Caroline Jones
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545520
- eISBN:
- 9780191721113
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545520.003.0015
- Subject:
- Law, Medical Law
This chapter analyses the routes by which Parliamentary bodies move from consultation to formulating public policy in the controversial field of assisted conception and related technological ...
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This chapter analyses the routes by which Parliamentary bodies move from consultation to formulating public policy in the controversial field of assisted conception and related technological developments. It explores the findings of the Department of Health consultation, focusing not only on the official interpretation of the data, but to alternative constructions and problems created by the quasi-quantitative representation of the material at some junctures. On the one hand, this process has led to greater empathy for the Department of Health and other official bodies in sifting through the myriad responses, but on the other hand a creeping cynicism has also taken hold. It is clear that there are significant issues about the way that data is presented by governmental and Parliamentary bodies, and even in the absence of the use of statistical data it remains feasible to skew the presentation of data in ways that are, strictly speaking, factually correct but simultaneously misleading about the dataset as a whole.Less
This chapter analyses the routes by which Parliamentary bodies move from consultation to formulating public policy in the controversial field of assisted conception and related technological developments. It explores the findings of the Department of Health consultation, focusing not only on the official interpretation of the data, but to alternative constructions and problems created by the quasi-quantitative representation of the material at some junctures. On the one hand, this process has led to greater empathy for the Department of Health and other official bodies in sifting through the myriad responses, but on the other hand a creeping cynicism has also taken hold. It is clear that there are significant issues about the way that data is presented by governmental and Parliamentary bodies, and even in the absence of the use of statistical data it remains feasible to skew the presentation of data in ways that are, strictly speaking, factually correct but simultaneously misleading about the dataset as a whole.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195158427
- eISBN:
- 9780199871407
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each ...
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The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each separately. It sets out a comprehensive theory of rationality applicable to both practical and theoretical reason. In both domains, the book explains how experience grounds rationality, delineates the structure of central elements, and attacks the egocentric conception of rationality. It establishes the rationality of altruism and thereby supports major moral principles. The concluding part describes the pluralism and relativity the book's conception of rationality accommodates and, taking the unified account of theoretical and practical rationality in that light, constructs a theory of global rationality — the overall rationality of persons.Less
The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each separately. It sets out a comprehensive theory of rationality applicable to both practical and theoretical reason. In both domains, the book explains how experience grounds rationality, delineates the structure of central elements, and attacks the egocentric conception of rationality. It establishes the rationality of altruism and thereby supports major moral principles. The concluding part describes the pluralism and relativity the book's conception of rationality accommodates and, taking the unified account of theoretical and practical rationality in that light, constructs a theory of global rationality — the overall rationality of persons.
Andrew Mason
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199264414
- eISBN:
- 9780191718489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264414.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter explores this form of egalitarianism further by asking when justice requires us to hold people responsible for their behaviour by requiring them to bear its costs. Some maintain that ...
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This chapter explores this form of egalitarianism further by asking when justice requires us to hold people responsible for their behaviour by requiring them to bear its costs. Some maintain that people can legitimately be required to bear the costs of their behaviour if and only if they could have acted otherwise and no excusing conditions apply. Against this formulation, some would argue that what matters is whether an agent's behaviour is responsive to his reasons in the right way, and whether there are any excusing conditions, but not whether he could have acted otherwise. It is argued that both of these accounts are inadequate because they do not recognize the full range of reasons we might have for not requiring a person to bear the full costs of his behaviour.Less
This chapter explores this form of egalitarianism further by asking when justice requires us to hold people responsible for their behaviour by requiring them to bear its costs. Some maintain that people can legitimately be required to bear the costs of their behaviour if and only if they could have acted otherwise and no excusing conditions apply. Against this formulation, some would argue that what matters is whether an agent's behaviour is responsive to his reasons in the right way, and whether there are any excusing conditions, but not whether he could have acted otherwise. It is argued that both of these accounts are inadequate because they do not recognize the full range of reasons we might have for not requiring a person to bear the full costs of his behaviour.
Peter Hylton
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199286355
- eISBN:
- 9780191713309
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286355.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The work of Bertrand Russell had a decisive influence on the emergence of analytic philosophy, and on its subsequent development. The essays collected in this volume, by one of the authorities on ...
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The work of Bertrand Russell had a decisive influence on the emergence of analytic philosophy, and on its subsequent development. The essays collected in this volume, by one of the authorities on Russell's philosophy, all aim at recapturing and articulating aspects of Russell's philosophical vision during his most influential and important period, the two decades following his break with Idealism in 1899. One theme of the collection concerns Russell's views about propositions and their analysis, and the relation of those ideas to his rejection of Idealism. Another theme is the development of Russell's logicism, culminating in Whitehead's and Russell's Principia Mathematica, and the author offers a revealing view of the conception of logic that underlies it. Here again there is an emphasis on Russell's argument against Idealism, on the idea that his logicism was a crucial part of that argument. A further focus of the volume is Russell's views about functions and propositional functions. This theme is part of a contrast that the author draws between Russell's general philosophical position and that of Frege; in particular, there is a close parallel with the quite different views that the two philosophers held about the nature of philosophical analysis. The author also sheds light on the much-disputed idea of an operation, which Wittgenstein advances in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Less
The work of Bertrand Russell had a decisive influence on the emergence of analytic philosophy, and on its subsequent development. The essays collected in this volume, by one of the authorities on Russell's philosophy, all aim at recapturing and articulating aspects of Russell's philosophical vision during his most influential and important period, the two decades following his break with Idealism in 1899. One theme of the collection concerns Russell's views about propositions and their analysis, and the relation of those ideas to his rejection of Idealism. Another theme is the development of Russell's logicism, culminating in Whitehead's and Russell's Principia Mathematica, and the author offers a revealing view of the conception of logic that underlies it. Here again there is an emphasis on Russell's argument against Idealism, on the idea that his logicism was a crucial part of that argument. A further focus of the volume is Russell's views about functions and propositional functions. This theme is part of a contrast that the author draws between Russell's general philosophical position and that of Frege; in particular, there is a close parallel with the quite different views that the two philosophers held about the nature of philosophical analysis. The author also sheds light on the much-disputed idea of an operation, which Wittgenstein advances in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
Paul Hurley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559305
- eISBN:
- 9780191721212
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559305.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The focus of this book is consequentialism, the moral theory upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs. The theory can with some ...
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The focus of this book is consequentialism, the moral theory upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs. The theory can with some plausibility claim a status as the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy. Moreover, its pervasive deployment in spheres such as economics, public policy, and jurisprudence is one of the striking developments of the last 150 years. It is the thesis of this book that debates concerning the challenge of consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism, an unresolved tension between the theory and many of its most fundamental presuppositions. An appreciation of the nature of this tension grounds the articulation of a fundamental challenge to the theory from within. This challenge is developed and sharpened through the first 4 chapters of the book. Development of this challenge to consequentialism in turn reveals the apparent force of the challenge of consequentialism to be largely illusory. Chapter 5 demonstrates that many traditional rationales offered in its support draw upon systematic misappropriations of intuitions linking rightness of actions and goodness of actions, treating them as intuitions concerning rightness of actions and goodness of overall states of affairs. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that one remaining rationale — a rationale grounded in the appeal to the impartiality of morality — does not provide support for the theory; indeed, that attempts to respond to the tension within consequentialism suggest a fundamental role for an alternative to the consequentialist's impersonal conception of impartiality, an interpersonal rather than an impersonal conception of equal concern. Unlike the consequentialist's impersonal conception, such interpersonal impartiality can allow for the ordinary moral convictions that actions that do not promote the best overall state of affairs are often morally permitted, and are sometimes morally required.Less
The focus of this book is consequentialism, the moral theory upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs. The theory can with some plausibility claim a status as the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy. Moreover, its pervasive deployment in spheres such as economics, public policy, and jurisprudence is one of the striking developments of the last 150 years. It is the thesis of this book that debates concerning the challenge of consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism, an unresolved tension between the theory and many of its most fundamental presuppositions. An appreciation of the nature of this tension grounds the articulation of a fundamental challenge to the theory from within. This challenge is developed and sharpened through the first 4 chapters of the book. Development of this challenge to consequentialism in turn reveals the apparent force of the challenge of consequentialism to be largely illusory. Chapter 5 demonstrates that many traditional rationales offered in its support draw upon systematic misappropriations of intuitions linking rightness of actions and goodness of actions, treating them as intuitions concerning rightness of actions and goodness of overall states of affairs. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that one remaining rationale — a rationale grounded in the appeal to the impartiality of morality — does not provide support for the theory; indeed, that attempts to respond to the tension within consequentialism suggest a fundamental role for an alternative to the consequentialist's impersonal conception of impartiality, an interpersonal rather than an impersonal conception of equal concern. Unlike the consequentialist's impersonal conception, such interpersonal impartiality can allow for the ordinary moral convictions that actions that do not promote the best overall state of affairs are often morally permitted, and are sometimes morally required.
Walter Ott
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570430
- eISBN:
- 9780191722394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.003.0029
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter returns to one of the questions with which this book began: Why does the conception of causal necessity as logical necessity so outlive the notion of powers on which it was based? The ...
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This chapter returns to one of the questions with which this book began: Why does the conception of causal necessity as logical necessity so outlive the notion of powers on which it was based? The question itself is wrong. For the Aristotelian conception of power was not discarded so much as reinvented during the modern period, issuing in the cognitive and geometrical models of causation and hence in the top‐down and bottom‐up conceptions of laws. It is a mistake to think of the scholastic concept of power as lingering on without justification, long after it was unmoored by the “new” philosophy. Instead, it was adopted and transformed. This chapter draws together the themes of the book and extends its argument to the contemporary debate over laws of nature. Roughly, the argument is that the top‐down conception of laws is unintelligible in the absence of the theological underpinnings moderns like Descartes provide. It should thus be jettisoned in a version of a bottom‐up theory, one which is not hamstrung by Hume's unreasonable limitations on intentionality.Less
This chapter returns to one of the questions with which this book began: Why does the conception of causal necessity as logical necessity so outlive the notion of powers on which it was based? The question itself is wrong. For the Aristotelian conception of power was not discarded so much as reinvented during the modern period, issuing in the cognitive and geometrical models of causation and hence in the top‐down and bottom‐up conceptions of laws. It is a mistake to think of the scholastic concept of power as lingering on without justification, long after it was unmoored by the “new” philosophy. Instead, it was adopted and transformed. This chapter draws together the themes of the book and extends its argument to the contemporary debate over laws of nature. Roughly, the argument is that the top‐down conception of laws is unintelligible in the absence of the theological underpinnings moderns like Descartes provide. It should thus be jettisoned in a version of a bottom‐up theory, one which is not hamstrung by Hume's unreasonable limitations on intentionality.
Paul Crowther
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199244973
- eISBN:
- 9780191697425
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244973.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism (Clarendon Press, 1993) argued that art and aesthetic experiences have the capacity to humanize. In this book, the author develops this theme in ...
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Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism (Clarendon Press, 1993) argued that art and aesthetic experiences have the capacity to humanize. In this book, the author develops this theme in much greater depth, arguing that art can bridge the gap between philosophy's traditional striving for generality and completeness, and the concreteness and contingency of humanity's basic relation to the world. As the key element in his theory, he proposes an ecological definition of art. His strategy involves first mapping out and analysing the logical boundaries and ontological structures of the aesthetic domain. He then considers key concepts from this analysis in the light of a tradition in Continental philosophy (notably the work of Kant, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Hegel) which — by virtue of the philosophical significance that it assigns to art — significantly anticipates the ecological conception. On this basis the author is able to give a full formulation of his ecological definition. Art, in making sensible or imaginative material into symbolic form, harmonizes and conserves what is unique and what is general in human experience. The aesthetic domain answers basic needs intrinsic to self-consciousness itself, and art is the highest realization of such needs. In the creation and reception of art the embodied subject is fully at home with his or her environment.Less
Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism (Clarendon Press, 1993) argued that art and aesthetic experiences have the capacity to humanize. In this book, the author develops this theme in much greater depth, arguing that art can bridge the gap between philosophy's traditional striving for generality and completeness, and the concreteness and contingency of humanity's basic relation to the world. As the key element in his theory, he proposes an ecological definition of art. His strategy involves first mapping out and analysing the logical boundaries and ontological structures of the aesthetic domain. He then considers key concepts from this analysis in the light of a tradition in Continental philosophy (notably the work of Kant, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Hegel) which — by virtue of the philosophical significance that it assigns to art — significantly anticipates the ecological conception. On this basis the author is able to give a full formulation of his ecological definition. Art, in making sensible or imaginative material into symbolic form, harmonizes and conserves what is unique and what is general in human experience. The aesthetic domain answers basic needs intrinsic to self-consciousness itself, and art is the highest realization of such needs. In the creation and reception of art the embodied subject is fully at home with his or her environment.
Paul Grice and Judith Baker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199243877
- eISBN:
- 9780191697302
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243877.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed ...
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The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed as objective; value is part of the world we live in, but nonetheless is constructed by us. We inherit, or seem to inherit, the Aristotelian world in which objects and creatures are characterized in terms of what they are supposed to do. We are thereby enabled to evaluate by reference to function and finality. This much is not surprising. The most striking part of Grice's position, however, is his contention that the legitimacy of such evaluations rests ultimately on an argument for absolute value. The collection includes Grice's three previously unpublished Carus Lectures on the conception of value, a section of his ‘Reply to Richards’ (previously published in Grandy and Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Oxford, 1986), and ‘Method in Philosophical Psychology’ (Presidential Address delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 1975).Less
The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed as objective; value is part of the world we live in, but nonetheless is constructed by us. We inherit, or seem to inherit, the Aristotelian world in which objects and creatures are characterized in terms of what they are supposed to do. We are thereby enabled to evaluate by reference to function and finality. This much is not surprising. The most striking part of Grice's position, however, is his contention that the legitimacy of such evaluations rests ultimately on an argument for absolute value. The collection includes Grice's three previously unpublished Carus Lectures on the conception of value, a section of his ‘Reply to Richards’ (previously published in Grandy and Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Oxford, 1986), and ‘Method in Philosophical Psychology’ (Presidential Address delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 1975).
John V. Kulvicki
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290758
- eISBN:
- 9780191604010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019929075X.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter and the next focus on pictorial realism, with an aim towards responding to some objections to the structural account of depiction. One important aspect of realism is verity: pictures are ...
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This chapter and the next focus on pictorial realism, with an aim towards responding to some objections to the structural account of depiction. One important aspect of realism is verity: pictures are veritable to the extent that they represent objects true to our conceptions of them. This is an unpopular way to think of pictorial realism, but it turns out that verity does a better job of accounting for realism in general than many have thought it could. This undercuts some of the motivation for other accounts of realism, discussed in the next chapter.Less
This chapter and the next focus on pictorial realism, with an aim towards responding to some objections to the structural account of depiction. One important aspect of realism is verity: pictures are veritable to the extent that they represent objects true to our conceptions of them. This is an unpopular way to think of pictorial realism, but it turns out that verity does a better job of accounting for realism in general than many have thought it could. This undercuts some of the motivation for other accounts of realism, discussed in the next chapter.
Hugh Rice
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250289
- eISBN:
- 9780191598302
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250282.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Proposes an abstract conception of God, which identifies the will of God with the basic facts about good and bad. I argue that this conception does justice both to the nature of goodness and to the ...
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Proposes an abstract conception of God, which identifies the will of God with the basic facts about good and bad. I argue that this conception does justice both to the nature of goodness and to the sovereignty of God. And, while it is does not represent God as a person, it allows for the attribution to him of properties that form the key elements of many people's conception of God. I argue that a belief in God, so conceived, is a natural extension of ordinary scientific outlook and a belief in objective value. I defend this belief in objective value and claim that it is reasonable to explain the existence of the world in terms of such value. In the latter part of the book, I discuss the problem of evil, and the question of whether there are good reasons for believing in miracles. Finally, I discuss the value of rational belief in God.Less
Proposes an abstract conception of God, which identifies the will of God with the basic facts about good and bad. I argue that this conception does justice both to the nature of goodness and to the sovereignty of God. And, while it is does not represent God as a person, it allows for the attribution to him of properties that form the key elements of many people's conception of God. I argue that a belief in God, so conceived, is a natural extension of ordinary scientific outlook and a belief in objective value. I defend this belief in objective value and claim that it is reasonable to explain the existence of the world in terms of such value. In the latter part of the book, I discuss the problem of evil, and the question of whether there are good reasons for believing in miracles. Finally, I discuss the value of rational belief in God.
J. M. Hinton
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198244035
- eISBN:
- 9780191680717
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244035.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses that the contrast emerges in its most marked form if one compares the notion of an experience in certain philosophical discussions with that of an a-experience. When someone ...
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This chapter discusses that the contrast emerges in its most marked form if one compares the notion of an experience in certain philosophical discussions with that of an a-experience. When someone avers that if one dreams being cut into small pieces then one ‘has the experience of’ being cut into small pieces, one does not mean having the a-1-experience. Nor, when someone says that if one dreams someone being tortured then one has the experience of being tortured, does one mean having the a-2-experience. One means that you sb-l-experience being cut into small pieces, or some other form of physical abuse. This means that one is or may be getting into philosophy. For many questions arise as to how that special kind of event is being conceived, and the answers when elicited will often reveal some decidedly philosophical conception.Less
This chapter discusses that the contrast emerges in its most marked form if one compares the notion of an experience in certain philosophical discussions with that of an a-experience. When someone avers that if one dreams being cut into small pieces then one ‘has the experience of’ being cut into small pieces, one does not mean having the a-1-experience. Nor, when someone says that if one dreams someone being tortured then one has the experience of being tortured, does one mean having the a-2-experience. One means that you sb-l-experience being cut into small pieces, or some other form of physical abuse. This means that one is or may be getting into philosophy. For many questions arise as to how that special kind of event is being conceived, and the answers when elicited will often reveal some decidedly philosophical conception.
Lawrence S. Cunningham
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195178067
- eISBN:
- 9780199784905
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195178068.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
This chapter explores the Protestant reaction against the Marian tradition of Catholicism, which was addressed by the reform of the Council of Trent. Topics discussed include the Catholic Reformation ...
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This chapter explores the Protestant reaction against the Marian tradition of Catholicism, which was addressed by the reform of the Council of Trent. Topics discussed include the Catholic Reformation and two conspicuous events which characterized the Marian character of Catholicism in the 19th century: the definition of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception by Pope Pius IX in 1854 and the rise of Marian apparitions and subsequent pilgrimage locations, most conspicuously at Lourdes in France.Less
This chapter explores the Protestant reaction against the Marian tradition of Catholicism, which was addressed by the reform of the Council of Trent. Topics discussed include the Catholic Reformation and two conspicuous events which characterized the Marian character of Catholicism in the 19th century: the definition of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception by Pope Pius IX in 1854 and the rise of Marian apparitions and subsequent pilgrimage locations, most conspicuously at Lourdes in France.
Caroline Johnson Hodge
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195182163
- eISBN:
- 9780199785612
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182163.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies
In Romans 8:29, Paul outlines the relationship between Christ, the gentiles newly in-Christ, and God. Christ is not an ancestor (like Abraham), but a firstborn brother of the same generation as the ...
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In Romans 8:29, Paul outlines the relationship between Christ, the gentiles newly in-Christ, and God. Christ is not an ancestor (like Abraham), but a firstborn brother of the same generation as the gentiles, while the gentiles are younger brothers of Christ and are modeled after his image. God is the father of both parties and is a procreative force, much like the power associated with the male seed in both in biblical tradition and in ancient discussions of embryology and conception. The language of being formed or shaped into the likeness of another person or an ideal model is found in discussions of procreation and succession both in biblical texts and in Greek discussions of procreation. For Paul, Romans 8:29 is a perfect description of newly adopted gentiles, who in their new status as adopted sons of God, are now heirs to God's promises.Less
In Romans 8:29, Paul outlines the relationship between Christ, the gentiles newly in-Christ, and God. Christ is not an ancestor (like Abraham), but a firstborn brother of the same generation as the gentiles, while the gentiles are younger brothers of Christ and are modeled after his image. God is the father of both parties and is a procreative force, much like the power associated with the male seed in both in biblical tradition and in ancient discussions of embryology and conception. The language of being formed or shaped into the likeness of another person or an ideal model is found in discussions of procreation and succession both in biblical texts and in Greek discussions of procreation. For Paul, Romans 8:29 is a perfect description of newly adopted gentiles, who in their new status as adopted sons of God, are now heirs to God's promises.
Sarah M. Pike
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195177299
- eISBN:
- 9780199785537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195177299.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
New religious movements have typically emerged and thrived in times of social upheaval during which normative gender roles are challenged, such as in the United States during the industrializing ...
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New religious movements have typically emerged and thrived in times of social upheaval during which normative gender roles are challenged, such as in the United States during the industrializing mid-19th century and in the 1960s-1970s. New religions offer a range of roles for men and women that are shaped by a variety of different factors, including mythology, conceptions of deity, the role and teachings of the founder and leaders, and the demographic background of participants. Gender roles in NRMs include hierarchical models, role reversals, partnerships, and androgynous models. NRMs have typically experimented with alternative sex, marriage, and family structures, including celibacy, polygamy, and free love.Less
New religious movements have typically emerged and thrived in times of social upheaval during which normative gender roles are challenged, such as in the United States during the industrializing mid-19th century and in the 1960s-1970s. New religions offer a range of roles for men and women that are shaped by a variety of different factors, including mythology, conceptions of deity, the role and teachings of the founder and leaders, and the demographic background of participants. Gender roles in NRMs include hierarchical models, role reversals, partnerships, and androgynous models. NRMs have typically experimented with alternative sex, marriage, and family structures, including celibacy, polygamy, and free love.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, ...
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The question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, the author identifies the topic: events of experience whose defining characteristic is that there is something it is like to undergo them. Conceiving of experiences this way leaves open many issues that are philosophically controversial, issues such metaphysics of mind, ontology, qualia, consciousness, access versus phenomenal consciousness, and the diaphanousness or transparency of experience.Less
The question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, the author identifies the topic: events of experience whose defining characteristic is that there is something it is like to undergo them. Conceiving of experiences this way leaves open many issues that are philosophically controversial, issues such metaphysics of mind, ontology, qualia, consciousness, access versus phenomenal consciousness, and the diaphanousness or transparency of experience.
Gerald SJ O'Collins
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199203130
- eISBN:
- 9780191707742
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199203130.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
The divine identity of Jesus is essential for the efficacy of salvation and its entire story. That story comprises all the stages in the human history of the incarnate Son of God—right from his ...
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The divine identity of Jesus is essential for the efficacy of salvation and its entire story. That story comprises all the stages in the human history of the incarnate Son of God—right from his conception through to his glorious coming at the end of time.Less
The divine identity of Jesus is essential for the efficacy of salvation and its entire story. That story comprises all the stages in the human history of the incarnate Son of God—right from his conception through to his glorious coming at the end of time.
William Child
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236252
- eISBN:
- 9780191597206
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236255.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Explores the relation between interpretationism and causal theories in the philosophy of mind. Interpretationism is the view that we can understand the nature of the propositional attitudes by ...
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Explores the relation between interpretationism and causal theories in the philosophy of mind. Interpretationism is the view that we can understand the nature of the propositional attitudes by reflecting on the process of interpretation—the process of ascribing attitudes to a subject on the basis of what she says and does. Causal theories say that the concepts of common‐sense psychology—concepts such as action, perception, and memory—are essentially causal. Interpretationism and causal theories are sometimes combined, notably in the work of Donald Davidson. But it is often thought that they are incompatible—that interpretationism makes it impossible for mental phenomena to play genuinely causal roles. The book defends interpretationism as an approach to the propositional attitudes; it defends causal theories of action‐explanation and vision; and it explains how these two approaches are compatible. Different versions of interpretationism are distinguished and assessed. The relations between the mental and the physical are discussed; the anomalism of the mental is traced to the uncodifiability of rationality and its implications are explored. A disjunctive conception of visual experience is supported and combined with a causal theory of vision. And the explanatory relevance of mental properties is defended against those who hold that non‐reductive monism in general, and anomalous monism in particular, cannot satisfactorily accommodate the causal role of the mental.Less
Explores the relation between interpretationism and causal theories in the philosophy of mind. Interpretationism is the view that we can understand the nature of the propositional attitudes by reflecting on the process of interpretation—the process of ascribing attitudes to a subject on the basis of what she says and does. Causal theories say that the concepts of common‐sense psychology—concepts such as action, perception, and memory—are essentially causal. Interpretationism and causal theories are sometimes combined, notably in the work of Donald Davidson. But it is often thought that they are incompatible—that interpretationism makes it impossible for mental phenomena to play genuinely causal roles. The book defends interpretationism as an approach to the propositional attitudes; it defends causal theories of action‐explanation and vision; and it explains how these two approaches are compatible. Different versions of interpretationism are distinguished and assessed. The relations between the mental and the physical are discussed; the anomalism of the mental is traced to the uncodifiability of rationality and its implications are explored. A disjunctive conception of visual experience is supported and combined with a causal theory of vision. And the explanatory relevance of mental properties is defended against those who hold that non‐reductive monism in general, and anomalous monism in particular, cannot satisfactorily accommodate the causal role of the mental.
Eamonn Callan
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242689
- eISBN:
- 9780191598715
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242682.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Autonomy is important to leading a good life but a common liberal instrumental construal of the way in which it contributes to the leading of a good life is defective. A one‐sided focus on the ...
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Autonomy is important to leading a good life but a common liberal instrumental construal of the way in which it contributes to the leading of a good life is defective. A one‐sided focus on the development of capacities for revision of conceptions of the good should be corrected by attention to the value of developing capacities permitting a rational adherence to a conception of the good. Exposing children to a diverse but shallow secular and consumer culture might not facilitate goodness‐enhancing autonomy in a way that is superior to the more insular strategies of religious minorities whose child‐rearing practices are criticized by liberals.Less
Autonomy is important to leading a good life but a common liberal instrumental construal of the way in which it contributes to the leading of a good life is defective. A one‐sided focus on the development of capacities for revision of conceptions of the good should be corrected by attention to the value of developing capacities permitting a rational adherence to a conception of the good. Exposing children to a diverse but shallow secular and consumer culture might not facilitate goodness‐enhancing autonomy in a way that is superior to the more insular strategies of religious minorities whose child‐rearing practices are criticized by liberals.
Joe Coleman
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242689
- eISBN:
- 9780191598715
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242682.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
While young children lack the moral powers that Rawls calls a conception of the good and a sense of justice, psychological data show that adolescents are closer to adults in this respect. The idea ...
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While young children lack the moral powers that Rawls calls a conception of the good and a sense of justice, psychological data show that adolescents are closer to adults in this respect. The idea that civic education should be compulsory for younger person but not for adults cannot be justified by appeal to the supposed incapacities of the former. A more democratic ’participation‐oriented’ approach to the civic education of the young is more appropriate than an ’authority‐oriented’ approach. Such an approach is a requirement that flows from according younger persons the respect that justice requires.Less
While young children lack the moral powers that Rawls calls a conception of the good and a sense of justice, psychological data show that adolescents are closer to adults in this respect. The idea that civic education should be compulsory for younger person but not for adults cannot be justified by appeal to the supposed incapacities of the former. A more democratic ’participation‐oriented’ approach to the civic education of the young is more appropriate than an ’authority‐oriented’ approach. Such an approach is a requirement that flows from according younger persons the respect that justice requires.
Hillel Steiner
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242689
- eISBN:
- 9780191598715
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242682.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
There is an important distinction between a person's ’initial genetic endowment’ and his ’post‐conception inputs’ such as nutrition and education. From a left‐libertarian perspective that views ...
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There is an important distinction between a person's ’initial genetic endowment’ and his ’post‐conception inputs’ such as nutrition and education. From a left‐libertarian perspective that views persons as self‐owning, children have an enforceable claim that parents should provide adequate ’post‐conception’ inputs. Moreover, with the revolution in genetic science, it is now possible to effect genetic changes without altering identity. If so, children can, in principle, claim a right against ’genetic‐disablement’.Less
There is an important distinction between a person's ’initial genetic endowment’ and his ’post‐conception inputs’ such as nutrition and education. From a left‐libertarian perspective that views persons as self‐owning, children have an enforceable claim that parents should provide adequate ’post‐conception’ inputs. Moreover, with the revolution in genetic science, it is now possible to effect genetic changes without altering identity. If so, children can, in principle, claim a right against ’genetic‐disablement’.
