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Introduction

Christopher Peacocke

in Truly Understood

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199239443
eISBN:
9780191717000
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This introduction begins with a discussion of the principal claim of the book, which is that reference and truth have an explanatory role to play in the nature of understanding and ... More


Understanding People

Michael Morris

in The Good and the True

Published in print:
1992
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198239444
eISBN:
9780191679919
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter explains humansʼ behaviour. It aims to provide a conception of the kind of explanation which we get from knowledge of people's beliefs, desires, and other attitudes. The definition of ... More


Word-Meaning and Opacity

Michael Morris

in The Good and the True

Published in print:
1992
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198239444
eISBN:
9780191679919
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter makes a programmatic showing how an evaluative theory of content can meet two constraints: the right substitution conditions for belief contexts, and what it is for words to be ... More


The Idea of a Transcendental Deduction

Hubert Schwyzer

in The Unity of Understanding: A Study in Kantian Problems

Published in print:
1990
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198248293
eISBN:
9780191681110
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248293.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses whether the need for a Transcendental Deduction is due merely to the unfortunate fact that Kant's account of concept possession proceeds from two unrelated points, or is there ... More


Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory

Jerry A. Fodor

in Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong

Published in print:
1998
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198236368
eISBN:
9780191597404
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198236360.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Concepts as central theoretical constructs in cognitive science. Theories of concepts and theories of concept possession. Representational. The place of concepts in `representational theories of ... More


Prototypes and Compositionality 1

Jerry A. Fodor

in Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong

Published in print:
1998
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198236368
eISBN:
9780191597404
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198236360.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

A consideration of the view, widely held in cognitive science, that typical concepts are complex statistical structures (`bundles of subjective probabilities’). The crucial difficulty: since ... More


Fregean Sense First

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis

in The Rules of Thought

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199661800
eISBN:
9780191748325
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter concerns deductive reasoning. It is of note that subjects are not generally rationally permitted to jointly accept propositions that are logically inconsistent. This fact illustrates the ... More


Inconsistent Concepts

Kevin Scharp

in Replacing Truth

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199653850
eISBN:
9780191760631
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653850.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The central claim of the book is that truth is an inconsistent concept. This chapter provides a general theory of inconsistent concepts that focuses on a concept's constitutive principles. The ... More


In Defense of Conceptualism

Rocco J. Gennaro

in The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262016605
eISBN:
9780262298582
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262016605.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter focuses on the Conceptualism Thesis, which is based on the view that the content of perceptual experience is fully determined by concepts possessed by the subject. Related to this thesis ... More


Grasp of Essences versus Intuitions: An Unequal Contest

E. J. Lowe

in Intuitions

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199609192
eISBN:
9780191758973
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

One currently popular methodology of metaphysics has it that ‘intuitions’ play an evidential role with respect to metaphysical claims. This chapter defends a realist methodology of metaphysics that ... More


The General Argument from Intuition

Robert C. Koons

in Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God: The Plantinga Project

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
September 2018
ISBN:
9780190842215
eISBN:
9780190874445
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190842215.003.0015
Subject:
Religion, Theology

Argument Q, the seventeenth argument in Plantinga’s battery, concerns the problem of explaining how we can take seriously our capacity for intuition in such areas as logic, arithmetic, morality, and ... More


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