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A full clause profiles a grounded instance of a process type. Conceptual archetypes function as the prototypical values of basic clause types and clausal elements. Languages naturally differ in their implementation of this general characterization, and within a language clauses are varied and complex. Subject and object are defined schematically as trajector and landmark, i.e. primary and secondary focal participant. In most languages a particular semantic role represents the typical choice of trajector: either agent or theme (a patient-like participant). Each is the starting point along a natural path: the path of energy flow in the case of agent, and a path based on conceptual autonomy in the case of theme. In varied proportions and for different grammatical phenomena, every language makes some use of these two basic strategies. This is the basis for nominative/accusative, ergative/absolutive, and agent/patient organization. It can be argued that subject is a grammatical universal when defined abstractly in terms of primary focal prominence. In addition to the most typical clausal organization, every language offers a variety of alternatives for special purposes. Voice alternations (such as active, passive, and middle) pertain to the semantic role of the participant focused as trajector. The trajector can also be a non-participant, e.g. a setting or location. There is comparable variation in the choice of landmark, resulting in different kinds of objects. In agent-oriented languages, clauses which choose the theme as trajector represent an important secondary option. The verb of a clause is often complex. In addition to incorporating nominal or adverbial elements, the verb can exhibit layers of morphological derivation, be a phrase instead of a single word, or even consist in a series of verb-like elements.

The standard doctrine that basic grammatical classes (parts of speech) are not semantically definable rests on erroneous assumptions about the nature of linguistic meaning. With a proper view of meaning, basic categories—notably noun and verb—have plausible conceptual characterizations at both the prototype level (for typical examples) and the schema level (valid for all instances). The prototypes are based on conceptual archetypes: objects for nouns, and actions for verbs. The schemas are independent of any particular conceptual content, residing instead in basic cognitive abilities immanent in the archetypes: for nouns, grouping and reification; in the case of verbs, the ability to apprend relationships and to track their evolution through time. An expression's grammatical category specifically depends on the nature of its profile (not its overall content). Thus a noun profiles a thing (defined abstractly as any product of grouping and reification), while a verb profiles a process (a relationship tracked through time). Expressions that profile non-processual relationships include adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, infinitives, and participles. Relational expressions can be categorized in different ways, depending on factors like the number and type of focused participants, whether the profiled relation is simplex or complex, and whether it is apprehended holistically or sequentially. These characterizations prove efficacious in describing how relational expressions function as noun modifiers and in clausal organization.

Without contradiction, linguistic meaning is seen as residing in conceptualization and as having a social-interactive basis. Conceptualization is fundamentally imagistic rather than propositional. Instead of there being a unique set of semantic primitives, there are different kinds of elemental conceptions, each basic in its own respect. Certain fundamental grammatical notions are semantically characterized both schematically, in terms of basic cognitive abilities, and prototypically, in terms of experientially grounded conceptual archetypes. Linguistic meanings do not reflect the world in any direct or straightforward manner, but rather embody particular ways of construing the situations described, often involving imagination and mental constructions. There is no specific boundary between linguistic and extralinguistic aspects of lexical meanings (which are better likened metaphorically to encyclopedia entries rather than dictionary entries), nor between semantics and pragmatics. Hence semantics is only partially (not fully) compositional. An expression derives its meaning by flexibly invoking an open-ended set of cognitive domains, i.e. concepts or conceptual complexes of any degree of complexity. These domains are connected in various ways, e.g. by overlap, inclusion, and metaphorical correspondences. There is no clear distinction between domains and mental spaces.