Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
It has often been claimed that the phrase ‘common sense’ occurs only three or four times in the Aristotelian corpus. However, the phrase ‘common sense’ can also be found in Historia Animalium I.3 ...
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It has often been claimed that the phrase ‘common sense’ occurs only three or four times in the Aristotelian corpus. However, the phrase ‘common sense’ can also be found in Historia Animalium I.3 489 a 17 and Metaphysics I.1 981 b 14. This chapter examines the two overlooked occurrences to see what the phrase ‘common sense’ means there. In the overlooked occurrences the phrase ‘common sense’ refers to the individual senses, to the sense of touch in particular, or to the five individual senses indiscriminately. There the phrase is not a proper name for any particular perceptual capacity, but rather a description applicable to the individual senses in certain contexts. Aristotle describes the individual senses as ‘common’ to bring out the fact that they are shared by animals of different species.Less
It has often been claimed that the phrase ‘common sense’ occurs only three or four times in the Aristotelian corpus. However, the phrase ‘common sense’ can also be found in Historia Animalium I.3 489 a 17 and Metaphysics I.1 981 b 14. This chapter examines the two overlooked occurrences to see what the phrase ‘common sense’ means there. In the overlooked occurrences the phrase ‘common sense’ refers to the individual senses, to the sense of touch in particular, or to the five individual senses indiscriminately. There the phrase is not a proper name for any particular perceptual capacity, but rather a description applicable to the individual senses in certain contexts. Aristotle describes the individual senses as ‘common’ to bring out the fact that they are shared by animals of different species.
John Russell Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313932
- eISBN:
- 9780199871926
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313932.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
George Berkeley notoriously claimed that his immaterialist metaphysics was not only consistent with common sense, but that it was also integral to its defense. This book argues that understanding the ...
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George Berkeley notoriously claimed that his immaterialist metaphysics was not only consistent with common sense, but that it was also integral to its defense. This book argues that understanding the basic connection between Berkeley's philosophy and common sense requires a better understanding of the four principle components of Berkeley's positive metaphysics: the nature of being, the divine language thesis, the active/passive distinction, and the nature of spirits. This book begins by focusing on Berkeley's view of the nature of being. It elucidates Berkeley's view on Locke and the Cartesians, and examines Berkeley's views about related concepts such as unity and simplicity. From there, it moves on to Berkeley's philosophy of language, arguing that scrutiny of the famous Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge reveals that Berkeley identified the ideational theory of meaning and understanding as the root cause of some of the worst of humanity's intellectual errors, not abstract ideas. Abstract ideas are, rather, the most debilitating symptom of this underlying ailment. In place of the ideational theory, Berkeley defends a rudimentary use theory of meaning. This understanding of Berkeley's approach to semantics is then applied to the divine language thesis and is shown to have important consequences for Berkeley's pragmatic approach to the ontology of natural objects and for his approach to our knowledge of, and relation to, other minds, including God's. Turning next to Berkeley's much maligned account of spirits, the book defends the coherence of Berkeley's view of spirits by way of providing an interpretation of the active/passive distinction as marking a normative distinction and by focusing on the role that divine language plays in letting Berkeley identify the soul with the will. With these four principles of Berkeley's philosophy in hand, the book returns to the topic of common sense and offers a defense of Berkeley's philosophy as built upon, and expressive of, the deepest metaphysical commitments of mainstream Christianity.Less
George Berkeley notoriously claimed that his immaterialist metaphysics was not only consistent with common sense, but that it was also integral to its defense. This book argues that understanding the basic connection between Berkeley's philosophy and common sense requires a better understanding of the four principle components of Berkeley's positive metaphysics: the nature of being, the divine language thesis, the active/passive distinction, and the nature of spirits. This book begins by focusing on Berkeley's view of the nature of being. It elucidates Berkeley's view on Locke and the Cartesians, and examines Berkeley's views about related concepts such as unity and simplicity. From there, it moves on to Berkeley's philosophy of language, arguing that scrutiny of the famous Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge reveals that Berkeley identified the ideational theory of meaning and understanding as the root cause of some of the worst of humanity's intellectual errors, not abstract ideas. Abstract ideas are, rather, the most debilitating symptom of this underlying ailment. In place of the ideational theory, Berkeley defends a rudimentary use theory of meaning. This understanding of Berkeley's approach to semantics is then applied to the divine language thesis and is shown to have important consequences for Berkeley's pragmatic approach to the ontology of natural objects and for his approach to our knowledge of, and relation to, other minds, including God's. Turning next to Berkeley's much maligned account of spirits, the book defends the coherence of Berkeley's view of spirits by way of providing an interpretation of the active/passive distinction as marking a normative distinction and by focusing on the role that divine language plays in letting Berkeley identify the soul with the will. With these four principles of Berkeley's philosophy in hand, the book returns to the topic of common sense and offers a defense of Berkeley's philosophy as built upon, and expressive of, the deepest metaphysical commitments of mainstream Christianity.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for ...
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Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special composition question; others arise from prohibitions against causal redundancy, ontological vagueness, or colocation; and others still come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a rival to a scientific one. This book makes the case that the mistakes behind all of these superficially diverse eliminativist arguments may be traced to a common source, and may be successfully resisted by adopting a small cluster of interrelated and independently plausible theses about reference, analyticity, and modality. By adopting these theses, we can make sense of our common sense world view without internal contradiction, violation of plausible metaphysical principles, or rivalry with a scientific ontology. In the end, however, the most important result of addressing these eliminativist arguments is not merely avoiding their conclusions. It also leads to important metaontological results, bringing into question widely held assumptions about which uses of metaphysical principles are appropriate, which metaphysical demands are answerable, and how we incur ontological commitments. As a result, the work of this book hopes to provide not only the route to a reflective understanding of our unreflective common sense world view, but also a better understanding of the proper methods and limits of metaphysics.Less
Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special composition question; others arise from prohibitions against causal redundancy, ontological vagueness, or colocation; and others still come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a rival to a scientific one. This book makes the case that the mistakes behind all of these superficially diverse eliminativist arguments may be traced to a common source, and may be successfully resisted by adopting a small cluster of interrelated and independently plausible theses about reference, analyticity, and modality. By adopting these theses, we can make sense of our common sense world view without internal contradiction, violation of plausible metaphysical principles, or rivalry with a scientific ontology. In the end, however, the most important result of addressing these eliminativist arguments is not merely avoiding their conclusions. It also leads to important metaontological results, bringing into question widely held assumptions about which uses of metaphysical principles are appropriate, which metaphysical demands are answerable, and how we incur ontological commitments. As a result, the work of this book hopes to provide not only the route to a reflective understanding of our unreflective common sense world view, but also a better understanding of the proper methods and limits of metaphysics.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter indicates that the phrase ‘common sense’ probably has not yet crystallized into a technical term with Aristotle. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that, owing to Aristotle, it ...
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This chapter indicates that the phrase ‘common sense’ probably has not yet crystallized into a technical term with Aristotle. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that, owing to Aristotle, it became a technical term at some point between Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias. There is consistency in Aristotle's use of the phrase ‘common sense’ which, on its own, would imply that the phrase is a technical term for Aristotle, functioning as a proper name for the sensory capacity of the soul. However, a survey of the other uses manifest variation which suggests that the phrase really did not have the status of a technical term for Aristotle. Depending on the context, the terms which make up the phrase can take different nuances in meaning within their respective semantic horizons and assume different word order to express different ideas. Aristotle takes advantage of this variability in different contexts, and it is possible that he would not be inclined to do so had the phrase been fixed in his mind as a technical term. Less
This chapter indicates that the phrase ‘common sense’ probably has not yet crystallized into a technical term with Aristotle. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that, owing to Aristotle, it became a technical term at some point between Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias. There is consistency in Aristotle's use of the phrase ‘common sense’ which, on its own, would imply that the phrase is a technical term for Aristotle, functioning as a proper name for the sensory capacity of the soul. However, a survey of the other uses manifest variation which suggests that the phrase really did not have the status of a technical term for Aristotle. Depending on the context, the terms which make up the phrase can take different nuances in meaning within their respective semantic horizons and assume different word order to express different ideas. Aristotle takes advantage of this variability in different contexts, and it is possible that he would not be inclined to do so had the phrase been fixed in his mind as a technical term.
Anna Wierzbicka
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195368000
- eISBN:
- 9780199867653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368000.003.0008
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
Common sense is one of the central values of Anglo culture reflected in the English language. This chapter begins by demonstrating the importance of this value for speakers of English by examining ...
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Common sense is one of the central values of Anglo culture reflected in the English language. This chapter begins by demonstrating the importance of this value for speakers of English by examining two areas of language use: book titles and the language of the law. It then discusses the meaning of common sense in contemporary English, Thomas Reid and the origin of English common sense, and common sense and the British Enlightenment.Less
Common sense is one of the central values of Anglo culture reflected in the English language. This chapter begins by demonstrating the importance of this value for speakers of English by examining two areas of language use: book titles and the language of the law. It then discusses the meaning of common sense in contemporary English, Thomas Reid and the origin of English common sense, and common sense and the British Enlightenment.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
One of the main purposes of De Anima III.1 is to show that there can be no sense in addition to the five familiar ones — that is, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Aristotle supplies an ...
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One of the main purposes of De Anima III.1 is to show that there can be no sense in addition to the five familiar ones — that is, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Aristotle supplies an argument in which he concludes for the common perceptibles — such as change, shape, or magnitude — ‘we have an aisthesin koinen’. This is usually taken to imply that the common perceptibles are perceived by the common sense. The logic and the terminology of Aristotle's argument is analysed in this chapter, and it is shown that the phrase does not in fact refer to any higher-order perceptual capacity, but rather it describes an aspect of properly functioning individual senses, namely their sensitivity to the common perceptibles. This interpretation respects the logic of Aristotle's argument and accommodates the facts that the key phrase occurs without the definite article and in reverse word order.Less
One of the main purposes of De Anima III.1 is to show that there can be no sense in addition to the five familiar ones — that is, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Aristotle supplies an argument in which he concludes for the common perceptibles — such as change, shape, or magnitude — ‘we have an aisthesin koinen’. This is usually taken to imply that the common perceptibles are perceived by the common sense. The logic and the terminology of Aristotle's argument is analysed in this chapter, and it is shown that the phrase does not in fact refer to any higher-order perceptual capacity, but rather it describes an aspect of properly functioning individual senses, namely their sensitivity to the common perceptibles. This interpretation respects the logic of Aristotle's argument and accommodates the facts that the key phrase occurs without the definite article and in reverse word order.
Bonnie Mann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187458
- eISBN:
- 9780199786565
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187458.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter describes one type of sublime experience that often tears open the sealed worlds that tend to mark our contemporary life, called “the liberatory sublime.” The liberatory sublime is the ...
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This chapter describes one type of sublime experience that often tears open the sealed worlds that tend to mark our contemporary life, called “the liberatory sublime.” The liberatory sublime is the aesthetic experience of the opening of worlds onto a space between, in which the claims of one woman on another, of one person on another, can be heard and lived. It is the aesthetic experience of the other's presence as a person that interrupts the comfort of a world organized to reduce other persons (women in relation to men, women in relation to one another) to mere functions. Sublime experience is orienting for feminism because it breaks open a space for feminist practice across all kinds of differences. And if that space is a ground of fierce contestation, then it is also a common ground, a ground on which we are called to give an account of how we live, think, and work in relation to one another.Less
This chapter describes one type of sublime experience that often tears open the sealed worlds that tend to mark our contemporary life, called “the liberatory sublime.” The liberatory sublime is the aesthetic experience of the opening of worlds onto a space between, in which the claims of one woman on another, of one person on another, can be heard and lived. It is the aesthetic experience of the other's presence as a person that interrupts the comfort of a world organized to reduce other persons (women in relation to men, women in relation to one another) to mere functions. Sublime experience is orienting for feminism because it breaks open a space for feminist practice across all kinds of differences. And if that space is a ground of fierce contestation, then it is also a common ground, a ground on which we are called to give an account of how we live, think, and work in relation to one another.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter considers two perceptual operations which can be plausibly related to the common sense. These two perceptual operations are often regarded as functions of the common sense. In fact, the ...
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This chapter considers two perceptual operations which can be plausibly related to the common sense. These two perceptual operations are often regarded as functions of the common sense. In fact, the first one, perception of the common perceptibles, is usually regarded as the most salient function of the common sense, a view that is largely based on an erroneous reading of Aristotle's argument in De Anima III.1 425 a 12-27. It is argued that Aristotle gives us no reason to think that the common sense is necessary for perception of all types of common perceptibles, although it may be necessary for perception of some types. Moreover, it is plausible to suggest that the common sense enhances the sensitivity of the individual senses to the common perceptibles in a number of ways. The other perceptual operation in which the common sense might play a role is accidental perception. Both forms of accidental perception — perception of the accidental perceptibles, and perception of the special perceptibles of one sense by another sense (here called ‘cross-modal perception’) — are probably achieved not by the higher-order perceptual power, but by the sensory capacity of the soul, since these operations seem to require joint operation of perception and imagination. Less
This chapter considers two perceptual operations which can be plausibly related to the common sense. These two perceptual operations are often regarded as functions of the common sense. In fact, the first one, perception of the common perceptibles, is usually regarded as the most salient function of the common sense, a view that is largely based on an erroneous reading of Aristotle's argument in De Anima III.1 425 a 12-27. It is argued that Aristotle gives us no reason to think that the common sense is necessary for perception of all types of common perceptibles, although it may be necessary for perception of some types. Moreover, it is plausible to suggest that the common sense enhances the sensitivity of the individual senses to the common perceptibles in a number of ways. The other perceptual operation in which the common sense might play a role is accidental perception. Both forms of accidental perception — perception of the accidental perceptibles, and perception of the special perceptibles of one sense by another sense (here called ‘cross-modal perception’) — are probably achieved not by the higher-order perceptual power, but by the sensory capacity of the soul, since these operations seem to require joint operation of perception and imagination.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
If your five senses — sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch — were completely independent from one another, you would not be a creature that wakes or sleeps because your senses would not all be ...
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If your five senses — sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch — were completely independent from one another, you would not be a creature that wakes or sleeps because your senses would not all be operating in the state of waking or all resting in the state of sleep. Your body would be housing five yous, a visual you, an auditory you, an olfactory you, and so forth. Should your perceptual abilities be accompanied by other capacities, such as imagination and memory, these capacities would be bereft of their unity. Your body simply would not be able to serve all the yous at once, and there would be no means of reaching an agreement as to which you is going to use the body at what time. This scenario is developed from a suggestion made by Plato in his dialogue Theaetetus. The unpalatable suggestion is that the senses are sitting in us ‘as in a wooden horse’. Aristotle proposed to avoid this scenario by postulating a perceptual power over and above the five senses which monitors their states and co-ordinates their reports. This perceptual power is known as the ‘common sense’. Plato's Theaetetus is examined to see why Aristotle decided to avoid the described scenario in this particular way, rather than in the way proposed by his master.Less
If your five senses — sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch — were completely independent from one another, you would not be a creature that wakes or sleeps because your senses would not all be operating in the state of waking or all resting in the state of sleep. Your body would be housing five yous, a visual you, an auditory you, an olfactory you, and so forth. Should your perceptual abilities be accompanied by other capacities, such as imagination and memory, these capacities would be bereft of their unity. Your body simply would not be able to serve all the yous at once, and there would be no means of reaching an agreement as to which you is going to use the body at what time. This scenario is developed from a suggestion made by Plato in his dialogue Theaetetus. The unpalatable suggestion is that the senses are sitting in us ‘as in a wooden horse’. Aristotle proposed to avoid this scenario by postulating a perceptual power over and above the five senses which monitors their states and co-ordinates their reports. This perceptual power is known as the ‘common sense’. Plato's Theaetetus is examined to see why Aristotle decided to avoid the described scenario in this particular way, rather than in the way proposed by his master.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
In De Somno et Vigilia 2 Aristotle observes that sleep and waking are contrary states which simultaneously affect all individual senses of an animal. Aristotle argues that this occurs because there ...
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In De Somno et Vigilia 2 Aristotle observes that sleep and waking are contrary states which simultaneously affect all individual senses of an animal. Aristotle argues that this occurs because there is a common sense organ which controls the peripheral sense organs in such a way that the peripheral sense organs are active or incapacitated depending on whether the common sense organ is active or incapacitated. Aristotle's argument seems to allow for the conclusion that the common sense, which is located in the common sense organ, controls the individual senses located in the peripheral sense organs. In the course of his argument Aristotle appeals to some ‘common power’ which accompanies all the senses. This power enables one to perceive that one is seeing and hearing, and to discriminate between heterogeneous special perceptibles. This chapter investigates what ‘perceiving that one is seeing and hearing’ amounts to. It is shown that perceiving that one is seeing and hearing refers to the awareness of the activity of one's own senses. This awareness characterizes the state of waking, just as its absence characterizes the state of sleep. It is argued that the ‘common power’ which enables one to be aware of the activity of one's senses is the higher-order perceptual power, i.e. the common sense. However, this conclusion has to be aligned with Aristotle's argument in De Anima III.2 in which he seems to claim that we perceive that we see by nothing other than sight, and in which he does not mention any higher-order powers or capacities.Less
In De Somno et Vigilia 2 Aristotle observes that sleep and waking are contrary states which simultaneously affect all individual senses of an animal. Aristotle argues that this occurs because there is a common sense organ which controls the peripheral sense organs in such a way that the peripheral sense organs are active or incapacitated depending on whether the common sense organ is active or incapacitated. Aristotle's argument seems to allow for the conclusion that the common sense, which is located in the common sense organ, controls the individual senses located in the peripheral sense organs. In the course of his argument Aristotle appeals to some ‘common power’ which accompanies all the senses. This power enables one to perceive that one is seeing and hearing, and to discriminate between heterogeneous special perceptibles. This chapter investigates what ‘perceiving that one is seeing and hearing’ amounts to. It is shown that perceiving that one is seeing and hearing refers to the awareness of the activity of one's own senses. This awareness characterizes the state of waking, just as its absence characterizes the state of sleep. It is argued that the ‘common power’ which enables one to be aware of the activity of one's senses is the higher-order perceptual power, i.e. the common sense. However, this conclusion has to be aligned with Aristotle's argument in De Anima III.2 in which he seems to claim that we perceive that we see by nothing other than sight, and in which he does not mention any higher-order powers or capacities.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken ...
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Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's own senses are active. Observing that other animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the ‘common sense’ (koine aisthesis, sensus communis). Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. This book offers an extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. This book begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotle's terminology, this book provides an examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.Less
Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's own senses are active. Observing that other animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the ‘common sense’ (koine aisthesis, sensus communis). Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. This book offers an extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. This book begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotle's terminology, this book provides an examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.
Mark Richard
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239955
- eISBN:
- 9780191716881
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239955.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Is the point of belief and assertion invariably to think or say something true? Is the truth of a belief or assertion absolute, or is it only relative to human interests? Most philosophers think it ...
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Is the point of belief and assertion invariably to think or say something true? Is the truth of a belief or assertion absolute, or is it only relative to human interests? Most philosophers think it incoherent to profess to believe something but not think it true, or to say that some of the things we believe are only relatively true. Common sense disagrees. It sees many opinions, such as those about matters of taste, as neither true nor false; it takes it as obvious that some of the truth is relative. This book argues that when it comes to truth, common sense is right, philosophical orthodoxy wrong. The first half of the book examines connections between the performative aspects of talk (what we do when we speak), our emotions and evaluations, and the conditions under which talk and thought qualifies as true or false. It argues that the performative and expressive sometimes trump the semantic, making truth and falsity the wrong dimension of evaluation for belief or assertion. Among the topics taken up are: racial slurs and other epithets; relations between logic and truth; the status of moral and ethical talk; vagueness, and the liar paradox. The book's second half defends the idea that much of everyday thought and talk is only relatively true or false. Truth is inevitably relative, given that we cannot work out in advance how our concepts will apply to the world. The book explains what it is for truth to be relative, rebuts standard objections to relativism, and argues that relativism is consistent with the idea that one view can be objectively better than another. The book concludes with an account of matters of taste and of how it is possible for divergent views of such matters to be equally valid, even if not true or false.Less
Is the point of belief and assertion invariably to think or say something true? Is the truth of a belief or assertion absolute, or is it only relative to human interests? Most philosophers think it incoherent to profess to believe something but not think it true, or to say that some of the things we believe are only relatively true. Common sense disagrees. It sees many opinions, such as those about matters of taste, as neither true nor false; it takes it as obvious that some of the truth is relative. This book argues that when it comes to truth, common sense is right, philosophical orthodoxy wrong. The first half of the book examines connections between the performative aspects of talk (what we do when we speak), our emotions and evaluations, and the conditions under which talk and thought qualifies as true or false. It argues that the performative and expressive sometimes trump the semantic, making truth and falsity the wrong dimension of evaluation for belief or assertion. Among the topics taken up are: racial slurs and other epithets; relations between logic and truth; the status of moral and ethical talk; vagueness, and the liar paradox. The book's second half defends the idea that much of everyday thought and talk is only relatively true or false. Truth is inevitably relative, given that we cannot work out in advance how our concepts will apply to the world. The book explains what it is for truth to be relative, rebuts standard objections to relativism, and argues that relativism is consistent with the idea that one view can be objectively better than another. The book concludes with an account of matters of taste and of how it is possible for divergent views of such matters to be equally valid, even if not true or false.
Barry Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286690
- eISBN:
- 9780191604065
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286698.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses formal theories of truth: the redundancy theory and its ilk, distinguished by the attempt to characterize truth in terms of its structural properties, in the context of the ...
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This chapter discusses formal theories of truth: the redundancy theory and its ilk, distinguished by the attempt to characterize truth in terms of its structural properties, in the context of the position adopted by Putnam in his John Dewey Lectures, here styled ‘Common-sense Realism’. This position is described, combining two principles called the Thesis of the Internality (according to which the elements of a representational system are internally related to their content) and the Thesis of World-Embeddedness (which holds that content is dependent on the world in a more than causal way), with a formal account of truth. It is argued that Common-sense Realism, along with all theories comprising a formal account of truth, should be committed to the flames, because they are cut off from exploiting the Fregean model of meaning, based on a recursion on truth.Less
This chapter discusses formal theories of truth: the redundancy theory and its ilk, distinguished by the attempt to characterize truth in terms of its structural properties, in the context of the position adopted by Putnam in his John Dewey Lectures, here styled ‘Common-sense Realism’. This position is described, combining two principles called the Thesis of the Internality (according to which the elements of a representational system are internally related to their content) and the Thesis of World-Embeddedness (which holds that content is dependent on the world in a more than causal way), with a formal account of truth. It is argued that Common-sense Realism, along with all theories comprising a formal account of truth, should be committed to the flames, because they are cut off from exploiting the Fregean model of meaning, based on a recursion on truth.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The divergence between the world descriptions provided by physical science and by common sense has led to some of the oldest and most persistent arguments for eliminating ordinary objects. Some ...
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The divergence between the world descriptions provided by physical science and by common sense has led to some of the oldest and most persistent arguments for eliminating ordinary objects. Some (inspired by Eddington) allege that there is a conflict between common sense and physical science, while others (such as Sellars) hold that there is rivalry between the scientific and manifest images, as each purports to offer the true and complete description of the world. This chapter addresses these two claims in turn, arguing that both at bottom rely on the idea that a generic, category-neutral use of “thing” can be made sense of. If, as has been argued in previous chapters, we reject that idea, then neither claims of a conflict nor a rivalry between the two can be sustained.Less
The divergence between the world descriptions provided by physical science and by common sense has led to some of the oldest and most persistent arguments for eliminating ordinary objects. Some (inspired by Eddington) allege that there is a conflict between common sense and physical science, while others (such as Sellars) hold that there is rivalry between the scientific and manifest images, as each purports to offer the true and complete description of the world. This chapter addresses these two claims in turn, arguing that both at bottom rely on the idea that a generic, category-neutral use of “thing” can be made sense of. If, as has been argued in previous chapters, we reject that idea, then neither claims of a conflict nor a rivalry between the two can be sustained.
MARCUS GEORGE SINGER
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250210
- eISBN:
- 9780191681264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250210.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores the relations between ethics and common sense. It argues that (1) common sense is essential to ethics, but not sufficient for it; ...
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This chapter explores the relations between ethics and common sense. It argues that (1) common sense is essential to ethics, but not sufficient for it; (2) ethics is also essential to common sense, which is an inherently practical capacity; (3) common sense is basically conservative, not innovative, and can be oppressive, and consequently on its own terms requires supplementation and correction by ethical thinking; and (4) developments — improvements — in ethics that lead to improvements in morality lead to improvements in common sense by leading to improvements in common-sense morality.Less
This chapter explores the relations between ethics and common sense. It argues that (1) common sense is essential to ethics, but not sufficient for it; (2) ethics is also essential to common sense, which is an inherently practical capacity; (3) common sense is basically conservative, not innovative, and can be oppressive, and consequently on its own terms requires supplementation and correction by ethical thinking; and (4) developments — improvements — in ethics that lead to improvements in morality lead to improvements in common sense by leading to improvements in common-sense morality.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257676
- eISBN:
- 9780191600197
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257671.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
By attaching significance to the distinction between doing and failing to prevent and by recognizing special obligations to family members and others, common‐sense morality limits the size of an ...
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By attaching significance to the distinction between doing and failing to prevent and by recognizing special obligations to family members and others, common‐sense morality limits the size of an agent's moral world. Consequentialism, by contrast, upholds a more expansive notion of normative responsibility that neither assigns intrinsic moral significance to the distinction between doing and failing to prevent nor recognizes special obligations as a fundamental moral category. The conflict between restrictive and expansive notions of normative responsibility has a parallel in modern political life, in the opposition between nationalism and other varieties of particularism, on the one hand, and globalism or universalism, on the other. The opposing pulls of global integration and ethnic fragmentation pose a political problem that, Scheffler argues, we are unlikely to resolve without attaining greater stability in our thinking about normative responsibility more generally.Less
By attaching significance to the distinction between doing and failing to prevent and by recognizing special obligations to family members and others, common‐sense morality limits the size of an agent's moral world. Consequentialism, by contrast, upholds a more expansive notion of normative responsibility that neither assigns intrinsic moral significance to the distinction between doing and failing to prevent nor recognizes special obligations as a fundamental moral category. The conflict between restrictive and expansive notions of normative responsibility has a parallel in modern political life, in the opposition between nationalism and other varieties of particularism, on the one hand, and globalism or universalism, on the other. The opposing pulls of global integration and ethnic fragmentation pose a political problem that, Scheffler argues, we are unlikely to resolve without attaining greater stability in our thinking about normative responsibility more generally.
Karl Ameriks
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205349
- eISBN:
- 9780191709272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205349.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter builds on the contrast between Hume and Kant by showing how the Critical philosophy can be understood as an ally of Reid's critique of empiricism and the whole tradition of the ‘way of ...
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This chapter builds on the contrast between Hume and Kant by showing how the Critical philosophy can be understood as an ally of Reid's critique of empiricism and the whole tradition of the ‘way of ideas’. The general ‘anti-Cartesian’ and realist approach of Reid's common-sense philosophy has gained many distinguished adherents, but most analytic philosophers have continued to assume that this approach is the very opposite of Kant's. By building on extensive research by Manfred Kuehn on the role of common-sense philosophy in 18th-century Germany, it is argued that there has been a deep misunderstanding concerning passages that have been repeatedly taken to prove that Kant's philosophy completely opposes Reid's. Moreover, it is argued that common sense plays a crucial role in the first stage of Kant's system (in his theoretical and practical philosophy as well as his aesthetics), and that historical research has established that this fact was clearly recognized by a significant circle of early Kantians who worked in Jena right before the full development of German Idealism.Less
This chapter builds on the contrast between Hume and Kant by showing how the Critical philosophy can be understood as an ally of Reid's critique of empiricism and the whole tradition of the ‘way of ideas’. The general ‘anti-Cartesian’ and realist approach of Reid's common-sense philosophy has gained many distinguished adherents, but most analytic philosophers have continued to assume that this approach is the very opposite of Kant's. By building on extensive research by Manfred Kuehn on the role of common-sense philosophy in 18th-century Germany, it is argued that there has been a deep misunderstanding concerning passages that have been repeatedly taken to prove that Kant's philosophy completely opposes Reid's. Moreover, it is argued that common sense plays a crucial role in the first stage of Kant's system (in his theoretical and practical philosophy as well as his aesthetics), and that historical research has established that this fact was clearly recognized by a significant circle of early Kantians who worked in Jena right before the full development of German Idealism.
Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One prominent objection to externalism is that it commits its adherents to approving of epistemic circularity. This chapter explains and then responds to this objection by giving two arguments for ...
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One prominent objection to externalism is that it commits its adherents to approving of epistemic circularity. This chapter explains and then responds to this objection by giving two arguments for the conclusion that we should sometimes approve of epistemic circularity, that being committed to approving of it is not, in itself, a defect of externalism. It then explains why approving of epistemic circularity misleadingly seems like a defect, and how epistemic circularity is likely to occur in an acceptable manner.Less
One prominent objection to externalism is that it commits its adherents to approving of epistemic circularity. This chapter explains and then responds to this objection by giving two arguments for the conclusion that we should sometimes approve of epistemic circularity, that being committed to approving of it is not, in itself, a defect of externalism. It then explains why approving of epistemic circularity misleadingly seems like a defect, and how epistemic circularity is likely to occur in an acceptable manner.
Barry Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286690
- eISBN:
- 9780191604065
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286698.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the status of Tarskian truth. It argues that because of its connections with behaviour and psychology through the notion of translation, it is properly classified as a ...
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This chapter examines the status of Tarskian truth. It argues that because of its connections with behaviour and psychology through the notion of translation, it is properly classified as a substantial, rather than a formal, account of truth. It also contends that Common-sense Realism might be modified by replacing the commitment it made to a formal account of truth with commitment to a substantial alternative capable of playing a part in the Fregean model of meaning. Tarskian truth, with its bland neutrality, is the obvious candidate for the replacement role. The resulting position, dubbed ‘Quietist Realism’, proves on examination to be that of John McDowell in Mind and World. Moreover, its characteristic principles, borrowed by Putnam for Common-sense Realism, are no optional extra to Tarskian truth as McDowell deploys it, but play an essential role in his defence of the notion as suitable for use in the Fregean model, against attacks mounted by Dummett.Less
This chapter examines the status of Tarskian truth. It argues that because of its connections with behaviour and psychology through the notion of translation, it is properly classified as a substantial, rather than a formal, account of truth. It also contends that Common-sense Realism might be modified by replacing the commitment it made to a formal account of truth with commitment to a substantial alternative capable of playing a part in the Fregean model of meaning. Tarskian truth, with its bland neutrality, is the obvious candidate for the replacement role. The resulting position, dubbed ‘Quietist Realism’, proves on examination to be that of John McDowell in Mind and World. Moreover, its characteristic principles, borrowed by Putnam for Common-sense Realism, are no optional extra to Tarskian truth as McDowell deploys it, but play an essential role in his defence of the notion as suitable for use in the Fregean model, against attacks mounted by Dummett.
John Russell Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313932
- eISBN:
- 9780199871926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313932.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
With an interpretation of Berkeley's view of spirits in hand, this chapter turns to the task of situating that view of spirits within his overall positive metaphysics and defending the connection it ...
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With an interpretation of Berkeley's view of spirits in hand, this chapter turns to the task of situating that view of spirits within his overall positive metaphysics and defending the connection it bears to “common sense”. The book argues that Berkeley's metaphysics is the metaphysics of the “mob” so long as the mob is properly understood to be the mob of professing monotheists. It further argues that core aspects of traditional monotheism inevitably tend toward support for immaterialism. Wilfred Sellars' metaphilosophy from Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man is used to both elucidate and map Berkeley's core metaphysical commitments.Less
With an interpretation of Berkeley's view of spirits in hand, this chapter turns to the task of situating that view of spirits within his overall positive metaphysics and defending the connection it bears to “common sense”. The book argues that Berkeley's metaphysics is the metaphysics of the “mob” so long as the mob is properly understood to be the mob of professing monotheists. It further argues that core aspects of traditional monotheism inevitably tend toward support for immaterialism. Wilfred Sellars' metaphilosophy from Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man is used to both elucidate and map Berkeley's core metaphysical commitments.
