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What is Quine's View of Truth?

Donald Davidson

in Truth, Language, and History: Philosophical Essays Volume 5

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780198237570
eISBN:
9780191602610
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019823757X.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This essay explores Quine’s concept of truth. Quine substitutes radical translation for translation which aims to preserve ‘meaning’. Although radical translation does not always preserve truth ... More


Reasons, Truth, and Relativism

Paul K. Moser

in Philosophy after Objectivity: Making Sense in Perspective

Published in print:
1993
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780195081091
eISBN:
9780199852994
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195081091.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines relativism about reasons and relativism about concepts of reasons and truth. Purposive normative reasons, according to this chapter, are noteworthy. It explains how purposive ... More


Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth

Marian David

in New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199296309
eISBN:
9780191712272
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296309.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter examines Tarski's Convention T and argues that as an adequacy condition for a definition of truth it is in some ways peculiarly specific to a given language and metalanguage, while also ... More


The Folly of Trying to Define Truth

Donald Davidson

in Truth, Language, and History: Philosophical Essays Volume 5

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780198237570
eISBN:
9780191602610
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019823757X.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This essay argues that the concept of truth as well as related subjects of philosophical inquiry such as knowledge, belief, intention, and memory cannot be reduced to more elementary concepts, since ... More


Language, Thought, and World

Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig

in Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199251346
eISBN:
9780191602634
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251347.003.0024
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Reviews a number of interconnected arguments concerned with the question whether the third person stance of the radical interpreter is conceptually basic in understanding language. These include ... More


Truth Rehabilitated

Donald Davidson

in Truth, Language, and History: Philosophical Essays Volume 5

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780198237570
eISBN:
9780191602610
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019823757X.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This essay examines the scepticism about the concept of truth in the past century. It argues that although correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, and epistemic theories of truth are all failures, this ... More


Pursuit of the Concept of Truth

Donald Davidson

in Truth, Language, and History: Philosophical Essays Volume 5

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780198237570
eISBN:
9780191602610
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019823757X.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This essay explores the shift in Quine’s thinking about the relation between meaning and truth. Quine has long been a deflationist about truth. A deflationist is one who holds that to say of a ... More


Reality Without Reference

Donald Davidson

in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199246298
eISBN:
9780191715181
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199246297.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Davidson replies to critics (in particular Hartry Field and Gilbert Harman) who have objected that truth theories cannot do the duty of meaning theories if they fail to elucidate the concept of ... More


The Method of Truth in Metaphysics

Donald Davidson

in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199246298
eISBN:
9780191715181
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199246297.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

In this essay, Davidson sets out to demonstrate that successful communication or mutual interpretability indicates the presence of a shared, and largely true, view of the world. Beliefs must be ... More


The Explanatory Role of the Concept of Truth

Paul Horwich

in Truth

Published in print:
1998
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198752233
eISBN:
9780191597732
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198752237.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

It is argued here that the existence of various explanatory principles, couched in terms of truth, does not call for an analysis of truth—a theory of its underlying nature. In particular, minimalist ... More


Comparing Different Cultural or Theoretical Frameworks: Davidson, Rorty, and the Nature of Truth

Jeremy Barris

in Sometimes Always True: Undogmatic Pluralism in Politics, Metaphysics, and Epistemology

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780823262144
eISBN:
9780823266647
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Fordham University Press
DOI:
10.5422/fordham/9780823262144.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Political Philosophy

In comparing very different cultural, theoretical, or methodological standpoints, the nature of truth itself becomes a problem. If the standpoints have different conceptions of truth, a comparative ... More


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