Vyvyan Evans
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199234660
- eISBN:
- 9780191715495
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234660.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This book is concerned with word meaning, and the role of words in meaning construction. The specific problem addressed concerns how best to account for the inherent variation of word meaning in ...
More
This book is concerned with word meaning, and the role of words in meaning construction. The specific problem addressed concerns how best to account for the inherent variation of word meaning in language use. That is, the books seeks to provide an account for the way in which the meaning associated with any given word form appears to vary each time it is used, in terms of the conceptualization that it, in part, gives rise to. The book develops a new theoretical synthesis building upon developments in cognitive science: in particular cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology. The model proposed is termed the Theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models, or LCCM Theory for short. The theory is based upon two central theoretical constructs: the lexical concept and the cognitive model. The essential insight of the theory is that meaning construction in language understanding relies upon the interaction between distinct types of knowledge representation — units of semantic structure: lexical concepts, and units of conceptual structure: cognitive models — which inhere in distinct representational systems that evolved for different purposes: the conceptual system and the linguistic system. The book provides a joined-up account of lexical semantics and semantic compositionality which is at once descriptively adequate and psychologically plausible.Less
This book is concerned with word meaning, and the role of words in meaning construction. The specific problem addressed concerns how best to account for the inherent variation of word meaning in language use. That is, the books seeks to provide an account for the way in which the meaning associated with any given word form appears to vary each time it is used, in terms of the conceptualization that it, in part, gives rise to. The book develops a new theoretical synthesis building upon developments in cognitive science: in particular cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology. The model proposed is termed the Theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models, or LCCM Theory for short. The theory is based upon two central theoretical constructs: the lexical concept and the cognitive model. The essential insight of the theory is that meaning construction in language understanding relies upon the interaction between distinct types of knowledge representation — units of semantic structure: lexical concepts, and units of conceptual structure: cognitive models — which inhere in distinct representational systems that evolved for different purposes: the conceptual system and the linguistic system. The book provides a joined-up account of lexical semantics and semantic compositionality which is at once descriptively adequate and psychologically plausible.
Jerry A. Fodor
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199548774
- eISBN:
- 9780191721106
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This book presents a new development of the famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. The book defends ...
More
This book presents a new development of the famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. The book defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which has been established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present cognitive science is Turing's suggestion that cognitive processes are not associations but computations; and computation requires a language of thought. This book offers a more cogent presentation and a fuller explication of a distinctive account of the mind, with various intriguing new features. The central role of compositionality in the representational theory of mind is revealed: most of what we know about concepts follows from the compositionality of thoughts. The book shows the necessity of a referentialist account of the content of intentional states, and of an atomistic account of the individuation of concepts. Not least among the new developments is the book's identification and persecution of pragmatism as the leading source of error in the study of the mind today.Less
This book presents a new development of the famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. The book defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which has been established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present cognitive science is Turing's suggestion that cognitive processes are not associations but computations; and computation requires a language of thought. This book offers a more cogent presentation and a fuller explication of a distinctive account of the mind, with various intriguing new features. The central role of compositionality in the representational theory of mind is revealed: most of what we know about concepts follows from the compositionality of thoughts. The book shows the necessity of a referentialist account of the content of intentional states, and of an atomistic account of the individuation of concepts. Not least among the new developments is the book's identification and persecution of pragmatism as the leading source of error in the study of the mind today.
Jerry A. Fodor
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236368
- eISBN:
- 9780191597404
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236360.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have ...
More
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.Less
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter presents an overview of central issues that must be confronted in developing a decent account of meaning, with various positions that might be taken with respect to them, and with some ...
More
This chapter presents an overview of central issues that must be confronted in developing a decent account of meaning, with various positions that might be taken with respect to them, and with some of the arguments that can be given for and against these positions. Topics addressed include forms of scepticism about meaning, the pros and cons of reductionism, the relationship between language and thought, the compositionality of sentence-meanings from word-meanings, the normative import of meaning, individualism, externalism, and the promise of a deflationary theory.Less
This chapter presents an overview of central issues that must be confronted in developing a decent account of meaning, with various positions that might be taken with respect to them, and with some of the arguments that can be given for and against these positions. Topics addressed include forms of scepticism about meaning, the pros and cons of reductionism, the relationship between language and thought, the compositionality of sentence-meanings from word-meanings, the normative import of meaning, individualism, externalism, and the promise of a deflationary theory.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter considers the phenomenon of meaning from the perspective of Chomsky’s ‘I-linguistics’ and his empirical postulation of the ‘language faculty’. After a sketch of that model, the question ...
More
This chapter considers the phenomenon of meaning from the perspective of Chomsky’s ‘I-linguistics’ and his empirical postulation of the ‘language faculty’. After a sketch of that model, the question is raised as to how meaning should be incorporated within it. In accord with the use-theoretic perspective of this book, an answer is developed whereby the association of I-sounds with I-meanings is achieved by virtue of the conceptual roles of those I-sounds, i.e., their basic acceptance-properties. It is shown that this picture compares favourably with various alternatives, including those suggested by Fodor’s mentalese, Davidson’s view of compositionality, naturalizations of the reference relation, and by Chomsky-style explicitly-represented definitions.Less
This chapter considers the phenomenon of meaning from the perspective of Chomsky’s ‘I-linguistics’ and his empirical postulation of the ‘language faculty’. After a sketch of that model, the question is raised as to how meaning should be incorporated within it. In accord with the use-theoretic perspective of this book, an answer is developed whereby the association of I-sounds with I-meanings is achieved by virtue of the conceptual roles of those I-sounds, i.e., their basic acceptance-properties. It is shown that this picture compares favourably with various alternatives, including those suggested by Fodor’s mentalese, Davidson’s view of compositionality, naturalizations of the reference relation, and by Chomsky-style explicitly-represented definitions.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The meaning of any sentence derives from the meanings of its words and from how those words are syntactically combined with one another. But what explains this ‘principle of compositionality’, and ...
More
The meaning of any sentence derives from the meanings of its words and from how those words are syntactically combined with one another. But what explains this ‘principle of compositionality’, and what is its import? The answer is due to Davidson: that since we know (from Tarski) how to deduce the truth conditions of sentences from the referents of their words, we should explain it by identifying (or replacing) sentence-meanings with truth conditions and word-meanings with referents. This chapter offers a deflationary alternative according to which the meaning of a sentence is trivially compositional, since it is constituted by the facts concerning its structure and the meanings of its words. An important implication of this idea is that contrary to the writings of Fodor and Lepore, compositionality can place no constraint whatsoever on how word-meanings are engendered.Less
The meaning of any sentence derives from the meanings of its words and from how those words are syntactically combined with one another. But what explains this ‘principle of compositionality’, and what is its import? The answer is due to Davidson: that since we know (from Tarski) how to deduce the truth conditions of sentences from the referents of their words, we should explain it by identifying (or replacing) sentence-meanings with truth conditions and word-meanings with referents. This chapter offers a deflationary alternative according to which the meaning of a sentence is trivially compositional, since it is constituted by the facts concerning its structure and the meanings of its words. An important implication of this idea is that contrary to the writings of Fodor and Lepore, compositionality can place no constraint whatsoever on how word-meanings are engendered.
Andrew Spencer
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780197265253
- eISBN:
- 9780191760419
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265253.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
In order to establish a typological picture of periphrastic negation, this chapter begins from the criteria for periphrasis established by Ackerman and Stump. These are feature intersection, ...
More
In order to establish a typological picture of periphrastic negation, this chapter begins from the criteria for periphrasis established by Ackerman and Stump. These are feature intersection, non-compositionality, and distributed exponence. It is argued that while the first two work well for defining periphrasis, the third criterion is not sufficiently robust, and should therefore be substituted by the criterion of multiple exponence. Multiple exponence is a recurrent feature of morphology and therefore, when found in a syntactic construction, it signals its morphology-like status. The chapter analyses the applicability of the criteria by testing them on data from genetically and typologically diverse languages (such as Japanese, and languages within Oto-Manguean, Nilotic, Tungusic, Uralic, Nakh-Daghestanian, and Semitic languages). It shows the extent to which the existing criteria can be applied to languages of different types, and justifies the new criterion (multiple exponence) for identifying periphrasis.Less
In order to establish a typological picture of periphrastic negation, this chapter begins from the criteria for periphrasis established by Ackerman and Stump. These are feature intersection, non-compositionality, and distributed exponence. It is argued that while the first two work well for defining periphrasis, the third criterion is not sufficiently robust, and should therefore be substituted by the criterion of multiple exponence. Multiple exponence is a recurrent feature of morphology and therefore, when found in a syntactic construction, it signals its morphology-like status. The chapter analyses the applicability of the criteria by testing them on data from genetically and typologically diverse languages (such as Japanese, and languages within Oto-Manguean, Nilotic, Tungusic, Uralic, Nakh-Daghestanian, and Semitic languages). It shows the extent to which the existing criteria can be applied to languages of different types, and justifies the new criterion (multiple exponence) for identifying periphrasis.
James R. Hurford
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199216840
- eISBN:
- 9780191712043
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216840.003.0014
- Subject:
- Biology, Animal Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
Human languages are far more complex than any animal communication system. Furthermore, they are learned, rather than innate, a fact which partially accounts for their great diversity. Human ...
More
Human languages are far more complex than any animal communication system. Furthermore, they are learned, rather than innate, a fact which partially accounts for their great diversity. Human languages are semantically compositional, generating new meaningful combinations as functions of the meanings of their elementary parts (words). This is unlike any known animal communication system (except the limited waggle dance of honeybees). Humans can use language to describe and refer to objects and events in the far distant past and the far distant future, another feature which distinguishes language from animal communication systems. The complexity of languages arises partly from self-organization through cultural transmission over many generations of users. The human willingness altruistically to impart information is also unique.Less
Human languages are far more complex than any animal communication system. Furthermore, they are learned, rather than innate, a fact which partially accounts for their great diversity. Human languages are semantically compositional, generating new meaningful combinations as functions of the meanings of their elementary parts (words). This is unlike any known animal communication system (except the limited waggle dance of honeybees). Humans can use language to describe and refer to objects and events in the far distant past and the far distant future, another feature which distinguishes language from animal communication systems. The complexity of languages arises partly from self-organization through cultural transmission over many generations of users. The human willingness altruistically to impart information is also unique.
Mark Richard
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0027
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues for the following theses. There are perfectly possible meanings (ones of a sort one would think are possessed by many vague predicates) which would necessitate a predicate's being ...
More
This chapter argues for the following theses. There are perfectly possible meanings (ones of a sort one would think are possessed by many vague predicates) which would necessitate a predicate's being gappy. Many arguments against the coherence of truth value gaps depend on a very narrow picture of saying, which ignores the possibility of such things as sui generis denial. Frege/Geach objections to things like sui generis denial dissolve once we observe that ‘not’ and other sentence compounding devices lead a double life, sometimes contributing to sense, sometimes to force. There is a simple compositional story about how (for instance) embedding a denial operator within a ‘force conditional’ makes if not A, then B fit to perform a sort of speech act which, when combined with B's denial, commits one to the aptness of asserting A. The trisection thesis — predicates trisect their domains into three groups, those they are true of, those they are false of, and the rest — is correct. The objection to the trisection thesis —that it is inconsistent with the idea that there are no sharp boundaries in a Sorites series — is not compelling: there is no conception of a ‘sharp boundary’ on which it's plausible, both that there are no sharp boundaries in a Sorites series, and that trisection involves the creation of sharp boundaries. Once we recognize that talk of indeterminacy is contrastive, we also recognize that higher order vagueness is not inconsistent with trisection. We also, once we think of indeterminacy as contrastive, come to see that indeterminacy itself is indeterminate: if it is indeterminate whether p, that indeterminacy itself is not something that is settled, but is itself indeterminate.Less
This chapter argues for the following theses. There are perfectly possible meanings (ones of a sort one would think are possessed by many vague predicates) which would necessitate a predicate's being gappy. Many arguments against the coherence of truth value gaps depend on a very narrow picture of saying, which ignores the possibility of such things as sui generis denial. Frege/Geach objections to things like sui generis denial dissolve once we observe that ‘not’ and other sentence compounding devices lead a double life, sometimes contributing to sense, sometimes to force. There is a simple compositional story about how (for instance) embedding a denial operator within a ‘force conditional’ makes if not A, then B fit to perform a sort of speech act which, when combined with B's denial, commits one to the aptness of asserting A. The trisection thesis — predicates trisect their domains into three groups, those they are true of, those they are false of, and the rest — is correct. The objection to the trisection thesis —that it is inconsistent with the idea that there are no sharp boundaries in a Sorites series — is not compelling: there is no conception of a ‘sharp boundary’ on which it's plausible, both that there are no sharp boundaries in a Sorites series, and that trisection involves the creation of sharp boundaries. Once we recognize that talk of indeterminacy is contrastive, we also recognize that higher order vagueness is not inconsistent with trisection. We also, once we think of indeterminacy as contrastive, come to see that indeterminacy itself is indeterminate: if it is indeterminate whether p, that indeterminacy itself is not something that is settled, but is itself indeterminate.
Martin Everaert
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199544325
- eISBN:
- 9780191720536
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199544325.003.0005
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Historical Linguistics
This chapter addresses the question how idioms are lexically represented, and the consequences that this has for a theory about the computational system. It argues that there is no straightforward ...
More
This chapter addresses the question how idioms are lexically represented, and the consequences that this has for a theory about the computational system. It argues that there is no straightforward way to use compositionality as a way to make a distinction between expressions that are idiomatic and expressions that are not idiomatic, and that only convention determines which phrases can be called an idiom.Less
This chapter addresses the question how idioms are lexically represented, and the consequences that this has for a theory about the computational system. It argues that there is no straightforward way to use compositionality as a way to make a distinction between expressions that are idiomatic and expressions that are not idiomatic, and that only convention determines which phrases can be called an idiom.
K. M. Jaszczolt
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261987
- eISBN:
- 9780191718656
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261987.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
The book offers an original theory of meaning in discourse that combines a dynamic representation of discourse with an intentional explanation of processing. It contains an exposition of a theory of ...
More
The book offers an original theory of meaning in discourse that combines a dynamic representation of discourse with an intentional explanation of processing. It contains an exposition of a theory of default semantics and its application to a range of language constructions. Default semantics provides cognitive foundations of discourse interpretation and does so in a broadly conceived truth-conditional framework where truth conditions are applied to utterances. The theory combines the subject matter of post-Gricean ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’ with the formalism and semanticization of meaning found in discourse representation theory (DRT). It is assumed that pragmatic information can contribute to the truth-conditional representation of an utterance. This information can have the form of (i) conscious inference, or it can have a form of default interpretation conceived of as (ii) cognitive defaults and (iii) social-cultural defaults. From DRT, it borrows the idea of dynamic semantics as context change implemented in semantic representation and the idea that meaning in discourse will, somehow or other, turn out to be compositional, that is, it will turn out to be a function of the parts and the structure. In short, default semantics combines two seemingly incompatible assumptions that (i) pragmatic input contributes to the truth conditions and (ii) the theory of meaning of utterances and discourses is a compositional, semantic theory. Such semantic representations are called merger representations in that they combine (merge) information from word meaning, sentence structure, pragmatic inference, and various kinds of defaults. Predicating compositionality of such merger representations aided by using an extended and amended language of DRT allows for the semanticization of the account of discourse meaning. The book is divided into two parts. Part I contains theoretical foundations and addresses the questions of the semantics/pragmatics boundary, underspecification, logical form, levels of representation, default meanings, and ‘pragmatic’ compositionality of merger representations. Part II contains some applications of the theory, including definite descriptions, propositional attitude reports, temporality, presupposition, sentential connectives, and number terms.Less
The book offers an original theory of meaning in discourse that combines a dynamic representation of discourse with an intentional explanation of processing. It contains an exposition of a theory of default semantics and its application to a range of language constructions. Default semantics provides cognitive foundations of discourse interpretation and does so in a broadly conceived truth-conditional framework where truth conditions are applied to utterances. The theory combines the subject matter of post-Gricean ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’ with the formalism and semanticization of meaning found in discourse representation theory (DRT). It is assumed that pragmatic information can contribute to the truth-conditional representation of an utterance. This information can have the form of (i) conscious inference, or it can have a form of default interpretation conceived of as (ii) cognitive defaults and (iii) social-cultural defaults. From DRT, it borrows the idea of dynamic semantics as context change implemented in semantic representation and the idea that meaning in discourse will, somehow or other, turn out to be compositional, that is, it will turn out to be a function of the parts and the structure. In short, default semantics combines two seemingly incompatible assumptions that (i) pragmatic input contributes to the truth conditions and (ii) the theory of meaning of utterances and discourses is a compositional, semantic theory. Such semantic representations are called merger representations in that they combine (merge) information from word meaning, sentence structure, pragmatic inference, and various kinds of defaults. Predicating compositionality of such merger representations aided by using an extended and amended language of DRT allows for the semanticization of the account of discourse meaning. The book is divided into two parts. Part I contains theoretical foundations and addresses the questions of the semantics/pragmatics boundary, underspecification, logical form, levels of representation, default meanings, and ‘pragmatic’ compositionality of merger representations. Part II contains some applications of the theory, including definite descriptions, propositional attitude reports, temporality, presupposition, sentential connectives, and number terms.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Without contradiction, linguistic meaning is seen as residing in conceptualization and as having a social-interactive basis. Conceptualization is fundamentally imagistic rather than propositional. ...
More
Without contradiction, linguistic meaning is seen as residing in conceptualization and as having a social-interactive basis. Conceptualization is fundamentally imagistic rather than propositional. Instead of there being a unique set of semantic primitives, there are different kinds of elemental conceptions, each basic in its own respect. Certain fundamental grammatical notions are semantically characterized both schematically, in terms of basic cognitive abilities, and prototypically, in terms of experientially grounded conceptual archetypes. Linguistic meanings do not reflect the world in any direct or straightforward manner, but rather embody particular ways of construing the situations described, often involving imagination and mental constructions. There is no specific boundary between linguistic and extralinguistic aspects of lexical meanings (which are better likened metaphorically to encyclopedia entries rather than dictionary entries), nor between semantics and pragmatics. Hence semantics is only partially (not fully) compositional. An expression derives its meaning by flexibly invoking an open-ended set of cognitive domains, i.e. concepts or conceptual complexes of any degree of complexity. These domains are connected in various ways, e.g. by overlap, inclusion, and metaphorical correspondences. There is no clear distinction between domains and mental spaces.Less
Without contradiction, linguistic meaning is seen as residing in conceptualization and as having a social-interactive basis. Conceptualization is fundamentally imagistic rather than propositional. Instead of there being a unique set of semantic primitives, there are different kinds of elemental conceptions, each basic in its own respect. Certain fundamental grammatical notions are semantically characterized both schematically, in terms of basic cognitive abilities, and prototypically, in terms of experientially grounded conceptual archetypes. Linguistic meanings do not reflect the world in any direct or straightforward manner, but rather embody particular ways of construing the situations described, often involving imagination and mental constructions. There is no specific boundary between linguistic and extralinguistic aspects of lexical meanings (which are better likened metaphorically to encyclopedia entries rather than dictionary entries), nor between semantics and pragmatics. Hence semantics is only partially (not fully) compositional. An expression derives its meaning by flexibly invoking an open-ended set of cognitive domains, i.e. concepts or conceptual complexes of any degree of complexity. These domains are connected in various ways, e.g. by overlap, inclusion, and metaphorical correspondences. There is no clear distinction between domains and mental spaces.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0006
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Grammar consists in patterns for assembling symbolically complex expressions. Such expressions are characterized as assemblies of symbolic structures, also called constructions. In large measure, ...
More
Grammar consists in patterns for assembling symbolically complex expressions. Such expressions are characterized as assemblies of symbolic structures, also called constructions. In large measure, symbolic assemblies are hierarchically arranged: at a given level of organization, component symbolic structures are integrated to form a composite symbolic structure, which can in turn function as component structure at a higher level, and so on. Component structures are integrated both semantically and phonologically, the phonological integration serving to symbolize the semantic integration. Although linguistic meanings are only partially compositional, compositional patterns are essential to the formation and understanding of novel expressions. These patterns are themselves symbolic assemblies, differing from expressions just by virtue of being schematic rather than specific; they are thus referred to as constructional schemas. Abstracted from occurring expressions, these schemas serve as templates for assembling and assessing new ones. A distinction is made between unipolar and bipolar organization, depending on whether the elements involved are delimited solely on semantic or phonological grounds or whether they are delimited by their participation in symbolic relationships. That is, unipolar organization is a matter of phonological or conceptual structure per se, considered independently of symbolic relationships, whereas bipolar organization pertains to the semantic and phonological structures which function in lexicon and grammar. Unipolar and bipolar organization do not have to match at either the semantic or the phonological pole.Less
Grammar consists in patterns for assembling symbolically complex expressions. Such expressions are characterized as assemblies of symbolic structures, also called constructions. In large measure, symbolic assemblies are hierarchically arranged: at a given level of organization, component symbolic structures are integrated to form a composite symbolic structure, which can in turn function as component structure at a higher level, and so on. Component structures are integrated both semantically and phonologically, the phonological integration serving to symbolize the semantic integration. Although linguistic meanings are only partially compositional, compositional patterns are essential to the formation and understanding of novel expressions. These patterns are themselves symbolic assemblies, differing from expressions just by virtue of being schematic rather than specific; they are thus referred to as constructional schemas. Abstracted from occurring expressions, these schemas serve as templates for assembling and assessing new ones. A distinction is made between unipolar and bipolar organization, depending on whether the elements involved are delimited solely on semantic or phonological grounds or whether they are delimited by their participation in symbolic relationships. That is, unipolar organization is a matter of phonological or conceptual structure per se, considered independently of symbolic relationships, whereas bipolar organization pertains to the semantic and phonological structures which function in lexicon and grammar. Unipolar and bipolar organization do not have to match at either the semantic or the phonological pole.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0008
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Language is both cognitive and sociocultural, consisting in conventionally sanctioned patterns of communicative activity. These patterns take the form of schemas abstracted from usage events by the ...
More
Language is both cognitive and sociocultural, consisting in conventionally sanctioned patterns of communicative activity. These patterns take the form of schemas abstracted from usage events by the reinforcement of recurring commonalities. Conventional linguistic units are linked by relationships of composition and categorization (either elaboration or extension) and thus form intersecting networks of great complexity. Expressions are interpreted and assessed for well-formedness through categorization by linguistic units. Through a process of interactive activation, particular units are selected to categorize particular facets of an expression. The total set of categorizing relationships constitutes the expression's structural description, and whether the categorizations involve elaboration or extension determines its degree of conventionality. Despite the absence of explicit prohibitions, this model affords an account of distribution, restrictions, and judgments of ungrammaticality. One aspect of grammatical constructions is their characterization at different levels of specificity, including constructional subschemas incorporating specific lexical items. And since one aspect of lexical items is their occurrence in particular constructions, lexicon and grammar are overlapping rather than disjoint. The model accommodates degrees and kinds of regularity, which decomposes into generality, productivity, and compositionality. Regularities include higher-order generalizations, where sets of categorizations or lexical behaviors are themselves schematized to form productive patterns. Among the phenomena described in this manner are patterns of phonological extension (phonological rules), patterns of semantic extension (e.g. general metonymies), and patterns of morphological realization (like conjugation classes).Less
Language is both cognitive and sociocultural, consisting in conventionally sanctioned patterns of communicative activity. These patterns take the form of schemas abstracted from usage events by the reinforcement of recurring commonalities. Conventional linguistic units are linked by relationships of composition and categorization (either elaboration or extension) and thus form intersecting networks of great complexity. Expressions are interpreted and assessed for well-formedness through categorization by linguistic units. Through a process of interactive activation, particular units are selected to categorize particular facets of an expression. The total set of categorizing relationships constitutes the expression's structural description, and whether the categorizations involve elaboration or extension determines its degree of conventionality. Despite the absence of explicit prohibitions, this model affords an account of distribution, restrictions, and judgments of ungrammaticality. One aspect of grammatical constructions is their characterization at different levels of specificity, including constructional subschemas incorporating specific lexical items. And since one aspect of lexical items is their occurrence in particular constructions, lexicon and grammar are overlapping rather than disjoint. The model accommodates degrees and kinds of regularity, which decomposes into generality, productivity, and compositionality. Regularities include higher-order generalizations, where sets of categorizations or lexical behaviors are themselves schematized to form productive patterns. Among the phenomena described in this manner are patterns of phonological extension (phonological rules), patterns of semantic extension (e.g. general metonymies), and patterns of morphological realization (like conjugation classes).
Geert Booij
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226245
- eISBN:
- 9780191710360
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226245.003.009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
The semantic interpretation of complex words is governed by the general principle of compositionality. The semantic scope of morphosyntactic properties of words may be larger than the word on which ...
More
The semantic interpretation of complex words is governed by the general principle of compositionality. The semantic scope of morphosyntactic properties of words may be larger than the word on which they are marked. Polysemy is a pervasive phenomenon on the domain of word formation, and can be explained through general mechanisms of meaning extension such as metaphor and metonymy.Less
The semantic interpretation of complex words is governed by the general principle of compositionality. The semantic scope of morphosyntactic properties of words may be larger than the word on which they are marked. Polysemy is a pervasive phenomenon on the domain of word formation, and can be explained through general mechanisms of meaning extension such as metaphor and metonymy.
Christopher Potts
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199273829
- eISBN:
- 9780191706653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273829.003.0003
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter presents the technical details of the proposed theory of conventional implicatures, which is based in the lambda calculus. Semantic types play an important role in organizing the logical ...
More
This chapter presents the technical details of the proposed theory of conventional implicatures, which is based in the lambda calculus. Semantic types play an important role in organizing the logical space into the at-issue and conventional-implicature dimensions. The central rules of semantic composition are presented — those that are particular to this theory and those that are required to achieve a functioning compositional theory. The models for the theory are designed to accommodate basic discourse structures and relations. The chapter ends by discussing some of the major consequences of this general logical apparatus, connecting them to specific features of Grice’s original definition of conventional implicatures.Less
This chapter presents the technical details of the proposed theory of conventional implicatures, which is based in the lambda calculus. Semantic types play an important role in organizing the logical space into the at-issue and conventional-implicature dimensions. The central rules of semantic composition are presented — those that are particular to this theory and those that are required to achieve a functioning compositional theory. The models for the theory are designed to accommodate basic discourse structures and relations. The chapter ends by discussing some of the major consequences of this general logical apparatus, connecting them to specific features of Grice’s original definition of conventional implicatures.
Edward P. Stabler
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195305432
- eISBN:
- 9780199866953
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305432.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Models and Architectures
This chapter reports on research showing that it may be a universal structural property of human languages that they fall into a class of languages defined by mildly context-sensitive grammars. It ...
More
This chapter reports on research showing that it may be a universal structural property of human languages that they fall into a class of languages defined by mildly context-sensitive grammars. It also investigates the issue of whether there are properties of language that are needed to guarantee that it is learnable. It suggests that languages are learnable if they have a finite Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension (where the VC dimension provides a combinatorial measure of complexity for a set of languages). Informally, a finite VC dimension requires that there be restrictions on the set of languages to be learned such that they do not differ from one another in arbitrary ways. These restrictions can be construed as universals that are required for language to be learnable (given formal language learnability theory). The chapter concludes by pointing out that formalizations of the semantic contribution (e.g., compositionality) to language learning might yield further insight into language universals.Less
This chapter reports on research showing that it may be a universal structural property of human languages that they fall into a class of languages defined by mildly context-sensitive grammars. It also investigates the issue of whether there are properties of language that are needed to guarantee that it is learnable. It suggests that languages are learnable if they have a finite Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension (where the VC dimension provides a combinatorial measure of complexity for a set of languages). Informally, a finite VC dimension requires that there be restrictions on the set of languages to be learned such that they do not differ from one another in arbitrary ways. These restrictions can be construed as universals that are required for language to be learnable (given formal language learnability theory). The chapter concludes by pointing out that formalizations of the semantic contribution (e.g., compositionality) to language learning might yield further insight into language universals.
Gary Kemp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695621
- eISBN:
- 9780191738524
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Quine’s naturalism is not well appreciated for either its force or its detail. It is a scientific view of what science, knowledge and objectivity amount to that takes seriously the fact that such a ...
More
Quine’s naturalism is not well appreciated for either its force or its detail. It is a scientific view of what science, knowledge and objectivity amount to that takes seriously the fact that such a view is benignly circular: there is no point of view commanding knowledge or science that transcends science. After explaining how Quine himself accepted the view after his famous responses to Carnap, the chapter discusses naturalized epistemology and its implications for the study of language, the specter of indeterminacy, the fundamental importance for naturalism of the inscrutability of reference, and the place within naturalism of ontology. The chapter concludes with the implications for compositionality, truth, semantical holism, instrumentalism, realism, objectivity, the status of psychological characterization and the propositional attitudes.Less
Quine’s naturalism is not well appreciated for either its force or its detail. It is a scientific view of what science, knowledge and objectivity amount to that takes seriously the fact that such a view is benignly circular: there is no point of view commanding knowledge or science that transcends science. After explaining how Quine himself accepted the view after his famous responses to Carnap, the chapter discusses naturalized epistemology and its implications for the study of language, the specter of indeterminacy, the fundamental importance for naturalism of the inscrutability of reference, and the place within naturalism of ontology. The chapter concludes with the implications for compositionality, truth, semantical holism, instrumentalism, realism, objectivity, the status of psychological characterization and the propositional attitudes.
Wayne A. Davis
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199261659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603099
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261652.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter defines word meaning in terms of speaker meaning and expression. The definition is recursive: in the basic case, individual words and idioms have meaning because of what they are ...
More
This chapter defines word meaning in terms of speaker meaning and expression. The definition is recursive: in the basic case, individual words and idioms have meaning because of what they are conventionally used to mean; the recursion clause (the basis of compositionality) is provided by the fact that word structures are conventionally used to express certain idea structures. Different kinds of language are distinguished. What words mean today in living languages is dependent on the conventions that evolve from those of prior users of the language.Less
This chapter defines word meaning in terms of speaker meaning and expression. The definition is recursive: in the basic case, individual words and idioms have meaning because of what they are conventionally used to mean; the recursion clause (the basis of compositionality) is provided by the fact that word structures are conventionally used to express certain idea structures. Different kinds of language are distinguished. What words mean today in living languages is dependent on the conventions that evolve from those of prior users of the language.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199226993
- eISBN:
- 9780191710223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226993.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, General
It has often been observed that the meaning of a word may be affected by the other words which occur in the same sentence. How are we to account for this phenomenon of ‘semantic flexibility’? This ...
More
It has often been observed that the meaning of a word may be affected by the other words which occur in the same sentence. How are we to account for this phenomenon of ‘semantic flexibility’? This chapter argues that semantic flexibility reduces to context-sensitivity and does not raise unsurmountable problems for standard compositional accounts. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to assume too simple a view of context-sensitivity. Two basic forms of context-sensitivity are distinguished. The second form — sense modulation — shows that there is more in the meaning of the whole than can be derived from the meanings of the parts.Less
It has often been observed that the meaning of a word may be affected by the other words which occur in the same sentence. How are we to account for this phenomenon of ‘semantic flexibility’? This chapter argues that semantic flexibility reduces to context-sensitivity and does not raise unsurmountable problems for standard compositional accounts. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to assume too simple a view of context-sensitivity. Two basic forms of context-sensitivity are distinguished. The second form — sense modulation — shows that there is more in the meaning of the whole than can be derived from the meanings of the parts.
