JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
In this chapter, the author first presents a standard taxonomy of the major alternative positions about color ontology. The distinction between color realism and color irrealism is explored. Several ...
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In this chapter, the author first presents a standard taxonomy of the major alternative positions about color ontology. The distinction between color realism and color irrealism is explored. Several difficulties with the Standard Taxonomy are discussed including some directions in which one might proceed to refine the characterization of the options. The distinction between relationalist and non-relationalist accounts of color is then illustrated. The author argues that this distinction is useful in understanding the space of alternative views on color ontology because it crystallizes a central set of issues that divides the accounts, and does so while sidestepping problems that plague the Standard Taxonomy. Further, an alternative Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology is then provided as a useful way to clarify the relationship of color relationalism to other views.Less
In this chapter, the author first presents a standard taxonomy of the major alternative positions about color ontology. The distinction between color realism and color irrealism is explored. Several difficulties with the Standard Taxonomy are discussed including some directions in which one might proceed to refine the characterization of the options. The distinction between relationalist and non-relationalist accounts of color is then illustrated. The author argues that this distinction is useful in understanding the space of alternative views on color ontology because it crystallizes a central set of issues that divides the accounts, and does so while sidestepping problems that plague the Standard Taxonomy. Further, an alternative Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology is then provided as a useful way to clarify the relationship of color relationalism to other views.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
A relationalist treatment of the phenomenology of color is offered in this chapter. It explores the accusation that color relationalism is inconsistent with the ordinary color phenomenology, and that ...
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A relationalist treatment of the phenomenology of color is offered in this chapter. It explores the accusation that color relationalism is inconsistent with the ordinary color phenomenology, and that it cannot be coherently combined with plausible theories of the nature of color phenomenology. To defend relationalism against both types of phenomenological objections, the aim of this chapter is to illustrate that color relationalism is not in conflict with the phenomenological evidence about color once one understands just how phenomenology can be useful in addressing questions of color ontology and that it presents no special difficulties regarding the metaphysics of color experience. Furthermore, the threat of regress dissolves when it is seen that it depends crucially on substitution instances that one has reason to reject, and that relationalism is not ungrounded in any sense that would prevent understanding of the theory.Less
A relationalist treatment of the phenomenology of color is offered in this chapter. It explores the accusation that color relationalism is inconsistent with the ordinary color phenomenology, and that it cannot be coherently combined with plausible theories of the nature of color phenomenology. To defend relationalism against both types of phenomenological objections, the aim of this chapter is to illustrate that color relationalism is not in conflict with the phenomenological evidence about color once one understands just how phenomenology can be useful in addressing questions of color ontology and that it presents no special difficulties regarding the metaphysics of color experience. Furthermore, the threat of regress dissolves when it is seen that it depends crucially on substitution instances that one has reason to reject, and that relationalism is not ungrounded in any sense that would prevent understanding of the theory.
JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556168
- eISBN:
- 9780191701672
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556168.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter compares role functionalism with other forms of color relationalism that have attracted philosophical adherents and argues that these alternative forms of relationalism all have serious ...
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This chapter compares role functionalism with other forms of color relationalism that have attracted philosophical adherents and argues that these alternative forms of relationalism all have serious drawbacks. Specifically, these forms include color dispositionalism, ecological relationalism, and sensory classificationalism. The author argues that dispositionalism either collapses onto role functionalism or rests on an implausible account of the relationship between dispositions and their bases. Ecological relationalism, on the other hand, falls prey to worries about multiple realization and is committed either to an unacceptable form of idealism or mislocates colors. Lastly, sensory classficationism links too tightly the perceptual classificatory responses of organisms and their subsequent epistemic or non-epistemic actions. With these contentions at hand, this chapter asserts that the role functionalism is the most promising species of relationalist color ontology.Less
This chapter compares role functionalism with other forms of color relationalism that have attracted philosophical adherents and argues that these alternative forms of relationalism all have serious drawbacks. Specifically, these forms include color dispositionalism, ecological relationalism, and sensory classificationalism. The author argues that dispositionalism either collapses onto role functionalism or rests on an implausible account of the relationship between dispositions and their bases. Ecological relationalism, on the other hand, falls prey to worries about multiple realization and is committed either to an unacceptable form of idealism or mislocates colors. Lastly, sensory classficationism links too tightly the perceptual classificatory responses of organisms and their subsequent epistemic or non-epistemic actions. With these contentions at hand, this chapter asserts that the role functionalism is the most promising species of relationalist color ontology.
Jonathan Cohen and Mohan Matthen (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262013857
- eISBN:
- 9780262312493
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262013857.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Philosophers and scientists have long speculated about the nature of color. Atomists such as Democritus thought color to be “conventional,” not real; Galileo and other key figures of the Scientific ...
More
Philosophers and scientists have long speculated about the nature of color. Atomists such as Democritus thought color to be “conventional,” not real; Galileo and other key figures of the Scientific Revolution thought that it was an erroneous projection of our own sensations onto external objects. More recently, philosophers have enriched the debate about color by aligning the most advanced color science with the most sophisticated methods of analytical philosophy. In this book, scientists and philosophers examine new problems with new analytic tools, considering such topics as the psychophysical measurement of color and its implications, the nature of color experience in both normal color-perceivers and the color blind, and questions that arise from what we now know about the neural processing of color information, color consciousness, and color language. Taken together, these chapters point toward a complete restructuring of current orthodoxy concerning color experience and how it relates to objective reality. Kuehni, Jameson, Mausfeld, and Niederee discuss how the traditional framework of a three-dimensional color space and basic color terms is far too simple to capture the complexities of color experience.Less
Philosophers and scientists have long speculated about the nature of color. Atomists such as Democritus thought color to be “conventional,” not real; Galileo and other key figures of the Scientific Revolution thought that it was an erroneous projection of our own sensations onto external objects. More recently, philosophers have enriched the debate about color by aligning the most advanced color science with the most sophisticated methods of analytical philosophy. In this book, scientists and philosophers examine new problems with new analytic tools, considering such topics as the psychophysical measurement of color and its implications, the nature of color experience in both normal color-perceivers and the color blind, and questions that arise from what we now know about the neural processing of color information, color consciousness, and color language. Taken together, these chapters point toward a complete restructuring of current orthodoxy concerning color experience and how it relates to objective reality. Kuehni, Jameson, Mausfeld, and Niederee discuss how the traditional framework of a three-dimensional color space and basic color terms is far too simple to capture the complexities of color experience.
M. Chirimuuta
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029087
- eISBN:
- 9780262327435
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029087.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter introduces the reader to the philosophical debate around color and gives an overview of the central themes and conclusions of the book. It proposes that there are two distinct ways of ...
More
This chapter introduces the reader to the philosophical debate around color and gives an overview of the central themes and conclusions of the book. It proposes that there are two distinct ways of setting up the problem of color ontology. The first is through cases of perceptual variation (as illustrated by Betrand Russell) and the second is through the clash of the “manifest” and “scientific images” (as illustrated by Arthur Eddington and Wilfrid Sellars). Comparisons are drawn between the debate over color and other topics in philosophy concerning the nature of perceptual experience, the relationship between neurophysiology and psychology, and more generally, the place of mind in nature.Less
This chapter introduces the reader to the philosophical debate around color and gives an overview of the central themes and conclusions of the book. It proposes that there are two distinct ways of setting up the problem of color ontology. The first is through cases of perceptual variation (as illustrated by Betrand Russell) and the second is through the clash of the “manifest” and “scientific images” (as illustrated by Arthur Eddington and Wilfrid Sellars). Comparisons are drawn between the debate over color and other topics in philosophy concerning the nature of perceptual experience, the relationship between neurophysiology and psychology, and more generally, the place of mind in nature.
M. Chirimuuta
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029087
- eISBN:
- 9780262327435
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029087.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Is color real or illusory, mind independent or mind dependent? The metaphysical debate over color has gone on at least since the seventeenth century. In this book, M. Chirimuuta draws on contemporary ...
More
Is color real or illusory, mind independent or mind dependent? The metaphysical debate over color has gone on at least since the seventeenth century. In this book, M. Chirimuuta draws on contemporary perceptual science to address these questions. Her account integrates historical philosophical debates, contemporary work in the philosophy of color, and recent findings in neuroscience and vision science to propose a novel theory of the relationship between color and physical reality. Chirimuuta offers an overview of philosophy’s approach to the problem of color, finds the origins of much of the familiar conception of color in Aristotelian theories of perception, and describes the assumptions that have shaped contemporary philosophy of color. She then reviews recent work in perceptual science that challenges philosophers’ accounts of color experience. Finally, she offers a pragmatic alternative whereby perceptual states are understood primarily as action-guiding interactions between a perceiver and the environment. The fact that perceptual states are shaped in idiosyncratic ways by the needs and interests of the perceiver does not render the states illusory. Colors are perceiver-dependent properties, and yet our awareness of them does not mislead us about the world. Colors force us to reconsider what we mean by accurately presenting external reality, and, as this book demonstrates, thinking about color has important consequences for the philosophy of perception and, more generally, for the philosophy of mind.Less
Is color real or illusory, mind independent or mind dependent? The metaphysical debate over color has gone on at least since the seventeenth century. In this book, M. Chirimuuta draws on contemporary perceptual science to address these questions. Her account integrates historical philosophical debates, contemporary work in the philosophy of color, and recent findings in neuroscience and vision science to propose a novel theory of the relationship between color and physical reality. Chirimuuta offers an overview of philosophy’s approach to the problem of color, finds the origins of much of the familiar conception of color in Aristotelian theories of perception, and describes the assumptions that have shaped contemporary philosophy of color. She then reviews recent work in perceptual science that challenges philosophers’ accounts of color experience. Finally, she offers a pragmatic alternative whereby perceptual states are understood primarily as action-guiding interactions between a perceiver and the environment. The fact that perceptual states are shaped in idiosyncratic ways by the needs and interests of the perceiver does not render the states illusory. Colors are perceiver-dependent properties, and yet our awareness of them does not mislead us about the world. Colors force us to reconsider what we mean by accurately presenting external reality, and, as this book demonstrates, thinking about color has important consequences for the philosophy of perception and, more generally, for the philosophy of mind.
