Josh M. Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226582061
- eISBN:
- 9780226582375
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226582375.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Though many of the world's legislatures are bicameral in nature, the ways in which they change legislation is not well understood. This chapter begins with a review of the expected effects of ...
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Though many of the world's legislatures are bicameral in nature, the ways in which they change legislation is not well understood. This chapter begins with a review of the expected effects of bicameralism, and discusses the state of the literature on how the House and Senate resolve their differences. The chapter also introduces data on conference committees and the use of amendment trading to resolve differences, with a special focus on important legislation and appropriations legislation. There is no doubt that the use of bicameral bargaining in Congress has declined, though the current literature has little explanation for the reasons behind this reduction.Less
Though many of the world's legislatures are bicameral in nature, the ways in which they change legislation is not well understood. This chapter begins with a review of the expected effects of bicameralism, and discusses the state of the literature on how the House and Senate resolve their differences. The chapter also introduces data on conference committees and the use of amendment trading to resolve differences, with a special focus on important legislation and appropriations legislation. There is no doubt that the use of bicameral bargaining in Congress has declined, though the current literature has little explanation for the reasons behind this reduction.
Eduardo Alemán and Patricio Navia
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198777861
- eISBN:
- 9780191823336
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777861.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter describes the agenda setting powers of Chilean presidents and the positional constraints with which they have had to govern. The latter has been caused mainly by the lack of unified ...
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This chapter describes the agenda setting powers of Chilean presidents and the positional constraints with which they have had to govern. The latter has been caused mainly by the lack of unified government and super-majority requirements for changes on several policy areas. Presidents initiate most laws and have a high rate of bill approval, which is consistent with the view that strong legislative powers can contribute to overcoming some positional constraints. The chapter finds that most major presidential bills passed include legislators’ amendments, and that presidents fight off unwanted changes with amendments of their own offered during the committee stage or via amendatory vetoes. With regard to plenary votes, it finds that majority control in the Chamber of Deputies has led to significant advantages for the governing coalition, while in a split Senate there have been no significant differences between the two coalitions. It also finds that conference committee proposals, always voted under closed rules, are highly successful.Less
This chapter describes the agenda setting powers of Chilean presidents and the positional constraints with which they have had to govern. The latter has been caused mainly by the lack of unified government and super-majority requirements for changes on several policy areas. Presidents initiate most laws and have a high rate of bill approval, which is consistent with the view that strong legislative powers can contribute to overcoming some positional constraints. The chapter finds that most major presidential bills passed include legislators’ amendments, and that presidents fight off unwanted changes with amendments of their own offered during the committee stage or via amendatory vetoes. With regard to plenary votes, it finds that majority control in the Chamber of Deputies has led to significant advantages for the governing coalition, while in a split Senate there have been no significant differences between the two coalitions. It also finds that conference committee proposals, always voted under closed rules, are highly successful.
Josh M. Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226582061
- eISBN:
- 9780226582375
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226582375.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
The formal model characterizes conferees as having discretion to change legislation. Most importantly, conferees can make more dramatic changes to the bill when the winning coalitions in the chambers ...
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The formal model characterizes conferees as having discretion to change legislation. Most importantly, conferees can make more dramatic changes to the bill when the winning coalitions in the chambers are unwilling to reject the bill because they receive low benefits from rejection, and when coalition size is large. If the winning coalitions within each chamber are small, even a minor change to the legislation by the conferees could result in a few members switching their vote and a loss in majority support. Likewise, failure at the post-passage resolution stage is characterized as a mistake in the use of discretion by the conferees. The results demonstrate that more moderate coalitions constrain conferee discretion as they are more willing to reject the bill.Less
The formal model characterizes conferees as having discretion to change legislation. Most importantly, conferees can make more dramatic changes to the bill when the winning coalitions in the chambers are unwilling to reject the bill because they receive low benefits from rejection, and when coalition size is large. If the winning coalitions within each chamber are small, even a minor change to the legislation by the conferees could result in a few members switching their vote and a loss in majority support. Likewise, failure at the post-passage resolution stage is characterized as a mistake in the use of discretion by the conferees. The results demonstrate that more moderate coalitions constrain conferee discretion as they are more willing to reject the bill.
Josh M. Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226582061
- eISBN:
- 9780226582375
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226582375.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
In bicameral legislatures like Congress, the two chambers must reach agreement before a bill is enacted into law, a process that is often chaotic and contentious. In The Congressional End Game: ...
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In bicameral legislatures like Congress, the two chambers must reach agreement before a bill is enacted into law, a process that is often chaotic and contentious. In The Congressional End Game: Interchamber Bargaining and Compromise in Congress, Josh Ryan offers a coherent theory of how this process works and the types of policy outcomes produced. He shows that both conference committees and an alternative resolution venue, amendment trading, create policy that approximates the preferences of the more moderate chamber, though neither chamber receives exactly what it wants. Using comprehensive data on recent congressional legislation and an array of empirical tests, The Congressional Endgame explains how the chambers seek agreement, why failure at the resolution stage is so rare, and what types of legislation are likely to emerge from negotiations. The book finds that the characteristics of the winning coalition are critically important to which chamber "wins" after bargaining, with more moderate chambers receiving more of what they want. The results are especially relevant in the current age of party polarization and strong leadership, where divided party control of the House and Senate is common. These factors contribute to the public perception that the House and Senate are unable to compromise, and call into question the relevance and effectiveness of the bicameral system as designed by the Framers. Instead, The Congressional Endgame demonstrates interchamber negotiations serve their intended purpose well: they increase the odds of compromise while at the same time offering a powerful constraint on dramatic policy changes.Less
In bicameral legislatures like Congress, the two chambers must reach agreement before a bill is enacted into law, a process that is often chaotic and contentious. In The Congressional End Game: Interchamber Bargaining and Compromise in Congress, Josh Ryan offers a coherent theory of how this process works and the types of policy outcomes produced. He shows that both conference committees and an alternative resolution venue, amendment trading, create policy that approximates the preferences of the more moderate chamber, though neither chamber receives exactly what it wants. Using comprehensive data on recent congressional legislation and an array of empirical tests, The Congressional Endgame explains how the chambers seek agreement, why failure at the resolution stage is so rare, and what types of legislation are likely to emerge from negotiations. The book finds that the characteristics of the winning coalition are critically important to which chamber "wins" after bargaining, with more moderate chambers receiving more of what they want. The results are especially relevant in the current age of party polarization and strong leadership, where divided party control of the House and Senate is common. These factors contribute to the public perception that the House and Senate are unable to compromise, and call into question the relevance and effectiveness of the bicameral system as designed by the Framers. Instead, The Congressional Endgame demonstrates interchamber negotiations serve their intended purpose well: they increase the odds of compromise while at the same time offering a powerful constraint on dramatic policy changes.
