Peter Unger
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195155617
- eISBN:
- 9780199850563
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195155617.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers some clearly distinct basic bodies, as with some spatially separate spherical red particles. It suggests that it is in conceiving such clearly spatial bodies as are so ...
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This chapter considers some clearly distinct basic bodies, as with some spatially separate spherical red particles. It suggests that it is in conceiving such clearly spatial bodies as are so spatially separate that we humans may have our clearest conception as to how it is that, all at the very same time, there may be several distinct concrete individuals and not, say, just a single concretism multiply conceived. The chapter explores concrete reality and substantial dualism, sameness and difference of concrete individuals, conception of nonspatial simultaneous souls, Berkeleian idealism, Cartesian dualism, substantial individuals, the hypothesis of spacelike extension, the deflationary approach, a hypothesized dimension far more like space than time, an analogical conception of nonspatial souls, how nonspatial souls might precede even the initial physical embodiment, whether immaterial souls ever change propensitively, a constitutional view of souls, fusional dualism, the mental problems of the many, and the problem of our unconscious quality.Less
This chapter considers some clearly distinct basic bodies, as with some spatially separate spherical red particles. It suggests that it is in conceiving such clearly spatial bodies as are so spatially separate that we humans may have our clearest conception as to how it is that, all at the very same time, there may be several distinct concrete individuals and not, say, just a single concretism multiply conceived. The chapter explores concrete reality and substantial dualism, sameness and difference of concrete individuals, conception of nonspatial simultaneous souls, Berkeleian idealism, Cartesian dualism, substantial individuals, the hypothesis of spacelike extension, the deflationary approach, a hypothesized dimension far more like space than time, an analogical conception of nonspatial souls, how nonspatial souls might precede even the initial physical embodiment, whether immaterial souls ever change propensitively, a constitutional view of souls, fusional dualism, the mental problems of the many, and the problem of our unconscious quality.
Peter Unger
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195155617
- eISBN:
- 9780199850563
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195155617.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The idea of physical things as extensible qualified is so aptly related to our power to think experientially that it may serve us humans fairly well when it comes to our clearly conceiving physical ...
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The idea of physical things as extensible qualified is so aptly related to our power to think experientially that it may serve us humans fairly well when it comes to our clearly conceiving physical individuals. Accordingly, the physical need not be so opaque to us as it sometimes seemed to many philosophers. When we speak of a certain quality exemplified in an individual, the matter is related more perspicuously by saying that the particular is qualified in a certain way. Whatever its deficiencies, the restrictive empiricism epitomized by David Hume should not be completely abandoned. Our power to experience cannot be our only resource for understanding concrete reality. This chapter examines the hypothesis that: in your fully conceiving a physical entity as being Monochromatic Spatially Extensible Blue, you will be (spatially Non-extensible) experiential blue. It also discusses the notion of spatially extensible colors, spatial bodies, insensate bodies as pervaded with tactile qualities, extensible qualities, experiential qualities, and metaphysics.Less
The idea of physical things as extensible qualified is so aptly related to our power to think experientially that it may serve us humans fairly well when it comes to our clearly conceiving physical individuals. Accordingly, the physical need not be so opaque to us as it sometimes seemed to many philosophers. When we speak of a certain quality exemplified in an individual, the matter is related more perspicuously by saying that the particular is qualified in a certain way. Whatever its deficiencies, the restrictive empiricism epitomized by David Hume should not be completely abandoned. Our power to experience cannot be our only resource for understanding concrete reality. This chapter examines the hypothesis that: in your fully conceiving a physical entity as being Monochromatic Spatially Extensible Blue, you will be (spatially Non-extensible) experiential blue. It also discusses the notion of spatially extensible colors, spatial bodies, insensate bodies as pervaded with tactile qualities, extensible qualities, experiential qualities, and metaphysics.
Peter Unger
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195155617
- eISBN:
- 9780199850563
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195155617.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This work of philosophy presents a new picture of concrete reality. The author breaks with what he terms the conservatism of present-day philosophy, and returns to central themes from Descartes, ...
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This work of philosophy presents a new picture of concrete reality. The author breaks with what he terms the conservatism of present-day philosophy, and returns to central themes from Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Russell. He works from the ground up, to formulate a new metaphysic capable of accommodating our distinctly human perspective. The author proposes a world with inherently powerful particulars of two basic sorts: one mental but not physical, the other physical but not mental. Whether of one sort or the other, each individual possesses powers for determining his or her own course, as well as powers for interaction with other individuals. It is only a purely mental particular—an immaterial soul, like yourself—that is ever fit for real choosing, or for conscious experiencing. Reasoning that the only satisfactory metaphysic is one that situates the physical alongside the non-physical, the author explains the genesis of, and continual interaction of, the two sides of our deeply dualistic world. He reveals the need for an entirely novel approach to the nature of physical reality, and shows how this approach can lead to wholly unexpected possibilities, including disembodied human existence for billions of years. The book returns philosophy to its most ambitious roots in its attempt to answer difficult human questions about ourselves and our world.Less
This work of philosophy presents a new picture of concrete reality. The author breaks with what he terms the conservatism of present-day philosophy, and returns to central themes from Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Russell. He works from the ground up, to formulate a new metaphysic capable of accommodating our distinctly human perspective. The author proposes a world with inherently powerful particulars of two basic sorts: one mental but not physical, the other physical but not mental. Whether of one sort or the other, each individual possesses powers for determining his or her own course, as well as powers for interaction with other individuals. It is only a purely mental particular—an immaterial soul, like yourself—that is ever fit for real choosing, or for conscious experiencing. Reasoning that the only satisfactory metaphysic is one that situates the physical alongside the non-physical, the author explains the genesis of, and continual interaction of, the two sides of our deeply dualistic world. He reveals the need for an entirely novel approach to the nature of physical reality, and shows how this approach can lead to wholly unexpected possibilities, including disembodied human existence for billions of years. The book returns philosophy to its most ambitious roots in its attempt to answer difficult human questions about ourselves and our world.
David Hyder and Hans-Jorg Rheinberger (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804756044
- eISBN:
- 9780804772945
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804756044.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book is a collection of chapters on Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences by philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last ...
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This book is a collection of chapters on Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences by philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last work has never received the attention its author's prominence demands. In the Crisis, Husserl considers the gap that has grown between the “life-world” of everyday human experience and the world of mathematical science. He argues that the two have become disconnected because we misunderstand our own scientific past—we confuse mathematical idealities with concrete reality and thereby undermine the validity of our immediate experience. The philosopher's foundational work in the theory of intentionality is relevant to contemporary discussions of qualia, naïve science, and the fact–value distinction. The chapters included in this volume consider Husserl's diagnosis of this “crisis” and his proposed solution. Topics addressed include Husserl's late philosophy, the relation between scientific and everyday objects and “worlds,” the history of Greek and Galilean science, the philosophy of history, and Husserl's influence on Foucault.Less
This book is a collection of chapters on Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences by philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last work has never received the attention its author's prominence demands. In the Crisis, Husserl considers the gap that has grown between the “life-world” of everyday human experience and the world of mathematical science. He argues that the two have become disconnected because we misunderstand our own scientific past—we confuse mathematical idealities with concrete reality and thereby undermine the validity of our immediate experience. The philosopher's foundational work in the theory of intentionality is relevant to contemporary discussions of qualia, naïve science, and the fact–value distinction. The chapters included in this volume consider Husserl's diagnosis of this “crisis” and his proposed solution. Topics addressed include Husserl's late philosophy, the relation between scientific and everyday objects and “worlds,” the history of Greek and Galilean science, the philosophy of history, and Husserl's influence on Foucault.
Charles W. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198745112
- eISBN:
- 9780191806056
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198745112.003.0003
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Finance, Accounting, and Banking, Political Economy
Drawing heavily on market examples and transcendental/critical realism, this chapter switches the focus from knowing and ambiguities to unexpected happenings and contingencies, and from past to ...
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Drawing heavily on market examples and transcendental/critical realism, this chapter switches the focus from knowing and ambiguities to unexpected happenings and contingencies, and from past to future events. The central theme of this chapter is that concrete reality is composed of a myriad of interrelated open systems subject to underlying causal forces and contingencies. This perspective is similar in a way to modern chaos theory in being skeptical of our ability to predict future outcomes, but differs in embracing an ontologically rather than an empirically based view of causality. Reality is seen to entail a flow of often conflicting currents of various sorts, rather than an ordered structure.Less
Drawing heavily on market examples and transcendental/critical realism, this chapter switches the focus from knowing and ambiguities to unexpected happenings and contingencies, and from past to future events. The central theme of this chapter is that concrete reality is composed of a myriad of interrelated open systems subject to underlying causal forces and contingencies. This perspective is similar in a way to modern chaos theory in being skeptical of our ability to predict future outcomes, but differs in embracing an ontologically rather than an empirically based view of causality. Reality is seen to entail a flow of often conflicting currents of various sorts, rather than an ordered structure.
