Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.001.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
The corporate governance systems of continental Europe have traditionally been quite different to those of the liberal market economies (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom). Company ...
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The corporate governance systems of continental Europe have traditionally been quite different to those of the liberal market economies (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom). Company ownership has been dominated by incumbent blockholders, with a relatively minor role for minority shareholders and institutional investors. However, since the mid‐1990s, European corporations have adopted many of the characteristics of the Anglo‐American shareholder model. Furthermore, such an increased shareholder orientation has coincided with a significant role for the Left in European government. This presents a puzzle, as conventional wisdom does not conceive of the European Left as the natural ally of pro‐shareholder capitalism. This book provides an analysis of this paradox by arguing that the postwar support of the European Left for the prevailing blockholder‐dominated corporate system depended on the willingness of blockholders to share economic rents with employees, both through higher wages and greater employment stability. However, during the 1990s, product markets became more competitive in many European countries. The sharing of rents between social actors became increasingly difficult to sustain. In such an environment, the Left chose to relinquish its traditional social partnership with blockholders and embraced many aspects of the shareholder model. The hypothesis is initially explored through a panel data econometric analysis of fifteen non‐liberal market economies. Subsequent case study chapters examine the political economy of recent corporate governance change in Germany and Italy.Less
The corporate governance systems of continental Europe have traditionally been quite different to those of the liberal market economies (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom). Company ownership has been dominated by incumbent blockholders, with a relatively minor role for minority shareholders and institutional investors. However, since the mid‐1990s, European corporations have adopted many of the characteristics of the Anglo‐American shareholder model. Furthermore, such an increased shareholder orientation has coincided with a significant role for the Left in European government. This presents a puzzle, as conventional wisdom does not conceive of the European Left as the natural ally of pro‐shareholder capitalism. This book provides an analysis of this paradox by arguing that the postwar support of the European Left for the prevailing blockholder‐dominated corporate system depended on the willingness of blockholders to share economic rents with employees, both through higher wages and greater employment stability. However, during the 1990s, product markets became more competitive in many European countries. The sharing of rents between social actors became increasingly difficult to sustain. In such an environment, the Left chose to relinquish its traditional social partnership with blockholders and embraced many aspects of the shareholder model. The hypothesis is initially explored through a panel data econometric analysis of fifteen non‐liberal market economies. Subsequent case study chapters examine the political economy of recent corporate governance change in Germany and Italy.
David Gerber
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199228225
- eISBN:
- 9780191711350
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228225.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Competition Law
This book examines the relationship between law and economic globalization. It focuses on national and international efforts to protect the competitive process, exploring the critically important ...
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This book examines the relationship between law and economic globalization. It focuses on national and international efforts to protect the competitive process, exploring the critically important relationships between those two domains and the way the resulting system shapes economic activity in all parts of the world. The laws, institutions, and principles of the international domain increasingly influence national competition law development, and national competition law experience provides both the lenses through which decision makers view transnational competition issues and the incentive structures that generate their competition law decisions. The analysis examines the ideas, institutions, and people that provide the legal framework for global competition; how they evolved, how they operate today, and the forces that are likely to influence their future development. US anti-trust experience has long been at the center of this global governance picture, but European competition law experience is also rich, varied, and potentially of great value for future competition law development. China, Japan, Korea, and newer players in Latin America and Africa will also play a key role in this future, and the analysis pays close attention to them as well. On the basis of this analysis, the book analyzes current global competition law proposals and outlines a strategy that utilizes these discussions, but more specifically addresses global economic development needs. This strategy may be developed within the institutional framework of the WTO, but it may also be pursued independently.Less
This book examines the relationship between law and economic globalization. It focuses on national and international efforts to protect the competitive process, exploring the critically important relationships between those two domains and the way the resulting system shapes economic activity in all parts of the world. The laws, institutions, and principles of the international domain increasingly influence national competition law development, and national competition law experience provides both the lenses through which decision makers view transnational competition issues and the incentive structures that generate their competition law decisions. The analysis examines the ideas, institutions, and people that provide the legal framework for global competition; how they evolved, how they operate today, and the forces that are likely to influence their future development. US anti-trust experience has long been at the center of this global governance picture, but European competition law experience is also rich, varied, and potentially of great value for future competition law development. China, Japan, Korea, and newer players in Latin America and Africa will also play a key role in this future, and the analysis pays close attention to them as well. On the basis of this analysis, the book analyzes current global competition law proposals and outlines a strategy that utilizes these discussions, but more specifically addresses global economic development needs. This strategy may be developed within the institutional framework of the WTO, but it may also be pursued independently.
Tito Boeri, Micael Castanheira, Riccardo Faini, Vincenzo Galasso, Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Carcillo Stéphane, Jonathan Haskel, Giuseppe Nicoletti, Enrico Perotti, Carlo Scarpa, Lidia Tsyganok, and Christian Wey
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199203628
- eISBN:
- 9780191708169
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199203628.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Theory is not ambiguous about the impact of competition on economic performance. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that competition raises productivity. Both policy-makers and the academic ...
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Theory is not ambiguous about the impact of competition on economic performance. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that competition raises productivity. Both policy-makers and the academic community agree that the benefits of competition outweigh any eventual costs. Competition boosts the incentives for innovation and raises productivity growth of firms via the process of entry and exit.Less
Theory is not ambiguous about the impact of competition on economic performance. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that competition raises productivity. Both policy-makers and the academic community agree that the benefits of competition outweigh any eventual costs. Competition boosts the incentives for innovation and raises productivity growth of firms via the process of entry and exit.
Andrew Mason
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199264414
- eISBN:
- 9780191718489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264414.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter begins with an examination of the simple view that equality of opportunity requires open competition for advantaged social positions. It is argued that this idea is not really so simple. ...
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This chapter begins with an examination of the simple view that equality of opportunity requires open competition for advantaged social positions. It is argued that this idea is not really so simple. The notion of an open competition and the idea of a qualification which it presupposes are more complicated than they seem, and need to be looked at in a broad account of justice in general, or equality of opportunity in particular. The simple view must be regarded as incomplete: it is implausible to suppose, for example, that open competition for advantaged social positions is a sufficient condition of equality of opportunity. Reflection upon the simple view suggests that any adequate account of equality of opportunity must include at least two components: the idea that there should be open competition for advantaged social positions, and that there should be fair access to the qualifications required for success in these competitions.Less
This chapter begins with an examination of the simple view that equality of opportunity requires open competition for advantaged social positions. It is argued that this idea is not really so simple. The notion of an open competition and the idea of a qualification which it presupposes are more complicated than they seem, and need to be looked at in a broad account of justice in general, or equality of opportunity in particular. The simple view must be regarded as incomplete: it is implausible to suppose, for example, that open competition for advantaged social positions is a sufficient condition of equality of opportunity. Reflection upon the simple view suggests that any adequate account of equality of opportunity must include at least two components: the idea that there should be open competition for advantaged social positions, and that there should be fair access to the qualifications required for success in these competitions.
Flavio M. Menezes and Paulo K. Monteiro
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199275984
- eISBN:
- 9780191602214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019927598X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This introductory chapter provides three examples to illustrate the importance of auction theory to modern economics. These are the problem faced by a regulator wanting to regulate a monopolist with ...
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This introductory chapter provides three examples to illustrate the importance of auction theory to modern economics. These are the problem faced by a regulator wanting to regulate a monopolist with unknown costs, the design of a mechanism that will establish competition for the market when there is none, and the design of a spot market for electricity. It discusses the current treatment of auctions in existing graduate microeconomics textbooks, and compares this book and that of Klemperer (2004). It describes the book’s intended audience and its contents.Less
This introductory chapter provides three examples to illustrate the importance of auction theory to modern economics. These are the problem faced by a regulator wanting to regulate a monopolist with unknown costs, the design of a mechanism that will establish competition for the market when there is none, and the design of a spot market for electricity. It discusses the current treatment of auctions in existing graduate microeconomics textbooks, and compares this book and that of Klemperer (2004). It describes the book’s intended audience and its contents.
Paul Geroski
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199248896
- eISBN:
- 9780191596308
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199248893.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Sheds some light on how markets develop. In particular, it suggests that the ‘new economy’ is not much different from the ‘old economy’ and that in general, the early evolution of markets can ...
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Sheds some light on how markets develop. In particular, it suggests that the ‘new economy’ is not much different from the ‘old economy’ and that in general, the early evolution of markets can significantly shape their later structure. The main arguments are elaborated in four chapters, each of them extensively illustrated with product‐case studies (internet, automobiles, television, or mobile phones, etc.). Ch. 2 explores the drivers of innovation and concludes that new technologies are basically pushed on to the market from the supply side. Ch. 3 looks at the dynamics of entry in a new market. Ch. 4 deals with the emergence of a dominant design as a consensus good. Ch. 5 shows how the dominant design shapes the nature of the competition in the new mass market and describes the logistical growth pattern characteristic of most new markets. The last chapter is devoted to sketch out the basic features of market evolution that follow from the events in the early stages of development.Less
Sheds some light on how markets develop. In particular, it suggests that the ‘new economy’ is not much different from the ‘old economy’ and that in general, the early evolution of markets can significantly shape their later structure. The main arguments are elaborated in four chapters, each of them extensively illustrated with product‐case studies (internet, automobiles, television, or mobile phones, etc.). Ch. 2 explores the drivers of innovation and concludes that new technologies are basically pushed on to the market from the supply side. Ch. 3 looks at the dynamics of entry in a new market. Ch. 4 deals with the emergence of a dominant design as a consensus good. Ch. 5 shows how the dominant design shapes the nature of the competition in the new mass market and describes the logistical growth pattern characteristic of most new markets. The last chapter is devoted to sketch out the basic features of market evolution that follow from the events in the early stages of development.
G. B. Richardson
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292432
- eISBN:
- 9780191596810
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292430.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Firms base their investment decisions on expectations, these being based, in turn, upon information about relevant future circumstance. The availability of this information depends partly upon the ...
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Firms base their investment decisions on expectations, these being based, in turn, upon information about relevant future circumstance. The availability of this information depends partly upon the market structure within which firms operate. In perfect competition, firms would find this information impossible to obtain, which is the reason why no plausible account has been provided of how, given that particular market structure, movement to equilibrium could take place. In order to understand how market economies work, how competitive and complementary investments are coordinated, we need to take explicit account of circumstances, which commonly feature as ‘imperfections’, but make informed expectations possible.The information available to firms will always be incomplete and the expectations based on it necessarily uncertain. Consideration is therefore given to the strategies adopted in order to cope with this uncertainty.The selective or evolutionary function of competition is discussed, particular attention being given to its compatibility with the circumstances, which, by providing a firm's environment with stability, facilitate foresight.There is a discussion of whether firms’ response to uncertainty is likely to result in undue (or insufficient) discrimination against risky ventures and to a consequent misallocation of resources.Two articles published since the first edition of this book feature as Annexes to this edition. The Organisation of Industry explains the networks of inter‐firm cooperation and affiliation in terms of the need to coordinate activities that are complementary in a process of production but require different capabilities for their undertaking. Planning versus Competition deals with the ways in which economic activities can be coordinated, contrasting centralized and de‐centralized systems.Less
Firms base their investment decisions on expectations, these being based, in turn, upon information about relevant future circumstance. The availability of this information depends partly upon the market structure within which firms operate. In perfect competition, firms would find this information impossible to obtain, which is the reason why no plausible account has been provided of how, given that particular market structure, movement to equilibrium could take place. In order to understand how market economies work, how competitive and complementary investments are coordinated, we need to take explicit account of circumstances, which commonly feature as ‘imperfections’, but make informed expectations possible.
The information available to firms will always be incomplete and the expectations based on it necessarily uncertain. Consideration is therefore given to the strategies adopted in order to cope with this uncertainty.
The selective or evolutionary function of competition is discussed, particular attention being given to its compatibility with the circumstances, which, by providing a firm's environment with stability, facilitate foresight.
There is a discussion of whether firms’ response to uncertainty is likely to result in undue (or insufficient) discrimination against risky ventures and to a consequent misallocation of resources.
Two articles published since the first edition of this book feature as Annexes to this edition. The Organisation of Industry explains the networks of inter‐firm cooperation and affiliation in terms of the need to coordinate activities that are complementary in a process of production but require different capabilities for their undertaking. Planning versus Competition deals with the ways in which economic activities can be coordinated, contrasting centralized and de‐centralized systems.
David M. Kreps
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198283812
- eISBN:
- 9780191596568
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198283814.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Beginning in the early to the mid‐1970s, non‐cooperative game theory became an important tool of economics. This book is based on a series of lectures given at Oxford, and comments on this use of ...
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Beginning in the early to the mid‐1970s, non‐cooperative game theory became an important tool of economics. This book is based on a series of lectures given at Oxford, and comments on this use of non‐cooperative game theory. After providing a non‐technical introduction to the basic ideas of non‐cooperative game theory, the book discusses: (1) how and why game theory has been a success—because it permits economists to model and analyse situations of dynamic competition and where private information plays an important role; (2) how and why the theory has failed—to provide an understanding of when it (and equilibrium analysis) applies, when not, and what to do when not; and (3) how its weaknesses might be addressed—by considering individuals who are imperfectly rational and learn adaptively.Less
Beginning in the early to the mid‐1970s, non‐cooperative game theory became an important tool of economics. This book is based on a series of lectures given at Oxford, and comments on this use of non‐cooperative game theory. After providing a non‐technical introduction to the basic ideas of non‐cooperative game theory, the book discusses: (1) how and why game theory has been a success—because it permits economists to model and analyse situations of dynamic competition and where private information plays an important role; (2) how and why the theory has failed—to provide an understanding of when it (and equilibrium analysis) applies, when not, and what to do when not; and (3) how its weaknesses might be addressed—by considering individuals who are imperfectly rational and learn adaptively.
Jean J. Gabszewicz
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198233411
- eISBN:
- 9780191596292
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198233418.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Perfect competition provides a model of a frictionless economy in which economic agents behave independently of each other, abandoning to the market the task of coordinating their individual ...
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Perfect competition provides a model of a frictionless economy in which economic agents behave independently of each other, abandoning to the market the task of coordinating their individual decisions. This model is extensively studied in traditional price theory textbooks.Imperfect competition is the paradigm that develops when, on the contrary, economic agents interact in a conscious manner, which is necessarily the case when competition takes place ‘among the few’. In this system, agents act strategically, taking into account the impact of their own decisions on competitors ‘behaviour and on the price mechanism. Such situations commonly arise when firms differentiate their products, erect strategic entry barriers, or exploit the imperfect information of their customers about the price or characteristics of their product.This book explores the theoretical richness of these economic contexts, using some basic concepts of game theory. The four assumptions underlying the paradigm of perfect competition (no barriers to entry, large number of agents, product homogeneity, and perfect information) constitute the natural departure points of the theories of imperfect competition: whenever at least one of these assumptions is violated, imperfect competition is present. The framework of the book is organized around the four corresponding themes: the role of collusion and entry barriers in the degree of market competition (Ch. 3), product differentiation (Ch. 4) and the information of agents as an instrument of competition (Ch. 5). Finally, Ch. 6 illustrates the possibility of extending the theory to a general equilibrium framework.Less
Perfect competition provides a model of a frictionless economy in which economic agents behave independently of each other, abandoning to the market the task of coordinating their individual decisions. This model is extensively studied in traditional price theory textbooks.
Imperfect competition is the paradigm that develops when, on the contrary, economic agents interact in a conscious manner, which is necessarily the case when competition takes place ‘among the few’. In this system, agents act strategically, taking into account the impact of their own decisions on competitors ‘behaviour and on the price mechanism. Such situations commonly arise when firms differentiate their products, erect strategic entry barriers, or exploit the imperfect information of their customers about the price or characteristics of their product.
This book explores the theoretical richness of these economic contexts, using some basic concepts of game theory. The four assumptions underlying the paradigm of perfect competition (no barriers to entry, large number of agents, product homogeneity, and perfect information) constitute the natural departure points of the theories of imperfect competition: whenever at least one of these assumptions is violated, imperfect competition is present. The framework of the book is organized around the four corresponding themes: the role of collusion and entry barriers in the degree of market competition (Ch. 3), product differentiation (Ch. 4) and the information of agents as an instrument of competition (Ch. 5). Finally, Ch. 6 illustrates the possibility of extending the theory to a general equilibrium framework.
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199270569
- eISBN:
- 9780191602542
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270562.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
This book presents eight essays on financial regulation, focusing on the European context. Essay one examines the concept of market-friendly regulation. Essay two discusses the need for stronger bank ...
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This book presents eight essays on financial regulation, focusing on the European context. Essay one examines the concept of market-friendly regulation. Essay two discusses the need for stronger bank licensing principles. Essay three explores the changing attitude towards banking competition. Essay four discusses self-regulation by financial institutions. Essay five explores the increasing links between banking and securities activities. Essay six examines the organisational structure of financial regulatory and supervisory functions. Essays seven and eight discuss the abandonment of the coincidence between the jurisdiction of monetary policy and the jurisdiction of banking supervision, and the important role of central banks in financial stability, respectively.Less
This book presents eight essays on financial regulation, focusing on the European context. Essay one examines the concept of market-friendly regulation. Essay two discusses the need for stronger bank licensing principles. Essay three explores the changing attitude towards banking competition. Essay four discusses self-regulation by financial institutions. Essay five explores the increasing links between banking and securities activities. Essay six examines the organisational structure of financial regulatory and supervisory functions. Essays seven and eight discuss the abandonment of the coincidence between the jurisdiction of monetary policy and the jurisdiction of banking supervision, and the important role of central banks in financial stability, respectively.
Peter Mair
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295495
- eISBN:
- 9780191599804
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295499.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This is the third of three chapters on political party systems and structures of competition, and presents an overall review. In the first section, Approaches to the Classification of Party Systems: ...
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This is the third of three chapters on political party systems and structures of competition, and presents an overall review. In the first section, Approaches to the Classification of Party Systems: A Review it looks at the principal existing approaches to the classification of party systems, pointing to both their limits and possibilities when applied within comparative analysis. It then goes on in the second section, Party Systems and the Competition for Government, to underline the importance of understanding the structure of competition in any given party system, since in many ways the whole notion of a party system is centred on the assumption that there exists a stable structure of competition. Structures of competition can be seen to be either closed (and predictable) or open (and unpredictable), depending on the patterns of alternation in government, the degree of innovation or persistence in processes of government formation, and the range of parties gaining access to government. The emphasis in the third section, Party Systems and Electoral Outcomes, is on the need to distinguish between processes of electoral change on the one hand, and changes in party systems and the structures of competition on the other, a distinction which also allows the possibility of situations in which electoral change is the consequence rather than the cause of party system change.Less
This is the third of three chapters on political party systems and structures of competition, and presents an overall review. In the first section, Approaches to the Classification of Party Systems: A Review it looks at the principal existing approaches to the classification of party systems, pointing to both their limits and possibilities when applied within comparative analysis. It then goes on in the second section, Party Systems and the Competition for Government, to underline the importance of understanding the structure of competition in any given party system, since in many ways the whole notion of a party system is centred on the assumption that there exists a stable structure of competition. Structures of competition can be seen to be either closed (and predictable) or open (and unpredictable), depending on the patterns of alternation in government, the degree of innovation or persistence in processes of government formation, and the range of parties gaining access to government. The emphasis in the third section, Party Systems and Electoral Outcomes, is on the need to distinguish between processes of electoral change on the one hand, and changes in party systems and the structures of competition on the other, a distinction which also allows the possibility of situations in which electoral change is the consequence rather than the cause of party system change.
Partha Dasgupta
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198288350
- eISBN:
- 9780191596094
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198288352.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
The main part of this chapter discusses decentralization and central guidance in relation to resource allocation. There are seven sections: (1) competitive mechanisms in the private realm; (2) the ...
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The main part of this chapter discusses decentralization and central guidance in relation to resource allocation. There are seven sections: (1) competitive mechanisms in the private realm; (2) the existence of competitive equilibrium; (3) competitive markets and efficiency; (4) the implementation of just allocations in the private realm; (5) pluralism and exchange restrictions (exchange control) in the public realm; (6) producer versus consumer taxation; and (7) national income in a pluralist society. An extra and separate section (designated Chapter *7) gives a theoretical presentation on real national income as a measure of general well-being.Less
The main part of this chapter discusses decentralization and central guidance in relation to resource allocation. There are seven sections: (1) competitive mechanisms in the private realm; (2) the existence of competitive equilibrium; (3) competitive markets and efficiency; (4) the implementation of just allocations in the private realm; (5) pluralism and exchange restrictions (exchange control) in the public realm; (6) producer versus consumer taxation; and (7) national income in a pluralist society. An extra and separate section (designated Chapter *7) gives a theoretical presentation on real national income as a measure of general well-being.
Stefano Bartolini
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246748
- eISBN:
- 9780191599385
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246742.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Focuses on the concept of electoral and party competition as the key mechanism leading party elites to respond to the preferences of voters. While competition is of central importance in both ...
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Focuses on the concept of electoral and party competition as the key mechanism leading party elites to respond to the preferences of voters. While competition is of central importance in both democratic theory and in empirical studies of party behaviour, the concept (as operationalized in many studies) is vague and ambiguous; in particular, it has very different meanings in the real world of electoral and parliamentary behaviour, on the one hand, and in the formal models of rational‐choice scholars, on the other. Discusses the unintended by‐product (social value) of competition, and gives an overview of the intellectual origins (from Simmel, Schumpeter, and Downs) of this approach. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to an original criticism of the problems inherent in applying this import from economic theory to the study of electoral competition, first focusing on key dimensions of this competition—contestability, availability, decidability, and vulnerability, and then arguing that these four crucial dimensions of competition interact with one another in ways that are fundamentally incompatible with the simplifying assumptions upon which the economic model depends. Each of the dimensions of electoral competition impinges on the others in an interactive, if not sometimes contradictory manner, and as a result of these multidimensional interaction effects, party competition cannot be conceived of as a linear process that unfolds between minimum and maximum points on a single continuum, but rather as a moving point shifting about in a four‐dimensional space within which no equilibrium point can be identified; accordingly, electoral preferences cannot be regarded as exogenous to party competition, but are decisively influenced by parties and party elites.Less
Focuses on the concept of electoral and party competition as the key mechanism leading party elites to respond to the preferences of voters. While competition is of central importance in both democratic theory and in empirical studies of party behaviour, the concept (as operationalized in many studies) is vague and ambiguous; in particular, it has very different meanings in the real world of electoral and parliamentary behaviour, on the one hand, and in the formal models of rational‐choice scholars, on the other. Discusses the unintended by‐product (social value) of competition, and gives an overview of the intellectual origins (from Simmel, Schumpeter, and Downs) of this approach. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to an original criticism of the problems inherent in applying this import from economic theory to the study of electoral competition, first focusing on key dimensions of this competition—contestability, availability, decidability, and vulnerability, and then arguing that these four crucial dimensions of competition interact with one another in ways that are fundamentally incompatible with the simplifying assumptions upon which the economic model depends. Each of the dimensions of electoral competition impinges on the others in an interactive, if not sometimes contradictory manner, and as a result of these multidimensional interaction effects, party competition cannot be conceived of as a linear process that unfolds between minimum and maximum points on a single continuum, but rather as a moving point shifting about in a four‐dimensional space within which no equilibrium point can be identified; accordingly, electoral preferences cannot be regarded as exogenous to party competition, but are decisively influenced by parties and party elites.
John H. Evans
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199860852
- eISBN:
- 9780199932474
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860852.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Seemingly every day society faces a new ethical challenge raised by a scientific innovation. Human genetic engineering, stem cell research, face transplantation, synthetic biology – all were science ...
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Seemingly every day society faces a new ethical challenge raised by a scientific innovation. Human genetic engineering, stem cell research, face transplantation, synthetic biology – all were science fiction only a few decades ago, but are now all are reality. How do we as a society decide whether these technologies are ethical? For decades professional bioethicists have served as a mediator between a busy public and decision-makers, helping people understand their own ethical concerns, framing arguments, discrediting illogical claims and lifting up promising ones. These bioethicists operate in multiple venues such as hospital decision-making, institutions that conduct research on humans, and recommending ethical policy to the government. While functioning quite well for many years, the bioethics profession is in crisis. Policy-makers are less inclined to take the advice of bioethics professionals, with many observers saying that bioethics debates have simply become partisan politics with dueling democratic and republican bioethicists. While this crisis is contained to the task of recommending ethical policy to the government, there is risk that it will spread to the other tasks conducted by bioethicists. To understand how this situation came into being, and the solution to this problem, this book closely examines the history of the bioethics profession. Bioethics debates were originally dominated by theologians, but came to be dominated by the emerging profession of bioethics due to the subtle and slow involvement of the government as the primary consumer of bioethical arguments. However, after the 1980s the views of the government changed, making bioethical arguments not quite so legitimate. With this knowledge of the sociological processes that lead to this evolution, the book proposes a radical solution to the crisis, which is for the bioethics profession to give up on some of the work that it currently does so that it can focus upon its strengths, and change the way the profession makes ethical arguments.Less
Seemingly every day society faces a new ethical challenge raised by a scientific innovation. Human genetic engineering, stem cell research, face transplantation, synthetic biology – all were science fiction only a few decades ago, but are now all are reality. How do we as a society decide whether these technologies are ethical? For decades professional bioethicists have served as a mediator between a busy public and decision-makers, helping people understand their own ethical concerns, framing arguments, discrediting illogical claims and lifting up promising ones. These bioethicists operate in multiple venues such as hospital decision-making, institutions that conduct research on humans, and recommending ethical policy to the government. While functioning quite well for many years, the bioethics profession is in crisis. Policy-makers are less inclined to take the advice of bioethics professionals, with many observers saying that bioethics debates have simply become partisan politics with dueling democratic and republican bioethicists. While this crisis is contained to the task of recommending ethical policy to the government, there is risk that it will spread to the other tasks conducted by bioethicists. To understand how this situation came into being, and the solution to this problem, this book closely examines the history of the bioethics profession. Bioethics debates were originally dominated by theologians, but came to be dominated by the emerging profession of bioethics due to the subtle and slow involvement of the government as the primary consumer of bioethical arguments. However, after the 1980s the views of the government changed, making bioethical arguments not quite so legitimate. With this knowledge of the sociological processes that lead to this evolution, the book proposes a radical solution to the crisis, which is for the bioethics profession to give up on some of the work that it currently does so that it can focus upon its strengths, and change the way the profession makes ethical arguments.
David Gerber
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199244010
- eISBN:
- 9780191705182
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244010.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Competition Law
Protecting economic competition has become a major objective of government in Western Europe, and competition law has become a central part of economic and legal experience. The competition law of ...
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Protecting economic competition has become a major objective of government in Western Europe, and competition law has become a central part of economic and legal experience. The competition law of the European Union has played a key role in the success of European integration during the last four decades, and it is likely to do so in the future. In recent years, national competition laws have also become increasingly important, often creating tensions between national-level and European-level regulation. Yet, despite its importance, images of European experience with competition law often remain vague and are sometimes dangerously distorted. This book examines European experience in protecting competition, analysing its dynamics, revealing its importance and highlighting the political and economic issues it raises.Less
Protecting economic competition has become a major objective of government in Western Europe, and competition law has become a central part of economic and legal experience. The competition law of the European Union has played a key role in the success of European integration during the last four decades, and it is likely to do so in the future. In recent years, national competition laws have also become increasingly important, often creating tensions between national-level and European-level regulation. Yet, despite its importance, images of European experience with competition law often remain vague and are sometimes dangerously distorted. This book examines European experience in protecting competition, analysing its dynamics, revealing its importance and highlighting the political and economic issues it raises.
Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246748
- eISBN:
- 9780191599385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246742.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This book is one in a series (Comparative Politics) for students and teachers of political science that deals with contemporary issues in comparative government and politics. After an introduction, ...
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This book is one in a series (Comparative Politics) for students and teachers of political science that deals with contemporary issues in comparative government and politics. After an introduction, it has 11 contributions from leading scholars in the field, which present a critical overview of much of the recent literature on political parties, and systematically assess the capacity of existing concepts, typologies, and methodological approaches to deal with contemporary parties. The book critically analyses the ‘decline of parties’ literature, both from a conceptual perspective and—with regard to antiparty attitudes among citizens—on the basis of empirical analyses of survey data. It systematically re‐examines the underpinnings of rational‐choice analyses of electoral competition, as well as the misapplication of standard party models as the ‘catch‐all party’. Several chapters re‐examine existing models of parties and party typologies, particularly with regard to the capacity of commonly used concepts to capture the wide variation among parties that exists in old and new democracies today, and with regard to their ability to deal adequately with the new challenges that parties are facing in rapidly changing political, social, and technological environments. In particular, two detailed case studies (from France and Spain) demonstrate how party models are significant not only as frameworks for scholarly research but also insofar as they can affect party performance. Other chapters also examine in detail how corruption and party patronage have contributed to party decline, as well as public attitudes towards parties in several countries. In the aggregate, the various contributions to the book reject the notion that a ‘decline of party’ has progressed to such an extent as to threaten the survival of parties as the crucial intermediary actors in modern democracies. The contributing authors argue, however, that parties are facing a new set of sometimes demanding challenges, and that not only have they differed significantly in their ability to successfully meet these challenges but also the core concepts, typologies, party models, and methodological approaches that have guided research in this area over the past 40 years have met with only mixed success in adequately capturing these recent developments and serving as fruitful frameworks for analysis; the book is intended to remedy some of these shortcomings. It is arranged in three parts: I. Reconceptualizing Parties and Party Competition; II. Re‐examining Party Organization and Party Models; and III. Revisiting Party Linkages and Attitudes Toward Parties.Less
This book is one in a series (Comparative Politics) for students and teachers of political science that deals with contemporary issues in comparative government and politics. After an introduction, it has 11 contributions from leading scholars in the field, which present a critical overview of much of the recent literature on political parties, and systematically assess the capacity of existing concepts, typologies, and methodological approaches to deal with contemporary parties. The book critically analyses the ‘decline of parties’ literature, both from a conceptual perspective and—with regard to antiparty attitudes among citizens—on the basis of empirical analyses of survey data. It systematically re‐examines the underpinnings of rational‐choice analyses of electoral competition, as well as the misapplication of standard party models as the ‘catch‐all party’. Several chapters re‐examine existing models of parties and party typologies, particularly with regard to the capacity of commonly used concepts to capture the wide variation among parties that exists in old and new democracies today, and with regard to their ability to deal adequately with the new challenges that parties are facing in rapidly changing political, social, and technological environments. In particular, two detailed case studies (from France and Spain) demonstrate how party models are significant not only as frameworks for scholarly research but also insofar as they can affect party performance. Other chapters also examine in detail how corruption and party patronage have contributed to party decline, as well as public attitudes towards parties in several countries. In the aggregate, the various contributions to the book reject the notion that a ‘decline of party’ has progressed to such an extent as to threaten the survival of parties as the crucial intermediary actors in modern democracies. The contributing authors argue, however, that parties are facing a new set of sometimes demanding challenges, and that not only have they differed significantly in their ability to successfully meet these challenges but also the core concepts, typologies, party models, and methodological approaches that have guided research in this area over the past 40 years have met with only mixed success in adequately capturing these recent developments and serving as fruitful frameworks for analysis; the book is intended to remedy some of these shortcomings. It is arranged in three parts: I. Reconceptualizing Parties and Party Competition; II. Re‐examining Party Organization and Party Models; and III. Revisiting Party Linkages and Attitudes Toward Parties.
Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
An analytical framework is outlined with three social actors: blockholders, insider labor, and outsiders. Each has differing corporate governance preferences. Blockholders and insider labor are ...
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An analytical framework is outlined with three social actors: blockholders, insider labor, and outsiders. Each has differing corporate governance preferences. Blockholders and insider labor are represented by conservative and Left parties respectively. Outsiders do not have their own party, and represent a potential source of new votes for both parties. However, they require a commitment to pro‐shareholder corporate governance reform in order to win their support. As long as economic rents are substantial (due to low levels of product market competition), neither the Left nor conservative parties are willing to solicit the support of outsiders. Both of their core constituents benefit from the sharing of economic rents. However, if economic rents decline, insider labor no longer has an interest in sustaining a self-regulatory blockholder model of corporate governance. In contrast, conservative parties remain the apologists of the blockholder model.Less
An analytical framework is outlined with three social actors: blockholders, insider labor, and outsiders. Each has differing corporate governance preferences. Blockholders and insider labor are represented by conservative and Left parties respectively. Outsiders do not have their own party, and represent a potential source of new votes for both parties. However, they require a commitment to pro‐shareholder corporate governance reform in order to win their support. As long as economic rents are substantial (due to low levels of product market competition), neither the Left nor conservative parties are willing to solicit the support of outsiders. Both of their core constituents benefit from the sharing of economic rents. However, if economic rents decline, insider labor no longer has an interest in sustaining a self-regulatory blockholder model of corporate governance. In contrast, conservative parties remain the apologists of the blockholder model.
Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.003.0005
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
An evaluation is made of potential ways in which product market competition can be operationalized as part of a panel data econometric analysis. As with corporate governance, it is necessary to ...
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An evaluation is made of potential ways in which product market competition can be operationalized as part of a panel data econometric analysis. As with corporate governance, it is necessary to identify suitable proxy variables. The OECD's NMR index is chosen as the most plausible measure of product market competition, an assessment reflected in its widespread utilization in the empirical economics literature.Less
An evaluation is made of potential ways in which product market competition can be operationalized as part of a panel data econometric analysis. As with corporate governance, it is necessary to identify suitable proxy variables. The OECD's NMR index is chosen as the most plausible measure of product market competition, an assessment reflected in its widespread utilization in the empirical economics literature.
Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.003.0006
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
A panel data econometric analysis of corporate governance change is undertaken utilizing a data set of fifteen nonliberal market economies covering the period 1975–2003. The results of this analysis ...
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A panel data econometric analysis of corporate governance change is undertaken utilizing a data set of fifteen nonliberal market economies covering the period 1975–2003. The results of this analysis suggested that the interaction of partisanship and competition is a highly significant determinant of corporate governance change. In particular, significant shifts in a pro‐shareholder direction are associated with Left government – but not conservative government – in the context of high levels of competition. In contrast, neither Left nor conservative government is associated with corporate governance change in a low‐competition environment.Less
A panel data econometric analysis of corporate governance change is undertaken utilizing a data set of fifteen nonliberal market economies covering the period 1975–2003. The results of this analysis suggested that the interaction of partisanship and competition is a highly significant determinant of corporate governance change. In particular, significant shifts in a pro‐shareholder direction are associated with Left government – but not conservative government – in the context of high levels of competition. In contrast, neither Left nor conservative government is associated with corporate governance change in a low‐competition environment.
Guido Ferrarini and Eddy Wymeersch (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199202911
- eISBN:
- 9780191707964
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199202911.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Company and Commercial Law
EU policy in the area of corporate governance and capital markets is being reoriented. Harmonization is less frequently seen as a concept in company law, regulatory competition is on the rise, and ...
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EU policy in the area of corporate governance and capital markets is being reoriented. Harmonization is less frequently seen as a concept in company law, regulatory competition is on the rise, and experiments in soft law are being carried out. Several member States have recently reformed their corporate laws, either as a reaction to financial scandals or in an effort to enhance investment. Convergence has increased as a result, particularly towards Anglo-American standards. Yet, differences still exist, profoundly rooted in national systems of corporate governance. By contrast, capital market law would seem to be an exception having undergone intense harmonization in the last few years through the Lamfalussy regulatory architecture. Nonetheless, a European system of securities regulation is not yet in place. Regulation is predominantly domestic, each country having its own securities supervisor, while private laws affecting capital markets are still divergent. This volume examines the on-going debate on corporate and financial law reform from an interdisciplinary perspective. Part 1 explores the political determinants of corporate governance and evaluates the likelihood of convergence and the role of regulatory competition. Part 2 considers the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), its central role in the harmonization of EU securities trading, and the intense debate that preceded its adoption. Part 3 provides deeper legal analysis of the MiFID and other core harmonization measures, including the Prospectus and Transparency Directives. Part 4 takes this analysis one step further by offering future perspectives on the post-FSAP era.Less
EU policy in the area of corporate governance and capital markets is being reoriented. Harmonization is less frequently seen as a concept in company law, regulatory competition is on the rise, and experiments in soft law are being carried out. Several member States have recently reformed their corporate laws, either as a reaction to financial scandals or in an effort to enhance investment. Convergence has increased as a result, particularly towards Anglo-American standards. Yet, differences still exist, profoundly rooted in national systems of corporate governance. By contrast, capital market law would seem to be an exception having undergone intense harmonization in the last few years through the Lamfalussy regulatory architecture. Nonetheless, a European system of securities regulation is not yet in place. Regulation is predominantly domestic, each country having its own securities supervisor, while private laws affecting capital markets are still divergent. This volume examines the on-going debate on corporate and financial law reform from an interdisciplinary perspective. Part 1 explores the political determinants of corporate governance and evaluates the likelihood of convergence and the role of regulatory competition. Part 2 considers the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), its central role in the harmonization of EU securities trading, and the intense debate that preceded its adoption. Part 3 provides deeper legal analysis of the MiFID and other core harmonization measures, including the Prospectus and Transparency Directives. Part 4 takes this analysis one step further by offering future perspectives on the post-FSAP era.
