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Malawi’s five methods of paying reparations — court awards, the government’s Disaster Preparedness, Relief and Rehabilitation program, civil service grants, special payments to the political elite, and the National Compensation Tribunal (NCT) — have not brought public closure to past rights abuses and the antipathy they engendered. NCT procedures, which included neither public truth-telling nor the identification of perpetrators, have not fostered democratic consolidation. Growing out of a political compromise during the transition, the NCT has received nearly 20,000 claims and paid interim awards to less than one-third. Eligible are Malawians of any age who, between July 6, 1964 and May 17, 1994, were born in detention or exile, were subjected to wrongful imprisonment, forced exile, personal injury, lost property or business, lost educational opportunities, and/or employment benefits. An autonomous body within the judiciary, the NCT has been consistently underfunded and has limited the bulk of its payments to symbolic “condolences”. While the public is generally ignorant of the NCT, claimants are frustrated by its procedures, its “trivialization” of their pain and suffering, its “favouritism” as well as its failure to offer them full compensation, information about future payments, or a “sincere apology”. The existence of the NCT has allowed politicians to counter periodic public demands for a truth commission by asserting that the NCT is addressing the past and nothing more is needed.

The September 11th Victims Compensation Fund can only hesitatingly find its place within a comprehensive study of reparation programs. While the origin of the Fund lies in the political exigencies surrounding a perceived threat to the security of the United States, it more accurately reflects the desire by the U.S. Congress to ensure the viability of its nation’s air carriers. Unlike traditional reparations which are closely related to a process of social reintegration of the victim, fostering civic trust and social solidarity, the Fund was not established to bring justice to the victims of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Also, unlike traditional reparations, the Fund did not seek to serve as a mechanism of corrective or distributive justice as a result of an authoritarian domestic regime or internal conflict. It was initially created out of fear that recourse to the U.S. courts would threaten the precarious financial health of the airline industry. Implicitly, however, such pragmatism reflected a desire by lawmakers that the government be seen as doing all it could to ease the pain of those who suffered so greatly on September 11, 2001. Initial motivations for the program aside, there is no question that the compensation scheme has since taken on a life of its own. Ultimately, the Fund’s contribution to any reparations case-study lies in its cautionary tale about the creation of elaborate administrative schemes that try to individualize recoveries as the mechanisms through which to compensate victims.

In the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the UN Security Council determined that Iraq was liable under international law for any direct damage resulting from its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) was established to process the claims against Iraq. Since 1991, the UNCC has received approximately 2.6 million claims, which it has subdivided in six categories, depending on the status of the claimant, the type of loss, and the amount claimed. For certain claims, the UNCC has established fixed compensation standards, rather than assessing the exact amount of the loss. Other innovative features include mass claims resolution techniques and methodologies such as data matching, grouping, and sampling. The reparation process was funded through oil exports under the oil-for-food program. A share of originally 30% and later 25% of the proceeds was reserved for compensation. The oil-for-food program was terminated after the new war in Iraq in 2003, and the share of oil revenues dedicated to reparation was lowered to 5%. As of June 2005, the UNCC has decided nearly all claims.

This paper seeks to articulate a conception of justice in reparations for victims of human rights violations when the aim is to repair a large number of cases, as opposed to individual, isolated cases. It starts with an effort to establish some semantic clarity by trying to distinguish between two different contexts for the use of the term “reparations”. It discusses some of the problems with merely transplanting the ideal of compensation in proportion to harm from its natural home in the resolution of individual judicial cases, and using it as a standard of justice for massive reparations programs. Instead, it argues in favor of thinking about justice in the context of massive cases in terms of the achievement of three goals, namely, recognition, civic trust, and social solidarity — three goals that are intimately related to justice. Finally, it tries to shed light on the basic trade-offs that accompany some of the choices that have to be made in the process of constructing a comprehensive and coherent reparations program.

Compensation for human rights abuse can be approached from two different perspectives. The first is through principles of tort law, under which the compensation of harm for human rights abuse is no different from the compensation of other, ordinary harm. The second is based on principles of administrative compensation, where victims are defined in standardized terms in a statute that provides a relatively fixed, tabulated amount of compensation for all, which is typically smaller than judicial compensation. This paper analyzes the circumstances that justify a shift from the torts to the administrative approach to compensation, and how the two approaches should relate to each other. It addresses the issue of whether victims should have a right to choose between them in the disposition of their cases and, if so, under what conditions. Finally, it compares judicial to administrative compensation in relation to the goals a compensation program must pursue, and argues that even in those cases where administrative compensation offers the best option, it is advisable to leave room for the use of judicial compensation as well.

This chapter discusses the nature of disadvantage. It opens with an analysis of the pluralism of disadvantage, and rejects the ‘monist’ view. If instead of building a theory of equality on imaginary examples, theorists start by examining real life cases, it will become clear that not all disadvantages are reducible to each other, and therefore disadvantage is plural in its nature. But this pluralism implies that there will be a problem of indexing: deciding which disadvantages are more important or urgent. The capability approach, developed by Amartya Sen and others, serves as the starting point for the theory advanced here. According to this theory, in order to understand how well or badly someone's life is going, we need to attend to what they can ‘do and be’; their ‘capability to function’.

This chapter aims to analyse the theoretical rationales behind derivative actions, and to ask how they relate to our understanding of the social value and roles of the derivative action as a corporate governance tool. An initial analysis of the merits and demerits of the derivative action is presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 analyses the roles derivative actions may assume in enforcing corporate accountability. The question addressed is whether their purpose is primarily to deter misconduct or simply to compensate the company for the wrongdoing. As part of this, the possible benefits and limitations of these rationales will be explored. Finally, Section 2.4 examines the public image, or expressive value, of the derivative action. The purpose is to determine if some of the features inherent in the derivative action procedure enhance or detract from the understanding of derivative action as a positive social force.

The consequences of executive pay are complex and particularly rich in a theoretical and practical sense. This chapter examines one of the most fundamental questions in this regard: Does executive pay affect firm performance? The evidence is decidedly mixed, but raises key questions about pay as a motivator, and the different ways in which executive pay can influence strategic and organizational choices as well as firm performance. This chapter also considers the burgeoning literature on behavioral agency theory, which leads naturally to a comparison of the effects of different types of compensation, especially stock options. A significant part of this chapter is dedicated to an analysis of the determinants and consequences of pay differentials among top management teams, another area of great theoretical interest. Studying pay differentials (or pay dispersion), as well as the pattern of compensation in place among the CEO and other top managers, yields fascinating insights that have important consequences for teamwork, perceived fairness of pay, strategic decision making, and firm performance.

This chapter shows how the firm should determine compensation for its managers. It distinguishes between ownership structures (i.e., whether the firm is privately or publicly held), the length of the planning horizons for the owners and managers of the firm, whether the firm is multidivisional or not, whether the firm sells one or multiple products, and how Wall Street's expectations affect decision making by managers. In particular, it shows how marketing-finance fusion allows senior management and the finance department to determine managerial compensation plans in the multiproduct or multidivisional firm.

This chapter shows how the firm should design sales force compensation plans to maximize its performance. It distinguishes whether or not the firm can observe the salesperson's effort. It shows how marketing-finance fusion allows the firm to design compensation plans based on such factors as the firm's cost structure, cost and demand uncertainty, consumer satisfaction, the firm's cost of capital, and whether or not the firm delegates price-setting or sales call policy to the salesperson. It shows how the sales force compensation plan should allow for multiperiod effects and the impact of Internet advertising. In particular, it distinguishes different scenarios (e.g., whether Internet advertising and conventional advertising are substitutes or complements).

This chapter shows how the multiproduct/multiagent firm should design compensation plans for its sales force. It distinguishes between the differential effects of experience (productivity), heterogeneous risk attitudes among salespersons, and the firm's market segmentation policies. In addition, it shows how marketing-finance fusion allows multiproduct and multiagent firms to measure changes in sales force productivity using an objective metric (not sales revenue).

This chapter examines how the Internet affects the firm's marketing policies. It shows how the firm should choose its marketing strategies including pricing (distinguishing between the B to B and B to C markets) and advertising messages. In addition, it shows how the firm should coordinate its Internet advertising and sales force policies, including redesigning its sales force compensation plans. It discusss the effects of ownership structure (whether the advertising firm is privately or publicly held) on the firm's Internet advertising strategy. In addition, it analyzes a number of structural changes brought about by Internet advertising, including the purchase of advertising space via auctions, behavioral targeting, and conquest advertising.

This chapter provides an analytical approach for defining the market. It shows the importance of explicitly evaluating consumer perceptions and perceived product benefits when defining the boundaries of an industry. In particular, it discusses the implications of market definition for measuring managerial performance, designing managerial incentive plans, choosing organizational structure, and optimizing resource allocation.