John Bishop and Ken Perszyk
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198722250
- eISBN:
- 9780191789090
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722250.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter considers the various problems of evil that attend different conceptions of God. It motivates an alternative ‘euteleological’ conception of divinity by focusing on the difficulties for ...
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This chapter considers the various problems of evil that attend different conceptions of God. It motivates an alternative ‘euteleological’ conception of divinity by focusing on the difficulties for traditional omniGod theism posed by the argument from evil. Euteleology is a panentheist, non-personal, and non-supernaturalist account, in which God is identified both with love, which is the supreme good that is the Universe’s telos, and with the reality directed towards that end and existing just because that end is actually realized within it. This account may seem religiously inadequate because its non-triumphalist notion of salvation is judged too austere. Euteleology also faces its own evidential problem of evil. Though this problem may be insurmountable from a position of religious neutrality, it may be resolvable from within certain (e.g. Christological) kinds of faith-stance.Less
This chapter considers the various problems of evil that attend different conceptions of God. It motivates an alternative ‘euteleological’ conception of divinity by focusing on the difficulties for traditional omniGod theism posed by the argument from evil. Euteleology is a panentheist, non-personal, and non-supernaturalist account, in which God is identified both with love, which is the supreme good that is the Universe’s telos, and with the reality directed towards that end and existing just because that end is actually realized within it. This account may seem religiously inadequate because its non-triumphalist notion of salvation is judged too austere. Euteleology also faces its own evidential problem of evil. Though this problem may be insurmountable from a position of religious neutrality, it may be resolvable from within certain (e.g. Christological) kinds of faith-stance.
John Bishop
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- July 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198821625
- eISBN:
- 9780191860904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198821625.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human ...
More
The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human fulfilment. Dealing with this problem at the cognitive level involves commitment to a view of reality as favourable to practical commitment to ethical ideals. An intellectual problem of evil then arises to the extent that it seems that the fact of evil is evidence against the truth of the salvific worldview we are inclined to adopt for dealing with it. In relation to theism’s ‘revelatory’ worldview, this intellectual problem is expressible as an Argument from Evil. A ‘normatively relativized’ version of the Argument from Evil is proposed that seeks to exclude rational belief in the ‘personal omniGod’. As a viable alternative conception of God is possible, however, the Argument fails to justify outright atheism.Less
The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human fulfilment. Dealing with this problem at the cognitive level involves commitment to a view of reality as favourable to practical commitment to ethical ideals. An intellectual problem of evil then arises to the extent that it seems that the fact of evil is evidence against the truth of the salvific worldview we are inclined to adopt for dealing with it. In relation to theism’s ‘revelatory’ worldview, this intellectual problem is expressible as an Argument from Evil. A ‘normatively relativized’ version of the Argument from Evil is proposed that seeks to exclude rational belief in the ‘personal omniGod’. As a viable alternative conception of God is possible, however, the Argument fails to justify outright atheism.
