Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199532186
- eISBN:
- 9780191714580
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199532186.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Calvin at the Centre explores the impact of various ideas on the thought of John Calvin and also that of later theologians who were influenced by him. The book therefore calls into ...
More
Calvin at the Centre explores the impact of various ideas on the thought of John Calvin and also that of later theologians who were influenced by him. The book therefore calls into question the attitude that Calvin's views are purely biblical and unaffected by the particular intellectual circumstances in which he lived. It also provides reason for thinking that the relation between Calvin and Calvinism is more complex than is commonly believed. The focus is on philosophical ideas as they find a place within Calvin's theology, and the chapters are organized to reflect this, dealing in turn with epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical issues. So the book follows the general outlook of the author's John Calvin's Ideas (OUP: 2004), but extends its scope and range. The emphasis is upon the coincidence of ideas between Calvin and other thinkers, rather than offering a historical account of how that influence came about. So, for example, there is a study of the extent to which Calvin's view of the atonement is Anselmic in its character, and how Calvin's view was treated in later discussions of the atonement in Puritanism. But the question of the exact ways in which Anselm's ideas came to Calvin's notice is left to one side. Among the topics treated are: the knowledge of God and of ourselves, Scripture and reason, the visibility of God, providence and predestination, Calvin and compatibilism, and the intermediate stateLess
Calvin at the Centre explores the impact of various ideas on the thought of John Calvin and also that of later theologians who were influenced by him. The book therefore calls into question the attitude that Calvin's views are purely biblical and unaffected by the particular intellectual circumstances in which he lived. It also provides reason for thinking that the relation between Calvin and Calvinism is more complex than is commonly believed. The focus is on philosophical ideas as they find a place within Calvin's theology, and the chapters are organized to reflect this, dealing in turn with epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical issues. So the book follows the general outlook of the author's John Calvin's Ideas (OUP: 2004), but extends its scope and range. The emphasis is upon the coincidence of ideas between Calvin and other thinkers, rather than offering a historical account of how that influence came about. So, for example, there is a study of the extent to which Calvin's view of the atonement is Anselmic in its character, and how Calvin's view was treated in later discussions of the atonement in Puritanism. But the question of the exact ways in which Anselm's ideas came to Calvin's notice is left to one side. Among the topics treated are: the knowledge of God and of ourselves, Scripture and reason, the visibility of God, providence and predestination, Calvin and compatibilism, and the intermediate state
Ishtiyaque Haji
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199899203
- eISBN:
- 9780199949885
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899203.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. This book argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort—“objective ...
More
To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. This book argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort—“objective reasons”—to perform some act unless one has free will regarding that act. So we cannot have objective reasons to perform an act unless we could have done otherwise. This is reason’s debt to freedom. the book argues, further, for the thesis that various things we value, such as moral and prudential obligation, intrinsic value, and a range of moral sentiments that figure centrally in interpersonal relationships, presuppose our having free will. They do so because each of these things essentially requires that we have objective reasons, the having of which, in turn, demands that we have alternatives. Finally, the book distinguishes between two sorts of alternative, strong or incompatibilist alternatives and weak or compatibilist alternatives. Assuming, on the one hand, that obligation and some of the other things we value require strong alternatives, the book concludes that determinism precludes these things because determinism expunges strong alternatives. If, on the other hand, they require only weak alternatives, a chief compatibilist agenda of establishing the compatibility of these things with determinism without appeal to alternatives of any kind—the semi-compatibilist’s agenda—is jeopardized.Less
To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. This book argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort—“objective reasons”—to perform some act unless one has free will regarding that act. So we cannot have objective reasons to perform an act unless we could have done otherwise. This is reason’s debt to freedom. the book argues, further, for the thesis that various things we value, such as moral and prudential obligation, intrinsic value, and a range of moral sentiments that figure centrally in interpersonal relationships, presuppose our having free will. They do so because each of these things essentially requires that we have objective reasons, the having of which, in turn, demands that we have alternatives. Finally, the book distinguishes between two sorts of alternative, strong or incompatibilist alternatives and weak or compatibilist alternatives. Assuming, on the one hand, that obligation and some of the other things we value require strong alternatives, the book concludes that determinism precludes these things because determinism expunges strong alternatives. If, on the other hand, they require only weak alternatives, a chief compatibilist agenda of establishing the compatibility of these things with determinism without appeal to alternatives of any kind—the semi-compatibilist’s agenda—is jeopardized.
Ishtiyaque Haji
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199899203
- eISBN:
- 9780199949885
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899203.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The final chapter summarizes the book’s principal argument and it draws some general conclusions.
The final chapter summarizes the book’s principal argument and it draws some general conclusions.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305043
- eISBN:
- 9780199786015
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305043.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book aims to help readers think more clearly about free will. It identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to the justified belief in the existence of free will, and ...
More
This book aims to help readers think more clearly about free will. It identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to the justified belief in the existence of free will, and meets them head on. It also clarifies the central concepts in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will: one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and another for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and this book offers novel solutions. One chapter explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will, and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents.Less
This book aims to help readers think more clearly about free will. It identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to the justified belief in the existence of free will, and meets them head on. It also clarifies the central concepts in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will: one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and another for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and this book offers novel solutions. One chapter explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will, and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents.
Ted Honderich
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198242833
- eISBN:
- 9780191680595
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242833.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
This text, originally Part Three of the single-volume hardback edition, poses the following question: if determinism is true, and free will an illusion, what are the consequences? The book maintains ...
More
This text, originally Part Three of the single-volume hardback edition, poses the following question: if determinism is true, and free will an illusion, what are the consequences? The book maintains that both of the entrenched and traditional doctrines about the consequences of determinism, compatibilism, and incompatibilism, are provably false, and formulates a new answer to the question.Less
This text, originally Part Three of the single-volume hardback edition, poses the following question: if determinism is true, and free will an illusion, what are the consequences? The book maintains that both of the entrenched and traditional doctrines about the consequences of determinism, compatibilism, and incompatibilism, are provably false, and formulates a new answer to the question.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150438
- eISBN:
- 9780199869091
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150430.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical ...
More
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical freedom concepts: most notably, free will, free choice, and free action. The book's first half develops an analysis of the nature of self‐control and explains the potential influence of self‐control on actions, beliefs, reasoning, emotions, and values. It also develops an account of an ideally self‐controlled person and argues that even such a person will fall short of autonomy. The second half of the book first asks what may be added to ideal self‐control to yield autonomy and then defends two distinctive answers, one for compatibilist believers in autonomy (believers in autonomy who see it as compatible with determinism) and another for libertarians (believers in autonomy who see it as incompatible with determinism). The compatibilist answer features an account of control and a sensitivity to agents’ histories, and the libertarian answer adds to this a kind of causal openness that does not require agent causation and that avoids the sort of luck that undermines autonomy and moral responsibility. It is argued that the disjunction of these two answers as applied to actual human beings is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. This is “agnostic autonomism”: the position is agnostic about whether the falsity of determinism is required for autonomy while asserting that it is more credible that there are autonomous human beings than there are not.Less
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical freedom concepts: most notably, free will, free choice, and free action. The book's first half develops an analysis of the nature of self‐control and explains the potential influence of self‐control on actions, beliefs, reasoning, emotions, and values. It also develops an account of an ideally self‐controlled person and argues that even such a person will fall short of autonomy. The second half of the book first asks what may be added to ideal self‐control to yield autonomy and then defends two distinctive answers, one for compatibilist believers in autonomy (believers in autonomy who see it as compatible with determinism) and another for libertarians (believers in autonomy who see it as incompatible with determinism). The compatibilist answer features an account of control and a sensitivity to agents’ histories, and the libertarian answer adds to this a kind of causal openness that does not require agent causation and that avoids the sort of luck that undermines autonomy and moral responsibility. It is argued that the disjunction of these two answers as applied to actual human beings is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. This is “agnostic autonomism”: the position is agnostic about whether the falsity of determinism is required for autonomy while asserting that it is more credible that there are autonomous human beings than there are not.
Michelle Kosch
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199289110
- eISBN:
- 9780191604003
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199289115.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter examines Schelling’s early systematic philosophy, with special attention to his solution to the freedom-determinism problem (a form of idealist compatibilism that was widely influential) ...
More
This chapter examines Schelling’s early systematic philosophy, with special attention to his solution to the freedom-determinism problem (a form of idealist compatibilism that was widely influential) and his account of the unity of reason.Less
This chapter examines Schelling’s early systematic philosophy, with special attention to his solution to the freedom-determinism problem (a form of idealist compatibilism that was widely influential) and his account of the unity of reason.
Martha Klein
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248347
- eISBN:
- 9780191681134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248347.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to examine the debate about determinism and moral responsibility, prompted by dissatisfaction with compatibilism and an uneasiness ...
More
This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to examine the debate about determinism and moral responsibility, prompted by dissatisfaction with compatibilism and an uneasiness about incompatibilism. It also presents an overview of the subsequent chapters.Less
This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to examine the debate about determinism and moral responsibility, prompted by dissatisfaction with compatibilism and an uneasiness about incompatibilism. It also presents an overview of the subsequent chapters.
Martin Schöneld
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195132182
- eISBN:
- 9780199786336
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195132181.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explores Kant’s doctoral dissertation, New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition (1755). Section 1 examines the context of the thesis and Kant’s monist contention ...
More
This chapter explores Kant’s doctoral dissertation, New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition (1755). Section 1 examines the context of the thesis and Kant’s monist contention that reality involves a consistent and coherent structure. Section 2 discusses the problem of causality arising from a consistent reality — How can there be free actions and lawful processes in one and the same world? Section 3 explores the principles of succession and coexistence in Kant’s ontology. Section 4 analyzes Kant’s compatibilist solution of the problem of causality and his attempt at deducing freedom from the individual power of resistance.Less
This chapter explores Kant’s doctoral dissertation, New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition (1755). Section 1 examines the context of the thesis and Kant’s monist contention that reality involves a consistent and coherent structure. Section 2 discusses the problem of causality arising from a consistent reality — How can there be free actions and lawful processes in one and the same world? Section 3 explores the principles of succession and coexistence in Kant’s ontology. Section 4 analyzes Kant’s compatibilist solution of the problem of causality and his attempt at deducing freedom from the individual power of resistance.
Jacqueline Mariña
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199206377
- eISBN:
- 9780191709753
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206377.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines several fundamental philosophical problems regarding the conditions of the possibility of moral transformation preoccupying the younger Schleiermacher, especially as he ...
More
This chapter examines several fundamental philosophical problems regarding the conditions of the possibility of moral transformation preoccupying the younger Schleiermacher, especially as he struggled to come to terms with Kant's practical philosophy. Included in this set of issues is the problem of transcendental freedom and how it relates to an agent's character, as well as the problem of the relation of the faculty of representation (knowing) to the faculty of desire (doing). Both questions have to do with how we are to conceive of the unity and continuity of the self throughout its changing states. Schleiermacher's compatibalist view of freedom is examined, as well as his analysis of Kant's fundamental division of the sources of human knowledge into spontaneity and receptivity. The principle focus of the chapter is Schleiermacher's early essay On Freedom.Less
This chapter examines several fundamental philosophical problems regarding the conditions of the possibility of moral transformation preoccupying the younger Schleiermacher, especially as he struggled to come to terms with Kant's practical philosophy. Included in this set of issues is the problem of transcendental freedom and how it relates to an agent's character, as well as the problem of the relation of the faculty of representation (knowing) to the faculty of desire (doing). Both questions have to do with how we are to conceive of the unity and continuity of the self throughout its changing states. Schleiermacher's compatibalist view of freedom is examined, as well as his analysis of Kant's fundamental division of the sources of human knowledge into spontaneity and receptivity. The principle focus of the chapter is Schleiermacher's early essay On Freedom.
Dana Kay Nelkin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199608560
- eISBN:
- 9780191729638
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608560.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
This book presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately ...
More
This book presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately reaffirming our conception of ourselves as agents. The book begins with a defense of the rational abilities view, according to which one is responsible for an action if and only if one acts with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. The view is compatibilist — that is, on the view defended, responsibility is compatible with determinism — and one of its striking features is a certain asymmetry: it requires the ability to do otherwise for responsibility when actions are blameworthy, but not when they are praiseworthy. In defending and elaborating the view, the book questions long-held assumptions such as those concerning the relation between fairness and blame and the nature of so-called reactive attitudes such as resentment and forgiveness. The book's argument not only fits with a metaphysical picture of causation — agent-causation — often assumed to be available only to incompatibilist accounts, but receives positive support from the intuitively appealing Ought Implies Can Principle, and establishes a new interpretation of freedom and moral responsibility that dovetails with a compelling account of our inescapable commitments as rational agents.Less
This book presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately reaffirming our conception of ourselves as agents. The book begins with a defense of the rational abilities view, according to which one is responsible for an action if and only if one acts with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. The view is compatibilist — that is, on the view defended, responsibility is compatible with determinism — and one of its striking features is a certain asymmetry: it requires the ability to do otherwise for responsibility when actions are blameworthy, but not when they are praiseworthy. In defending and elaborating the view, the book questions long-held assumptions such as those concerning the relation between fairness and blame and the nature of so-called reactive attitudes such as resentment and forgiveness. The book's argument not only fits with a metaphysical picture of causation — agent-causation — often assumed to be available only to incompatibilist accounts, but receives positive support from the intuitively appealing Ought Implies Can Principle, and establishes a new interpretation of freedom and moral responsibility that dovetails with a compelling account of our inescapable commitments as rational agents.
John Baer
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0016
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter proposes that the only kind of free will that is coherent is deterministic free will, and makes an argument for what philosophers call compatibilism. To the extent that the universe is ...
More
This chapter proposes that the only kind of free will that is coherent is deterministic free will, and makes an argument for what philosophers call compatibilism. To the extent that the universe is not deterministic, such as at the level of quantum events, free will is simply impossible, because actions or events that are random cannot be willed or caused by anyone. But in a largely deterministic universe, free will means that a person's thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, hopes, goals, desires, and skills matter, and that these personal attributes can and do cause that person to act as he does. The fact that those personal attributes may themselves be determined by prior events does not change the fact that who the person is plays a large role in the decisions he makes and the actions he takes. Determinism makes free will (and psychology) possible.Less
This chapter proposes that the only kind of free will that is coherent is deterministic free will, and makes an argument for what philosophers call compatibilism. To the extent that the universe is not deterministic, such as at the level of quantum events, free will is simply impossible, because actions or events that are random cannot be willed or caused by anyone. But in a largely deterministic universe, free will means that a person's thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, hopes, goals, desires, and skills matter, and that these personal attributes can and do cause that person to act as he does. The fact that those personal attributes may themselves be determined by prior events does not change the fact that who the person is plays a large role in the decisions he makes and the actions he takes. Determinism makes free will (and psychology) possible.
Bernard Berofsky
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199640010
- eISBN:
- 9780191738197
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640010.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
The classical problem of free will and determinism is a metaphysical problem that cannot, therefore, be solved through analyses of moral or evaluative notions like responsibility and agency. It is ...
More
The classical problem of free will and determinism is a metaphysical problem that cannot, therefore, be solved through analyses of moral or evaluative notions like responsibility and agency. It is crucial to understand the metaphysical concerns of the incompatibilist, one who finds that determinism threatens free will, and it is claimed that this concern rests on a mistaken vision of the world, necessitarianism. David Hume, who defended the compatibility of free will and determinism, attacked the necessitarian metaphysic and this book is essentially a defense of his views. Hume’s particular defense of compatibilism, conditionalist compatibilism, is, however, rejected. An explanation of the dearth of defenders of the thesis of the book, labeled “Humean Compatibilism,” is offered. Brief synopses of other principal chapters are provided.Less
The classical problem of free will and determinism is a metaphysical problem that cannot, therefore, be solved through analyses of moral or evaluative notions like responsibility and agency. It is crucial to understand the metaphysical concerns of the incompatibilist, one who finds that determinism threatens free will, and it is claimed that this concern rests on a mistaken vision of the world, necessitarianism. David Hume, who defended the compatibility of free will and determinism, attacked the necessitarian metaphysic and this book is essentially a defense of his views. Hume’s particular defense of compatibilism, conditionalist compatibilism, is, however, rejected. An explanation of the dearth of defenders of the thesis of the book, labeled “Humean Compatibilism,” is offered. Brief synopses of other principal chapters are provided.
Peter van Inwagen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199245604
- eISBN:
- 9780191715310
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245604.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the ...
More
The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the free-will defence: compatibilism; the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge; and the existence of ‘middle knowledge’. It is shown how Theist can cast sufficient doubt on these theses to block Atheist's attempt at conversion. The body of the chapter is devoted to Atheist's contention that the free-will defence cannot account for ‘natural evil’. Theist is represented as employing a version of the free-will defence that postulates a primordial separation of our remote ancestors from God, and as defending the conclusion that according to this story, the suffering of human beings that is caused proximately by natural evils might also be remotely caused by the abuse of free will.Less
The chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the free-will defence: compatibilism; the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge; and the existence of ‘middle knowledge’. It is shown how Theist can cast sufficient doubt on these theses to block Atheist's attempt at conversion. The body of the chapter is devoted to Atheist's contention that the free-will defence cannot account for ‘natural evil’. Theist is represented as employing a version of the free-will defence that postulates a primordial separation of our remote ancestors from God, and as defending the conclusion that according to this story, the suffering of human beings that is caused proximately by natural evils might also be remotely caused by the abuse of free will.
Andrew C. Dole
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195341171
- eISBN:
- 9780199866908
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341171.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter focuses on Schleiermacher's lifelong commitment to determinism, the view that all events take place of necessity. In an early, unpublished essay Schleiermacher argued for a compatibilist ...
More
This chapter focuses on Schleiermacher's lifelong commitment to determinism, the view that all events take place of necessity. In an early, unpublished essay Schleiermacher argued for a compatibilist understanding of human freedom against the views of Immanuel Kant. The chapter exposits Schleiermacher's position in this early essay and then argues that Schleiermacher held this position throughout the remainder of his career, with minor modifications. Schleiermacher's lectures on dialectics and his Speeches on Religion are discussed, and signs of determinism are seen in each. The chapter responds to a recent argument by Jacqueline Mariña that, by 1800, Schleiermacher had abandoned determinism. Finally, Schleiermacher's understanding of ethics is discussed, and the claim is advanced that he embraced the project of searching for the causes of human behavior in a manner parallel to natural‐scientific investigations of the material world.Less
This chapter focuses on Schleiermacher's lifelong commitment to determinism, the view that all events take place of necessity. In an early, unpublished essay Schleiermacher argued for a compatibilist understanding of human freedom against the views of Immanuel Kant. The chapter exposits Schleiermacher's position in this early essay and then argues that Schleiermacher held this position throughout the remainder of his career, with minor modifications. Schleiermacher's lectures on dialectics and his Speeches on Religion are discussed, and signs of determinism are seen in each. The chapter responds to a recent argument by Jacqueline Mariña that, by 1800, Schleiermacher had abandoned determinism. Finally, Schleiermacher's understanding of ethics is discussed, and the claim is advanced that he embraced the project of searching for the causes of human behavior in a manner parallel to natural‐scientific investigations of the material world.
Katherin A. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231676
- eISBN:
- 9780191716089
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231676.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, General
This introductory chapter defines key terms such as determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. Proposed definitions are somewhat non-standard, but better reflect the fundamental concerns of ...
More
This introductory chapter defines key terms such as determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. Proposed definitions are somewhat non-standard, but better reflect the fundamental concerns of libertarians than many contemporary definitions.Less
This introductory chapter defines key terms such as determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. Proposed definitions are somewhat non-standard, but better reflect the fundamental concerns of libertarians than many contemporary definitions.
Katherin A. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231676
- eISBN:
- 9780191716089
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231676.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, General
This chapter reviews Augustine's position on free will. The argument is made that Augustine was a compatibilist in his early work, De libero arbitrio, as well as in the later anti-Pelagian works, and ...
More
This chapter reviews Augustine's position on free will. The argument is made that Augustine was a compatibilist in his early work, De libero arbitrio, as well as in the later anti-Pelagian works, and he was a compatibilist about the condition of mankind before as well as after the fall of Adam and Eve. His compatibilism leaves him open to charge that God is ultimately the cause of sin.Less
This chapter reviews Augustine's position on free will. The argument is made that Augustine was a compatibilist in his early work, De libero arbitrio, as well as in the later anti-Pelagian works, and he was a compatibilist about the condition of mankind before as well as after the fall of Adam and Eve. His compatibilism leaves him open to charge that God is ultimately the cause of sin.
Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199532186
- eISBN:
- 9780191714580
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199532186.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Although Calvin does not avow compatibilism in so many words, his views on providence and predestination, as well as his doctrine of the bondage of the will to sin and the need for efficacious grace, ...
More
Although Calvin does not avow compatibilism in so many words, his views on providence and predestination, as well as his doctrine of the bondage of the will to sin and the need for efficacious grace, fit snugly with compatibilism. Calvin is also a resolute opponent of ‘Stoic fate’, arguing that in that scheme God himself is subject to fate. Nevertheless, there is some historical evidence (via Calvin's reading of Cicero and of Augustine) but also considerable evidence in terms of the coincidence of his ideas, that when he considers human action he thinks like a Stoic. Stoic views are explored at some length, and the points of coincidence established; for example, the idea of the locus of responsibility being the human person; his use of the ‘lazy argument’; and more generally the causal interconnection of means and ends. But there are also elements of ‘hard determinism’ in Calvin's views, notably in the area of the reception of divine grace. For, while a person is to be blamed for his sins, only God is to be praised for any gracious action.Less
Although Calvin does not avow compatibilism in so many words, his views on providence and predestination, as well as his doctrine of the bondage of the will to sin and the need for efficacious grace, fit snugly with compatibilism. Calvin is also a resolute opponent of ‘Stoic fate’, arguing that in that scheme God himself is subject to fate. Nevertheless, there is some historical evidence (via Calvin's reading of Cicero and of Augustine) but also considerable evidence in terms of the coincidence of his ideas, that when he considers human action he thinks like a Stoic. Stoic views are explored at some length, and the points of coincidence established; for example, the idea of the locus of responsibility being the human person; his use of the ‘lazy argument’; and more generally the causal interconnection of means and ends. But there are also elements of ‘hard determinism’ in Calvin's views, notably in the area of the reception of divine grace. For, while a person is to be blamed for his sins, only God is to be praised for any gracious action.
Paul Woodruff
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195332001
- eISBN:
- 9780199868186
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332001.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Theater puts actions on view, and actions are events that proceed from human choice. If choice is not possible for humans, or if it cannot be presented to public view, then theater will not be ...
More
Theater puts actions on view, and actions are events that proceed from human choice. If choice is not possible for humans, or if it cannot be presented to public view, then theater will not be possible. But we do present oaths in public, most commonly at weddings, and we take them to proceed from choice, by free will. The events of a tragedy, however, seem often to be determined by fate; yet great tragic plays, such as Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus, show heroes choosing their fates, so that ancient playwrights were hard compatibilists. To help an audience believe that Oedipus makes choices, Sophocles presents him as a coherent character—that is, as someone who credibly takes action, rather than passively submitting to fate. Factors that would defeat choice (such as insanity or divine intervention) also defeat character; that is why choice follows character.Less
Theater puts actions on view, and actions are events that proceed from human choice. If choice is not possible for humans, or if it cannot be presented to public view, then theater will not be possible. But we do present oaths in public, most commonly at weddings, and we take them to proceed from choice, by free will. The events of a tragedy, however, seem often to be determined by fate; yet great tragic plays, such as Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus, show heroes choosing their fates, so that ancient playwrights were hard compatibilists. To help an audience believe that Oedipus makes choices, Sophocles presents him as a coherent character—that is, as someone who credibly takes action, rather than passively submitting to fate. Factors that would defeat choice (such as insanity or divine intervention) also defeat character; that is why choice follows character.
Bruce Langtry
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199238798
- eISBN:
- 9780191716485
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238798.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The a priori investigation of God's providential policies depends on one's understanding of what options God has, and what options he has depends on the structure of the array of worlds. This chapter ...
More
The a priori investigation of God's providential policies depends on one's understanding of what options God has, and what options he has depends on the structure of the array of worlds. This chapter continues the investigation started in the first chapter. It starts with a discussion of whether any possible world has infinite value, and of whether for every world there is at least one better world, and concludes that currently available considerations do not settle either question. It then argues that even if there are worlds than which there are none better, we cannot infer that if God exists then the actual world is one of them. This conclusion is reached independently of any assumption concerning which out of theological compatibilism, Molinism, and open theism is to be preferred.Less
The a priori investigation of God's providential policies depends on one's understanding of what options God has, and what options he has depends on the structure of the array of worlds. This chapter continues the investigation started in the first chapter. It starts with a discussion of whether any possible world has infinite value, and of whether for every world there is at least one better world, and concludes that currently available considerations do not settle either question. It then argues that even if there are worlds than which there are none better, we cannot infer that if God exists then the actual world is one of them. This conclusion is reached independently of any assumption concerning which out of theological compatibilism, Molinism, and open theism is to be preferred.
