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Indicative conditionals: the psychological evidence

Jonathan St B T Evans and David E Over

in If

This chapter examines the basic empirical findings on indicative conditionals when participants are asked to make inferences or judgements about them in the psychological laboratory, and compares ... More

This chapter examines the basic empirical findings on indicative conditionals when participants are asked to make inferences or judgements about them in the psychological laboratory, and compares these findings with the analyses of logicians. The chapter considers only studies using abstract or arbitrary problem materials to avoid the complications introduced by use of semantically rich problem content or context that very markedly affects reasoning performance. First it looks at studies that examine by several different methods people's understanding of the truth conditions of conditional statements; that is when conditionals will be true or false. Subsequently, it looks at studies that have examined the basic inferences that people are willing to endorse or draw from conditional statements. The psychological work includes studies of conditionals phrased both as ‘if p then q’ and as ‘p only if q’, and also conditionals with negated components. Finally, it looks at some studies of the development of conditional reasoning in children.Less

Probabilistic accounts of conditionals

Jonathan St B T Evans and David E Over

in If

The Ramsey test implies that people will evaluate the probability of a conditional, P(if p then q), as the conditional probability, P(q¦p). This implication is referred to as the conditional ... More

The Ramsey test implies that people will evaluate the probability of a conditional, P(if p then q), as the conditional probability, P(q¦p). This implication is referred to as the conditional probability hypothesis. As a normative position, this hypothesis has been much discussed in the literature on philosophical logic, as described in Chapter 2. A number of psychologists have also suggested, as an empirical hypothesis, that ordinary conditionals are related to conditional probability. However, only in very recent research have psychologists run experiments in which people are asked directly to assess the probability of conditional statements. This chapter introduces this experimental work, which is highly relevant to the three broad theoretical accounts of the indicative conditional — T1, T2, and T3 — that were presented in Chapter 2. The strict truth of the conditional probability hypothesis would imply T3, but it is not so easy to decide between T2 and T3.Less

“If… ”: Satisficing Algorithms for Mapping Conditional Statements onto Social Domains

Alejandro López-Rousseau and Timothy Ketelaar

in Heuristics: The Foundations of Adaptive Behavior

People regularly use conditional statements to communicate promises and threats, advice and warnings, permissions and obligations to other people. Given that all conditionals are formally ... More

People regularly use conditional statements to communicate promises and threats, advice and warnings, permissions and obligations to other people. Given that all conditionals are formally equivalent—“if P, then Q”— the question is: When confronted with a conditional statement, how do people know whether they are facing a promise, a threat, or something else? In other words, what is the cognitive algorithm for mapping a particular conditional statement onto its corresponding social domain? This paper introduces the pragmatic cues algorithm and the syntactic cue algorithm as partial answers to this question. Two experiments were carried out to test how well these simple satisficing algorithms approximate the performance of the actual cognitive algorithm people use to classify conditional statements into social domains. Conditional statements for promises, threats, advice, warnings, permissions, and obligations were collected from people, and given to both other people and the algorithms for their classification. Their corresponding performances were then compared. Results revealed that even though these algorithms utilized a minimum number of cues and drew only a restricted range of inferences from these cues, they performed well above chance in the task of classifying conditional statements as promises, threats, advice, warnings, permissions, and obligations. Moreover, these simple satisficing algorithms performed comparable to actual people given the same task.Less

Dispositionals and Conditionals

C. B. Martin

in The Mind in Nature

Statements ascribing dispositions or powers are somehow linked to conditional statements. Attempts have been made to provide reductive analyses of powers in terms of such stronger-than-material ... More

Statements ascribing dispositions or powers are somehow linked to conditional statements. Attempts have been made to provide reductive analyses of powers in terms of such stronger-than-material conditionals, that is, to claim that the ascription to an object of a power or disposition is logically equivalent to one or more suitably glossed and qualified conditional statements about events involving the object. This chapter argues that the claimed equivalence does not hold if the conditional statement is formulated in a certain way, as demonstrated by two intuitive cases; and second, that this conclusion can be evaded by reformulating the conditional, but only at the cost of making the reformulation trivial.Less

The logic of indicative conditionals

Jonathan St B T Evans and David E Over

in If

This chapter examines the major logical issues concerning indicative conditional statements, as identified by philosophical logicians. It shows why philosophers largely reject the view that ‘if p ... More

This chapter examines the major logical issues concerning indicative conditional statements, as identified by philosophical logicians. It shows why philosophers largely reject the view that ‘if p then q’ is equivalent to ‘not-p or q’, and discusses some of the problems and complications that arise from trying to understand the logic of the ordinary conditional.Less

Indicative Conditionals

Robert C. Stalnaker

in Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought

Aims to reconcile a unified semantic account of conditional statements with an apparent contrast between the logics of indicative and ”subjunctive” conditionals. The difference between the two kinds ... More

Aims to reconcile a unified semantic account of conditional statements with an apparent contrast between the logics of indicative and ”subjunctive” conditionals. The difference between the two kinds of conditionals is explained in terms of different constraints imposed on the contexts relative to which the different forms of conditionals are interpreted. A pragmatic concept of reasonable inference is defined and contrasted with semantic entailment. This concept is then used to explain why certain inferences involving indicative conditionals are compelling, and to diagnose a fallacy in a familiar argument for fatalism.Less

Conditionals

Raymond S. Nickerson

in Conditional Reasoning: The Unruly Syntactics, Semantics, Thematics, and Pragmatics of "If"

This chapter describes the prototypical and other forms of conditionals. Distinguishes several types of conditionals, including indicatives, counterfactuals, deontic conditionals, and compound ... More

This chapter describes the prototypical and other forms of conditionals. Distinguishes several types of conditionals, including indicatives, counterfactuals, deontic conditionals, and compound conditionals. It also introduces the concept of a conditional argument.Less

Comparing Macroeconomic Model Forecasts under Common Assumptions

Stephen K. McNees

in Comparative Performance of U.S. Econometric Models

Economic forecasts differ because forecasters use different macroeconomic models. However, even if everyone used the same model, all forecasts would not be identical. Most forecasts reflect a complex ... More

Economic forecasts differ because forecasters use different macroeconomic models. However, even if everyone used the same model, all forecasts would not be identical. Most forecasts reflect a complex interaction among three elements. Unfortunately, little is known about the relative importance of these elements. This chapter addresses three kinds of question. The initial stage of the Model Comparison Seminar's project, starting in early 1986, has been the collection of relevant data, a laborious and time-consuming part of the project. The following results are a preliminary report on an ongoing effort. The conclusions, based on the limited experience so far, must be regarded as highly tentative. Any success that has been achieved should be largely credited to the modelers who participated in this exercise. This chapter compares model solutions based on different sets of conditioning information. In general, a model can be thought of as a conditional statement about the relationship between inputs (Xs) and outputs (Ys), or Y = f(X).Less

Getting Started

Raymond S. Nickerson

in Conditional Reasoning: The Unruly Syntactics, Semantics, Thematics, and Pragmatics of "If"

This chapter introduces the concept of conditional reasoning, illustrates many uses of “if,” and presents the plan for the remainder of the book.

Final Comments

Raymond S. Nickerson

in Conditional Reasoning: The Unruly Syntactics, Semantics, Thematics, and Pragmatics of "If"

The wrap-up chapter attempts to distinguish what we know about conditional reasoning—what we have learned from research—from what we do not know about it. The question of how conditional reasoning ... More

The wrap-up chapter attempts to distinguish what we know about conditional reasoning—what we have learned from research—from what we do not know about it. The question of how conditional reasoning should be done is likened to the question of what it means to be rational. The chapter concludes with the claim that although much has been learned about conditional reasoning from research, many questions remain, with respect both to how it is done and to how it should be done; and that in view of its importance to an understanding of human capabilities and limitations, conditional reasoning is likely to remain a major focus of research for a long time to come.Less