Peter Goldie
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253043
- eISBN:
- 9780191597510
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253048.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The central aim of the book is to give a deeper and wider understanding of emotion, and of related phenomena, such as consciousness, thought, feeling, imagination, expressive action, mood, and ...
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The central aim of the book is to give a deeper and wider understanding of emotion, and of related phenomena, such as consciousness, thought, feeling, imagination, expressive action, mood, and character. A key theme is the idea of a personal perspective or point of view, as contrasted with the impersonal stance of the empirical sciences. It is only from the personal perspective that thoughts, reasons, feelings, and actions—commonsense psychology—come into view. The book endorses the view that the emotions are intentional, but resists the thought that this intentionality can be fully captured without reference to feelings; this is a kind of over‐intellectualizing of the emotions. The notion of feeling towards is introduced to capture the intentionality of emotion. The book argues that the various elements of emotional experience—thought, feeling, bodily change, expression, and action—are tied together as part of a narrative structure.Less
The central aim of the book is to give a deeper and wider understanding of emotion, and of related phenomena, such as consciousness, thought, feeling, imagination, expressive action, mood, and character. A key theme is the idea of a personal perspective or point of view, as contrasted with the impersonal stance of the empirical sciences. It is only from the personal perspective that thoughts, reasons, feelings, and actions—commonsense psychology—come into view. The book endorses the view that the emotions are intentional, but resists the thought that this intentionality can be fully captured without reference to feelings; this is a kind of over‐intellectualizing of the emotions. The notion of feeling towards is introduced to capture the intentionality of emotion. The book argues that the various elements of emotional experience—thought, feeling, bodily change, expression, and action—are tied together as part of a narrative structure.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195093926
- eISBN:
- 9780199833689
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195093925.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Even though commonsense virtue ethics is less unified than utilitarianism, various forms of pluralism are inherent in utilitarianism.
Even though commonsense virtue ethics is less unified than utilitarianism, various forms of pluralism are inherent in utilitarianism.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents a three-part response to radical scepticism, a response which mirrors in key respects the ‘commonsense’ proposal often ascribed to G. E. Moore (and which is regarded with almost ...
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This chapter presents a three-part response to radical scepticism, a response which mirrors in key respects the ‘commonsense’ proposal often ascribed to G. E. Moore (and which is regarded with almost wholesale derision). Here this chapter calls this anti-sceptical proposal, Mooreanism. The first part of this anti-sceptical response is to focus on an everyday proposition which we paradigmatically take ourselves to know, such as that one has two hands, and to insist that we do indeed know this proposition. The second part of the response is to note that since this everyday proposition is manifestly inconsistent with the target radical sceptical hypothesis, it follows that if one knows the everyday proposition, then one must know the denial of the radical sceptical hypothesis as well. Finally, the third part of the response is the extraction of the antisceptical conclusion that one knows the denial of the target radical sceptical hypothesis, in this case that one is not a brain-in-a-vat.Less
This chapter presents a three-part response to radical scepticism, a response which mirrors in key respects the ‘commonsense’ proposal often ascribed to G. E. Moore (and which is regarded with almost wholesale derision). Here this chapter calls this anti-sceptical proposal, Mooreanism. The first part of this anti-sceptical response is to focus on an everyday proposition which we paradigmatically take ourselves to know, such as that one has two hands, and to insist that we do indeed know this proposition. The second part of the response is to note that since this everyday proposition is manifestly inconsistent with the target radical sceptical hypothesis, it follows that if one knows the everyday proposition, then one must know the denial of the radical sceptical hypothesis as well. Finally, the third part of the response is the extraction of the antisceptical conclusion that one knows the denial of the target radical sceptical hypothesis, in this case that one is not a brain-in-a-vat.
Margaret Urban Walker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195315394
- eISBN:
- 9780199872053
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315394.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter traces the emergence of a theoretical-juridical model of moral theory in the work of English utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick's masterwork, The Methods of Ethics. Through a series ...
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This chapter traces the emergence of a theoretical-juridical model of moral theory in the work of English utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick's masterwork, The Methods of Ethics. Through a series of theoretical exclusions and distinctions among morality and ethics, Sidgwick constructs the idea of a pure core of moral knowledge that can be captured by a compact moral system that is formally and practically superior to the supposed diversity of methods in commonsense morality. Sidgwick exhibits unusual self-consciousness in asking whom a scientific ethics is intended to serve, and with unusual candor defends the view that utilitarianism is best understood not as a replacement of commonsense morality for common people, but as the instrument of an exceptional few who may for utilitarian reasons not publicize their use of it.Less
This chapter traces the emergence of a theoretical-juridical model of moral theory in the work of English utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick's masterwork, The Methods of Ethics. Through a series of theoretical exclusions and distinctions among morality and ethics, Sidgwick constructs the idea of a pure core of moral knowledge that can be captured by a compact moral system that is formally and practically superior to the supposed diversity of methods in commonsense morality. Sidgwick exhibits unusual self-consciousness in asking whom a scientific ethics is intended to serve, and with unusual candor defends the view that utilitarianism is best understood not as a replacement of commonsense morality for common people, but as the instrument of an exceptional few who may for utilitarian reasons not publicize their use of it.
Mark A. Noll
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151114
- eISBN:
- 9780199834532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151119.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
The rise of a distinctly American theology came from Christian appropriation of a republican political vision, Christian confidence in commonsense moral reasoning, and Christian success at ...
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The rise of a distinctly American theology came from Christian appropriation of a republican political vision, Christian confidence in commonsense moral reasoning, and Christian success at implementing evangelical religion in the culture of the new United States. But, as American political thought evolved from classical whig (and hierarchical) principles toward liberal (and populist) principles, so also did the American theology evolve in the direction of greater confidence in free will, personal initiative, and self‐guided interpretations of the Bible.Less
The rise of a distinctly American theology came from Christian appropriation of a republican political vision, Christian confidence in commonsense moral reasoning, and Christian success at implementing evangelical religion in the culture of the new United States. But, as American political thought evolved from classical whig (and hierarchical) principles toward liberal (and populist) principles, so also did the American theology evolve in the direction of greater confidence in free will, personal initiative, and self‐guided interpretations of the Bible.
Mark A. Noll
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151114
- eISBN:
- 9780199834532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151119.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
Between 1730 and 1860, American Protestant Christianity developed in a way that set it apart from other forms of the faith in other western locales. American Protestantism moved away from ...
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Between 1730 and 1860, American Protestant Christianity developed in a way that set it apart from other forms of the faith in other western locales. American Protestantism moved away from traditional, establishmentarian forms of practice toward an individualistic, market‐oriented type. Contributing to these developments was an intellectual synthesis of evangelical Christianity, republican political thought, and commonsense moral reasoning.Less
Between 1730 and 1860, American Protestant Christianity developed in a way that set it apart from other forms of the faith in other western locales. American Protestantism moved away from traditional, establishmentarian forms of practice toward an individualistic, market‐oriented type. Contributing to these developments was an intellectual synthesis of evangelical Christianity, republican political thought, and commonsense moral reasoning.
Mark A. Noll
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151114
- eISBN:
- 9780199834532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151119.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
By 1790, American Christians also embraced the “new moral philosophy,” a way of understanding their faith through “commonsense moral reasoning.” Because they came to believe that God had created ...
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By 1790, American Christians also embraced the “new moral philosophy,” a way of understanding their faith through “commonsense moral reasoning.” Because they came to believe that God had created humans with a capacity for moral reasoning, American Christians largely gave up the traditional, hierarchical arbiters of truth found in the established churches of Europe and took into their own hands the determination of religious truth and control of the churches.Less
By 1790, American Christians also embraced the “new moral philosophy,” a way of understanding their faith through “commonsense moral reasoning.” Because they came to believe that God had created humans with a capacity for moral reasoning, American Christians largely gave up the traditional, hierarchical arbiters of truth found in the established churches of Europe and took into their own hands the determination of religious truth and control of the churches.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195093926
- eISBN:
- 9780199833689
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195093925.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Our commonsense thinking about the virtues has certain advantages over Kantian ethics and commonsense morality narrowly conceived. The latter two are committed to a self‐other asymmetry with respect ...
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Our commonsense thinking about the virtues has certain advantages over Kantian ethics and commonsense morality narrowly conceived. The latter two are committed to a self‐other asymmetry with respect to moral goodness and rightness: what harms the agent is not treated as morally criticizable in the way that what harms other people is. By contrast, our ordinary understanding of virtues allows for both self‐benefiting and other‐benefiting virtues, and what harms or is likely to harm the agent counts against his or her possession of the virtue of prudence as much as what is likely to harm others counts against his or her having the virtue of benevolence or kindness. But to treat what harms the agent as irrelevant to our deepest or most important ethical evaluations downgrades or devalues the agent himself or herself, and this criticism, while not applying to our ordinary thought about the virtues, does hold against both Kantianism and commonsense morality.Less
Our commonsense thinking about the virtues has certain advantages over Kantian ethics and commonsense morality narrowly conceived. The latter two are committed to a self‐other asymmetry with respect to moral goodness and rightness: what harms the agent is not treated as morally criticizable in the way that what harms other people is. By contrast, our ordinary understanding of virtues allows for both self‐benefiting and other‐benefiting virtues, and what harms or is likely to harm the agent counts against his or her possession of the virtue of prudence as much as what is likely to harm others counts against his or her having the virtue of benevolence or kindness. But to treat what harms the agent as irrelevant to our deepest or most important ethical evaluations downgrades or devalues the agent himself or herself, and this criticism, while not applying to our ordinary thought about the virtues, does hold against both Kantianism and commonsense morality.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195093926
- eISBN:
- 9780199833689
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195093925.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Kantian and commonsense moral thinking are incoherent because self‐other asymmetry does not cogently combine with the belief that we owe more to people the closer they are to us in familial or ...
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Kantian and commonsense moral thinking are incoherent because self‐other asymmetry does not cogently combine with the belief that we owe more to people the closer they are to us in familial or personal terms. The latter is commonsensically explained by the claim that it is natural or inevitable that we should care about those closer to us more than about those less close to us, but this seemingly plausible assumption tends to undercut the justification that is typically and intuitively offered for self‐other asymmetry, namely, that we naturally care more about ourselves than about others, so that there is no need to assume any duty to avoid harming oneself. A commonsense ethics of virtue avoids this and other incoherences or tensions in Kantian and commonsense moral thinking.Less
Kantian and commonsense moral thinking are incoherent because self‐other asymmetry does not cogently combine with the belief that we owe more to people the closer they are to us in familial or personal terms. The latter is commonsensically explained by the claim that it is natural or inevitable that we should care about those closer to us more than about those less close to us, but this seemingly plausible assumption tends to undercut the justification that is typically and intuitively offered for self‐other asymmetry, namely, that we naturally care more about ourselves than about others, so that there is no need to assume any duty to avoid harming oneself. A commonsense ethics of virtue avoids this and other incoherences or tensions in Kantian and commonsense moral thinking.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195093926
- eISBN:
- 9780199833689
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195093925.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Just like commonsense morality, commonsense virtue ethics faces complicated issues about luck. However, if luck plays a role in our development of virtuous or vicious traits of character, then we can ...
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Just like commonsense morality, commonsense virtue ethics faces complicated issues about luck. However, if luck plays a role in our development of virtuous or vicious traits of character, then we can evaluate such traits in virtue‐ethical terms without blaming or condemning those, e.g., whom we wish, in favored terms, to criticize. This approach is very reminiscent of Spinoza.Less
Just like commonsense morality, commonsense virtue ethics faces complicated issues about luck. However, if luck plays a role in our development of virtuous or vicious traits of character, then we can evaluate such traits in virtue‐ethical terms without blaming or condemning those, e.g., whom we wish, in favored terms, to criticize. This approach is very reminiscent of Spinoza.
Renée Elio
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147667
- eISBN:
- 9780199785865
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147669.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter begins by discussing the issue of normative standards, in particular the role human performance plays in specifying these standards for common sense and rationality. It then discusses ...
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This chapter begins by discussing the issue of normative standards, in particular the role human performance plays in specifying these standards for common sense and rationality. It then discusses commonsense knowledge and commonsense reasoning, and rationality. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This chapter begins by discussing the issue of normative standards, in particular the role human performance plays in specifying these standards for common sense and rationality. It then discusses commonsense knowledge and commonsense reasoning, and rationality. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280803
- eISBN:
- 9780191723254
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The book has two parts: one metaphysical, the other epistemological. The metaphysical part is largely concerned with realism issues. It starts with realism about universals, dismissing Plato's ...
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The book has two parts: one metaphysical, the other epistemological. The metaphysical part is largely concerned with realism issues. It starts with realism about universals, dismissing Plato's notorious ‘one over many’ problem. Several chapters argue for a fairly uncompromisingly realist view of the external physical world of commonsense and science. Both the nonfactualism of moral noncognitivism and positivistic instrumentalism, and deflationism about truth, are found to rest on antirealisms about their subject matters that are hard to characterize. A case is presented for moral realism. Various biological realisms are considered. Finally, an argument is presented for an unfashionable biological essentialism. The epistemological part of the book argues against the a priori and for a Quinean naturalism. The intuitions that so dominate ‘armchair philosophy’ are empirical not a priori. There is an emphasis throughout the book on distinguishing metaphysical issues about what there is and what it's like from semantic issues about meaning, truth, and reference. Another central theme, captured in the title, is that we should ‘put metaphysics first’. We should approach epistemology and semantics from a metaphysical perspective rather than vice versa. The epistemological turn in modern philosophy and the linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy were something of disasters.Less
The book has two parts: one metaphysical, the other epistemological. The metaphysical part is largely concerned with realism issues. It starts with realism about universals, dismissing Plato's notorious ‘one over many’ problem. Several chapters argue for a fairly uncompromisingly realist view of the external physical world of commonsense and science. Both the nonfactualism of moral noncognitivism and positivistic instrumentalism, and deflationism about truth, are found to rest on antirealisms about their subject matters that are hard to characterize. A case is presented for moral realism. Various biological realisms are considered. Finally, an argument is presented for an unfashionable biological essentialism. The epistemological part of the book argues against the a priori and for a Quinean naturalism. The intuitions that so dominate ‘armchair philosophy’ are empirical not a priori. There is an emphasis throughout the book on distinguishing metaphysical issues about what there is and what it's like from semantic issues about meaning, truth, and reference. Another central theme, captured in the title, is that we should ‘put metaphysics first’. We should approach epistemology and semantics from a metaphysical perspective rather than vice versa. The epistemological turn in modern philosophy and the linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy were something of disasters.
Bill Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199260256
- eISBN:
- 9780191725470
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260256.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The motivation and defence of (OV) is completed by a detailed engagement with the question how the mind-independence of the physical objects that we perceive shows up from our own perspective as ...
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The motivation and defence of (OV) is completed by a detailed engagement with the question how the mind-independence of the physical objects that we perceive shows up from our own perspective as perceivers. Philosophical debate about the nature of the direct objects of perception is responsible at least in part to how things are from the subject's own perspective. An account is offered of the role in bringing mind-independence to light for the subject of certain commonsense explanations of the actual and counterfactual order and nature of experience of physical objects on the basis of the perceptible natures of the particular objects perceived. In virtue of their modal robustness, such explanations resist any reduction to scientific physics that might threaten to undermine the empiricist idea that physical objects themselves are genuinely presented in perception. The resulting position provides a fully adequate vindication of empirical realism.Less
The motivation and defence of (OV) is completed by a detailed engagement with the question how the mind-independence of the physical objects that we perceive shows up from our own perspective as perceivers. Philosophical debate about the nature of the direct objects of perception is responsible at least in part to how things are from the subject's own perspective. An account is offered of the role in bringing mind-independence to light for the subject of certain commonsense explanations of the actual and counterfactual order and nature of experience of physical objects on the basis of the perceptible natures of the particular objects perceived. In virtue of their modal robustness, such explanations resist any reduction to scientific physics that might threaten to undermine the empiricist idea that physical objects themselves are genuinely presented in perception. The resulting position provides a fully adequate vindication of empirical realism.
Francis Oakley
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300176339
- eISBN:
- 9780300183504
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300176339.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, European Medieval History
This chapter discusses the continuities that encompass the two and a half centuries on which this book has focused. Kingship was the primary institutional focus of political thinking in the ...
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This chapter discusses the continuities that encompass the two and a half centuries on which this book has focused. Kingship was the primary institutional focus of political thinking in the mid-eleventh century, and this continued until the early fourteenth century. Despite being beleaguered at the theoretical level, at the popular level the hallowed conviction that there was something sacred about even the temporal monarchs of Europe continued to betray a remarkable resilience. However, an enormous theoretical chasm had also opened between the theopolitical commonsense of the mid-eleventh century when the German king Henry III, acting as sacred emperor-pontiff and imperial vicar of Christ, could make and unmake popes, and that of the early fourteenth century, when papal ideologists such as Aegidius Romanus and James of Viterbo could portray kings and emperors as essentially secular figures.Less
This chapter discusses the continuities that encompass the two and a half centuries on which this book has focused. Kingship was the primary institutional focus of political thinking in the mid-eleventh century, and this continued until the early fourteenth century. Despite being beleaguered at the theoretical level, at the popular level the hallowed conviction that there was something sacred about even the temporal monarchs of Europe continued to betray a remarkable resilience. However, an enormous theoretical chasm had also opened between the theopolitical commonsense of the mid-eleventh century when the German king Henry III, acting as sacred emperor-pontiff and imperial vicar of Christ, could make and unmake popes, and that of the early fourteenth century, when papal ideologists such as Aegidius Romanus and James of Viterbo could portray kings and emperors as essentially secular figures.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280803
- eISBN:
- 9780191723254
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This introductory chapter starts with an overall summary of the book, and then goes on to provide a summary of each chapter. Topics covered in the book include nominalism, realism, commonsense ...
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This introductory chapter starts with an overall summary of the book, and then goes on to provide a summary of each chapter. Topics covered in the book include nominalism, realism, commonsense realism, scientific realism, moral realism, naturalism, biological essentialism, and nonfactualism.Less
This introductory chapter starts with an overall summary of the book, and then goes on to provide a summary of each chapter. Topics covered in the book include nominalism, realism, commonsense realism, scientific realism, moral realism, naturalism, biological essentialism, and nonfactualism.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280803
- eISBN:
- 9780191723254
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter defends commonsense realism from the underdetermination theses of extreme skepticism. If true, these would count against nearly all our knowledge and hence undermine realism about the ...
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This chapter defends commonsense realism from the underdetermination theses of extreme skepticism. If true, these would count against nearly all our knowledge and hence undermine realism about the observable world. The traditional responses to these theses rest on a priori knowledge. The chapter rejects a priori knowledge, but even if there were such knowledge, these traditional responses tend to involve bizarre metaphysics and to be otherwise unsatisfactory. Instead, it offers a Moorean response: realism is much more firmly based than the epistemological theses that are thought to undermine it. The Moorean response is supported by a naturalistic one that appeals to scientific practice. Rather than proceeding form an a priori epistemology to an a priori metaphysics, we should proceed from an empirical metaphysics to an empirical epistemology. We should put metaphysics first.Less
This chapter defends commonsense realism from the underdetermination theses of extreme skepticism. If true, these would count against nearly all our knowledge and hence undermine realism about the observable world. The traditional responses to these theses rest on a priori knowledge. The chapter rejects a priori knowledge, but even if there were such knowledge, these traditional responses tend to involve bizarre metaphysics and to be otherwise unsatisfactory. Instead, it offers a Moorean response: realism is much more firmly based than the epistemological theses that are thought to undermine it. The Moorean response is supported by a naturalistic one that appeals to scientific practice. Rather than proceeding form an a priori epistemology to an a priori metaphysics, we should proceed from an empirical metaphysics to an empirical epistemology. We should put metaphysics first.
Bill Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199692040
- eISBN:
- 9780191729713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Philosophers of perception face a problem in combining two intuitively compelling ideas about physical objects and our perceptual relation with them: first, empiricism, the thesis that physical ...
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Philosophers of perception face a problem in combining two intuitively compelling ideas about physical objects and our perceptual relation with them: first, empiricism, the thesis that physical objects are presented to us in perception; second, realism, the thesis that physical objects are mind‐independent. Realism is to be sustained by the fact that we may explain the actual and counterfactual order and nature of our perceptual experience of physical objects by appeal to the prior and independent nature of the physical objects themselves that we perceive. This poses a threat to empiricism. It is argued that the threat may be overcome by resisting the orthodox development of the explanatory strategy. In virtue of their modal robustness, commonsense explanations of the order and nature of experience resist any reduction to scientific physics that might threaten to undermine the empiricist idea that physical objects themselves are genuinely presented in perception.Less
Philosophers of perception face a problem in combining two intuitively compelling ideas about physical objects and our perceptual relation with them: first, empiricism, the thesis that physical objects are presented to us in perception; second, realism, the thesis that physical objects are mind‐independent. Realism is to be sustained by the fact that we may explain the actual and counterfactual order and nature of our perceptual experience of physical objects by appeal to the prior and independent nature of the physical objects themselves that we perceive. This poses a threat to empiricism. It is argued that the threat may be overcome by resisting the orthodox development of the explanatory strategy. In virtue of their modal robustness, commonsense explanations of the order and nature of experience resist any reduction to scientific physics that might threaten to undermine the empiricist idea that physical objects themselves are genuinely presented in perception.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199217250
- eISBN:
- 9780191696053
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217250.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter addresses the question of whether we can find in the writings of Thomas Reid a commonsense alternative to virtuous circularity? It argues that Reid eventually must face a problem of ...
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This chapter addresses the question of whether we can find in the writings of Thomas Reid a commonsense alternative to virtuous circularity? It argues that Reid eventually must face a problem of vicious circularity like the one he deems fatal to Descartes, one that, ironically, we can best escape by following Descartes’ lead.Less
This chapter addresses the question of whether we can find in the writings of Thomas Reid a commonsense alternative to virtuous circularity? It argues that Reid eventually must face a problem of vicious circularity like the one he deems fatal to Descartes, one that, ironically, we can best escape by following Descartes’ lead.
Peter Goldie
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253043
- eISBN:
- 9780191597510
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253048.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Emotions and emotional episodes are distinguished. Emotions are intentional, but this intentionality cannot be fully captured in terms of feelingless beliefs and desires. The idea of feeling towards ...
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Emotions and emotional episodes are distinguished. Emotions are intentional, but this intentionality cannot be fully captured in terms of feelingless beliefs and desires. The idea of feeling towards the object of the emotion is introduced as an antidote to this over‐intellectualization: emotions are intentional, but also essentially involve feelings. Emotions can be educated. They involve a conceptual tie between recognition and response: the recognition‐response tie. Commonsense psychological explanation of emotion and of action out of emotion are discussed.Less
Emotions and emotional episodes are distinguished. Emotions are intentional, but this intentionality cannot be fully captured in terms of feelingless beliefs and desires. The idea of feeling towards the object of the emotion is introduced as an antidote to this over‐intellectualization: emotions are intentional, but also essentially involve feelings. Emotions can be educated. They involve a conceptual tie between recognition and response: the recognition‐response tie. Commonsense psychological explanation of emotion and of action out of emotion are discussed.
Peter Goldie
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253043
- eISBN:
- 9780191597510
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253048.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The notion of paradigmatic narrative structures can help explain cross‐cultural similarities and differences in emotional experience, expression, and conception. Our capabilities for emotional ...
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The notion of paradigmatic narrative structures can help explain cross‐cultural similarities and differences in emotional experience, expression, and conception. Our capabilities for emotional experience are developmentally open or plastic. This is contrasted with the avocado‐pear conception, that basic emotions are hard‐wired, and that it is only the soft outer element that is culturally influenced. There is a defence of commonsense psychology, showing how it can learn from evolutionary psychology, rather than being threatened by it. In particular, the idea is discussed that weakness of the will or akrasia can be explained by reference to the cognitive impenetrability of some of our emotional responses, and our primitively intelligible emotional desires.Less
The notion of paradigmatic narrative structures can help explain cross‐cultural similarities and differences in emotional experience, expression, and conception. Our capabilities for emotional experience are developmentally open or plastic. This is contrasted with the avocado‐pear conception, that basic emotions are hard‐wired, and that it is only the soft outer element that is culturally influenced. There is a defence of commonsense psychology, showing how it can learn from evolutionary psychology, rather than being threatened by it. In particular, the idea is discussed that weakness of the will or akrasia can be explained by reference to the cognitive impenetrability of some of our emotional responses, and our primitively intelligible emotional desires.
