Jake Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199604760
- eISBN:
- 9780191741548
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604760.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
At a time in which probability theory is exerting an unprecedented influence on epistemology and philosophy of science, promising to deliver an exact and unified foundation for the philosophy of ...
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At a time in which probability theory is exerting an unprecedented influence on epistemology and philosophy of science, promising to deliver an exact and unified foundation for the philosophy of rational inference and decision-making, it is worth remembering that the philosophy of religion has long proven to be an extremely fertile ground for the application of probabilistic thinking to traditional epistemological debates. This book offers a representative sample of the work currently being carried out in this potentially rich field of inquiry. Grouped into five sections, the chapters span a broad range of traditional issues in religious epistemology. The first three sections discuss the evidential impact of various considerations that have been thought to have a bearing on the question of the existence of God. These include witness reports of the occurrence of miraculous events, the existence of complex biological adaptations, the apparent ‘fine-tuning’ for life of various physical constants and the existence of seemingly unnecessary evil. The fourth section addresses a number of issues raised by Pascal’s famous pragmatic argument for theistic belief. A final section offers probabilistic perspectives on the rationality of faith and the epistemic significance of religious disagreement.Less
At a time in which probability theory is exerting an unprecedented influence on epistemology and philosophy of science, promising to deliver an exact and unified foundation for the philosophy of rational inference and decision-making, it is worth remembering that the philosophy of religion has long proven to be an extremely fertile ground for the application of probabilistic thinking to traditional epistemological debates. This book offers a representative sample of the work currently being carried out in this potentially rich field of inquiry. Grouped into five sections, the chapters span a broad range of traditional issues in religious epistemology. The first three sections discuss the evidential impact of various considerations that have been thought to have a bearing on the question of the existence of God. These include witness reports of the occurrence of miraculous events, the existence of complex biological adaptations, the apparent ‘fine-tuning’ for life of various physical constants and the existence of seemingly unnecessary evil. The fourth section addresses a number of issues raised by Pascal’s famous pragmatic argument for theistic belief. A final section offers probabilistic perspectives on the rationality of faith and the epistemic significance of religious disagreement.
Hilary Greaves and Wayne Myrvold
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199560561
- eISBN:
- 9780191721380
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Much of the evidence for quantum mechanics is statistical in nature. Relative frequency data summarizing the results of repeated experiments is compared to probabilities calculated from the theory; ...
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Much of the evidence for quantum mechanics is statistical in nature. Relative frequency data summarizing the results of repeated experiments is compared to probabilities calculated from the theory; close agreement between the observed relative frequencies and calculated probabilities is taken as evidence in favour of the theory. The Everett interpretation, if it is to be a candidate for serious consideration, must be capable of doing justice to this sort of reasoning. Since, on the Everett interpretation, all outcomes with non-zero amplitude are actualized on different branches, it is not obvious that sense can be made of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments, and this poses a prima facie problem for statistical inference. It is incumbent on the Everettian either to make sense of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments in the Everett interpretation, or to find a substitute on which the usual statistical analysis of experimental results continues to count as evidence for quantum mechanics, and, since it is the very evidence for quantum mechanics that is at stake, this must be done in a way that does not presuppose the correctness of Everettian quantum mechanics. This requires an account of theory confirmation that applies to branching-universe theories but does not presuppose the correctness of any such theory. This chapter supplies and defends such an account. The account has the consequence that statistical evidence can confirm a branching-universe theory such as Everettian quantum mechanics in the same way in which it can confirm a non-branching probabilistic theory.Less
Much of the evidence for quantum mechanics is statistical in nature. Relative frequency data summarizing the results of repeated experiments is compared to probabilities calculated from the theory; close agreement between the observed relative frequencies and calculated probabilities is taken as evidence in favour of the theory. The Everett interpretation, if it is to be a candidate for serious consideration, must be capable of doing justice to this sort of reasoning. Since, on the Everett interpretation, all outcomes with non-zero amplitude are actualized on different branches, it is not obvious that sense can be made of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments, and this poses a prima facie problem for statistical inference. It is incumbent on the Everettian either to make sense of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments in the Everett interpretation, or to find a substitute on which the usual statistical analysis of experimental results continues to count as evidence for quantum mechanics, and, since it is the very evidence for quantum mechanics that is at stake, this must be done in a way that does not presuppose the correctness of Everettian quantum mechanics. This requires an account of theory confirmation that applies to branching-universe theories but does not presuppose the correctness of any such theory. This chapter supplies and defends such an account. The account has the consequence that statistical evidence can confirm a branching-universe theory such as Everettian quantum mechanics in the same way in which it can confirm a non-branching probabilistic theory.
Jon Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199228003
- eISBN:
- 9780191711060
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.003.0010
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Probability / Statistics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
In this chapter we will take stock and consider some questions and applications that merit future attention. In §10.1 we will encounter some questions arising from the topics covered in this book. ...
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In this chapter we will take stock and consider some questions and applications that merit future attention. In §10.1 we will encounter some questions arising from the topics covered in this book. Sect. 10.2, 10.3, 10.4 will advertise the application of objective Bayesian erastemology to statistics, confirmation theoryand metaphysics respectively. As we see, there is plenty on the agenda for those wishing to contribute to the objective Bayesian research programme.Less
In this chapter we will take stock and consider some questions and applications that merit future attention. In §10.1 we will encounter some questions arising from the topics covered in this book. Sect. 10.2, 10.3, 10.4 will advertise the application of objective Bayesian erastemology to statistics, confirmation theoryand metaphysics respectively. As we see, there is plenty on the agenda for those wishing to contribute to the objective Bayesian research programme.
Christopher Pincock
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199757107
- eISBN:
- 9780199932313
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199757107.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter clarifies two notions which are central to the book: the content of a scientific representation and how we can think of the confirmation of these representations. When mathematics is ...
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This chapter clarifies two notions which are central to the book: the content of a scientific representation and how we can think of the confirmation of these representations. When mathematics is central to a representation a number of complications arise which are explored in this chapter. Pincock argues that the accuracy conditions of a representation can be understood in terms of the existence of a structural relation between a mathematical structure and a physical target system. This helps to clarify the process of confirming such representations. The second half of the chapter considers the prospects for applying confirmation theory to help with these questions and argues that there are systematic problems in dealing with how mathematics helps with confirmation.Less
This chapter clarifies two notions which are central to the book: the content of a scientific representation and how we can think of the confirmation of these representations. When mathematics is central to a representation a number of complications arise which are explored in this chapter. Pincock argues that the accuracy conditions of a representation can be understood in terms of the existence of a structural relation between a mathematical structure and a physical target system. This helps to clarify the process of confirming such representations. The second half of the chapter considers the prospects for applying confirmation theory to help with these questions and argues that there are systematic problems in dealing with how mathematics helps with confirmation.
Stephen Yablo
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144955
- eISBN:
- 9781400845989
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144955.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter argues that logical subtraction has a role to play in confirmation theory via the notion of surplus content. Subject matter does, too, via the notion of content-part. Content-part lets ...
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This chapter argues that logical subtraction has a role to play in confirmation theory via the notion of surplus content. Subject matter does, too, via the notion of content-part. Content-part lets us define a new type of evidential relation; E pervasively probabilifies H if it probabilifies “all of it,” meaning H and its parts. This helps with the tacking and raven paradoxes. Equivalent generalizations can be about different things, which affect their evidential relations. Inductive skeptics do not care about confirmation, but they derive some benefit too, for they care about verisimilitude—one theory having more truth in it than another—and the truth in a theory is made up of its wholly true parts.Less
This chapter argues that logical subtraction has a role to play in confirmation theory via the notion of surplus content. Subject matter does, too, via the notion of content-part. Content-part lets us define a new type of evidential relation; E pervasively probabilifies H if it probabilifies “all of it,” meaning H and its parts. This helps with the tacking and raven paradoxes. Equivalent generalizations can be about different things, which affect their evidential relations. Inductive skeptics do not care about confirmation, but they derive some benefit too, for they care about verisimilitude—one theory having more truth in it than another—and the truth in a theory is made up of its wholly true parts.
Philip Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130058
- eISBN:
- 9780199833481
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130057.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In “Scientific Knowledge,” Philip Kitcher challenges arguments that deny the truth of the theoretical claims of science, and he attempts to discover reasons for endorsing the truth of such claims. He ...
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In “Scientific Knowledge,” Philip Kitcher challenges arguments that deny the truth of the theoretical claims of science, and he attempts to discover reasons for endorsing the truth of such claims. He suggests that the discovery of such reasons might succeed if we ask why anyone thinks that the theoretical claims we accept are true and then look for answers that reconstruct actual belief‐generating processes. To this end, Kitcher presents the “homely argument” for scientific truth, which claims that when a field of science is continually applied to yield precise predictions, then it is at least approximately true. He defends this approach and offers a supplementary account that gives more attention to detail. This account includes a historical aspect (a dependence on the previous conclusions of scientists) that must answer to skeptical challenges and a social aspect (the coordination of individuals in pursuit of specific knowledge‐related goals).Less
In “Scientific Knowledge,” Philip Kitcher challenges arguments that deny the truth of the theoretical claims of science, and he attempts to discover reasons for endorsing the truth of such claims. He suggests that the discovery of such reasons might succeed if we ask why anyone thinks that the theoretical claims we accept are true and then look for answers that reconstruct actual belief‐generating processes. To this end, Kitcher presents the “homely argument” for scientific truth, which claims that when a field of science is continually applied to yield precise predictions, then it is at least approximately true. He defends this approach and offers a supplementary account that gives more attention to detail. This account includes a historical aspect (a dependence on the previous conclusions of scientists) that must answer to skeptical challenges and a social aspect (the coordination of individuals in pursuit of specific knowledge‐related goals).
Jake Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199604760
- eISBN:
- 9780191741548
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604760.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
While situating the contribution of the volume within the recent trajectory of philosophy of religion, this chapter highlights the formative role that the notion of probability has exercised on the ...
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While situating the contribution of the volume within the recent trajectory of philosophy of religion, this chapter highlights the formative role that the notion of probability has exercised on the philosophy of religion in recent times. Tracing a number of key debates from their formulation in the work of David Hume, it looks at the assimilation of probability and confirmation theory within philosophy of religion with reference to five topical areas of the discipline: testimony and miracles; design arguments; the problem of evil; Pascal’s wager; and faith and reason. In doing so, it provides short summaries of each chapter, explaining how they contribute to certain key debates. It concludes with the prediction that probability theory will continue to enjoy a profound influence on the philosophy of religion for some time to come.Less
While situating the contribution of the volume within the recent trajectory of philosophy of religion, this chapter highlights the formative role that the notion of probability has exercised on the philosophy of religion in recent times. Tracing a number of key debates from their formulation in the work of David Hume, it looks at the assimilation of probability and confirmation theory within philosophy of religion with reference to five topical areas of the discipline: testimony and miracles; design arguments; the problem of evil; Pascal’s wager; and faith and reason. In doing so, it provides short summaries of each chapter, explaining how they contribute to certain key debates. It concludes with the prediction that probability theory will continue to enjoy a profound influence on the philosophy of religion for some time to come.
David Albert
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199560561
- eISBN:
- 9780191721380
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter reviews and criticizes various strategies for making sense of quantum-mechanical probability-talk in the context of Everett Picture, with particular attention to recent such strategies ...
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This chapter reviews and criticizes various strategies for making sense of quantum-mechanical probability-talk in the context of Everett Picture, with particular attention to recent such strategies involving decision theory.Less
This chapter reviews and criticizes various strategies for making sense of quantum-mechanical probability-talk in the context of Everett Picture, with particular attention to recent such strategies involving decision theory.
L. Jonathan Cohen
- Published in print:
- 1977
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198244127
- eISBN:
- 9780191680748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244127.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter discusses the probability as gradation of provability. It is stated that probability is to be viewed as a generalization on the notion of provability. Proof-criteria that are general, ...
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This chapter discusses the probability as gradation of provability. It is stated that probability is to be viewed as a generalization on the notion of provability. Proof-criteria that are general, necessary, and extensional generate probabilities that are appropriate to games of chance. Proof-criteria that are general, contingent, and extensional produce the probabilities that are appropriate to empirical statistics. In addition, proof-criteria that are general, contingent, and non-extensional generate probabilities that are appropriate to the measurement of causal propensities. Moreover, proof-criteria that are singular and necessary generate probabilities like those of Carnapian confirmation-theory, and proof-criteria that are singular and contingent generate probabilities appropriate to subjectivist, or personalist theory. Finally, probability-statements are evaluations of inferential soundness, and cannot be elucidated as acts of guarded assertion.Less
This chapter discusses the probability as gradation of provability. It is stated that probability is to be viewed as a generalization on the notion of provability. Proof-criteria that are general, necessary, and extensional generate probabilities that are appropriate to games of chance. Proof-criteria that are general, contingent, and extensional produce the probabilities that are appropriate to empirical statistics. In addition, proof-criteria that are general, contingent, and non-extensional generate probabilities that are appropriate to the measurement of causal propensities. Moreover, proof-criteria that are singular and necessary generate probabilities like those of Carnapian confirmation-theory, and proof-criteria that are singular and contingent generate probabilities appropriate to subjectivist, or personalist theory. Finally, probability-statements are evaluations of inferential soundness, and cannot be elucidated as acts of guarded assertion.
Brian D. Haig
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190222055
- eISBN:
- 9780190871734
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190222055.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Chapter 4 focuses on Bayesian confirmation theory, a formal theory of reasoning based on probability theory. It deals with important, and related, general ideas, such as rationality, confirmation, ...
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Chapter 4 focuses on Bayesian confirmation theory, a formal theory of reasoning based on probability theory. It deals with important, and related, general ideas, such as rationality, confirmation, and inductive inference, including statistical inference. The chapter also provides a selective discussion of Bayesian statistics. The chapter traces some of the broad contours of Bayesian confirmation theory and then presents an evaluation of a philosophy of Bayesian statistical practice. Psychology’s attitudes to Bayesianism are briefly discussed. Considered is the question of whether Bayesianism provides an illuminating account of the approach to theory evaluation known as inference to the best explanation. The chapter offers some broad recommendations for research practice.Less
Chapter 4 focuses on Bayesian confirmation theory, a formal theory of reasoning based on probability theory. It deals with important, and related, general ideas, such as rationality, confirmation, and inductive inference, including statistical inference. The chapter also provides a selective discussion of Bayesian statistics. The chapter traces some of the broad contours of Bayesian confirmation theory and then presents an evaluation of a philosophy of Bayesian statistical practice. Psychology’s attitudes to Bayesianism are briefly discussed. Considered is the question of whether Bayesianism provides an illuminating account of the approach to theory evaluation known as inference to the best explanation. The chapter offers some broad recommendations for research practice.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199603213
- eISBN:
- 9780191725388
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This is the third volume of the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion series. As with the first two volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan ...
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This is the third volume of the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion series. As with the first two volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield within this time frame along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our disciplines, while at the same time inviting greater interest in the work being done in the philosophy of religion. We thus present the third volume in this series, a volume containing contributions by an impressive group of philosophers on topics of central important to the philosophy of religion.Less
This is the third volume of the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion series. As with the first two volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield within this time frame along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our disciplines, while at the same time inviting greater interest in the work being done in the philosophy of religion. We thus present the third volume in this series, a volume containing contributions by an impressive group of philosophers on topics of central important to the philosophy of religion.
Shyam Nair
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199315192
- eISBN:
- 9780190245580
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There are situations where people have multiple reasons to do a certain action, a, that are individually worse than a reason to do another incompatible act. But in some of these cases, the reasons to ...
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There are situations where people have multiple reasons to do a certain action, a, that are individually worse than a reason to do another incompatible act. But in some of these cases, the reasons to do a taken together (which can be called the accrual of the reasons to do a) make it so that you ought to do a. This chapter explores how the weight of individual reasons determines how strongly an accrual of reasons supports an act. It argues that a key to understanding how individual reasons determine how strongly an accrual supports an act is to distinguish sharply between derivative and non-derivative reasons.Less
There are situations where people have multiple reasons to do a certain action, a, that are individually worse than a reason to do another incompatible act. But in some of these cases, the reasons to do a taken together (which can be called the accrual of the reasons to do a) make it so that you ought to do a. This chapter explores how the weight of individual reasons determines how strongly an accrual of reasons supports an act. It argues that a key to understanding how individual reasons determine how strongly an accrual supports an act is to distinguish sharply between derivative and non-derivative reasons.
Elia Zardini
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199658343
- eISBN:
- 9780191760983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter proposes that, contrary intuitions notwithstanding, dogmatists accept a variety of Moorean arguments as legitimate ways to acquire a justification for their conclusions. The chapter ...
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The chapter proposes that, contrary intuitions notwithstanding, dogmatists accept a variety of Moorean arguments as legitimate ways to acquire a justification for their conclusions. The chapter counters an ensuing objection from Bayesian confirmation theory, arguing by way of example that acquisition of justification is compatible with the probability lowering that Bayesian confirmation theory predicts to take place in many Moorean arguments. Appealing to considerations concerning defeat, it then shows that a minimal strengthening of dogmatism is incompatible with the classical, additive theory of the very structure of probabilities, and it consequently investigates a more dogmatist-friendly non-classical, super-additive theory of both the structure and dynamics of probabilities, in which the probability of the conclusion of a Moorean argument rises no less than the probability of its premise, and in which perception can play this epistemic role without either presupposing or directly contributing justification for a principle linking appearances with reality.Less
The chapter proposes that, contrary intuitions notwithstanding, dogmatists accept a variety of Moorean arguments as legitimate ways to acquire a justification for their conclusions. The chapter counters an ensuing objection from Bayesian confirmation theory, arguing by way of example that acquisition of justification is compatible with the probability lowering that Bayesian confirmation theory predicts to take place in many Moorean arguments. Appealing to considerations concerning defeat, it then shows that a minimal strengthening of dogmatism is incompatible with the classical, additive theory of the very structure of probabilities, and it consequently investigates a more dogmatist-friendly non-classical, super-additive theory of both the structure and dynamics of probabilities, in which the probability of the conclusion of a Moorean argument rises no less than the probability of its premise, and in which perception can play this epistemic role without either presupposing or directly contributing justification for a principle linking appearances with reality.
Jon Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- March 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199666478
- eISBN:
- 9780191749292
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199666478.001.0001
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
Inductive logic (also known as confirmation theory) seeks to determine the extent to which the premisses of an argument entail its conclusion. This book offers an introduction to the field of ...
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Inductive logic (also known as confirmation theory) seeks to determine the extent to which the premisses of an argument entail its conclusion. This book offers an introduction to the field of inductive logic and develops a new Bayesian inductive logic. Chapter 1 introduces perhaps the simplest and most natural account of inductive logic, classical inductive logic, which is attributable to Ludwig Wittgenstein. Classical inductive logic is seen to fail in a crucial way, so there is a need to develop more sophisticated inductive logics. Chapter 2 presents enough logic and probability theory for the reader to begin to study inductive logic, while Chapter 3 introduces the ways in which logic and probability can be combined in an inductive logic. Chapter 4 analyses the most influential approach to inductive logic, due to W.E. Johnson and Rudolf Carnap. Again, this logic is seen to be inadequate. Chapter 5 shows how an alternative approach to inductive logic follows naturally from the philosophical theory of objective Bayesian epistemology. This approach preserves the inferences that classical inductive logic gets right (Chapter 6). On the other hand, it also offers a way out of the problems that beset classical inductive logic (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 defends the approach by tackling several key criticisms that are often levelled at inductive logic. Chapter 9 presents a formal justification of the version of objective Bayesianism which underpins the approach. Chapter 10 explains what has been achieved and poses some open questions.Less
Inductive logic (also known as confirmation theory) seeks to determine the extent to which the premisses of an argument entail its conclusion. This book offers an introduction to the field of inductive logic and develops a new Bayesian inductive logic. Chapter 1 introduces perhaps the simplest and most natural account of inductive logic, classical inductive logic, which is attributable to Ludwig Wittgenstein. Classical inductive logic is seen to fail in a crucial way, so there is a need to develop more sophisticated inductive logics. Chapter 2 presents enough logic and probability theory for the reader to begin to study inductive logic, while Chapter 3 introduces the ways in which logic and probability can be combined in an inductive logic. Chapter 4 analyses the most influential approach to inductive logic, due to W.E. Johnson and Rudolf Carnap. Again, this logic is seen to be inadequate. Chapter 5 shows how an alternative approach to inductive logic follows naturally from the philosophical theory of objective Bayesian epistemology. This approach preserves the inferences that classical inductive logic gets right (Chapter 6). On the other hand, it also offers a way out of the problems that beset classical inductive logic (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 defends the approach by tackling several key criticisms that are often levelled at inductive logic. Chapter 9 presents a formal justification of the version of objective Bayesianism which underpins the approach. Chapter 10 explains what has been achieved and poses some open questions.
G. Kelly James
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195173796
- eISBN:
- 9780199847631
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173796.003.0015
- Subject:
- Psychology, Clinical Psychology
Community psychology can potentially illustrate the dynamic interplay between the qualities of people and the attributes of smaller social settings and larger social environments. This requires ...
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Community psychology can potentially illustrate the dynamic interplay between the qualities of people and the attributes of smaller social settings and larger social environments. This requires research methods that attempt to illustrate environmental complexity. Thinking psychologically and ecologically are interdependent approaches. The process of theory confirmation is adapted to informed insights from the community as well as current knowledge from the literature. An educated view of a particular place creates a dynamic interplay between prior knowledge and informed insights. The views of the place can be related to the concepts in the literature, and the concepts from the literature can be assessed based on their salience in this particular community. The use of ecological concepts affirms that there is need for a real interdependence between the wishes and aspirations of the community participants and the project staff.Less
Community psychology can potentially illustrate the dynamic interplay between the qualities of people and the attributes of smaller social settings and larger social environments. This requires research methods that attempt to illustrate environmental complexity. Thinking psychologically and ecologically are interdependent approaches. The process of theory confirmation is adapted to informed insights from the community as well as current knowledge from the literature. An educated view of a particular place creates a dynamic interplay between prior knowledge and informed insights. The views of the place can be related to the concepts in the literature, and the concepts from the literature can be assessed based on their salience in this particular community. The use of ecological concepts affirms that there is need for a real interdependence between the wishes and aspirations of the community participants and the project staff.
Paul Draper
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199661183
- eISBN:
- 9780191785566
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies, Philosophy of Religion
Long before skeptical theism was called “skeptical theism,” Stephen Wykstra defended a version of it based on an epistemological principle he called CORNEA. In this chapter, elementary confirmation ...
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Long before skeptical theism was called “skeptical theism,” Stephen Wykstra defended a version of it based on an epistemological principle he called CORNEA. In this chapter, elementary confirmation theory is used to analyze CORNEA’s core. This allows one to see precisely what is right about Wykstra’s very influential defense of skeptical theism and precisely what is wrong with it. A key premise of Wykstra’s defense is that, on the assumption that God exists, one wouldn’t expect to know God’s reasons for allowing certain evils. This chapter shows that, while that premise together with CORNEA’s core shows that a general inability to adequately explain the existence of those evils in terms of theism is not strong evidence against theism, it fails to show that the evils themselves are not strong evidence against theism.Less
Long before skeptical theism was called “skeptical theism,” Stephen Wykstra defended a version of it based on an epistemological principle he called CORNEA. In this chapter, elementary confirmation theory is used to analyze CORNEA’s core. This allows one to see precisely what is right about Wykstra’s very influential defense of skeptical theism and precisely what is wrong with it. A key premise of Wykstra’s defense is that, on the assumption that God exists, one wouldn’t expect to know God’s reasons for allowing certain evils. This chapter shows that, while that premise together with CORNEA’s core shows that a general inability to adequately explain the existence of those evils in terms of theism is not strong evidence against theism, it fails to show that the evils themselves are not strong evidence against theism.
