Mary Leng
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280797
- eISBN:
- 9780191723452
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280797.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers a tension between Quine's naturalism and his confirmational holism that has been pointed out by Penelope Maddy, amongst others. Naturalism requires us to look to science to ...
More
This chapter considers a tension between Quine's naturalism and his confirmational holism that has been pointed out by Penelope Maddy, amongst others. Naturalism requires us to look to science to discover what we ought to believe, and holism requires us to accept the truth of our best scientific theories. But as Maddy has pointed out, there are cases where scientists hold back from believing all the claims of their theories. Scientists might simply be wrong here—our naturalism does not require us to accept, uncritically, the attitudes scientists take to their own theories. However, it is argued that reflection on the role various theoretical assumptions play in our scientific theories shows that the attitude taken by these scientists may be reasonable. Confirmational holism is therefore rejected—the question of which among our theoretical assumptions becomes a question of how best to understand the successful use of these assumptions.Less
This chapter considers a tension between Quine's naturalism and his confirmational holism that has been pointed out by Penelope Maddy, amongst others. Naturalism requires us to look to science to discover what we ought to believe, and holism requires us to accept the truth of our best scientific theories. But as Maddy has pointed out, there are cases where scientists hold back from believing all the claims of their theories. Scientists might simply be wrong here—our naturalism does not require us to accept, uncritically, the attitudes scientists take to their own theories. However, it is argued that reflection on the role various theoretical assumptions play in our scientific theories shows that the attitude taken by these scientists may be reasonable. Confirmational holism is therefore rejected—the question of which among our theoretical assumptions becomes a question of how best to understand the successful use of these assumptions.
Mark Colyvan
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195137545
- eISBN:
- 9780199833139
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019513754X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The thesis that philosophy is continuous with science is defended and distinguished from another influential version of naturalism. Holism is then discussed with particular emphasis on the kind of ...
More
The thesis that philosophy is continuous with science is defended and distinguished from another influential version of naturalism. Holism is then discussed with particular emphasis on the kind of holism the indispensability argument requires – namely, confirmational holism. It is then revealed how Quinean naturalism and confirmational holism combine to yield the crucial premise of the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument.Less
The thesis that philosophy is continuous with science is defended and distinguished from another influential version of naturalism. Holism is then discussed with particular emphasis on the kind of holism the indispensability argument requires – namely, confirmational holism. It is then revealed how Quinean naturalism and confirmational holism combine to yield the crucial premise of the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument.
Mary Leng
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280797
- eISBN:
- 9780191723452
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280797.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter introduces the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects, presenting it as relying on three premises: (P1) Naturalism, (P2) Confirmational Holism, and (P3) ...
More
This chapter introduces the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects, presenting it as relying on three premises: (P1) Naturalism, (P2) Confirmational Holism, and (P3) Indispensability. It lays out the argumentative strategy of the book, noting that, while the assumptions of naturalism and the indispensability of mathematics are accepted, confirmational holism will be called into question. It finishes with notes on two assumptions that form part of the backdrop for the argument of the book. Firstly, that the ‘there is’ of existential quantification is to be read as ontologically committing, so that a commitment to the literal truth of the sentence ‘There are Fs’ amounts to a commitment to the existence of Fs. And secondly, that no anti‐platonist account of the nature of mathematical objects is available.Less
This chapter introduces the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects, presenting it as relying on three premises: (P1) Naturalism, (P2) Confirmational Holism, and (P3) Indispensability. It lays out the argumentative strategy of the book, noting that, while the assumptions of naturalism and the indispensability of mathematics are accepted, confirmational holism will be called into question. It finishes with notes on two assumptions that form part of the backdrop for the argument of the book. Firstly, that the ‘there is’ of existential quantification is to be read as ontologically committing, so that a commitment to the literal truth of the sentence ‘There are Fs’ amounts to a commitment to the existence of Fs. And secondly, that no anti‐platonist account of the nature of mathematical objects is available.
