscience does not rule this out — there is a role for intentions after all. Finally, a theorem of mathematics, Gödel's theory, has been interpreted to suggest that the initial conditions and laws of development of a mathematician's brain could not fully determine which mathematical conjectures he sees to be true. The extent to which human behaviour is determined by brain events may well depend on whether conscious events, such as intentions, are themselves merely brain events, or whether they are separate events which interact with brain events (perhaps in the radical form that intentions are events in our soul, and not in our body). This book considers what kind of free will we need in order to be morally responsible for our actions or be held guilty in a court of law. Is it sufficient merely that our actions are uncaused by brain events?
HOWARD ROBINSON
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264898
- eISBN:
- 9780191754074
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Substance dualism is the view that humans are essentially immaterial souls, and that conscious events are events in that soul. This chapter considers the arguments for and against this view. It ...
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Substance dualism is the view that humans are essentially immaterial souls, and that conscious events are events in that soul. This chapter considers the arguments for and against this view. It argues that such questions as ‘Would I have existed if my mother's egg had been fertilized by a different though genetically identical sperm from my father?’ must have a sharp yes-or-no answer, but that they would not have a sharp answer if being me consisted simply of being made of similar genetic material and having a similar conscious life.Less
Substance dualism is the view that humans are essentially immaterial souls, and that conscious events are events in that soul. This chapter considers the arguments for and against this view. It argues that such questions as ‘Would I have existed if my mother's egg had been fertilized by a different though genetically identical sperm from my father?’ must have a sharp yes-or-no answer, but that they would not have a sharp answer if being me consisted simply of being made of similar genetic material and having a similar conscious life.
David Hodgson
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240686
- eISBN:
- 9780191680236
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240686.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Part I of this book summarizes some views basic to the general approach. It elaborates on mental events, the distinctions between them and physical events; and trace possible views on the ...
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Part I of this book summarizes some views basic to the general approach. It elaborates on mental events, the distinctions between them and physical events; and trace possible views on the relationship between the two. It also outlines the current consensus on the question in science and philosophy. Part II presents the main arguments against the mechanistic view of the brain-mind, which is at the heart of the current consensus. Part III considers quantum physics, its basic mathematics, its interpretation, and some of its implications for the mind-matter question. Part IV gives suggestions for the resolution of the mind-matter question.Less
Part I of this book summarizes some views basic to the general approach. It elaborates on mental events, the distinctions between them and physical events; and trace possible views on the relationship between the two. It also outlines the current consensus on the question in science and philosophy. Part II presents the main arguments against the mechanistic view of the brain-mind, which is at the heart of the current consensus. Part III considers quantum physics, its basic mathematics, its interpretation, and some of its implications for the mind-matter question. Part IV gives suggestions for the resolution of the mind-matter question.
