Search Results

A Contract on Future Generations?

Stephen M. Gardiner

in Intergenerational Justice

Contract theories — such as contractarianism and contractualism — seek to justify (and sometimes to explain) moral and political ideals and principles through the notion of ‘mutually agreeable ... More

Contract theories — such as contractarianism and contractualism — seek to justify (and sometimes to explain) moral and political ideals and principles through the notion of ‘mutually agreeable reciprocity or cooperation between equals’ (Darwall 2002). This chapter argues that such theories face fundamental difficulties in the intergenerational setting. Most prominently, the standard understanding of cooperation appears not to apply, and the intergenerational setting brings on a more severe collective action problem than the traditional prisoner's dilemma. Mainstream contract theorists (such as Gauthier and Rawls) have tried to overcome such difficulties by postulating some kind of chain of connection between generations. However, as this chapter maintains, thus far such attempts have proven inadequate. Given this, it seems either that mainstream contract theory needs to be rethought, or that a new, specifically intergenerational, contract theory is needed.Less

Access Points and Bias in Trade Policy

Sean D. Ehrlich

in Access Points: An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity

This chapter and the two that follow use Access Point Theory to explain bias in policy outcomes, starting here with an examination of tariff rates and trade policy. Protectionists should have a ... More

This chapter and the two that follow use Access Point Theory to explain bias in policy outcomes, starting here with an examination of tariff rates and trade policy. Protectionists should have a lobbying advantage because the benefits of protection are concentrated on domestic industries that compete with imports while the costs of protection are dispersed among all consumers of the protected products so that it is easier for protectionists to overcome the collective action problem. As a result, the more access points there are, the higher the level of protection there will be. This chapter finds support for this argument by examining tariffs in post–World War II developed democracies as well as examining the effect of delegation to the President on tariff rates and Congressional lobbying on trade policy in the United States over the course of the twentieth century.Less

Collective-Action Problems and Institutional Systems

William D. Ferguson

in The Political Economy of Collective Action, Inequality, and Development

A society’s prospects for development depend on its ability to resolve collective-action problems (CAPs). Resolution depends on underlying institutional contexts. Inequality permeates these ... More

A society’s prospects for development depend on its ability to resolve collective-action problems (CAPs). Resolution depends on underlying institutional contexts. Inequality permeates these interactions. This chapter introduces CAPs, institutions, institutional systems, social orders, and political settlements. CAPs arise when individuals, pursuing their own goals, generate undesirable outcomes for some group. First-order CAPs concern forms of free riding; second-order CAPs concern orchestrating the coordination and enforcement that render agreements to limit free riding credible. Discussion proceeds to distinguish informal and formal institutions (norms and rules) from organizations (structured groups of individuals that can take action). Institutional systems are complementary mixes of institutions and organizations, where the latter play critical roles in resolving second-order CAPs. Social orders are large-scale institutional systems. Political settlements are mutual understandings that limit organized violence by addressing broad allocations of authority and benefits.Less

Democracy and the Commons

Steven Vogel

in Thinking like a Mall: Environmental Philosophy after the End of Nature

The collective action problem Hardin named the tragedy of the commons is another version of the phenomenon that Marx called alienation. The aggregated effect of the individual actions of myriad ... More

The collective action problem Hardin named the tragedy of the commons is another version of the phenomenon that Marx called alienation. The aggregated effect of the individual actions of myriad private individuals engaging in private transactions produces consequences harmful to all that none of them intend. This is the standard form of environmental problems. The “tragedy” does not arise from the selfishness or greed or stupidity of the individuals involved, but rather from their inability to find a way to decide together as a community what to do. This inability is characteristic of a social order based on market relations. The problem can only be solved by moving from the level of the market to the level of politics, in which decisions are made by a community as a whole, acting self-consciously as a community through discursive democratic processes.Less

How Much Environmental Regulation Will a Country Have?

Sean D. Ehrlich

in Access Points: An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity

Existing research has extensively examined whether democratic or dictatorial regimes are better for the environment, but little research has investigated how democracies might differ among ... More

Existing research has extensively examined whether democratic or dictatorial regimes are better for the environment, but little research has investigated how democracies might differ among themselves. This chapter argues that more access points in democracies should lead to fewer environmental regulations since regulated industries should enjoy a collective action advantage given that the costs of regulations are concentrated on these industries while the benefits are broadly dispersed, sometimes to everyone on the planet. This chapter tests this argument by examining how many environmental treaties a country becomes a party to as well as the level of environmental taxation in a country.Less

The Utopian Impulse in International Relations

in The Perils of Global Legalism

Economists call the various essential goods and services that cannot be supplied privately—including defense against external aggression, law enforcement, a currency, a social safety net, enforcement ... More

Economists call the various essential goods and services that cannot be supplied privately—including defense against external aggression, law enforcement, a currency, a social safety net, enforcement of property rights and contracts, environmental protection, a transportation infrastructure, basic education, and so forth—public or collective goods. These goods are those that are most efficiently supplied at a scale beyond that available to individuals or corporations: they are solutions to collective action problems. Yet governments fail to supply their populations with public goods that exist at a scale that transcends national borders—what this book calls global public goods. Global collective action problems, which pose the most significant challenges of our time, include war, pollution, overfishing, disease, and terrorism. This chapter explores global legalism as an approach to solving the problem of global collective action, and also discusses political integration (and its variant, hegemony), economic integration, and ideological integration. Finally, it considers the place of global legalism in international relations.Less

Collective Action and Dimensions of Power

Keith Dowding

in Rational Choice and Political Power

Taking the resource bargaining model of the previous chapter and applying the theory of action this chapter explodes some myths about the analysis of power. It carefully explains Steven Lukes three ... More

Taking the resource bargaining model of the previous chapter and applying the theory of action this chapter explodes some myths about the analysis of power. It carefully explains Steven Lukes three dimensions of power which forms the basis of much of the analysis of social power and then demonstrates Lukesaccount can be re-interpreted within the resource bargaining model. We do not need to impute several dimensions of power. By ignoring the collective action problem Lukes commits the same error that he attributes to others in their analysis of power. The chapter elucidates the political power or blame fallacy wherein one groups failure to promote their interests is explained by another’s group power over them. But groups can be powerless all on their own, and that is true even if the other groups could act to stop them. Distinguishing the capacity to act and the actual exercise of power is important if we wish to measure the power in society. We have to model capacities since they are not always revealed through action. It discusses the important work of John Gaventa and how his findings can be interpreted through the resource-bargaining model. It then applies the analysis to local government in the local state autonomy and the growth machine model.Less

Public Goods, Externalities, and Collective-Action Problems of Governance

William D. Ferguson

in The Political Economy of Collective Action, Inequality, and Development

This chapter addresses the book’s first developmental hypothesis and its relations to CAPs that complicate establishing functional governance: Development requires creating social arrangements that ... More

This chapter addresses the book’s first developmental hypothesis and its relations to CAPs that complicate establishing functional governance: Development requires creating social arrangements that deliver key public goods and services and that concurrently mitigate important negative externalities. Externalities are either positive or negative impacts of economic or political interactions on the noninvolved. Negative externalities include pollution and the spread of contagious disease; they arise from activities such as coal-powered electricity generation, crime, lack of sanitation, overuse of natural resources (e.g., deforestation), and excess conflict. Using game-theoretic logic, this chapter develops a few simple models that illustrate the basic CAPs and more detailed models that address how the political and economic incentives of rival coalitions influence the ability and motivation of governments to develop, utilize, and broadly or selectively apply state fiscal and legal capacity.Less

Rationality in Collective Action

Margaret Gilbert

in Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World

Two senses of “collective action” are discussed in this paper. To begin, “collective action” is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that such collective ... More

Two senses of “collective action” are discussed in this paper. To begin, “collective action” is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that such collective agency involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The author’s account of collective intentions is presented: at its core is her notion of joint commitment—a species of commitments of the will. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory are then considered. These problems include the prisoner’s dilemma, which involves a degree of conflict of interest, and coordination problems, which do not. An explanation is given of how, when such a problem is interpreted in terms of the parties’ inclinations over possible outcomes, a suitable collective intention resolves the problem for agents who are rational in a broad sense other than the game-theoretical one.Less

Problem, Background, Method

Matthew Simonton

in Classical Greek Oligarchy: A Political History

This book examines the rule of the few, or oligarchia (oligarchy), in ancient Greece. It considers the relationship between the rulers and the wider male citizenry (demos) of an oligarchically ... More

This book examines the rule of the few, or oligarchia (oligarchy), in ancient Greece. It considers the relationship between the rulers and the wider male citizenry (demos) of an oligarchically governed polis, the extent to which oligarchic rule was contested by popular movements, and how oligarchs might have collectively responded in an atempt to retain their power. This introductory chapter discusses the lack of studies devoted to ancient Greek oligarchia and how the meaning of oligarchia, both as a concept and as a form of political practice, relates to dēmokratia (democracy). It also provides an overview of the book's methodological approach, explores the extent to which the ideas of “institutions” and the “New Institutionalism” can be adapted and applied to the ancient world, and introduces some relevant concepts such as “equilibrium,” “common knowledge,” “coordination,” the “collective action problem,” and a few elementary games from game theory.Less

The Effect of Incentives: The Problem of Collective Action

Jason Brennan, William English, John Hasnas, and Peter Jaworski

in Business Ethics for Better Behavior

Even if cooperating will make everyone better off, cooperation won’t happen if people lack certain kinds of knowledge and motivation. In group settings, individuals will often have incentives to ... More

Even if cooperating will make everyone better off, cooperation won’t happen if people lack certain kinds of knowledge and motivation. In group settings, individuals will often have incentives to promote their own interest at the expense of the group, either by exploiting others or by failing to contribute to public goods. There are two ways to overcome these “collective action” problems: (1) the incentives that individuals face can be changed so that individual and group interest no longer conflict, and/or (2) group members can embrace norms that enable them to exercise self-restraint and forego opportunities to get ahead at the expense of others. The rule of law, property rights, and proper firm structure can help overcome collective action problems. However, these same structures can also create new opportunities for rent seeking.Less

The Innovation Problem

Jason Potts

in Innovation Commons: The Origin of Economic Growth

Explains the nature of the innovation problem as an economic problem in the context of economic trade and long-run growth. Distinguishes between a market failure definition of the innovation problem ... More

Explains the nature of the innovation problem as an economic problem in the context of economic trade and long-run growth. Distinguishes between a market failure definition of the innovation problem as an allocation problems and the innovation problem as a collective action problem of coordination and discovery. Defines the innovation commons as the zeroth phase of the innovation trajectory. Introduces the concept of discovery failure and discovery costs. This locates the argument of the book in the broader context of Schumpeterian, evolutionary, and Austrian “mainline economics” with a contextualization of the innovation problem simultaneously as both a knowledge problem and a coordination problem, and therefore as a governance problem solved with institutions.Less

The Organizational Basis of Constitutional Rights Protection

Adam S. Chilton and Mila Versteeg

in How Constitutional Rights Matter

This chapter develops a theoretical account of why organizations are key to enforcing constitutional rights. The starting point for our argument is that rights enforcement is not automatic; ... More

This chapter develops a theoretical account of why organizations are key to enforcing constitutional rights. The starting point for our argument is that rights enforcement is not automatic; governments that wish to violate rights will only refrain from doing so when violations are politically costly. Yet punishing governments for violating rights requires overcoming two problems: dedicated citizens must agree that certain government actions indeed constitute a violation (a coordination problem) and devise a strategy to impose such costs (a collective action problem). Formal organizations are well equipped to overcome these problems. When rights are practiced by or within organizations, these organizations will be motivated to protect their rights, even when rights protection is not their core mission. For example, religious groups are not established to protect religious freedom, but they have strong incentives to nonetheless do so when religious freedom is under threat. When rights are practiced on an individual basis, equivalent organizations do not exist. While civil society groups can attempt to enforce these rights, they rely on members dedicated specifically to rights protection and are therefore typically weaker than mass-membership organizations like organized religion, trade unions, or political parties.Less

Honorable Business and Valuing What We Ought

James R. Otteson

in Honorable Business: A Framework for Business in a Just and Humane Society

Chapter 8 looks at several more worries about, and objections raised to, markets and business. This chapter focuses specifically on concerns raised about how markets can induce us to misvalue ... More

Chapter 8 looks at several more worries about, and objections raised to, markets and business. This chapter focuses specifically on concerns raised about how markets can induce us to misvalue things—valuing some things too highly, valuing other things not enough. Chapter 8 argues that it is not things but rather people and their choices that should be valued. It also argues that one can advocate both liberty and virtue, that is, respecting people’s right to choose while retaining the moral authority to criticize—though not interfere with—their choices. It argues that working for wages is not plausibly similar to slavery and hence, contrary to some critics’ claims, should not be described as such. Finally, the chapter discusses tragedies of the commons and explores the ways that honorable business might address and mitigate some, if not all, of them.Less

The Use of Indicators to Measure Government Responses to Human Trafficking

Anne T. Gallagher and Janie Chuang

in Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and Rankings

This chapter explores the main efforts to produce compliance-focused indicators that can help improve international treaties against human trafficking. It shows that the power held by the US State ... More

This chapter explores the main efforts to produce compliance-focused indicators that can help improve international treaties against human trafficking. It shows that the power held by the US State Department (the organization that tried to pursue such indicators) is used unilaterally, and that this unilateralism can overcome a collective action problem. It then examines other functions of unilateralism, and shows that the indicators for human trafficking created by the US State Department are produced using criteria set by the US legislation.Less

The Flaws of Global Legalism

in The Perils of Global Legalism

If the rule of law has flourished in the United States and many (though not most) other states, why can't it flourish internationally? The global legalist might point out that individuals overcome ... More

If the rule of law has flourished in the United States and many (though not most) other states, why can't it flourish internationally? The global legalist might point out that individuals overcome domestic collective action problems by consenting to a domestic government that has the power to pass laws and punish those who violate them. If individuals can overcome collective action problems in this way, why can't states? Or, why can't individuals, acting through their states, solve global as well as within-state collective action problems? William Ian Miller has written of a quasi-legal system in early Iceland, one that lacked sophisticated legal institutions but seemed to keep a degree of order. Robert Ellickson has also described various settings in which people maintain complex cooperative relationship without relying on legal institutions. Why can't the same occur at the global level? This chapter examines the flaws of global legalism as well as the institutional weakness of international law. This weakness can be attributed to three problems: legislation without legislatures, enforcement without enforcers, and adjudication without courts.Less

The Conceptual Framework: Collective Action, Trust, Culture, and Ideas

Andrea Lorenzo Capussela

in The Political Economy of Italy's Decline

This chapter completes the theoretical framework of the book by juxtaposing institutional economics with the literature on the collective action problem, social norms, culture, and ideas. It ... More

This chapter completes the theoretical framework of the book by juxtaposing institutional economics with the literature on the collective action problem, social norms, culture, and ideas. It discusses the foundations of the collective action problem and the role of institutions—formal (laws) and informal (social norms)—in overcoming it. It links these studies with those on social capital, civicness, and the origins of generalized inter-personal trust. It criticizes the view—frequent in analyses of Italy—that a society’s culture is an independent obstacle to its development, and argues conversely that institutions, civicness, trust, and culture are part of the extant social order, and co-evolve. It ends with a discussion of the role of ideas, which are freer from the grip of the extant equilibrium and can lead elites, distributional coalitions, and ordinary citizens and firms to revise their assessment of their own interests and support efficiency-enhancing reforms.Less

From “Inconvenient Truth” to Effective Governance: The UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, and the Future of Climate Governance

Richard Passarelli, David Michel, and William Durch

in Just Security in an Undergoverned World

The Earth’s climate system is a global public good. Maintaining it is a collective action problem. This chapter looks at a quarter-century of efforts to understand and respond to the challenges posed ... More

The Earth’s climate system is a global public good. Maintaining it is a collective action problem. This chapter looks at a quarter-century of efforts to understand and respond to the challenges posed by global climate change and why the collective political response, until very recently, has seemed to lag so far behind our scientific knowledge of the problem. The chapter tracks the efforts of the main global, intergovernmental process for negotiating both useful and politically acceptable responses to climate change, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also highlights efforts by scientific and environmental groups and, more recently, networks of sub-national governments—especially cities—and of businesses to redefine interests so as to meet the dangers of climate system disruption.Less

Conclusion: A Conceptual Framework for Development Theory

William D. Ferguson

in The Political Economy of Collective Action, Inequality, and Development

Development entails sustained enhancement of economic and political capabilities across a society’s members and groups. This text presents a conceptual framework, fully developed in Chapters 8 and 9, ... More

Development entails sustained enhancement of economic and political capabilities across a society’s members and groups. This text presents a conceptual framework, fully developed in Chapters 8 and 9, that addresses the social scientist’s dilemma concerning how to approach systematic inquiry into the myriad complexities of political-economic development. To address pertinent contexts, this framework systematically addresses interactions between asymmetric distributions of power and institutional evolution. It relates distinct types of political settlements to distinct sets of developmental CAPs that shape development. Related inquiry can then focus on how principles from the five core hypotheses operate in specific political-economic contexts. Such analysis can uncover how specific types of policy innovations relate to prospects for successful adoption within specific contexts. This framework can also underlie broad research programs with many theoretical and modeling extensions, as well as multiple testable empirical hypotheses.Less