Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control ...
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European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control mechanisms to limit the discretion of the Commission in the policy process. Examines the record of delegation to the Commission throughout the EU's history, measuring the extent of delegation and Commission discretion across 35 different issue‐areas. Almost without exception, member states delegate to the Commission precisely the functions hypothesized by principal‐agent models, including most notably monitoring compliance, setting the legislative agenda and laying down expert and credible market regulations. Similarly, however, the Commission is closely monitored by member governments, which have adopted a carefully designed and calibrated system of appointment and censure mechanisms, ‘comitology’ or oversight committees and administrative law and judicial review by the European Court of Justice.Less
European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control mechanisms to limit the discretion of the Commission in the policy process. Examines the record of delegation to the Commission throughout the EU's history, measuring the extent of delegation and Commission discretion across 35 different issue‐areas. Almost without exception, member states delegate to the Commission precisely the functions hypothesized by principal‐agent models, including most notably monitoring compliance, setting the legislative agenda and laying down expert and credible market regulations. Similarly, however, the Commission is closely monitored by member governments, which have adopted a carefully designed and calibrated system of appointment and censure mechanisms, ‘comitology’ or oversight committees and administrative law and judicial review by the European Court of Justice.
Jürgen Neyer
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296409
- eISBN:
- 9780191599989
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296401.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Provides basic data on comitology and introduces the normative concerns voiced by the EP. Responding to the inter‐institutional debate and the Commission's proposal concerning the reform of ...
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Provides basic data on comitology and introduces the normative concerns voiced by the EP. Responding to the inter‐institutional debate and the Commission's proposal concerning the reform of comitology, the chapter proceeds by discussing comitology in the context of supranational governance in general. It is argued that convincing normative justifications must take account of the distinctive nature of the European polity. One way of formulating such a justification is provided by the concept of deliberative supranationalism. This concept corresponds to theoretical interpretations emphasizing the sui generis nature of the EC. It assumes that the legitimation of governance within constitutional nation‐states remains inevitably one‐sided and parochial. Deliberative supranationalism, in this regard, respects the member states’ constitutional legitimacy, while at the same time clarifying and sanctioning the commitments arising from its interdependence with equally democratically legitimized states, and with the supranational prerogatives that the institutionalization of this interdependence requires.Less
Provides basic data on comitology and introduces the normative concerns voiced by the EP. Responding to the inter‐institutional debate and the Commission's proposal concerning the reform of comitology, the chapter proceeds by discussing comitology in the context of supranational governance in general. It is argued that convincing normative justifications must take account of the distinctive nature of the European polity. One way of formulating such a justification is provided by the concept of deliberative supranationalism. This concept corresponds to theoretical interpretations emphasizing the sui generis nature of the EC. It assumes that the legitimation of governance within constitutional nation‐states remains inevitably one‐sided and parochial. Deliberative supranationalism, in this regard, respects the member states’ constitutional legitimacy, while at the same time clarifying and sanctioning the commitments arising from its interdependence with equally democratically legitimized states, and with the supranational prerogatives that the institutionalization of this interdependence requires.
Giandomenico Majone
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274307
- eISBN:
- 9780191603310
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274304.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
This chapter discusses the delegation of implementing powers by the Council (or by the Council and the EP) to the Commission or to European agencies. While delegation to the Commission may involve ...
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This chapter discusses the delegation of implementing powers by the Council (or by the Council and the EP) to the Commission or to European agencies. While delegation to the Commission may involve wide discretionary powers, European agencies are denied the regulatory powers which national agencies normally have. The Commission uses the principle of institutional balance to impede institutional developments which would reduce its own role, but would enhance the credibility of European policies. The division of roles between the Commission and the agencies aggravates an already serious accountability problem.Less
This chapter discusses the delegation of implementing powers by the Council (or by the Council and the EP) to the Commission or to European agencies. While delegation to the Commission may involve wide discretionary powers, European agencies are denied the regulatory powers which national agencies normally have. The Commission uses the principle of institutional balance to impede institutional developments which would reduce its own role, but would enhance the credibility of European policies. The division of roles between the Commission and the agencies aggravates an already serious accountability problem.
William Wallace
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198280354
- eISBN:
- 9780191599422
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198280351.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The European Communities were built around a series of committees. The central tension was between the Council of Ministers and its substructure of intergovernmental committees and the European ...
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The European Communities were built around a series of committees. The central tension was between the Council of Ministers and its substructure of intergovernmental committees and the European Commission and its committees of experts. The resulting ‘comitology’ sought to replace conflicts of national interest by functional consensus. While this type of decision‐making facilitates business interest group influence, it reduces that of parliaments and political parties. As controversial issues increasingly supplement technical ones, committee government is decreasingly sustainable in a multi‐level political system.Less
The European Communities were built around a series of committees. The central tension was between the Council of Ministers and its substructure of intergovernmental committees and the European Commission and its committees of experts. The resulting ‘comitology’ sought to replace conflicts of national interest by functional consensus. While this type of decision‐making facilitates business interest group influence, it reduces that of parliaments and political parties. As controversial issues increasingly supplement technical ones, committee government is decreasingly sustainable in a multi‐level political system.
Jarle Trondal
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579426
- eISBN:
- 9780191722714
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579426.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, European Union
Chapter 9 explores the role of EU committees in the emergent European Executive Order. EU committees are important laboratories for studying transformational change that transcends the territorial ...
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Chapter 9 explores the role of EU committees in the emergent European Executive Order. EU committees are important laboratories for studying transformational change that transcends the territorial dynamics of Westphalia because they have institutionalized the bringing together of domestic and Community officials. This chapter explores the following EU committees: The Commission Expert Committees (ECs) that prepare decisions for the Commission, the Council Working Parties (CWPs) that prepare decisions for the Council of Ministers, and the so‐called Comitology Committees (CCs) that assist the Council in controlling delegated powers to the Commission. Comparative survey data reveals that the intergovernmental dynamic is weaker within the ECs than within the CWPs and CCs. Hence, the picture of one unified EU committee system has to be sacrificed for the model of a compound committee system balancing multiple behavioural dynamics. The data seriously challenges sweeping generalizations of administrative fusion and bureaucratic engrenage. This chapter also demonstrates that deliberative dynamics are not omnipotent within the CCs as asserted by Joerges and Neyer (1997).Less
Chapter 9 explores the role of EU committees in the emergent European Executive Order. EU committees are important laboratories for studying transformational change that transcends the territorial dynamics of Westphalia because they have institutionalized the bringing together of domestic and Community officials. This chapter explores the following EU committees: The Commission Expert Committees (ECs) that prepare decisions for the Commission, the Council Working Parties (CWPs) that prepare decisions for the Council of Ministers, and the so‐called Comitology Committees (CCs) that assist the Council in controlling delegated powers to the Commission. Comparative survey data reveals that the intergovernmental dynamic is weaker within the ECs than within the CWPs and CCs. Hence, the picture of one unified EU committee system has to be sacrificed for the model of a compound committee system balancing multiple behavioural dynamics. The data seriously challenges sweeping generalizations of administrative fusion and bureaucratic engrenage. This chapter also demonstrates that deliberative dynamics are not omnipotent within the CCs as asserted by Joerges and Neyer (1997).
Erik O. Eriksen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199572519
- eISBN:
- 9780191722400
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572519.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, Democratization
The development of post‐national democracy in Europe depends not merely on rights but also on the emergence of an overarching communicative space that functions as a public sphere. But is this ...
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The development of post‐national democracy in Europe depends not merely on rights but also on the emergence of an overarching communicative space that functions as a public sphere. But is this possible when there is no collective identity? Although the EU is not a state, nor a nation, its development as a new kind of polity is closely connected to the formation of a common communicative space. Cooperation and problem‐solving create public spaces but have not produced a single, non‐exclusive, general European public sphere. Rather, we find a layered public sphere containing several transnational, segmented publics evolving around policy networks, as well as legally institutionalized discourses—strong publics, such as the EP, Comitology, the ECJ, and conventions. The lack of a truly European public sphere can be seen as the consequence of the democratic deficit, the deeper causes of which may result from a weak European civic solidarity.Less
The development of post‐national democracy in Europe depends not merely on rights but also on the emergence of an overarching communicative space that functions as a public sphere. But is this possible when there is no collective identity? Although the EU is not a state, nor a nation, its development as a new kind of polity is closely connected to the formation of a common communicative space. Cooperation and problem‐solving create public spaces but have not produced a single, non‐exclusive, general European public sphere. Rather, we find a layered public sphere containing several transnational, segmented publics evolving around policy networks, as well as legally institutionalized discourses—strong publics, such as the EP, Comitology, the ECJ, and conventions. The lack of a truly European public sphere can be seen as the consequence of the democratic deficit, the deeper causes of which may result from a weak European civic solidarity.
Carl Fredrik Bergström
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199280018
- eISBN:
- 9780191700095
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280018.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
In almost all fields of cooperation that are covered by the EC Treaty, the formal competence to adopt legislation has been assigned to the Council (which must normally collaborate with the European ...
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In almost all fields of cooperation that are covered by the EC Treaty, the formal competence to adopt legislation has been assigned to the Council (which must normally collaborate with the European Parliament), and in order to separate powers, the formal competence to prepare the necessary proposals (the right to initiate legislation), has been assigned to the European Commission. Over the years, however, it has become clear that the reality is far more complex. This book examines the fact that the Council is now passing an increasing part of the responsibility for adopting legislation to the Commission, subject to the requirement that it has to collaborate with a vast number of committees that consist of representatives of the various national administrations. This is known as comitology. Comitology provides the Council and national governments with a mechanism for controlling the Commission, and so comitology is often thought to manifest a conflict of interests. The book argues that, despite much support in principle for this assumption, in practice comitology does not give rise to the kinds of conflicts many expect or fear. It contends that in fact comitology appears to be a fruitful cooperation between the national administrations and the Commission. The book explains how and why comitology has developed, explores the nature of comitology and examines its present and future place in the legal order of the European Union.Less
In almost all fields of cooperation that are covered by the EC Treaty, the formal competence to adopt legislation has been assigned to the Council (which must normally collaborate with the European Parliament), and in order to separate powers, the formal competence to prepare the necessary proposals (the right to initiate legislation), has been assigned to the European Commission. Over the years, however, it has become clear that the reality is far more complex. This book examines the fact that the Council is now passing an increasing part of the responsibility for adopting legislation to the Commission, subject to the requirement that it has to collaborate with a vast number of committees that consist of representatives of the various national administrations. This is known as comitology. Comitology provides the Council and national governments with a mechanism for controlling the Commission, and so comitology is often thought to manifest a conflict of interests. The book argues that, despite much support in principle for this assumption, in practice comitology does not give rise to the kinds of conflicts many expect or fear. It contends that in fact comitology appears to be a fruitful cooperation between the national administrations and the Commission. The book explains how and why comitology has developed, explores the nature of comitology and examines its present and future place in the legal order of the European Union.
Peter L. Lindseth
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195390148
- eISBN:
- 9780199866397
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195390148.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Public International Law
This chapter initiates the discussion of the legal-historical effort to translate elements of the postwar constitutional settlement into supranational form over the last half-century. The focus here ...
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This chapter initiates the discussion of the legal-historical effort to translate elements of the postwar constitutional settlement into supranational form over the last half-century. The focus here is on the establishment of national executive leadership over the integration process. This development ran contrary to efforts by Jean Monnet to construct, purportedly on the New Deal model, a system of supranational technocratic autonomy in the High Authority of the European Coal and Steal Community. Monnet was ultimately curtailed significantly by the creation of the Council of Ministers in the Treaty of Paris of 1951. The institutional role of the Council of Ministers grew as a consequence of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, which established the European Economic Community. The crises of the 1960s further marginalized the Commission as an autonomous technocratic policy maker. But these crises also brought to the fore differing conceptions of national leadership that would play themselves out in the ‘empty chair’ crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise at mid-decade. France, under de Gaulle, favored control by particular national executives exercising a veto over supranational policy making; the remainder of the national executives favored shared oversight via consensus politics in the Council of Ministers. This later position prevailed, and found further expression in the creation of a dense bureaucracy of nationally dominated committees (COREPER, comitology). This process of national-executive ascendancy and shared oversight culminated in the creation of the European Council in 1974, which was to become the central institution of plebiscitary leadership in the process of European integration over the remainder of the century.Less
This chapter initiates the discussion of the legal-historical effort to translate elements of the postwar constitutional settlement into supranational form over the last half-century. The focus here is on the establishment of national executive leadership over the integration process. This development ran contrary to efforts by Jean Monnet to construct, purportedly on the New Deal model, a system of supranational technocratic autonomy in the High Authority of the European Coal and Steal Community. Monnet was ultimately curtailed significantly by the creation of the Council of Ministers in the Treaty of Paris of 1951. The institutional role of the Council of Ministers grew as a consequence of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, which established the European Economic Community. The crises of the 1960s further marginalized the Commission as an autonomous technocratic policy maker. But these crises also brought to the fore differing conceptions of national leadership that would play themselves out in the ‘empty chair’ crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise at mid-decade. France, under de Gaulle, favored control by particular national executives exercising a veto over supranational policy making; the remainder of the national executives favored shared oversight via consensus politics in the Council of Ministers. This later position prevailed, and found further expression in the creation of a dense bureaucracy of nationally dominated committees (COREPER, comitology). This process of national-executive ascendancy and shared oversight culminated in the creation of the European Council in 1974, which was to become the central institution of plebiscitary leadership in the process of European integration over the remainder of the century.
Adrienne Héritier, Catherine Moury, Carina S. Bischoff, and Carl Fredrik Bergström
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199653621
- eISBN:
- 9780191751349
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653621.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
With each legislative issue, legislators have to decide whether to delegate decision-making to the executive and/or to expert bodies in order to flesh out the details of this legislation, or, ...
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With each legislative issue, legislators have to decide whether to delegate decision-making to the executive and/or to expert bodies in order to flesh out the details of this legislation, or, alternatively, to spell out all aspects of this decision in legislation proper. The reasons why to delegate have been of prime interest to political science. The debate has concentrated on principal-agent theory to explain why politicians delegate decision-making to bureaucrats, to independent regulatory agencies and to others actors and how to control these agents. By contrast, our research focuses on the question: Which actors are empowered by delegation? Are executive actors empowered over legislative actors? How do legislative actors react to the loss of power? What opportunities are there to change the institutional rules governing delegation in order to (re)gain institutional power and, with it influence over policy outcomes. We analyze the conditions and processes of change of the rules that delegate decision-making power to the Commission’s implementing powers under comitology. We focus on the role of the European Parliament and explain why the Commission, the Council, and increasingly the Parliament, delegated decision-making to the Commission. If they chose delegation, they still have to determine under which institutional rule comitology should operate. These rules, too, distribute power unequally among actors and therefore raise the question of how they came about in the first place and whether and how the “losers” of a rule change seek to alter the rules at a later point in time.Less
With each legislative issue, legislators have to decide whether to delegate decision-making to the executive and/or to expert bodies in order to flesh out the details of this legislation, or, alternatively, to spell out all aspects of this decision in legislation proper. The reasons why to delegate have been of prime interest to political science. The debate has concentrated on principal-agent theory to explain why politicians delegate decision-making to bureaucrats, to independent regulatory agencies and to others actors and how to control these agents. By contrast, our research focuses on the question: Which actors are empowered by delegation? Are executive actors empowered over legislative actors? How do legislative actors react to the loss of power? What opportunities are there to change the institutional rules governing delegation in order to (re)gain institutional power and, with it influence over policy outcomes. We analyze the conditions and processes of change of the rules that delegate decision-making power to the Commission’s implementing powers under comitology. We focus on the role of the European Parliament and explain why the Commission, the Council, and increasingly the Parliament, delegated decision-making to the Commission. If they chose delegation, they still have to determine under which institutional rule comitology should operate. These rules, too, distribute power unequally among actors and therefore raise the question of how they came about in the first place and whether and how the “losers” of a rule change seek to alter the rules at a later point in time.
Adrienne Héritier, Catherine Moury, Carina Bischoff, and Carl-Fredrik Bergström
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199653621
- eISBN:
- 9780191751349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653621.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The first chapter offers background information on the Commission’s implementing powers. The comitology system dates from the 1960s, when the Council, overburdened with the implementation of the ...
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The first chapter offers background information on the Commission’s implementing powers. The comitology system dates from the 1960s, when the Council, overburdened with the implementation of the common agricultural policy, decided to delegate some implementing powers to the Commission. However, a majority of member states still wanted to retain some control over the Commission; hence committees of member states were set up to supervise the Commission - the so-called ‘comitology committees’. These committees have been engaged in two functions in delegated legislation: cooperation and coordination at a preparatory stage; and the control at the stage of formal decision-making. This control takes on various forms in different committee types. While in former times the Parliament did not play a role in comitology, over time it acquired a certain influence until, under the Lisbon Treaty, it became an equal partner to the Council under delegated acts (Art. 290).Less
The first chapter offers background information on the Commission’s implementing powers. The comitology system dates from the 1960s, when the Council, overburdened with the implementation of the common agricultural policy, decided to delegate some implementing powers to the Commission. However, a majority of member states still wanted to retain some control over the Commission; hence committees of member states were set up to supervise the Commission - the so-called ‘comitology committees’. These committees have been engaged in two functions in delegated legislation: cooperation and coordination at a preparatory stage; and the control at the stage of formal decision-making. This control takes on various forms in different committee types. While in former times the Parliament did not play a role in comitology, over time it acquired a certain influence until, under the Lisbon Treaty, it became an equal partner to the Council under delegated acts (Art. 290).
Gijs Jan Brandsma and Jens Blom-Hansen
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198767909
- eISBN:
- 9780191821769
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198767909.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Every year the EU Commission issues thousands of rules based on powers delegated by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. But delegation is carefully controlled. Traditionally, ...
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Every year the EU Commission issues thousands of rules based on powers delegated by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. But delegation is carefully controlled. Traditionally, control has been exerted through a system of committees of member state representatives (‘comitology’). However, this system was contested by the European Parliament which was left without any influence. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a new control regime for delegated powers, the so-called delegated acts system, which was meant to supplement the existing system. The new system involves direct control by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament and thus for the first time gave the European Parliament real influence over delegated powers. However, the choice over which delegation regime to use in practice has turned into one of the most vehement institutional conflicts in the EU political system. Controlling the EU Executive represents the first comprehensive investigation of this conflict. It does so by a combination of methods and data, including process-tracing of the introduction of the new system in the Lisbon Treaty, case studies of selected post-Lisbon delegation situations, and statistical analysis of data sets comprising hundreds of post-Lisbon legislative files.Less
Every year the EU Commission issues thousands of rules based on powers delegated by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. But delegation is carefully controlled. Traditionally, control has been exerted through a system of committees of member state representatives (‘comitology’). However, this system was contested by the European Parliament which was left without any influence. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a new control regime for delegated powers, the so-called delegated acts system, which was meant to supplement the existing system. The new system involves direct control by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament and thus for the first time gave the European Parliament real influence over delegated powers. However, the choice over which delegation regime to use in practice has turned into one of the most vehement institutional conflicts in the EU political system. Controlling the EU Executive represents the first comprehensive investigation of this conflict. It does so by a combination of methods and data, including process-tracing of the introduction of the new system in the Lisbon Treaty, case studies of selected post-Lisbon delegation situations, and statistical analysis of data sets comprising hundreds of post-Lisbon legislative files.
Carl Fredrik Bergström
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199280018
- eISBN:
- 9780191700095
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280018.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
This chapter covers the period 1985 to 2000 and the development of the committee system during the years that saw the old Community transform into a European Union. The exact nature of the new Union ...
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This chapter covers the period 1985 to 2000 and the development of the committee system during the years that saw the old Community transform into a European Union. The exact nature of the new Union was far from clear but was something which had to be discussed and specified after it had come into existence. No one fought harder than the European Parliament. Once it was given what it had always asked for — a real right to participate in the legislative process — it immediately used that right to get more, and soon the European Union was ravaged by an inter-institutional battle. A breeding ground for this battle was found in the so-called Comitology Decision and the ‘constitutional’ arrangement for exercise of implementing powers that had resulted from the 1985 reform of the Treaty.Less
This chapter covers the period 1985 to 2000 and the development of the committee system during the years that saw the old Community transform into a European Union. The exact nature of the new Union was far from clear but was something which had to be discussed and specified after it had come into existence. No one fought harder than the European Parliament. Once it was given what it had always asked for — a real right to participate in the legislative process — it immediately used that right to get more, and soon the European Union was ravaged by an inter-institutional battle. A breeding ground for this battle was found in the so-called Comitology Decision and the ‘constitutional’ arrangement for exercise of implementing powers that had resulted from the 1985 reform of the Treaty.
Paul Craig
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199568628
- eISBN:
- 9780191739415
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199568628.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The second edition of this book provides comprehensive coverage of the administrative system in the EU and the principles of judicial review that apply in this area. The chapters in the first half of ...
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The second edition of this book provides comprehensive coverage of the administrative system in the EU and the principles of judicial review that apply in this area. The chapters in the first half of the book deal with all the principal variants of the EU administrative regime. Thus, there are chapters dealing with the history and taxonomy of the EU administrative regime, direct administration, shared administration, Comitology, agencies, social partners, and the open method of coordination. The coverage throughout focuses on the legal regime that governs the particular form of administration and broader issues of accountability, drawing on literature from political science as well as law. The focus in the second part of the book shifts to the principles of judicial review. There are detailed chapters covering all principles of judicial review and the discussion of the law throughout is analytical and contextual. The discussion in this part of the book begins with a chapter that considers the principles that have informed the development of EU judicial review. This is followed by a chapter dealing with the judicial system and the way in which reform could impact on the subject matter of the book. There are then chapters dealing with competence, access, transparency, process; law, fact and discretion; rights, equality, legitimate expectations, two chapters on proportionality, the precautionary principle, two chapters on remedies, and the ombudsman. The book paints a comprehensive picture of administrative law as it exists in the EU today.Less
The second edition of this book provides comprehensive coverage of the administrative system in the EU and the principles of judicial review that apply in this area. The chapters in the first half of the book deal with all the principal variants of the EU administrative regime. Thus, there are chapters dealing with the history and taxonomy of the EU administrative regime, direct administration, shared administration, Comitology, agencies, social partners, and the open method of coordination. The coverage throughout focuses on the legal regime that governs the particular form of administration and broader issues of accountability, drawing on literature from political science as well as law. The focus in the second part of the book shifts to the principles of judicial review. There are detailed chapters covering all principles of judicial review and the discussion of the law throughout is analytical and contextual. The discussion in this part of the book begins with a chapter that considers the principles that have informed the development of EU judicial review. This is followed by a chapter dealing with the judicial system and the way in which reform could impact on the subject matter of the book. There are then chapters dealing with competence, access, transparency, process; law, fact and discretion; rights, equality, legitimate expectations, two chapters on proportionality, the precautionary principle, two chapters on remedies, and the ombudsman. The book paints a comprehensive picture of administrative law as it exists in the EU today.
Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe, and Alexander H. TÜrk
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199286485
- eISBN:
- 9780191730894
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286485.003.0009
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter discusses the organizational forms central to European administrative governance. It sets out the central features of these forms, their rationale(s) and, wherever possible, offers an ...
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This chapter discusses the organizational forms central to European administrative governance. It sets out the central features of these forms, their rationale(s) and, wherever possible, offers an assessment of the issues which they raise in terms of legitimacy and accountability. Specifically, it considers comitology, European agencies, various forms of European networks for administrative governance, the Open Method of Coordination, and organizational forms in which private parties play a dominant role.Less
This chapter discusses the organizational forms central to European administrative governance. It sets out the central features of these forms, their rationale(s) and, wherever possible, offers an assessment of the issues which they raise in terms of legitimacy and accountability. Specifically, it considers comitology, European agencies, various forms of European networks for administrative governance, the Open Method of Coordination, and organizational forms in which private parties play a dominant role.
Adrienne Héritier, Catherine Moury, Carina Bischoff, and Carl-Fredrik Bergström
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199653621
- eISBN:
- 9780191751349
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653621.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
This chapter examines how changes of powers in the interinstitutional balance have affected the willingness of the Commission and the Council to delegate legislative power to comitology committees. ...
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This chapter examines how changes of powers in the interinstitutional balance have affected the willingness of the Commission and the Council to delegate legislative power to comitology committees. For the areas of agricultural policy and taxation, it investigates the effects of the introduction of the 1999 comitology decision, which increased the competences of the Commission in the comitology procedure. We show that the Commission has proposed delegation to management and regulatory committees more extensively since the adoption of this decision. Surprisingly, the Council – which saw its own competences reduced by the decision - did not put up significant resistance to the more frequent use of delegation.Less
This chapter examines how changes of powers in the interinstitutional balance have affected the willingness of the Commission and the Council to delegate legislative power to comitology committees. For the areas of agricultural policy and taxation, it investigates the effects of the introduction of the 1999 comitology decision, which increased the competences of the Commission in the comitology procedure. We show that the Commission has proposed delegation to management and regulatory committees more extensively since the adoption of this decision. Surprisingly, the Council – which saw its own competences reduced by the decision - did not put up significant resistance to the more frequent use of delegation.
Carl Fredrik Bergström and Dominique Ritleng (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198703235
- eISBN:
- 9780191772535
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198703235.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This book examines the expectations on the new system for delegations of powers in the light of the experience after its first few years of operation and provides a balanced assessment of the legal ...
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This book examines the expectations on the new system for delegations of powers in the light of the experience after its first few years of operation and provides a balanced assessment of the legal implications. The basic question addressed is if the new system has really affected the old doctrine of delegation of powers, but a wide range of more specific aspects is also addressed. The book is divided into four main parts. In Part I the political and historical context is examined with special emphasis on driving forces behind reform and institutional reactions, strategic considerations, and competing agendas. In Part II the operation of the new system for delegation of powers is examined with focus on institutional practice and current interaction. In Part III a series of detailed analyses are made of the legal preconditions for delegation of powers and the emerging case law from the Court of Justice of the EU. In Part IV the procedural dimension is addressed and, in particular, the legal preconditions for private actors to participate in rulemaking by the European Commission. In addition to these parts there is, first, a general introduction which maps the development of the doctrine of delegation of powers and the EU regulatory productivity and, finally, a common conclusion where the striking patterns observed in this book are set out and its most forceful findings.Less
This book examines the expectations on the new system for delegations of powers in the light of the experience after its first few years of operation and provides a balanced assessment of the legal implications. The basic question addressed is if the new system has really affected the old doctrine of delegation of powers, but a wide range of more specific aspects is also addressed. The book is divided into four main parts. In Part I the political and historical context is examined with special emphasis on driving forces behind reform and institutional reactions, strategic considerations, and competing agendas. In Part II the operation of the new system for delegation of powers is examined with focus on institutional practice and current interaction. In Part III a series of detailed analyses are made of the legal preconditions for delegation of powers and the emerging case law from the Court of Justice of the EU. In Part IV the procedural dimension is addressed and, in particular, the legal preconditions for private actors to participate in rulemaking by the European Commission. In addition to these parts there is, first, a general introduction which maps the development of the doctrine of delegation of powers and the EU regulatory productivity and, finally, a common conclusion where the striking patterns observed in this book are set out and its most forceful findings.
Renaud Dehousse
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199246083
- eISBN:
- 9780191697548
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199246083.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
This chapter focuses on the relationship between European law and the functional needs of market integration of market governance. It begins by highlighting the main transformations occurring in ...
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This chapter focuses on the relationship between European law and the functional needs of market integration of market governance. It begins by highlighting the main transformations occurring in European Union governance. It then demonstrates the growing gap between new patterns of governance and traditional legal analyses. This is done by focusing on three sets of issues: comitology; the powers that can be conferred on specialized European agencies and other bodies whose existence was not contemplated by the EC Treaty; and the role of scientific expertise. Finally, the chapter considers the discrepancy between legal perceptions and functional realities.Less
This chapter focuses on the relationship between European law and the functional needs of market integration of market governance. It begins by highlighting the main transformations occurring in European Union governance. It then demonstrates the growing gap between new patterns of governance and traditional legal analyses. This is done by focusing on three sets of issues: comitology; the powers that can be conferred on specialized European agencies and other bodies whose existence was not contemplated by the EC Treaty; and the role of scientific expertise. Finally, the chapter considers the discrepancy between legal perceptions and functional realities.
Carl Fredrik Bergström
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199280018
- eISBN:
- 9780191700095
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280018.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
The book is divided into two main parts: a first part where the general development of the committee system is outlined and those aspects identified which must be considered to have been decisive; ...
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The book is divided into two main parts: a first part where the general development of the committee system is outlined and those aspects identified which must be considered to have been decisive; and a second part where the conclusions are drawn that shall answer the questions how and why. Although the first part is rather descriptive in character, it is based on a careful analysis. This is manifested in the selection and presentation of facts but also in the choice of direction: the problems, arguments, ideas, and sources which were reflected upon before the decision about how to proceed was taken.Less
The book is divided into two main parts: a first part where the general development of the committee system is outlined and those aspects identified which must be considered to have been decisive; and a second part where the conclusions are drawn that shall answer the questions how and why. Although the first part is rather descriptive in character, it is based on a careful analysis. This is manifested in the selection and presentation of facts but also in the choice of direction: the problems, arguments, ideas, and sources which were reflected upon before the decision about how to proceed was taken.
Carl Fredrik Bergström
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199280018
- eISBN:
- 9780191700095
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280018.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
This chapter offers a rather extensive summary. It hopes that it makes it possible to see a pattern with respect to the development of the committee system: the rather surprising consistency with ...
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This chapter offers a rather extensive summary. It hopes that it makes it possible to see a pattern with respect to the development of the committee system: the rather surprising consistency with which the actors involved have taken their positions. Importantly, it will also show which actors and positions have dominated the development and, indeed, the crucial moments of change, when prior positions have been reconsidered or even abandoned. Even if some conclusions presented deal with the more general aspects of the development of the committee system, the focus is on the actors and their positions. This chapter discusses overall conclusions the context of some recent events which are likely to have implications for the future of comitology and, indeed, the legal order which it is a part of.Less
This chapter offers a rather extensive summary. It hopes that it makes it possible to see a pattern with respect to the development of the committee system: the rather surprising consistency with which the actors involved have taken their positions. Importantly, it will also show which actors and positions have dominated the development and, indeed, the crucial moments of change, when prior positions have been reconsidered or even abandoned. Even if some conclusions presented deal with the more general aspects of the development of the committee system, the focus is on the actors and their positions. This chapter discusses overall conclusions the context of some recent events which are likely to have implications for the future of comitology and, indeed, the legal order which it is a part of.
Gijs Jan Brandsma and Jens Blom-Hansen
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198767909
- eISBN:
- 9780191821769
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198767909.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Chapter 3 begins the book’s empirical analysis. It focuses on the pre-Lisbon situation and investigates how delegation and control evolved from the early 1960s until the Lisbon Treaty came into ...
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Chapter 3 begins the book’s empirical analysis. It focuses on the pre-Lisbon situation and investigates how delegation and control evolved from the early 1960s until the Lisbon Treaty came into force. The argument is that the Council of Ministers installed the comitology system as a way to delegate without losing control. Since this control regime provides the member states with privileged control positions, it was immediately contested by the European Parliament, which, due to its weak institutional position, found it difficult to change the situation. However, the gradual empowerment of the European Parliament over the last twenty-five years has made it increasingly difficult for the Council to keep the member states’ privileged position in the comitology system. It is therefore the gradual empowerment of the European Parliament that is the key to understanding the evolution of the pre-Lisbon control regime over time.Less
Chapter 3 begins the book’s empirical analysis. It focuses on the pre-Lisbon situation and investigates how delegation and control evolved from the early 1960s until the Lisbon Treaty came into force. The argument is that the Council of Ministers installed the comitology system as a way to delegate without losing control. Since this control regime provides the member states with privileged control positions, it was immediately contested by the European Parliament, which, due to its weak institutional position, found it difficult to change the situation. However, the gradual empowerment of the European Parliament over the last twenty-five years has made it increasingly difficult for the Council to keep the member states’ privileged position in the comitology system. It is therefore the gradual empowerment of the European Parliament that is the key to understanding the evolution of the pre-Lisbon control regime over time.