Timothy Johnston
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199604036
- eISBN:
- 9780191731600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604036.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History, Political History
Official Soviet Identity evolved in relation to the dramatic events of this period. By 1953 a successful and resilient version of Sovietness had emerged that stressed the peace-loving diplomatic ...
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Official Soviet Identity evolved in relation to the dramatic events of this period. By 1953 a successful and resilient version of Sovietness had emerged that stressed the peace-loving diplomatic identity of the USSR. The cultural aspect of Official Soviet Identity was less compelling, particularly when faced with a dynamic opponent such as the USA. The USSR collapsed when enough people decided they no longer wanted to be Soviet. The supra-national narrative of Sovietness was swept away by a tide of nationalist rhetoric, but nationalism was the beneficiary not the cause of the fallLess
Official Soviet Identity evolved in relation to the dramatic events of this period. By 1953 a successful and resilient version of Sovietness had emerged that stressed the peace-loving diplomatic identity of the USSR. The cultural aspect of Official Soviet Identity was less compelling, particularly when faced with a dynamic opponent such as the USA. The USSR collapsed when enough people decided they no longer wanted to be Soviet. The supra-national narrative of Sovietness was swept away by a tide of nationalist rhetoric, but nationalism was the beneficiary not the cause of the fall
Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785808
- eISBN:
- 9780804787154
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785808.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
The CIA was created in 1947 in large part to prevent another Pearl Harbor. On at least four dramatic occasions, the Agency failed at this task: prior to in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the ...
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The CIA was created in 1947 in large part to prevent another Pearl Harbor. On at least four dramatic occasions, the Agency failed at this task: prior to in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. There has been no shortage of studies to understand how such failures happened. Until now, however, none of the explanations proffered has been fully satisfying, and sometimes competing explanations have been mutually incompatible. In contrast, this book proposes a unified, coherent and rigorous theory of intelligence failure built on culture and identity. Crucially, the book takes a systematic look at Cassandras - people who offered strategic warning, but were ignored, to show that surprises could be anticipated. As the first post-positivist study of intelligence failure, the book views intelligence analysis as permeated by social facts, and thus firmly in the grip of the identity and culture of the intelligence producer, the CIA. As a consequence, it can present novel model of surprise that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, including the identities of analysts, the corporate identity of Langley as a whole, and the Agency's organizational culture. It suggests that by examining the key features of the Agency's identity and culture, we can arrive at a holistic, unified understanding of the intelligence failures that resulted in dramatic strategic surprises.Less
The CIA was created in 1947 in large part to prevent another Pearl Harbor. On at least four dramatic occasions, the Agency failed at this task: prior to in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. There has been no shortage of studies to understand how such failures happened. Until now, however, none of the explanations proffered has been fully satisfying, and sometimes competing explanations have been mutually incompatible. In contrast, this book proposes a unified, coherent and rigorous theory of intelligence failure built on culture and identity. Crucially, the book takes a systematic look at Cassandras - people who offered strategic warning, but were ignored, to show that surprises could be anticipated. As the first post-positivist study of intelligence failure, the book views intelligence analysis as permeated by social facts, and thus firmly in the grip of the identity and culture of the intelligence producer, the CIA. As a consequence, it can present novel model of surprise that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, including the identities of analysts, the corporate identity of Langley as a whole, and the Agency's organizational culture. It suggests that by examining the key features of the Agency's identity and culture, we can arrive at a holistic, unified understanding of the intelligence failures that resulted in dramatic strategic surprises.
Eren Tasar
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- November 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190652104
- eISBN:
- 9780190652135
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190652104.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
Dramatic changes took place in the religious sphere during the tumultous final years of Soviet history. Shamsuddin Boboxonov’s unprecedented ouster as mufti in 1989 offered a preview of the confusion ...
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Dramatic changes took place in the religious sphere during the tumultous final years of Soviet history. Shamsuddin Boboxonov’s unprecedented ouster as mufti in 1989 offered a preview of the confusion that was to come: SADUM’s disintegration into national muftiates for each of the five Central Asian republics took place rapidly, in a climate of ethnic conflict. Though the Central Asian muftiate ceased to exist in 1991, the precedents established by the CRA-SADUM alliance continued to shape relations between Islam and the state in the post-Soviet period. In one important respect, however, those relations have departed dramatically from the Soviet legacy: now that the independent republics have abandoned communism and atheism, little incentive exists for a moderate line toward religion. This explains why state policies toward religion in post-Soviet Central Asia became more repressive after the collapse of the USSR, not less.Less
Dramatic changes took place in the religious sphere during the tumultous final years of Soviet history. Shamsuddin Boboxonov’s unprecedented ouster as mufti in 1989 offered a preview of the confusion that was to come: SADUM’s disintegration into national muftiates for each of the five Central Asian republics took place rapidly, in a climate of ethnic conflict. Though the Central Asian muftiate ceased to exist in 1991, the precedents established by the CRA-SADUM alliance continued to shape relations between Islam and the state in the post-Soviet period. In one important respect, however, those relations have departed dramatically from the Soviet legacy: now that the independent republics have abandoned communism and atheism, little incentive exists for a moderate line toward religion. This explains why state policies toward religion in post-Soviet Central Asia became more repressive after the collapse of the USSR, not less.
