Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780300194562
- eISBN:
- 9780300213416
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300194562.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter discusses the president's power as commander in chief. The president may command the military as commander in chief. However, he has no constitutionally protected sphere of autonomy; ...
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This chapter discusses the president's power as commander in chief. The president may command the military as commander in chief. However, he has no constitutionally protected sphere of autonomy; rather, the Congress has almost complete authority over war and military matters. Only the Congress has the power to decide whether the nation will declare war. It also has control over the regulation of the armed forces and the system of military discipline. But even if the Congress tries to micromanage the military, the president has many ways to restrain its meddling. The chief executive may supersede whatever military discretion that the Congress chooses not to exercise. He may also delay or veto bills that regulate the military, nominate his military subordinates, and dismiss them at will.Less
This chapter discusses the president's power as commander in chief. The president may command the military as commander in chief. However, he has no constitutionally protected sphere of autonomy; rather, the Congress has almost complete authority over war and military matters. Only the Congress has the power to decide whether the nation will declare war. It also has control over the regulation of the armed forces and the system of military discipline. But even if the Congress tries to micromanage the military, the president has many ways to restrain its meddling. The chief executive may supersede whatever military discretion that the Congress chooses not to exercise. He may also delay or veto bills that regulate the military, nominate his military subordinates, and dismiss them at will.
Harold Holzer
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195139211
- eISBN:
- 9780199848799
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195139211.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
Confederate President Jefferson Davis gained an enduring military image after he lost the war. This chapter portrays how the medium of popular prints made a powerful influence on creating Davis's ...
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Confederate President Jefferson Davis gained an enduring military image after he lost the war. This chapter portrays how the medium of popular prints made a powerful influence on creating Davis's image not only as a statesman and a patriot but crucially a soldier. The new commander in chief had come by his military reputation honestly—and, many agreed, heroically. Davis's reputation owed as much to action as to appearance. He fought in Black Hawk War, the same conflict in which his Union counterpart, Abraham Lincoln, experienced. Davis's long service record was enough to convince many Southerners—including Davis himself—that his proper place in a war for independence was in military, not civil, command.Less
Confederate President Jefferson Davis gained an enduring military image after he lost the war. This chapter portrays how the medium of popular prints made a powerful influence on creating Davis's image not only as a statesman and a patriot but crucially a soldier. The new commander in chief had come by his military reputation honestly—and, many agreed, heroically. Davis's reputation owed as much to action as to appearance. He fought in Black Hawk War, the same conflict in which his Union counterpart, Abraham Lincoln, experienced. Davis's long service record was enough to convince many Southerners—including Davis himself—that his proper place in a war for independence was in military, not civil, command.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804756662
- eISBN:
- 9780804770965
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804756662.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter discusses the reorganization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which was spurred by the catastrophic events of World War II. The reorganized Office of the Chief of Naval ...
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This chapter discusses the reorganization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which was spurred by the catastrophic events of World War II. The reorganized Office of the Chief of Naval Operations that emerged in the fall of 1945 successfully incorporated the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet's control of the Navy's operating forces with the Chief of Naval Operations' responsibilities, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, for coordinating and directing the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department in their efforts to provide the preparation, readiness, and logistic support of the operating forces and shore establishment of the Navy. Because of this new arrangement, the Chief of Naval Operations in December 1945 was far better equipped to handle the manifold responsibilities that would come his way in the challenging postwar years.Less
This chapter discusses the reorganization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which was spurred by the catastrophic events of World War II. The reorganized Office of the Chief of Naval Operations that emerged in the fall of 1945 successfully incorporated the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet's control of the Navy's operating forces with the Chief of Naval Operations' responsibilities, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, for coordinating and directing the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department in their efforts to provide the preparation, readiness, and logistic support of the operating forces and shore establishment of the Navy. Because of this new arrangement, the Chief of Naval Operations in December 1945 was far better equipped to handle the manifold responsibilities that would come his way in the challenging postwar years.
Charles R. Shrader
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780813165752
- eISBN:
- 9780813165950
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813165752.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Military History
In Chapter 2, the author describes the French reoccupation of Indochina following World War II and the organization of the French high command and territorial command structures. The strength and ...
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In Chapter 2, the author describes the French reoccupation of Indochina following World War II and the organization of the French high command and territorial command structures. The strength and organization of French naval and air forces as well as ground forces down to the battalion level are also described, as are the composition of static, mobile, amphibious/riverine, and parachute forces.Less
In Chapter 2, the author describes the French reoccupation of Indochina following World War II and the organization of the French high command and territorial command structures. The strength and organization of French naval and air forces as well as ground forces down to the battalion level are also described, as are the composition of static, mobile, amphibious/riverine, and parachute forces.
Heidi Kitrosser
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780226191638
- eISBN:
- 9780226191775
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226191775.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter defines presidential supremacy and offers a rejoinder to it. Presidential supremacy is the presidentialist counterpart to the substantive accountability framework, insofar as the latter ...
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This chapter defines presidential supremacy and offers a rejoinder to it. Presidential supremacy is the presidentialist counterpart to the substantive accountability framework, insofar as the latter entails external checks on presidential power. Presidential supremacists read the President’s constitutional powers to preclude Congress or the courts from checking presidential actions in many cases. Supremacy’s manifestations include some invocations of executive privilege and the state secrets privilege, all claims of a prerogative to violate statutes in secret, and all assertions of a presidential prerogative to effectively criminalize speech – without triggering the usual strict judicial review warranted under the First Amendment – by deeming information classified. While each manifestation has some unique aspects, supremacy for the most part is fueled by broad readings of the constitutional terms “executive power” and Commander in Chief,” by reasoning from founding assurances that the President would be capable of secrecy, and by “evolving history” arguments. In addition to explaining supremacy’s justifications, this chapter refutes them. It explains that the justifications stem from faulty readings of constitutional text, history, and structure.Less
This chapter defines presidential supremacy and offers a rejoinder to it. Presidential supremacy is the presidentialist counterpart to the substantive accountability framework, insofar as the latter entails external checks on presidential power. Presidential supremacists read the President’s constitutional powers to preclude Congress or the courts from checking presidential actions in many cases. Supremacy’s manifestations include some invocations of executive privilege and the state secrets privilege, all claims of a prerogative to violate statutes in secret, and all assertions of a presidential prerogative to effectively criminalize speech – without triggering the usual strict judicial review warranted under the First Amendment – by deeming information classified. While each manifestation has some unique aspects, supremacy for the most part is fueled by broad readings of the constitutional terms “executive power” and Commander in Chief,” by reasoning from founding assurances that the President would be capable of secrecy, and by “evolving history” arguments. In addition to explaining supremacy’s justifications, this chapter refutes them. It explains that the justifications stem from faulty readings of constitutional text, history, and structure.
John A. Dearborn
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- May 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780226797663
- eISBN:
- 9780226797977
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226797977.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Chapter 10 considers Congress’s passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973. It shows that Congress’s doubts that the president could be counted on to act in the national interest in the wake of the ...
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Chapter 10 considers Congress’s passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973. It shows that Congress’s doubts that the president could be counted on to act in the national interest in the wake of the Vietnam War fueled its pushback against presidential war making. Lawmakers correspondingly reasserted their own representational legitimacy and, more significantly, their constitutional primacy over declaring war. However, questions over the validity of presidential representation had less influence over Congress’s pushback against war powers because presidential national security authority rested on a different foundation: the Commander in Chief clause of the Constitution. Even many lawmakers supportive of reasserting Congress’s own constitutional authority were wary of infringing on what they perceived as the president’s constitutional claims. This led to a law that essentially enshrined a right for the president to initiate military conflicts without congressional authorization in statute.Less
Chapter 10 considers Congress’s passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973. It shows that Congress’s doubts that the president could be counted on to act in the national interest in the wake of the Vietnam War fueled its pushback against presidential war making. Lawmakers correspondingly reasserted their own representational legitimacy and, more significantly, their constitutional primacy over declaring war. However, questions over the validity of presidential representation had less influence over Congress’s pushback against war powers because presidential national security authority rested on a different foundation: the Commander in Chief clause of the Constitution. Even many lawmakers supportive of reasserting Congress’s own constitutional authority were wary of infringing on what they perceived as the president’s constitutional claims. This led to a law that essentially enshrined a right for the president to initiate military conflicts without congressional authorization in statute.
Randall M. Miller
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780823243440
- eISBN:
- 9780823243488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823243440.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
This introductory chapter by Randall M. Miller provides an overview of Lincoln as a political, military, and moral leader during the Civil War and a brief assessment of the Lincoln myths related to ...
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This introductory chapter by Randall M. Miller provides an overview of Lincoln as a political, military, and moral leader during the Civil War and a brief assessment of the Lincoln myths related to his leadership as the saviour of the Union, the great emancipator, and friend of the common man. It argues that Lincoln kept the priority of the Union first in all his thinking and public policy, but moved toward ending slavery as a way to win the war and realize the promise of the Declaration of Independence. It also argues that Lincoln was an engaged leader of the Republican Party, conscious of shaping public opinion in speeches and images, maintaining ties with party leaders, and understanding the necessity of translating ideas into action. It also suggests he defined the role of Commander in Chief as he developed a modern strategy for winning the war and sought out generals who would effect his thinking. And it argues that Lincoln proved successful in managing the war effort, his party, and public opinion, though he was unsuccessful in laying out a clear policy for Reconstruction.Less
This introductory chapter by Randall M. Miller provides an overview of Lincoln as a political, military, and moral leader during the Civil War and a brief assessment of the Lincoln myths related to his leadership as the saviour of the Union, the great emancipator, and friend of the common man. It argues that Lincoln kept the priority of the Union first in all his thinking and public policy, but moved toward ending slavery as a way to win the war and realize the promise of the Declaration of Independence. It also argues that Lincoln was an engaged leader of the Republican Party, conscious of shaping public opinion in speeches and images, maintaining ties with party leaders, and understanding the necessity of translating ideas into action. It also suggests he defined the role of Commander in Chief as he developed a modern strategy for winning the war and sought out generals who would effect his thinking. And it argues that Lincoln proved successful in managing the war effort, his party, and public opinion, though he was unsuccessful in laying out a clear policy for Reconstruction.
Ryan C. Hendrickson
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780813160948
- eISBN:
- 9780813165462
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813160948.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This chapter addresses the war powers interplay between the executive branch and Congress as the Obama administration moved toward military action in Syria in 2013. Although many members of Congress ...
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This chapter addresses the war powers interplay between the executive branch and Congress as the Obama administration moved toward military action in Syria in 2013. Although many members of Congress actively opposed Obama’s proposed strikes, senior leaders of both parties actively backed Obama both before and after Obama requested congressional approval for military action. This chapter also summarizes the preceding chapters, demonstrating the continuation of the president’s expansive power as commander in chief and Congress’s general abdication of military decision making to the president, and addresses the prospects of a Congress that exercises a more assertive war powers role.Less
This chapter addresses the war powers interplay between the executive branch and Congress as the Obama administration moved toward military action in Syria in 2013. Although many members of Congress actively opposed Obama’s proposed strikes, senior leaders of both parties actively backed Obama both before and after Obama requested congressional approval for military action. This chapter also summarizes the preceding chapters, demonstrating the continuation of the president’s expansive power as commander in chief and Congress’s general abdication of military decision making to the president, and addresses the prospects of a Congress that exercises a more assertive war powers role.
Colin Dueck
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501715181
- eISBN:
- 9781501715204
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0017
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This concluding chapter focuses on the role of George W. Bush himself, arguing that by 2006–2007, the president had become a more mature and assertive commander-in-chief who asked hard questions of ...
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This concluding chapter focuses on the role of George W. Bush himself, arguing that by 2006–2007, the president had become a more mature and assertive commander-in-chief who asked hard questions of his military commanders and pushed the policy process to deliver strategic alternatives. The president successfully related the policy advice he received to the political requirements and constraints he faced to fashion a new strategy for the Iraq War. His success in doing so might constitute the basis for a modest form of “Bush revisionism.” The chapter also defines the concept of policy entrepreneurship, including the ability to connect three distinct streams: problems, policies, and politics. It then analyzes these three streams as they existed regarding US policy in Iraq by mid-2006, and describes how and why Bush was able to connect the three streams.Less
This concluding chapter focuses on the role of George W. Bush himself, arguing that by 2006–2007, the president had become a more mature and assertive commander-in-chief who asked hard questions of his military commanders and pushed the policy process to deliver strategic alternatives. The president successfully related the policy advice he received to the political requirements and constraints he faced to fashion a new strategy for the Iraq War. His success in doing so might constitute the basis for a modest form of “Bush revisionism.” The chapter also defines the concept of policy entrepreneurship, including the ability to connect three distinct streams: problems, policies, and politics. It then analyzes these three streams as they existed regarding US policy in Iraq by mid-2006, and describes how and why Bush was able to connect the three streams.
Pesach Malovany IDF (Ret.), Amatzia Baram, Kevin M. Woods, and Ronna Englesberg
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780813169439
- eISBN:
- 9780813169514
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813169439.003.0045
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter deals with the major trends in the development of the Iraqi military power and the Armed Forces High Command during the Ba’ath regime, especially during Saddam’s presidency period. It ...
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This chapter deals with the major trends in the development of the Iraqi military power and the Armed Forces High Command during the Ba’ath regime, especially during Saddam’s presidency period. It describes the building of the Iraqi Armed Forces as a high-quality and the greatest military power in the Middle East and one of the largest in the world and the components of its military power. It describes its rise, as well as its deterioration since the Gulf war in 1991. It deals also with the high command of the armed forces, its organization and functions, and the main bodies that were included in it. It analyses also the role of Saddam Hussein as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.Less
This chapter deals with the major trends in the development of the Iraqi military power and the Armed Forces High Command during the Ba’ath regime, especially during Saddam’s presidency period. It describes the building of the Iraqi Armed Forces as a high-quality and the greatest military power in the Middle East and one of the largest in the world and the components of its military power. It describes its rise, as well as its deterioration since the Gulf war in 1991. It deals also with the high command of the armed forces, its organization and functions, and the main bodies that were included in it. It analyses also the role of Saddam Hussein as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.
Kori Schake
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501715181
- eISBN:
- 9781501715204
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0015
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter challenges the notion that the surge effort emerged from a process characterized by high degrees of internal dysfunction and civil–military discord. Instead, the challenges and ...
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This chapter challenges the notion that the surge effort emerged from a process characterized by high degrees of internal dysfunction and civil–military discord. Instead, the challenges and frustrations in the Bush administration stemmed primarily from difficulties among the president's civilian advisors, not between civilians and the uniformed military. The president and his closest advisors acknowledged from the outset that removing the bureaucratic impediment of an opposing secretary of defense would be essential and worked that problem in parallel. They allowed misplaced concern about veteran criticism to delay the process, but developing and reaching consensus on the new strategy might have taken as long even without that concern. The president's closest advisors also understood that the president needed a different approach himself to engaging on the issues; he had to become a different kind of commander in chief for the strategy reviews to produce a better outcome in the war. Ultimately, the very different civil–military relationship that produced the 2006 surge was entirely a function of changes on the civilian side of the equation.Less
This chapter challenges the notion that the surge effort emerged from a process characterized by high degrees of internal dysfunction and civil–military discord. Instead, the challenges and frustrations in the Bush administration stemmed primarily from difficulties among the president's civilian advisors, not between civilians and the uniformed military. The president and his closest advisors acknowledged from the outset that removing the bureaucratic impediment of an opposing secretary of defense would be essential and worked that problem in parallel. They allowed misplaced concern about veteran criticism to delay the process, but developing and reaching consensus on the new strategy might have taken as long even without that concern. The president's closest advisors also understood that the president needed a different approach himself to engaging on the issues; he had to become a different kind of commander in chief for the strategy reviews to produce a better outcome in the war. Ultimately, the very different civil–military relationship that produced the 2006 surge was entirely a function of changes on the civilian side of the equation.
Ryan C. Hendrickson
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780813160948
- eISBN:
- 9780813165462
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813160948.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
As the United States faces new foreign threats and security challenges, U.S. foreign-policy makers continue to find novel ways of using military force abroad. During the Obama presidency, the United ...
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As the United States faces new foreign threats and security challenges, U.S. foreign-policy makers continue to find novel ways of using military force abroad. During the Obama presidency, the United States has engaged in a number of controversial military operations that remain politically contentious and unresolved today. The political process between the president and the Congress over when and how to use the military remains as relevant as ever. In this study of the use of U.S. military power abroad, Ryan C. Hendrickson examines the political process between the president and Congress that has led to military action during the Obama presidency. In his case study analyses of military action in Afghanistan and the corresponding drone missile strikes, counterpiracy operations on the Indian Ocean, the U.S Special Forces hunt for African warlord Joseph Kony, and the U.S. air strikes on Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, Hendrickson finds that President Barack Obama has acted much like previous commanders in chief, who often made unilateral military decisions for the United States. Presidents draw their own “red lines” for war with little input from Congress. In contrast to other research on Congress’s role in shaping U.S. foreign policy, Hendrickson also finds that congressional deference remains the norm on war powers issues. An absence of partisanship in Congress on this issue, perpetuated by Congress’s senior leadership from both parties, helps explain why the commander in chief is given such wide latitude in foreign and military affairs.Less
As the United States faces new foreign threats and security challenges, U.S. foreign-policy makers continue to find novel ways of using military force abroad. During the Obama presidency, the United States has engaged in a number of controversial military operations that remain politically contentious and unresolved today. The political process between the president and the Congress over when and how to use the military remains as relevant as ever. In this study of the use of U.S. military power abroad, Ryan C. Hendrickson examines the political process between the president and Congress that has led to military action during the Obama presidency. In his case study analyses of military action in Afghanistan and the corresponding drone missile strikes, counterpiracy operations on the Indian Ocean, the U.S Special Forces hunt for African warlord Joseph Kony, and the U.S. air strikes on Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, Hendrickson finds that President Barack Obama has acted much like previous commanders in chief, who often made unilateral military decisions for the United States. Presidents draw their own “red lines” for war with little input from Congress. In contrast to other research on Congress’s role in shaping U.S. foreign policy, Hendrickson also finds that congressional deference remains the norm on war powers issues. An absence of partisanship in Congress on this issue, perpetuated by Congress’s senior leadership from both parties, helps explain why the commander in chief is given such wide latitude in foreign and military affairs.
Randall M. Miller (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780823243440
- eISBN:
- 9780823243488
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823243440.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
This book of original essays on “Lincoln and Leadership,” by leading Lincoln and Civil War scholars, explores Lincoln’s understandings and uses of leadership during the Civil War. The essays focus ...
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This book of original essays on “Lincoln and Leadership,” by leading Lincoln and Civil War scholars, explores Lincoln’s understandings and uses of leadership during the Civil War. The essays focus especially on Lincoln as Commander in Chief and war president, as party leader, and as moral guide by looking at his talents and practices in decision-making in critical moments of his presidency. They assess the myths of Lincoln by examining his ability to understand and direct military strategy, communicate with military men, shape public opinion, manage party affairs, move himself and the nation toward emancipation as policy and then as fact, accept the use of black troops, grapple with the moral and religious meaning of the war, empathize with the sufferings of his people, and explain the purpose of the war to the nation and posterity. They emphasize Lincoln’s ability to establish priorities, most especially the preservation of the Union and democratic government at all costs and the realization of the promise of freedom embodied in the Declaration of Independence, which gave Lincoln a unity of purpose and clarity that informed and emboldened his leadership, while they also show Lincoln’s flexibility as to means, which gave Lincoln the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, deal with contending interests, and gain support for his policies.Less
This book of original essays on “Lincoln and Leadership,” by leading Lincoln and Civil War scholars, explores Lincoln’s understandings and uses of leadership during the Civil War. The essays focus especially on Lincoln as Commander in Chief and war president, as party leader, and as moral guide by looking at his talents and practices in decision-making in critical moments of his presidency. They assess the myths of Lincoln by examining his ability to understand and direct military strategy, communicate with military men, shape public opinion, manage party affairs, move himself and the nation toward emancipation as policy and then as fact, accept the use of black troops, grapple with the moral and religious meaning of the war, empathize with the sufferings of his people, and explain the purpose of the war to the nation and posterity. They emphasize Lincoln’s ability to establish priorities, most especially the preservation of the Union and democratic government at all costs and the realization of the promise of freedom embodied in the Declaration of Independence, which gave Lincoln a unity of purpose and clarity that informed and emboldened his leadership, while they also show Lincoln’s flexibility as to means, which gave Lincoln the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, deal with contending interests, and gain support for his policies.
Gregory J. W. Urwin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780823243440
- eISBN:
- 9780823243488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823243440.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 19th Century
This chapter by Gregory J. W. Urwin challenges popular ideas of Lincoln as a natural and brilliant military strategist and war president, instead showing that Lincoln developed slowly and erratically ...
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This chapter by Gregory J. W. Urwin challenges popular ideas of Lincoln as a natural and brilliant military strategist and war president, instead showing that Lincoln developed slowly and erratically as a strategist and war leader. It argues that Lincoln’s innate intelligence and his focus on saving the Union by any means led him to bold assertions of power, including a curtailment of civil liberties, but also to stumble by interfering in military matters he did not fully understand. It shows how military men such as Henry Halleck helped Lincoln become an effective Commander in Chief by translating strategic concepts into military terms. And it argues that Lincoln’s use of black soldiers, organized as U.S. Colored Troops, strengthened the Union war effort while also galvanizing southern opposition, including Confederates committing atrocities against black soldiers, such as the Fort Pillow Massacre. It adds that the need to protect the integrity of black Union soldiers led to complications in prisoner exchange, but once Lincoln committed to emancipation as policy and using black troops he did not temporize.Less
This chapter by Gregory J. W. Urwin challenges popular ideas of Lincoln as a natural and brilliant military strategist and war president, instead showing that Lincoln developed slowly and erratically as a strategist and war leader. It argues that Lincoln’s innate intelligence and his focus on saving the Union by any means led him to bold assertions of power, including a curtailment of civil liberties, but also to stumble by interfering in military matters he did not fully understand. It shows how military men such as Henry Halleck helped Lincoln become an effective Commander in Chief by translating strategic concepts into military terms. And it argues that Lincoln’s use of black soldiers, organized as U.S. Colored Troops, strengthened the Union war effort while also galvanizing southern opposition, including Confederates committing atrocities against black soldiers, such as the Fort Pillow Massacre. It adds that the need to protect the integrity of black Union soldiers led to complications in prisoner exchange, but once Lincoln committed to emancipation as policy and using black troops he did not temporize.
Jeff Broadwater
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780807835302
- eISBN:
- 9781469601878
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9780807869918_broadwater.9
- Subject:
- History, American History: early to 18th Century
As the President of the United States, James Madison pledged to keep the peace, to maintain the Union, to support the Constitution, and to respect the people's liberties. However, a war with Great ...
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As the President of the United States, James Madison pledged to keep the peace, to maintain the Union, to support the Constitution, and to respect the people's liberties. However, a war with Great Britain dominated his presidency and he struggled in the White House with a host of problems. This chapter describes James Madison's function as a dynamic commander in chief and the threats and challenges that he faced as a wartime president.Less
As the President of the United States, James Madison pledged to keep the peace, to maintain the Union, to support the Constitution, and to respect the people's liberties. However, a war with Great Britain dominated his presidency and he struggled in the White House with a host of problems. This chapter describes James Madison's function as a dynamic commander in chief and the threats and challenges that he faced as a wartime president.
Harold H. Bruff
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780226211107
- eISBN:
- 9780226211244
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226211244.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
President Franklin Roosevelt produced another transformation of both the Constitution and the office of the presidency. The outpouring of legislation during the hundred days altered the presidential ...
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President Franklin Roosevelt produced another transformation of both the Constitution and the office of the presidency. The outpouring of legislation during the hundred days altered the presidential role within Congress and initiated new levels of federal involvement in the lives of citizens. A permanent expansion of the executive branch challenged the supervisory capacities of Roosevelt and later presidents. The second New Deal created today’s social safety net. Roosevelt established the modern institutional presidency. He battled the Supreme Court over constitutional interpretation and failed in his court-packing plan. He did not entrench his constitutional vision by seeking amendments. He did not adequately protect civil liberties, notably in the Japanese-American internment in World War II. In foreign policy, he guided the nation to abandon neutrality in favor of international involvement. As commander in chief, he set strategy in World War II. His third term broke the traditional two-term limit.Less
President Franklin Roosevelt produced another transformation of both the Constitution and the office of the presidency. The outpouring of legislation during the hundred days altered the presidential role within Congress and initiated new levels of federal involvement in the lives of citizens. A permanent expansion of the executive branch challenged the supervisory capacities of Roosevelt and later presidents. The second New Deal created today’s social safety net. Roosevelt established the modern institutional presidency. He battled the Supreme Court over constitutional interpretation and failed in his court-packing plan. He did not entrench his constitutional vision by seeking amendments. He did not adequately protect civil liberties, notably in the Japanese-American internment in World War II. In foreign policy, he guided the nation to abandon neutrality in favor of international involvement. As commander in chief, he set strategy in World War II. His third term broke the traditional two-term limit.
John Gilbert McCurdy
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501736605
- eISBN:
- 9781501736612
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501736605.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter explores the alternative quarters the American colonists sought for the North American Establishment, describing how massive barracks arose in the four largest American cities and ...
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This chapter explores the alternative quarters the American colonists sought for the North American Establishment, describing how massive barracks arose in the four largest American cities and several smaller towns in 1756-58. Following a history of barracks since ancient times, it explains the effects that barracks had on urban locales, colonists, and soldiers, as well as what happened in places that did not have barracks. The conclusion of the French and Indian War brought Canada, Florida, and the backcountry into the British Empire, which raised new questions about quartering as few of these places had barracks. Although the removal of the British army from the American colonies emptied the urban barracks, events like the Paxton Boys raids of 1763-64 put control of the military infrastructure at odds with the military geography of the colonies.Less
This chapter explores the alternative quarters the American colonists sought for the North American Establishment, describing how massive barracks arose in the four largest American cities and several smaller towns in 1756-58. Following a history of barracks since ancient times, it explains the effects that barracks had on urban locales, colonists, and soldiers, as well as what happened in places that did not have barracks. The conclusion of the French and Indian War brought Canada, Florida, and the backcountry into the British Empire, which raised new questions about quartering as few of these places had barracks. Although the removal of the British army from the American colonies emptied the urban barracks, events like the Paxton Boys raids of 1763-64 put control of the military infrastructure at odds with the military geography of the colonies.
John Relly Beard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9781469607870
- eISBN:
- 9781469607894
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/9781469607887_Beard
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
Toussaint L'Ouverture (1743–1803) won international renown in the Haitian fight for independence. He led thousands of former slaves into battle against French, Spanish, and English forces, routing ...
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Toussaint L'Ouverture (1743–1803) won international renown in the Haitian fight for independence. He led thousands of former slaves into battle against French, Spanish, and English forces, routing the Europeans and seizing control of the entire island of Hispaniola. L'Ouverture became governor and commander-in-chief of Haiti before officially acknowledging French rule in 1801, when he submitted a newly written constitution to Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) and the French legislature for ratification. In response, Bonaparte sent an army to depose L'Ouverture, who was taken prisoner in June of 1802 and shipped to France, where he died of pneumonia in April 1803. This book (1853) was first published in London on the fiftieth anniversary of L'Ouverture's death and remained the authoritative English-language history of L'Ouverture's life until the late twentieth century. Throughout the text, the book compares L'Ouverture to famously successful white generals, argues for his supremacy, and states that his ultimate failure to liberate Haiti and untimely death are the products of unfortunate circumstances—not an indictment of his character or leadership abilities.Less
Toussaint L'Ouverture (1743–1803) won international renown in the Haitian fight for independence. He led thousands of former slaves into battle against French, Spanish, and English forces, routing the Europeans and seizing control of the entire island of Hispaniola. L'Ouverture became governor and commander-in-chief of Haiti before officially acknowledging French rule in 1801, when he submitted a newly written constitution to Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) and the French legislature for ratification. In response, Bonaparte sent an army to depose L'Ouverture, who was taken prisoner in June of 1802 and shipped to France, where he died of pneumonia in April 1803. This book (1853) was first published in London on the fiftieth anniversary of L'Ouverture's death and remained the authoritative English-language history of L'Ouverture's life until the late twentieth century. Throughout the text, the book compares L'Ouverture to famously successful white generals, argues for his supremacy, and states that his ultimate failure to liberate Haiti and untimely death are the products of unfortunate circumstances—not an indictment of his character or leadership abilities.
Pesach Malovany IDF (Ret.), Amatzia Baram, Kevin M. Woods, and Ronna Englesberg
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780813169439
- eISBN:
- 9780813169514
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813169439.003.0052
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter deals with the Iraqi ground forces field system. The field system of the Iraqi Army’s ground forces included all the formations that were subordinate to the corps headquarters, the ...
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This chapter deals with the Iraqi ground forces field system. The field system of the Iraqi Army’s ground forces included all the formations that were subordinate to the corps headquarters, the General Headquarters Reserve and the Commander in Chief’s Reserve (the Republican Guard Forces). It describes the organization of the ground forces field headquarters and formations—the corps, division and brigade. It describes also the development of those headquarters and formations during the Iran-Iraq war and afterwards, and the field training system in those headquarters and formations.Less
This chapter deals with the Iraqi ground forces field system. The field system of the Iraqi Army’s ground forces included all the formations that were subordinate to the corps headquarters, the General Headquarters Reserve and the Commander in Chief’s Reserve (the Republican Guard Forces). It describes the organization of the ground forces field headquarters and formations—the corps, division and brigade. It describes also the development of those headquarters and formations during the Iran-Iraq war and afterwards, and the field training system in those headquarters and formations.
Margit Cohn
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- April 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198821984
- eISBN:
- 9780191861154
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198821984.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Public International Law
This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of one form of constitution-generated fuzziness – unilateral rule-making under the constitution. The bases of such powers include historically-embedded ...
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This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of one form of constitution-generated fuzziness – unilateral rule-making under the constitution. The bases of such powers include historically-embedded sources of power such as the British royal prerogative, uncontested long-standing practices, expansive interpretations of clauses in a written constitution such as the take-care and the Commander-in-Chief clauses in the US Constitution, and reliance on other constructs such as 'third-source' powers, 'constitutional gloss' and concepts of sovereignty. The high-level but indeterminate sources of such action typically do not demarcate the limits of such action; thus, they essentially guarantee the fuzziness so favoured by executives. The chapter considers in detail all the recognized sources for the continued existence of unilateral non-statutory powers in the two compared systems, and addresses two accepted legal constraints on their application: their subjection to statute, under the doctrine of residuality, and their subjection to judicial review.Less
This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of one form of constitution-generated fuzziness – unilateral rule-making under the constitution. The bases of such powers include historically-embedded sources of power such as the British royal prerogative, uncontested long-standing practices, expansive interpretations of clauses in a written constitution such as the take-care and the Commander-in-Chief clauses in the US Constitution, and reliance on other constructs such as 'third-source' powers, 'constitutional gloss' and concepts of sovereignty. The high-level but indeterminate sources of such action typically do not demarcate the limits of such action; thus, they essentially guarantee the fuzziness so favoured by executives. The chapter considers in detail all the recognized sources for the continued existence of unilateral non-statutory powers in the two compared systems, and addresses two accepted legal constraints on their application: their subjection to statute, under the doctrine of residuality, and their subjection to judicial review.