Bryan D. Jones, Sean M. Theriault, and Michelle C. Whyman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780226625805
- eISBN:
- 9780226626130
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226626130.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
In Chapter 4, we examine the nuts and bolts of the Great Broadening using the congressional hearings dataset. We show how the step-by-step expansion happened and then how it stopped and even ...
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In Chapter 4, we examine the nuts and bolts of the Great Broadening using the congressional hearings dataset. We show how the step-by-step expansion happened and then how it stopped and even retreated under the pressure of a conservative counterrevolution.Less
In Chapter 4, we examine the nuts and bolts of the Great Broadening using the congressional hearings dataset. We show how the step-by-step expansion happened and then how it stopped and even retreated under the pressure of a conservative counterrevolution.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226470740
- eISBN:
- 9780226470771
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226470771.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Ideology does not matter in congressional politics only insofar as individual members have personal beliefs that lead them to take predictable positions. Both Democrats and Republicans have an ...
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Ideology does not matter in congressional politics only insofar as individual members have personal beliefs that lead them to take predictable positions. Both Democrats and Republicans have an interest in focusing debate on issues that unify their party internally and that distinguish them from the opposition. This chapter examines variation in the presence of ideological issues on the Senate agenda. It argues that the strengthening of the parties as teams has helped to focus the legislative agenda on questions of ideology that most reliably distinguish between the parties. Much of the increase in Senate party conflict between 1981 and 2004 can be attributed to changes in the content of the Senate agenda. The types of ideological issues that caused the most division and partisanship in earlier periods became progressively more pronounced on the congressional agenda. Meanwhile, those issues that often triggered party conflict in earlier periods represented a smaller share of the agenda. In other words, changes in the content of the Senate agenda promoted higher levels of partisan voting.Less
Ideology does not matter in congressional politics only insofar as individual members have personal beliefs that lead them to take predictable positions. Both Democrats and Republicans have an interest in focusing debate on issues that unify their party internally and that distinguish them from the opposition. This chapter examines variation in the presence of ideological issues on the Senate agenda. It argues that the strengthening of the parties as teams has helped to focus the legislative agenda on questions of ideology that most reliably distinguish between the parties. Much of the increase in Senate party conflict between 1981 and 2004 can be attributed to changes in the content of the Senate agenda. The types of ideological issues that caused the most division and partisanship in earlier periods became progressively more pronounced on the congressional agenda. Meanwhile, those issues that often triggered party conflict in earlier periods represented a smaller share of the agenda. In other words, changes in the content of the Senate agenda promoted higher levels of partisan voting.
Frances E. Lee
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226470740
- eISBN:
- 9780226470771
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226470771.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This book argues that the congressional agenda includes many issues about which liberals and conservatives generally agree. Even over these matters, though, senators from the Democratic Party and ...
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This book argues that the congressional agenda includes many issues about which liberals and conservatives generally agree. Even over these matters, though, senators from the Democratic Party and Republican Party tend to fight with each other. What explains this discord? This book contends that many partisan battles are rooted in competition for power rather than disagreement over the rightful role of government. This is the first book to systematically distinguish Senate disputes centering on ideological questions from the large proportion of them that do not, and it foregrounds the role of power struggle in partisan conflict. Presidential leadership, for example, inherently polarizes legislators who can influence public opinion of the president and his party by how they handle his agenda. Senators also exploit good government measures and floor debate to embarrass opponents and burnish their own party's image — even when the issues involved are broadly supported or low-stakes. Moreover, the book suggests that the congressional agenda itself amplifies conflict by increasingly focusing on issues that reliably differentiate the parties. With the new president pledging to stem the tide of partisan polarization, this book provides a timely taxonomy of exactly what stands in his way.Less
This book argues that the congressional agenda includes many issues about which liberals and conservatives generally agree. Even over these matters, though, senators from the Democratic Party and Republican Party tend to fight with each other. What explains this discord? This book contends that many partisan battles are rooted in competition for power rather than disagreement over the rightful role of government. This is the first book to systematically distinguish Senate disputes centering on ideological questions from the large proportion of them that do not, and it foregrounds the role of power struggle in partisan conflict. Presidential leadership, for example, inherently polarizes legislators who can influence public opinion of the president and his party by how they handle his agenda. Senators also exploit good government measures and floor debate to embarrass opponents and burnish their own party's image — even when the issues involved are broadly supported or low-stakes. Moreover, the book suggests that the congressional agenda itself amplifies conflict by increasingly focusing on issues that reliably differentiate the parties. With the new president pledging to stem the tide of partisan polarization, this book provides a timely taxonomy of exactly what stands in his way.
Eduardo Alemán and George Tsebelis
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198777861
- eISBN:
- 9780191823336
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777861.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This last chapter reviews some of the important conclusions of the book. First, it discusses empirical findings that show that the lack of a majority government increases the complexity of ...
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This last chapter reviews some of the important conclusions of the book. First, it discusses empirical findings that show that the lack of a majority government increases the complexity of bargaining, makes changing the status quo more difficult, and favors centrist parties. Second, it highlights how some Latin American presidents benefit from substantial institutional prerogatives over the congressional agenda, while others are more restricted by the rules in place. Third, it describes the cross-national variation found in terms of legislative productivity and approval rates of bills initiated by presidents and members of congress. The brief concluding remarks connect some of the relevant findings regarding institutional prerogatives and positional advantage to the book’s introductory chapter on agenda setting in Latin American countries.Less
This last chapter reviews some of the important conclusions of the book. First, it discusses empirical findings that show that the lack of a majority government increases the complexity of bargaining, makes changing the status quo more difficult, and favors centrist parties. Second, it highlights how some Latin American presidents benefit from substantial institutional prerogatives over the congressional agenda, while others are more restricted by the rules in place. Third, it describes the cross-national variation found in terms of legislative productivity and approval rates of bills initiated by presidents and members of congress. The brief concluding remarks connect some of the relevant findings regarding institutional prerogatives and positional advantage to the book’s introductory chapter on agenda setting in Latin American countries.
