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This chapter examines how our common humanity as a ground of justice leads to an account of human rights, which in turn generates a duty of assistance in building institutions. It first considers the notion of a “conception of human rights” before offering such a conception built around the idea of common humanity and connecting that conception to the institutional stance. It argues that claims of common humanity generate a duty of assistance in building institutions. Finally, it explores Simon Caney's version of nonrelationism to suggest that certain more expansive views of the role of common humanity in a theory of global justice are implausible. The chapter contends that nonrelationists exaggerate the role of the idea of a distinctively human life for global justice.

This chapter tries to end in the simultaneously idealistic and practical spirit of literary humanism, with a thumbnail sketch, adapted from Gonzalo, of what life might be like. Although one might benefit from the idleness recommended by Gonzalo, it might be difficult to avoid ‘sweat’ altogether. Shakespeare presents strong images of common humanity, both in the plays discussed in previous chapters and in those not discussed, such as Gonzalo's utopian vision in The Tempest, as well as Lear's famous epiphany on the heath. It may be that the egalitarian concept of a common humanity is not enough to withstand the pressures and/or pleasures of individuality, diversity, cultural difference and the tendency for people to be explicably or inexplicably drawn to some more than others.

This chapter focuses on humanitarian alternatives as a response to the persistence of cruelty worldwide. It explores the diverse forms of advocacy for a common humanity through literacy about non-violence and for the health-promoting values of creative, non-destructive uses of power. A common humanity refers to a quality of living, as in the enjoyment of political and economic rights, and to a set of values, as in the acknowledgement of responsibility to care for others. Commitment to 'humanity' includes a moral imperative to respect such rights and to live by such values and begins by assessing the ways in which power is exercised. Ultimately, the philosophy, language, and practice of non-violence offers the fulfilling alternative to a global fascination with punishment and other forms of violence. In commentary about the vision required to build an economy not based on inequalities and injustices, the chapter also assesses the place of technology, whether it is help or hindrance.

This chapter argues that in analyses of cruelty, if the rules and niceties of social commentary and academic rigour are removed, the chequered picture of subtle and not-so-subtle differences in cruelty is lost. Instead, there emerges a stark, almost universal picture of human rights being derided and any respect for a common humanity thrown on a bonfire, literally in some cases. That trend shows the danger of not paying serious attention to cruelty as policy. The chapter contends that humanity would benefit from admissions that cruelty is present in the motives of policy makers, in the hate-filled attitudes of religious and political extremists, and in the cowardly indifference of media commentators. If cruelty is acknowledged to be significant in a range of values and policies, crucial to the operation of bureaucracies and in the conduct of international relations, there is a responsibility to ensure that such conduct is exposed, challenged, and eliminated.

This chapter lays out a tension that arises in a world that is dominated by the theory of imposed order, yet makes room for the theory of immanent order as a rhetoric that is set against what it done in the name of will and artifice. Theorizing international order in contemporary international relations can be interpreted as an attempt to negotiate these rival positions. However, the chapter makes the critical point that these theories of order represent incommensurable positions. The one cannot be assimilated to the other to form a coherent composite theory of order. The chapter discusses the implications of a world that is torn between these incommensurable positions. The theory of immanent order provides a sense of transcendent truth that conditions what human beings make and do, but in a constructed world, consistent with the theory of imposed order, this transcendent truth is an artefact of the same freedom it seeks to regulate. This is a consequence of substituting human decision in place of God to secure the regularity of international order. Secular alternatives to God are sustained in the same way that nominalist theologians repose confidence in God: through faith or belief. The chapter concludes by arguing that this theological inheritance begins to unravel at a certain point because, unlike God, human beings are conditionally, rather than absolutely, good. The danger is that abiding uncertainty exposes the regularity of international order to the arbitrary whims of power.

The chapter reconsiders the idea of the Common Heritage Fund (CHF) to be established as an efficient international law structure for the promotion of intra- and intergenerational justice. Through the description and analysis of previous international attempts aimed at preserving the living conditions for future generations, this proposal seeks to learn from and eliminate the weaknesses of the previous attempts, to describe a solution that may serve as a realistic guarantee for both developing and industrialized states. The chapter outlines the operation of the proposed CHF, including sources of the fund’s assets, allocation of the fund’s reserves and the voting structure of the fund. The chapter then turns to the challenges of the implementation of the proposal as a new international legal instrument and concludes by advocating the timeliness of its establishment.

Empathy makes an epistemic contribution to human rights. The account of empathy advocated in this chapter blends key elements from ordinary speech with helpful distinctions from David Hume and Adam Smith. It also engages with contemporary philosophical treatments of empathy, including Peter Goldie’s and Catriona Mackenzie and Jackie Leach Scully’s. Empathy enables you to viscerally grasp values and disvalues as another person experiences them. Analysis of A Woman in Berlin, a diary recounting an outbreak of mass rape during armed combat, rebuts Sonia Kruks’s claim that sexed/gendered embodiment impedes empathy with differently embodied others. This story induces empathy with attacks on our common humanity and with the individuality of a victim’s suffering. Empathetically processed, the gravity of human rights abuse, the moral void that many victims’ stories depict, and the demand they issue for a moral response are viscerally encoded. As a result, empathy can transform your value system.

This chapter evaluates the central role of compassion in preventing the contagion next time. During COVID-19, compassion revealed just how many people in the United States are deeply vulnerable to poor health. This vulnerability was often a product of underlying health conditions. There are many health challenges in the United States which annually generate a level of mortality comparable to that of COVID-19, challenges like obesity and addiction. However, America have not addressed these challenges with anywhere near the level of urgency they brought to bear in addressing COVID-19. A key reason why is, arguably, because these challenges are not infectious, making it possible for the public at large to escape the visceral feeling of vulnerability to a disease which transmits through the air and can strike anybody. Instead, they see these challenges somehow as niche issues, the niche being the lives of the marginalized and disadvantaged groups. This outlook allows them to evade the feeling of common humanity which gives rise to compassion. Compassion, then, depends on the understanding of the true nature of health and of the shared vulnerability to disease.