Jean J. Gabszewicz
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198233411
- eISBN:
- 9780191596292
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198233418.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Perfect competition provides a model of a frictionless economy in which economic agents behave independently of each other, abandoning to the market the task of coordinating their individual ...
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Perfect competition provides a model of a frictionless economy in which economic agents behave independently of each other, abandoning to the market the task of coordinating their individual decisions. This model is extensively studied in traditional price theory textbooks.Imperfect competition is the paradigm that develops when, on the contrary, economic agents interact in a conscious manner, which is necessarily the case when competition takes place ‘among the few’. In this system, agents act strategically, taking into account the impact of their own decisions on competitors ‘behaviour and on the price mechanism. Such situations commonly arise when firms differentiate their products, erect strategic entry barriers, or exploit the imperfect information of their customers about the price or characteristics of their product.This book explores the theoretical richness of these economic contexts, using some basic concepts of game theory. The four assumptions underlying the paradigm of perfect competition (no barriers to entry, large number of agents, product homogeneity, and perfect information) constitute the natural departure points of the theories of imperfect competition: whenever at least one of these assumptions is violated, imperfect competition is present. The framework of the book is organized around the four corresponding themes: the role of collusion and entry barriers in the degree of market competition (Ch. 3), product differentiation (Ch. 4) and the information of agents as an instrument of competition (Ch. 5). Finally, Ch. 6 illustrates the possibility of extending the theory to a general equilibrium framework.Less
Perfect competition provides a model of a frictionless economy in which economic agents behave independently of each other, abandoning to the market the task of coordinating their individual decisions. This model is extensively studied in traditional price theory textbooks.
Imperfect competition is the paradigm that develops when, on the contrary, economic agents interact in a conscious manner, which is necessarily the case when competition takes place ‘among the few’. In this system, agents act strategically, taking into account the impact of their own decisions on competitors ‘behaviour and on the price mechanism. Such situations commonly arise when firms differentiate their products, erect strategic entry barriers, or exploit the imperfect information of their customers about the price or characteristics of their product.
This book explores the theoretical richness of these economic contexts, using some basic concepts of game theory. The four assumptions underlying the paradigm of perfect competition (no barriers to entry, large number of agents, product homogeneity, and perfect information) constitute the natural departure points of the theories of imperfect competition: whenever at least one of these assumptions is violated, imperfect competition is present. The framework of the book is organized around the four corresponding themes: the role of collusion and entry barriers in the degree of market competition (Ch. 3), product differentiation (Ch. 4) and the information of agents as an instrument of competition (Ch. 5). Finally, Ch. 6 illustrates the possibility of extending the theory to a general equilibrium framework.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with perfect monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion and price wars in oligopolistic industries subject to ...
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This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with perfect monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion and price wars in oligopolistic industries subject to demand shocks, government policy and time consistency, and endogenous risk sharing (e.g., insurance).Less
This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with perfect monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion and price wars in oligopolistic industries subject to demand shocks, government policy and time consistency, and endogenous risk sharing (e.g., insurance).
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion in oligopoly with imperfectly monitored demand, ...
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This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion in oligopoly with imperfectly monitored demand, oligopoly games with privately observed costs and hence adverse selection, risk sharing and insurance, and repeated principal-agent problems. The latter example also illustrates review strategies.Less
This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion in oligopoly with imperfectly monitored demand, oligopoly games with privately observed costs and hence adverse selection, risk sharing and insurance, and repeated principal-agent problems. The latter example also illustrates review strategies.
Xiudian Dai
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199535026
- eISBN:
- 9780191715860
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199535026.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, European Union
The Commission promotes a competitive technology and related industrial policy through its coordination Framework Programmes. Commission funding is concentrated on a variety of Information Society ...
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The Commission promotes a competitive technology and related industrial policy through its coordination Framework Programmes. Commission funding is concentrated on a variety of Information Society Technologies. This chapter examines its role through two case studies of advanced television broadcasting technologies projects: High Definition Television (HDTV) and Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB). Competing leadership candidates with the Commission for HDTV included the French and Dutch national governments and major firms based on government-industry collusion in the service of competitiveness. The HDTV flagship project to meet the Japanese and American challenge, supported by the Commission and Council of Ministers with subsidies, was a failure of European technology policy. The DVB firm-led consortium has by contrast been market-driven and successful without public subsidy.Less
The Commission promotes a competitive technology and related industrial policy through its coordination Framework Programmes. Commission funding is concentrated on a variety of Information Society Technologies. This chapter examines its role through two case studies of advanced television broadcasting technologies projects: High Definition Television (HDTV) and Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB). Competing leadership candidates with the Commission for HDTV included the French and Dutch national governments and major firms based on government-industry collusion in the service of competitiveness. The HDTV flagship project to meet the Japanese and American challenge, supported by the Commission and Council of Ministers with subsidies, was a failure of European technology policy. The DVB firm-led consortium has by contrast been market-driven and successful without public subsidy.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300574
- eISBN:
- 9780199783748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0017
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter examines noncooperative bargaining models and links them with cooperative bargaining concepts in accordance with the Nash program. Following a discussion of what matters in real-life ...
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This chapter examines noncooperative bargaining models and links them with cooperative bargaining concepts in accordance with the Nash program. Following a discussion of what matters in real-life bargaining, the case in which commitment is possible is studied using the Nash Demand Game. It is shown that a Nash equilibrium of the smoothed version of the Nash Demand Game implements the Nash bargaining solution. Nash threat games are then considered with an application to collusion in Cournot models. The case in which commitment is impossible is considered. Rubinbstein's bargaining model is introduced using one-stage and two-stage Ultimatum Games to set the scene. Rubinstein's theorem that his model has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is proved. The outcome is shown to converge on an asymmetric version of the Nash bargaining solution when the time interval between successive proposals becomes sufficiently small. The chapter ends with a discussion of common mistakes in applying the theory.Less
This chapter examines noncooperative bargaining models and links them with cooperative bargaining concepts in accordance with the Nash program. Following a discussion of what matters in real-life bargaining, the case in which commitment is possible is studied using the Nash Demand Game. It is shown that a Nash equilibrium of the smoothed version of the Nash Demand Game implements the Nash bargaining solution. Nash threat games are then considered with an application to collusion in Cournot models. The case in which commitment is impossible is considered. Rubinbstein's bargaining model is introduced using one-stage and two-stage Ultimatum Games to set the scene. Rubinstein's theorem that his model has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is proved. The outcome is shown to converge on an asymmetric version of the Nash bargaining solution when the time interval between successive proposals becomes sufficiently small. The chapter ends with a discussion of common mistakes in applying the theory.
Yung Chul Park
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276776
- eISBN:
- 9780191603051
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276773.003.0013
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
Corporate sector reform in crisis-countries focused on rescuing ailing and bankrupt firms, strengthening the legal system for bankruptcies, restructuring large family-owned corporations, and ...
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Corporate sector reform in crisis-countries focused on rescuing ailing and bankrupt firms, strengthening the legal system for bankruptcies, restructuring large family-owned corporations, and improving overall corporate governance. These reforms have received mixed reviews, and there is a risk that the reform process will lose steam.Less
Corporate sector reform in crisis-countries focused on rescuing ailing and bankrupt firms, strengthening the legal system for bankruptcies, restructuring large family-owned corporations, and improving overall corporate governance. These reforms have received mixed reviews, and there is a risk that the reform process will lose steam.
Jerome Neu
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195314311
- eISBN:
- 9780199871780
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314311.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Humor, like ritual, may sometimes license otherwise offensive insults. When and why? The special genre of insult humor, including roasts, is considered along with Freud's account of the role of ...
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Humor, like ritual, may sometimes license otherwise offensive insults. When and why? The special genre of insult humor, including roasts, is considered along with Freud's account of the role of collusion in tendentious humor broadly conceived. When is it wrong to laugh? Satire, teasing, and bullying sometimes take the ridicule in insult humor to the extremes of aggression.Less
Humor, like ritual, may sometimes license otherwise offensive insults. When and why? The special genre of insult humor, including roasts, is considered along with Freud's account of the role of collusion in tendentious humor broadly conceived. When is it wrong to laugh? Satire, teasing, and bullying sometimes take the ridicule in insult humor to the extremes of aggression.
Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, Hiranya Mukhopadhyay, and Uday Bhanu Sinha
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198073970
- eISBN:
- 9780199081615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198073970.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This book discusses various aspects of economic theory and quantitative techniques and their applications and relevance to policymaking. It features contributions from economists who have come ...
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This book discusses various aspects of economic theory and quantitative techniques and their applications and relevance to policymaking. It features contributions from economists who have come together to honour Anjan Mukherji, arguably one of India's most distinguished economists. After providing a brief account of Mukherji's life and works, this chapter presents an overview of the book, which is divided into three parts. Part I deals with general equilibrium, macroeconomics, and economic dynamics; Part II focuses on applications of game theory to economics and information economics; while Part III explores India's socio-economic problems relating to India. Topics range from Markov processes to wealth effects, aspects of economic growth and applications of dynamic modelling to resource management and international competition, efficiency wages, collusion in oligopolies, cartels in international competition, price competition in a mixed duopoly, and strategic aspects of liability rules and liquidity preference.Less
This book discusses various aspects of economic theory and quantitative techniques and their applications and relevance to policymaking. It features contributions from economists who have come together to honour Anjan Mukherji, arguably one of India's most distinguished economists. After providing a brief account of Mukherji's life and works, this chapter presents an overview of the book, which is divided into three parts. Part I deals with general equilibrium, macroeconomics, and economic dynamics; Part II focuses on applications of game theory to economics and information economics; while Part III explores India's socio-economic problems relating to India. Topics range from Markov processes to wealth effects, aspects of economic growth and applications of dynamic modelling to resource management and international competition, efficiency wages, collusion in oligopolies, cartels in international competition, price competition in a mixed duopoly, and strategic aspects of liability rules and liquidity preference.
G. B. Richardson
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292432
- eISBN:
- 9780191596810
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292430.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
A firm's investment will prove profitable only if aggregate competitive investment is not excessive and complementary investments are sufficient. This chapter examines the factors necessary to ensure ...
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A firm's investment will prove profitable only if aggregate competitive investment is not excessive and complementary investments are sufficient. This chapter examines the factors necessary to ensure the first of these conditions: these may include differences among firms in their awareness of profit opportunities and in their ability to respond to them, connections between sellers and buyers, which give a degree of stability to market shares, and some measure of inter‐firm collusion.Less
A firm's investment will prove profitable only if aggregate competitive investment is not excessive and complementary investments are sufficient. This chapter examines the factors necessary to ensure the first of these conditions: these may include differences among firms in their awareness of profit opportunities and in their ability to respond to them, connections between sellers and buyers, which give a degree of stability to market shares, and some measure of inter‐firm collusion.
G. B. Richardson
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292432
- eISBN:
- 9780191596810
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292430.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Competition is required to provide incentives and efficient selection. This chapter considers how the performance of these disciplinary and evolutionary functions is affected by the circumstances, ...
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Competition is required to provide incentives and efficient selection. This chapter considers how the performance of these disciplinary and evolutionary functions is affected by the circumstances, such as price stability and implicit collusion, which provide predictability, and thereby permit informed investment decisions.Less
Competition is required to provide incentives and efficient selection. This chapter considers how the performance of these disciplinary and evolutionary functions is affected by the circumstances, such as price stability and implicit collusion, which provide predictability, and thereby permit informed investment decisions.
Jean J. Gabszewicz
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198233411
- eISBN:
- 9780191596292
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198233418.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Examines in turn the four assumptions defining a perfectly competitive market: a large number of buyers and sellers, no entry barrier, product homogeneity, and perfect information. Then, we state the ...
More
Examines in turn the four assumptions defining a perfectly competitive market: a large number of buyers and sellers, no entry barrier, product homogeneity, and perfect information. Then, we state the problems arising when these assumptions are relaxed: existence of entry barriers, collusion of economic agents, product differentiation, and competition with uninformed buyers. An introduction to the basic game‐theoretic equilibrium concepts used in the book is also provided at the end of this chapter.Less
Examines in turn the four assumptions defining a perfectly competitive market: a large number of buyers and sellers, no entry barrier, product homogeneity, and perfect information. Then, we state the problems arising when these assumptions are relaxed: existence of entry barriers, collusion of economic agents, product differentiation, and competition with uninformed buyers. An introduction to the basic game‐theoretic equilibrium concepts used in the book is also provided at the end of this chapter.
Jean J. Gabszewicz
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198233411
- eISBN:
- 9780191596292
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198233418.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Examines how the market solution is affected when the assumption of a large number of buyers and sellers is relaxed. After analysing market contexts involving a very small number of strategic agents ...
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Examines how the market solution is affected when the assumption of a large number of buyers and sellers is relaxed. After analysing market contexts involving a very small number of strategic agents (monopoly and duopoly), we consider the consequences of entry on the market solution when entry barriers are absent. Then we extend the analysis to the case when incumbent firms anticipate the entry of potential competitors. Finally, the effects of collusion are analysed at the end of this chapter.Less
Examines how the market solution is affected when the assumption of a large number of buyers and sellers is relaxed. After analysing market contexts involving a very small number of strategic agents (monopoly and duopoly), we consider the consequences of entry on the market solution when entry barriers are absent. Then we extend the analysis to the case when incumbent firms anticipate the entry of potential competitors. Finally, the effects of collusion are analysed at the end of this chapter.
Hiroyuki Odagiri
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198288732
- eISBN:
- 9780191596711
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198288735.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
Competition, it is argued, is a behavioural concept, and the growth pursuit of Japanese firms and their preference for internal growth over mergers and acquisitions make the markets competitive, ...
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Competition, it is argued, is a behavioural concept, and the growth pursuit of Japanese firms and their preference for internal growth over mergers and acquisitions make the markets competitive, probably more so than in other countries. This argument is consistent with the international comparison of the level and variance of profit rates, particularly the smaller inter‐firm variance of profit rates in Japan than in the USA and the UK.. The extent of the persistence of profits is also examined, which again suggests that a more competitive force is present in Japan. Finally, our study on structure‐performance correlation suggests that for Japan as well as for the USA, collusion of oligopolistic firms may have been dominant in the 1960s but has become rather irrelevant in recent years.Less
Competition, it is argued, is a behavioural concept, and the growth pursuit of Japanese firms and their preference for internal growth over mergers and acquisitions make the markets competitive, probably more so than in other countries. This argument is consistent with the international comparison of the level and variance of profit rates, particularly the smaller inter‐firm variance of profit rates in Japan than in the USA and the UK.. The extent of the persistence of profits is also examined, which again suggests that a more competitive force is present in Japan. Finally, our study on structure‐performance correlation suggests that for Japan as well as for the USA, collusion of oligopolistic firms may have been dominant in the 1960s but has become rather irrelevant in recent years.
Jean‐Jacques Laffont
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199248681
- eISBN:
- 9780191596575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199248680.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter studies the design of reciprocal supervision between members of the same hierarchy. It is shown that reciprocal capture may result in the form of a horizontal level exchange of favours, ...
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This chapter studies the design of reciprocal supervision between members of the same hierarchy. It is shown that reciprocal capture may result in the form of a horizontal level exchange of favours, which is costly to society. An example is also given where collusion is beneficial as it affects transaction costs in some states of nature.Less
This chapter studies the design of reciprocal supervision between members of the same hierarchy. It is shown that reciprocal capture may result in the form of a horizontal level exchange of favours, which is costly to society. An example is also given where collusion is beneficial as it affects transaction costs in some states of nature.
Jean‐Jacques Laffont
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199248681
- eISBN:
- 9780191596575
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199248680.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter studies horizontal collusion between interest groups in a Bayesian setting. Various models under complete and incomplete information are introduced and the different results are obtained ...
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This chapter studies horizontal collusion between interest groups in a Bayesian setting. Various models under complete and incomplete information are introduced and the different results are obtained as a function of the correlation of private information. The role of transaction costs within the coalition is found to be of crucial importance and a number of unresolved issues are outlined for future research.Less
This chapter studies horizontal collusion between interest groups in a Bayesian setting. Various models under complete and incomplete information are introduced and the different results are obtained as a function of the correlation of private information. The role of transaction costs within the coalition is found to be of crucial importance and a number of unresolved issues are outlined for future research.
Geoffrey Jones
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199249992
- eISBN:
- 9780191596483
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199249997.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
This chapter examines the revival of British trading companies between 1914 and 1945 in the face of the recession, including the Great Depression, the collapse of primary commodity prices, the ...
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This chapter examines the revival of British trading companies between 1914 and 1945 in the face of the recession, including the Great Depression, the collapse of primary commodity prices, the disruption of trade caused by import substitution and world wars. There was a loss of entrepreneurial vigour, but some continued geographical and product diversification. The survival of British trading companies rested on robust organizational structures and management systems, family ownership, collusive cartels, and imperial protection.Less
This chapter examines the revival of British trading companies between 1914 and 1945 in the face of the recession, including the Great Depression, the collapse of primary commodity prices, the disruption of trade caused by import substitution and world wars. There was a loss of entrepreneurial vigour, but some continued geographical and product diversification. The survival of British trading companies rested on robust organizational structures and management systems, family ownership, collusive cartels, and imperial protection.
Karl-Hermann Fischer and Christian Pfeil
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199253166
- eISBN:
- 9780191601651
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253161.003.0010
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
Offers an in-depth discussion of regulatory and competitive issues in German banking. Emphasising that regulation, market structure, and competitive conduct are deeply interrelated the authors look ...
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Offers an in-depth discussion of regulatory and competitive issues in German banking. Emphasising that regulation, market structure, and competitive conduct are deeply interrelated the authors look at bank regulation from an Industrial Organisation perspective. Special consideration is given to the three-pillar structure of German banking comprising private, public, and co-operative banking institutions as well as to the driving forces that shaped bank regulation and supervision from its beginning in 1931. To assess market structure and competition in Germany’s banking market, the available empirical evidence is carefully discussed. A concluding section points to the challenges stemming from the decision to phase out state-guarantees for public banks.Less
Offers an in-depth discussion of regulatory and competitive issues in German banking. Emphasising that regulation, market structure, and competitive conduct are deeply interrelated the authors look at bank regulation from an Industrial Organisation perspective. Special consideration is given to the three-pillar structure of German banking comprising private, public, and co-operative banking institutions as well as to the driving forces that shaped bank regulation and supervision from its beginning in 1931. To assess market structure and competition in Germany’s banking market, the available empirical evidence is carefully discussed. A concluding section points to the challenges stemming from the decision to phase out state-guarantees for public banks.
Austin Carson
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780691181769
- eISBN:
- 9780691184241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691181769.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter argues that escalation control and a shared desire to limit war can motivate covert intervention up front, collusion by major powers that detect it, and official non-acknowledgment if it ...
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This chapter argues that escalation control and a shared desire to limit war can motivate covert intervention up front, collusion by major powers that detect it, and official non-acknowledgment if it is widely exposed. Since World War I, large-scale escalation of war has become unacceptably costly, yet leader control of the escalation process has been simultaneously weakened. While a range of factors influence the escalation potential for war, this chapter focuses on two specific escalation-control problems: constraints created by domestic hawks and misunderstandings among adversaries about the value of limited war. It claims that backstaging military intervention allows rival leaders to insulate themselves and one another from domestic hawkish constraints. In addition, embracing the backstage communicates shared interest in keeping war limited. This basic relationship provides a unifying logic for the initial decision to intervene covertly, a detector's decision to collude after detection, and an intervener's continuing non-acknowledgment of a widely exposed intervention.Less
This chapter argues that escalation control and a shared desire to limit war can motivate covert intervention up front, collusion by major powers that detect it, and official non-acknowledgment if it is widely exposed. Since World War I, large-scale escalation of war has become unacceptably costly, yet leader control of the escalation process has been simultaneously weakened. While a range of factors influence the escalation potential for war, this chapter focuses on two specific escalation-control problems: constraints created by domestic hawks and misunderstandings among adversaries about the value of limited war. It claims that backstaging military intervention allows rival leaders to insulate themselves and one another from domestic hawkish constraints. In addition, embracing the backstage communicates shared interest in keeping war limited. This basic relationship provides a unifying logic for the initial decision to intervene covertly, a detector's decision to collude after detection, and an intervener's continuing non-acknowledgment of a widely exposed intervention.
Judy B. Rosener
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195119145
- eISBN:
- 9780199854882
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195119145.003.0006
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Strategy
In the advent of how women cause discomfort to their male coworkers, all professional women are aware of the fact that being female can bring both advantages and disadvantages to the work ...
More
In the advent of how women cause discomfort to their male coworkers, all professional women are aware of the fact that being female can bring both advantages and disadvantages to the work environment. Although some women express positive feedback regarding how they are being treated in their respective work environments, there are, nonetheless, still some cases wherein professional women may either feel neutral, or experience underutilization. By and large, women who harbor negative feelings towards how they are being treated in their workplaces tend to react in predictable ways: denial, collusion, acceptance, challenge, flight, and resorting to legal action. This chapter asserts that examining these reactions can be very useful to how executives may address the problem of female underutilization.Less
In the advent of how women cause discomfort to their male coworkers, all professional women are aware of the fact that being female can bring both advantages and disadvantages to the work environment. Although some women express positive feedback regarding how they are being treated in their respective work environments, there are, nonetheless, still some cases wherein professional women may either feel neutral, or experience underutilization. By and large, women who harbor negative feelings towards how they are being treated in their workplaces tend to react in predictable ways: denial, collusion, acceptance, challenge, flight, and resorting to legal action. This chapter asserts that examining these reactions can be very useful to how executives may address the problem of female underutilization.
Mordechai Bar-On
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198202417
- eISBN:
- 9780191675348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202417.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Middle East History
This chapter examines the question of collusion, which the author of this chapter witnessed at Sèvres as one of Ben-Gurion's military assistants. Ben-Gurion's purpose is brought into clear focus. He ...
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This chapter examines the question of collusion, which the author of this chapter witnessed at Sèvres as one of Ben-Gurion's military assistants. Ben-Gurion's purpose is brought into clear focus. He was certain that Nasser would attack Israel as soon as he could; he knew that the French wished to launch an attack on Nasser to quash the Algerian rebellion; but he harboured a deep mistrust of the British: he believed that they would encourage Jordanian annexation of the southern part of Israel, the Negev, to establish a British military base as a substitute for the Suez installations. This chapter systematically analyses the collaborative arrangement arrived at by the three parties at Sèvres on 22–4 October 1956.Less
This chapter examines the question of collusion, which the author of this chapter witnessed at Sèvres as one of Ben-Gurion's military assistants. Ben-Gurion's purpose is brought into clear focus. He was certain that Nasser would attack Israel as soon as he could; he knew that the French wished to launch an attack on Nasser to quash the Algerian rebellion; but he harboured a deep mistrust of the British: he believed that they would encourage Jordanian annexation of the southern part of Israel, the Negev, to establish a British military base as a substitute for the Suez installations. This chapter systematically analyses the collaborative arrangement arrived at by the three parties at Sèvres on 22–4 October 1956.
