Search Results

This chapter examines briefly the reform of comitology and Commission rule-making which was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Most importantly, it is argued that when studying the system resulting from the reform a distinction must be maintained between the two functions of old comitology: control and cooperation. Even if major changes have been introduced when it comes to ‘control’ (the so called delegated acts) it is far from clear that the new system will operate very differently when it comes to ‘cooperation’ and the consultation of experts from national authorities during the formative stage of the rule-making process. It would also seem that the full potential of the new system has not yet been explored and that there is still a fundamental reliance on a still familiar comitology (the so called implementing acts).

This chapter considers how Kant, from the mid-1760s through the mid-1770s, navigated between existing accounts of logic before finding his own voice. It highlights two breakthroughs that would contribute most to his mature theory of logic. The first breakthrough concerns Kant’s division of logic into two essentially different though complementary branches: a logic for the learned understanding and one for the common human understanding (to make it healthy), precursors to “pure logic” and “applied logic” respectively. This distinction not only marks a clear departure from the Leibnizian-Wolffian take on the relation between artificial and natural logics, but also pays homage to the humanist and Lockean practices of emphasizing certain ethical dimensions of logic. The second breakthrough is the emergence of “transcendental logic” from Kant’s efforts to secure metaphysics—particularly the first part thereof, ontology—as a proper science.

Arnold Berleant, who is known for his “aesthetics of engagement”, attempts to reconcile the need for cooperative environmental action in the face of environmental degradation and destruction with the existence of cultural and historic differences. The first part of this essay is conceptual and proposes a common understanding of ‘environment,’ ‘ecology,’ and ‘aesthetics.’ The second part develops the aesthetic side of the matter by identifying some representative cultural patterns of sensibility. It considers whether and how these patterns may be reconciled in order to enhance the effectiveness of our responses to environmental issues.

Philosophy and psychology appeal to a sense of understanding, typically a feeling invoked to explain people’s choices. ‘Understanding’ seems loosely associated with properties like transparency (things we understand we can also introspect), or voluntary (cognitive) control (things we understand we can turn over in our mind). Research on attention and memory shows that many candidate cases of understanding lack properties like transparency and voluntary control. In fact, ‘understanding’ may denote an unprincipled stew of states, processes, capacities, and goals that are only occasionally present when philosophers, and ordinary folks, apply the term or concept. A unified account of understanding might be valuable, but understanding isn’t a natural kind or defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Any unity we find in understanding comes not from the involvement of common mechanisms across diverse cases, but rather of messy cognitive activities in the common goal of pursuing the truth.

The Lisbon Treaty created the dichotomy between delegated and implementing acts in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, having taken over the core assumptions in this regard from the Constitutional Treaty. The chapter begins by considering the core assumptions underlying the Lisbon model and the rationale for the division between the two species of secondary acts. The subsequent analysis then addresses the tensions and strains in the application of this divide in the years since the Lisbon Treaty was ratified.

The chapter begins by considering the core assumptions underlying the Lisbon model and the rationale for the division between delegated and implementing acts. The subsequent analysis then addresses the tensions and strains in the application of this divide. The ‘analytical and temporal’ tension that lies at the heart of the distinction between delegated and implementing acts is discussed. The focus then shifts to the ‘constitutional’ dimension, signifying in this respect the ways in which key constitutional assumptions have been undermined by political change and the impact that this has had on the relative power of the relevant institutions. This is followed by the ‘institutional’ tension. The penultimate tension is ‘legal form’ and the way in which it can affect application of the normative assumptions. The discussion concludes with the ‘conceptual’ dimension, which signifies the ways in which administrative choice can affect the dichotomy between the two kinds of act.

In the 1990s, Russia’s wars in Chechnya alientated the officials in the Clinton administration, for they deemed the response by the Yeltsin government to be an overreaction to the acts committed by Chechnyan terrorists. However, the Twin Towers attacks in 2001 created a certain common understanding between the two powers. In spite of the contrasting attitudes of the two towards bin Laden and al Qaeda during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, responses to global terrorism put them on the same page in the new century. With the support of NATO’s Article 5, the American decision to invade Afghanstan and dislodge the Taliban met with allied approval and support. However, there was considerable controversy between Moscow and Washington over the Iraq war that America commenced with the Coalition of the Willing in 2003. Russian leaders condemned this invasion as an illustration of an American overreach as well as an inappropriate response to the 9/11 attacks. One commonality in the effort to contain terrorism was considerable administrative centralization within both political systems.

The European Parliament is often presented as a ‘winner’ of the Lisbon Treaty in this area. Indeed, Articles 290 and 291 TFEU grant Parliament powers in relation to the supervision of delegated acts and the design of arrangements for the adoption of implementing acts which it did not enjoy under old-style comitology. Moreover, as regards supervision of implementing powers, it achieved parity with the Council, at least on paper, in the sense that in theory neither is allowed to interfere with the exercise of the implementing powers conferred on the Commission. However, the introduction of the Appeal Committee can arguably be seen as the Council in all but name and the participation of national experts in the drafting of delegated acts is nothing else than the return of comitology by the back door.

The last chapter of the book provides the general conclusions in which the striking patterns which can be drawn from the authors’ analyses are set out and the most forceful findings are identified. These patterns and findings are sorted within five central themes covering; the contrast between the constitutional expectations on the reform and its result; the seemingly smooth operation of the regulatory machinery; the over-simplified and still unclear implications for the institutional balance of powers; the unsolved and, thus, remaining problems where fundamental difference of opinion has persisted; and, finally, the judicial response. In addition, this chapter provides an answer to the basic question they addressed—whether the new system has really affected the old doctrine of delegation of powers—and discuss, briefly, some of the issues which call for further study.