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“First General and Admiral of the Confederacy”

Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash

in Imperial from the Beginning: The Constitution of the Original Executive

This chapter discusses the president's power as commander in chief. The president may command the military as commander in chief. However, he has no constitutionally protected sphere of autonomy; ... More

This chapter discusses the president's power as commander in chief. The president may command the military as commander in chief. However, he has no constitutionally protected sphere of autonomy; rather, the Congress has almost complete authority over war and military matters. Only the Congress has the power to decide whether the nation will declare war. It also has control over the regulation of the armed forces and the system of military discipline. But even if the Congress tries to micromanage the military, the president has many ways to restrain its meddling. The chief executive may supersede whatever military discretion that the Congress chooses not to exercise. He may also delay or veto bills that regulate the military, nominate his military subordinates, and dismiss them at will.Less

The Image of Jefferson Davis as Commander in Chief

Harold Holzer

in Jefferson Davis's Generals

Confederate President Jefferson Davis gained an enduring military image after he lost the war. This chapter portrays how the medium of popular prints made a powerful influence on creating Davis's ... More

Confederate President Jefferson Davis gained an enduring military image after he lost the war. This chapter portrays how the medium of popular prints made a powerful influence on creating Davis's image not only as a statesman and a patriot but crucially a soldier. The new commander in chief had come by his military reputation honestly—and, many agreed, heroically. Davis's reputation owed as much to action as to appearance. He fought in Black Hawk War, the same conflict in which his Union counterpart, Abraham Lincoln, experienced. Davis's long service record was enough to convince many Southerners—including Davis himself—that his proper place in a war for independence was in military, not civil, command.Less

Wartime Organizational Changes in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations1

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter discusses the reorganization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which was spurred by the catastrophic events of World War II. The reorganized Office of the Chief of Naval ... More

This chapter discusses the reorganization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which was spurred by the catastrophic events of World War II. The reorganized Office of the Chief of Naval Operations that emerged in the fall of 1945 successfully incorporated the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet's control of the Navy's operating forces with the Chief of Naval Operations' responsibilities, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, for coordinating and directing the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department in their efforts to provide the preparation, readiness, and logistic support of the operating forces and shore establishment of the Navy. Because of this new arrangement, the Chief of Naval Operations in December 1945 was far better equipped to handle the manifold responsibilities that would come his way in the challenging postwar years.Less

French Union Combat Forces

Charles R. Shrader

in A War of Logistics: Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 1945-1954

In Chapter 2, the author describes the French reoccupation of Indochina following World War II and the organization of the French high command and territorial command structures. The strength and ... More

In Chapter 2, the author describes the French reoccupation of Indochina following World War II and the organization of the French high command and territorial command structures. The strength and organization of French naval and air forces as well as ground forces down to the battalion level are also described, as are the composition of static, mobile, amphibious/riverine, and parachute forces.Less

Supremacy Explained and Critiqued

Heidi Kitrosser

in Reclaiming Accountability: Transparency, Executive Power, and the U.S. Constitution

This chapter defines presidential supremacy and offers a rejoinder to it. Presidential supremacy is the presidentialist counterpart to the substantive accountability framework, insofar as the latter ... More

This chapter defines presidential supremacy and offers a rejoinder to it. Presidential supremacy is the presidentialist counterpart to the substantive accountability framework, insofar as the latter entails external checks on presidential power. Presidential supremacists read the President’s constitutional powers to preclude Congress or the courts from checking presidential actions in many cases. Supremacy’s manifestations include some invocations of executive privilege and the state secrets privilege, all claims of a prerogative to violate statutes in secret, and all assertions of a presidential prerogative to effectively criminalize speech – without triggering the usual strict judicial review warranted under the First Amendment – by deeming information classified. While each manifestation has some unique aspects, supremacy for the most part is fueled by broad readings of the constitutional terms “executive power” and Commander in Chief,” by reasoning from founding assurances that the President would be capable of secrecy, and by “evolving history” arguments. In addition to explaining supremacy’s justifications, this chapter refutes them. It explains that the justifications stem from faulty readings of constitutional text, history, and structure.Less

Congressional Pushback against Presidential National Security Authority

John A. Dearborn

in Power Shifts: Congress and Presidential Representation

Chapter 10 considers Congress’s passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973. It shows that Congress’s doubts that the president could be counted on to act in the national interest in the wake of the ... More

Chapter 10 considers Congress’s passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973. It shows that Congress’s doubts that the president could be counted on to act in the national interest in the wake of the Vietnam War fueled its pushback against presidential war making. Lawmakers correspondingly reasserted their own representational legitimacy and, more significantly, their constitutional primacy over declaring war. However, questions over the validity of presidential representation had less influence over Congress’s pushback against war powers because presidential national security authority rested on a different foundation: the Commander in Chief clause of the Constitution. Even many lawmakers supportive of reasserting Congress’s own constitutional authority were wary of infringing on what they perceived as the president’s constitutional claims. This led to a law that essentially enshrined a right for the president to initiate military conflicts without congressional authorization in statute.Less

Lincoln and Leadership: An Introduction

Randall M. Miller

in Lincoln and Leadership: Military, Political, and Religious Decision Making

This introductory chapter by Randall M. Miller provides an overview of Lincoln as a political, military, and moral leader during the Civil War and a brief assessment of the Lincoln myths related to ... More

This introductory chapter by Randall M. Miller provides an overview of Lincoln as a political, military, and moral leader during the Civil War and a brief assessment of the Lincoln myths related to his leadership as the saviour of the Union, the great emancipator, and friend of the common man. It argues that Lincoln kept the priority of the Union first in all his thinking and public policy, but moved toward ending slavery as a way to win the war and realize the promise of the Declaration of Independence. It also argues that Lincoln was an engaged leader of the Republican Party, conscious of shaping public opinion in speeches and images, maintaining ties with party leaders, and understanding the necessity of translating ideas into action. It also suggests he defined the role of Commander in Chief as he developed a modern strategy for winning the war and sought out generals who would effect his thinking. And it argues that Lincoln proved successful in managing the war effort, his party, and public opinion, though he was unsuccessful in laying out a clear policy for Reconstruction.Less

Syria and Beyond

Ryan C. Hendrickson

in Obama at War: Congress and the Imperial Presidency

This chapter addresses the war powers interplay between the executive branch and Congress as the Obama administration moved toward military action in Syria in 2013. Although many members of Congress ... More

This chapter addresses the war powers interplay between the executive branch and Congress as the Obama administration moved toward military action in Syria in 2013. Although many members of Congress actively opposed Obama’s proposed strikes, senior leaders of both parties actively backed Obama both before and after Obama requested congressional approval for military action. This chapter also summarizes the preceding chapters, demonstrating the continuation of the president’s expansive power as commander in chief and Congress’s general abdication of military decision making to the president, and addresses the prospects of a Congress that exercises a more assertive war powers role.Less

The President as Policy Entrepreneur: George W. Bush and the 2006 Iraq Strategy Review

Colin Dueck

in The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush's Decision to Surge in Iraq 

This concluding chapter focuses on the role of George W. Bush himself, arguing that by 2006–2007, the president had become a more mature and assertive commander-in-chief who asked hard questions of ... More

This concluding chapter focuses on the role of George W. Bush himself, arguing that by 2006–2007, the president had become a more mature and assertive commander-in-chief who asked hard questions of his military commanders and pushed the policy process to deliver strategic alternatives. The president successfully related the policy advice he received to the political requirements and constraints he faced to fashion a new strategy for the Iraq War. His success in doing so might constitute the basis for a modest form of “Bush revisionism.” The chapter also defines the concept of policy entrepreneurship, including the ability to connect three distinct streams: problems, policies, and politics. It then analyzes these three streams as they existed regarding US policy in Iraq by mid-2006, and describes how and why Bush was able to connect the three streams.Less

Major Trends in the Development of Military Power and the Armed Forces High Command

Pesach Malovany IDF (Ret.), Amatzia Baram, Kevin M. Woods, and Ronna Englesberg

in Wars of Modern Babylon: A History of the Iraqi Army from 1921 to 2003

This chapter deals with the major trends in the development of the Iraqi military power and the Armed Forces High Command during the Ba’ath regime, especially during Saddam’s presidency period. It ... More

This chapter deals with the major trends in the development of the Iraqi military power and the Armed Forces High Command during the Ba’ath regime, especially during Saddam’s presidency period. It describes the building of the Iraqi Armed Forces as a high-quality and the greatest military power in the Middle East and one of the largest in the world and the components of its military power. It describes its rise, as well as its deterioration since the Gulf war in 1991. It deals also with the high command of the armed forces, its organization and functions, and the main bodies that were included in it. It analyses also the role of Saddam Hussein as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.Less

Civil-Military Relations and the 2006 Iraq Surge

Kori Schake

in The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush's Decision to Surge in Iraq 

This chapter challenges the notion that the surge effort emerged from a process characterized by high degrees of internal dysfunction and civil–military discord. Instead, the challenges and ... More

This chapter challenges the notion that the surge effort emerged from a process characterized by high degrees of internal dysfunction and civil–military discord. Instead, the challenges and frustrations in the Bush administration stemmed primarily from difficulties among the president's civilian advisors, not between civilians and the uniformed military. The president and his closest advisors acknowledged from the outset that removing the bureaucratic impediment of an opposing secretary of defense would be essential and worked that problem in parallel. They allowed misplaced concern about veteran criticism to delay the process, but developing and reaching consensus on the new strategy might have taken as long even without that concern. The president's closest advisors also understood that the president needed a different approach himself to engaging on the issues; he had to become a different kind of commander in chief for the strategy reviews to produce a better outcome in the war. Ultimately, the very different civil–military relationship that produced the 2006 surge was entirely a function of changes on the civilian side of the equation.Less

Sowing the Wind and Reaping the Whirlwind: Abraham Lincoln as a War President

Gregory J. W. Urwin

in Lincoln and Leadership: Military, Political, and Religious Decision Making

This chapter by Gregory J. W. Urwin challenges popular ideas of Lincoln as a natural and brilliant military strategist and war president, instead showing that Lincoln developed slowly and erratically ... More

This chapter by Gregory J. W. Urwin challenges popular ideas of Lincoln as a natural and brilliant military strategist and war president, instead showing that Lincoln developed slowly and erratically as a strategist and war leader. It argues that Lincoln’s innate intelligence and his focus on saving the Union by any means led him to bold assertions of power, including a curtailment of civil liberties, but also to stumble by interfering in military matters he did not fully understand. It shows how military men such as Henry Halleck helped Lincoln become an effective Commander in Chief by translating strategic concepts into military terms. And it argues that Lincoln’s use of black soldiers, organized as U.S. Colored Troops, strengthened the Union war effort while also galvanizing southern opposition, including Confederates committing atrocities against black soldiers, such as the Fort Pillow Massacre. It adds that the need to protect the integrity of black Union soldiers led to complications in prisoner exchange, but once Lincoln committed to emancipation as policy and using black troops he did not temporize.Less

A Founder as Commander in Chief

Jeff Broadwater

in James Madison: A Son of Virginia and a Founder of the Nation

As the President of the United States, James Madison pledged to keep the peace, to maintain the Union, to support the Constitution, and to respect the people's liberties. However, a war with Great ... More

As the President of the United States, James Madison pledged to keep the peace, to maintain the Union, to support the Constitution, and to respect the people's liberties. However, a war with Great Britain dominated his presidency and he struggled in the White House with a host of problems. This chapter describes James Madison's function as a dynamic commander in chief and the threats and challenges that he faced as a wartime president.Less

What Must Be Done: Franklin Roosevelt

Harold H. Bruff

in Untrodden Ground: How Presidents Interpret the Constitution

President Franklin Roosevelt produced another transformation of both the Constitution and the office of the presidency. The outpouring of legislation during the hundred days altered the presidential ... More

President Franklin Roosevelt produced another transformation of both the Constitution and the office of the presidency. The outpouring of legislation during the hundred days altered the presidential role within Congress and initiated new levels of federal involvement in the lives of citizens. A permanent expansion of the executive branch challenged the supervisory capacities of Roosevelt and later presidents. The second New Deal created today’s social safety net. Roosevelt established the modern institutional presidency. He battled the Supreme Court over constitutional interpretation and failed in his court-packing plan. He did not entrench his constitutional vision by seeking amendments. He did not adequately protect civil liberties, notably in the Japanese-American internment in World War II. In foreign policy, he guided the nation to abandon neutrality in favor of international involvement. As commander in chief, he set strategy in World War II. His third term broke the traditional two-term limit.Less

Barracks: Constructing a Colonial Military Infrastructure

John Gilbert McCurdy

in Quarters: The Accommodation of the British Army and the Coming of the American Revolution

This chapter explores the alternative quarters the American colonists sought for the North American Establishment, describing how massive barracks arose in the four largest American cities and ... More

This chapter explores the alternative quarters the American colonists sought for the North American Establishment, describing how massive barracks arose in the four largest American cities and several smaller towns in 1756-58. Following a history of barracks since ancient times, it explains the effects that barracks had on urban locales, colonists, and soldiers, as well as what happened in places that did not have barracks. The conclusion of the French and Indian War brought Canada, Florida, and the backcountry into the British Empire, which raised new questions about quartering as few of these places had barracks. Although the removal of the British army from the American colonies emptied the urban barracks, events like the Paxton Boys raids of 1763-64 put control of the military infrastructure at odds with the military geography of the colonies.Less

The Ground Forces Field System

Pesach Malovany IDF (Ret.), Amatzia Baram, Kevin M. Woods, and Ronna Englesberg

in Wars of Modern Babylon: A History of the Iraqi Army from 1921 to 2003

This chapter deals with the Iraqi ground forces field system. The field system of the Iraqi Army’s ground forces included all the formations that were subordinate to the corps headquarters, the ... More

This chapter deals with the Iraqi ground forces field system. The field system of the Iraqi Army’s ground forces included all the formations that were subordinate to the corps headquarters, the General Headquarters Reserve and the Commander in Chief’s Reserve (the Republican Guard Forces). It describes the organization of the ground forces field headquarters and formations—the corps, division and brigade. It describes also the development of those headquarters and formations during the Iran-Iraq war and afterwards, and the field training system in those headquarters and formations.Less

Unilateral, Non-Statutory Executive Powers

Margit Cohn

in A Theory of the Executive Branch: Tension and Legality

This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of one form of constitution-generated fuzziness – unilateral rule-making under the constitution. The bases of such powers include historically-embedded ... More

This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of one form of constitution-generated fuzziness – unilateral rule-making under the constitution. The bases of such powers include historically-embedded sources of power such as the British royal prerogative, uncontested long-standing practices, expansive interpretations of clauses in a written constitution such as the take-care and the Commander-in-Chief clauses in the US Constitution, and reliance on other constructs such as 'third-source' powers, 'constitutional gloss' and concepts of sovereignty. The high-level but indeterminate sources of such action typically do not demarcate the limits of such action; thus, they essentially guarantee the fuzziness so favoured by executives. The chapter considers in detail all the recognized sources for the continued existence of unilateral non-statutory powers in the two compared systems, and addresses two accepted legal constraints on their application: their subjection to statute, under the doctrine of residuality, and their subjection to judicial review.Less