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We have two distinct notions of single-agent conflicts reflecting two distinct theoretical questions. The first concerns the possibility of there being a right action in conflicts. It is the question whether, and if so how, reasons deriving from different concerns or affecting different people can be of comparable strengths. The second concerns a sense that there is something unfortunate about conflicts, and that when facing conflicting options just taking the best or the right one is not sufficient. The chapter offers (in outline) an answer to the second question, which indirectly helps with the first question as well, in the form of the conformity principle, which asserts that if one cannot conform to reason completely one should come as close to complete conformity as possible. I will show that this innocent-sounding principle has far reaching consequences.

This chapter explores the ways in which deontic logic and the basic distinction between obligation and permission may illuminate the theory of legal rights. It is argued that deontic logic does not help us understand the process of legal deliberation and reasoning. The point is that law is not just an inventory of prescriptions over certain types of action. It includes principles, standards and argumentative techniques that operate in the process of deliberation. Legal standards are thus complex reasons for action. This accepted by the ‘deliberation’ view of legal rules, advocated by Raz but rejected by the ‘simple’ view, advocated by Hart. Yet, the latter view is guilty of a simplistic ‘rail-track’ view of rules. A key distinction therefore for understanding rights is the distinction between deliberative reasons and deliberative conclusions. Deontic logic may apply to the latter but not to the former. Rights are complex reasons.

This introduction gives a more exact characterization of the conflict of reason by relating it to Kant’s doctrine of transcendental illusion. As I explain, the conflict of reason arises because we cannot sensibly act on the demands of reason without assuming that their associated conditions for being applied obtain, but on Kant’s view, we can never know that those conditions do obtain. The chapter stresses the importance of Kant’s view that there is a conflict of reason considered in its speculative use, but also a conflict of reason considered in its practical use; as I argue, there is a significant difference between Kant’s diagnosis of and solution to the conflict of reason in each of its two uses, and this has to do with a fundamental distinction between theoretical and practical reason: namely, that while theoretical reason is receptive, practical reason is efficacious. The introduction also provides a chapter outline and draws attention to some of the distinguishing features of the book.

“Religion and Public Reasons: Making Laws and Evaluating Candidates,” shows that what actually count as public reasons can differ for legislators and judges, that even among public reasons there can obviously be conflicts, and that public reason itself cannot always settle the assignment of weight. Citizens and legislators cannot completely put aside their comprehensive views, since public reason is often radically incomplete. The religious affiliations and convictions of candidates for important public offices could make a difference for a rational voter; but by fully explaining their exact religious convictions, candidates could easily cause harms of unfair prejudice. Thus, in the United States, it was best for candidates, such as John F. Kennedy, Barack Obama, and Mitt Romney, to sketch how they saw their religion relating to their political convictions, but not to provide a detailed account or claim that their religion itself is a basic reason to vote for them.

Chapter 3 is a study of Strauß’s early intellectual context. It examines his early faith, his educational institutions (the Blaubeuren school and Tübinger Stift), his early devotion to mysticism and romanticism, his conversion to Hegel’s philosophy, his stint as an apprentice pastor in the village of Klein-Ingersheim, and his trip to Berlin to learn the master’s philosophy directly from its source. The chapter also discusses the influence of Kant, Schelling, Schleiermacher, and Boehme on the young Strauß, and attempts to reconstruct the major philosophical problem facing Strauß: the conflict between reason and faith in the early nineteenth century.