Willem A. deVries (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199573301
- eISBN:
- 9780191722172
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573301.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
These chapters in this book were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Wilfrid Sellars's essay ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, a landmark of 20th-century philosophy. Ranging widely ...
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These chapters in this book were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Wilfrid Sellars's essay ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, a landmark of 20th-century philosophy. Ranging widely through Sellars's oeuvre, the chapters are both appreciative and critical of Sellars's accomplishment. Their topics include the standing of empiricism in Sellars's philosophy, Sellars's theory of perception, his dissatisfaction with both foundationalist and coherentist epistemologies, his critique of idealism and commitment to realism, his conception of picturing, and the status of the normative (both the ‘logical space of reasons’ and the ‘manifest image’) in a broadly naturalistic form of scientific realism. These chapters show how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.Less
These chapters in this book were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Wilfrid Sellars's essay ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, a landmark of 20th-century philosophy. Ranging widely through Sellars's oeuvre, the chapters are both appreciative and critical of Sellars's accomplishment. Their topics include the standing of empiricism in Sellars's philosophy, Sellars's theory of perception, his dissatisfaction with both foundationalist and coherentist epistemologies, his critique of idealism and commitment to realism, his conception of picturing, and the status of the normative (both the ‘logical space of reasons’ and the ‘manifest image’) in a broadly naturalistic form of scientific realism. These chapters show how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.
A. N. Williams
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199236367
- eISBN:
- 9780191728556
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199236367.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This work proposes a new reading of Christian theology. Examining theological warrants, philosophical debates over the structures of arguments, and the role of beauty in intellectual structures, it ...
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This work proposes a new reading of Christian theology. Examining theological warrants, philosophical debates over the structures of arguments, and the role of beauty in intellectual structures, it suggests theology is inherently systematic, its systematicity reflecting its two subjects, ‘God and other things as they are related to God’ (Aquinas). The roles of the warrants (scripture, tradition, and reason) are re‐evaluated, showing their necessary interdependence. Debates in philosophical epistemology are also examined; these have conventionally contrasted foundationalism and coherentism. A contemporary consensus has emerged, however, of a chastened foundationalism or hybrid foundationalism‐coherentism, in light of which, arguments are understood both as reasoning from foundational propositions and as gaining plausibility from the coherence of claims. Theological arguments also exhibit a dual structure, with propositions underwritten by their dependence on both scripture and tradition and by their coherence in integrated webs, or systems. Theology is therefore shown to be systematic in its fundamental structure. The systematicity of theology is a function of its subject matter, ‘God and other things as they are related to God’. Both the two chief subjects of theology (God and humanity) and theology itself are characterized by rationality and relationality. Theology is therefore doubly mimetic, reflecting its subject matter in its structures of reasoning. The order and harmony of those structures however have an aesthetic appeal and potentially attract because of their beauty, rather than their truth. Theological aesthetics is surveyed, asking whether the beauty of systematic structures counts for or against their truth.Less
This work proposes a new reading of Christian theology. Examining theological warrants, philosophical debates over the structures of arguments, and the role of beauty in intellectual structures, it suggests theology is inherently systematic, its systematicity reflecting its two subjects, ‘God and other things as they are related to God’ (Aquinas). The roles of the warrants (scripture, tradition, and reason) are re‐evaluated, showing their necessary interdependence. Debates in philosophical epistemology are also examined; these have conventionally contrasted foundationalism and coherentism. A contemporary consensus has emerged, however, of a chastened foundationalism or hybrid foundationalism‐coherentism, in light of which, arguments are understood both as reasoning from foundational propositions and as gaining plausibility from the coherence of claims. Theological arguments also exhibit a dual structure, with propositions underwritten by their dependence on both scripture and tradition and by their coherence in integrated webs, or systems. Theology is therefore shown to be systematic in its fundamental structure. The systematicity of theology is a function of its subject matter, ‘God and other things as they are related to God’. Both the two chief subjects of theology (God and humanity) and theology itself are characterized by rationality and relationality. Theology is therefore doubly mimetic, reflecting its subject matter in its structures of reasoning. The order and harmony of those structures however have an aesthetic appeal and potentially attract because of their beauty, rather than their truth. Theological aesthetics is surveyed, asking whether the beauty of systematic structures counts for or against their truth.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078626
- eISBN:
- 9780199833559
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078624.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this book and in its sequels, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from ...
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In this book and in its sequels, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. Contemporary epistemologists seldom focus attention on the nature of warrant; and when they do, they display deplorable diversity: some claim that what turns true belief into knowledge is a matter of epistemic dutifulness, others that it goes by coherence, and still others that it is conferred by reliability. I shall argue that none of these claims is correct, and (in Warrant and Proper Function) suggest a more satisfactory alternative. In the present book, I survey current contributions to the discussion of warrant and neighboring issues. I begin with internalism, looking first at the carefully crafted foundationalist internalism of Roderick Chisholm (Chs. 2 and 3). To better understand Chisholm and other internalists, however, I first make a preliminary excursus (Ch 1) into the classical internalism of Descartes, Locke, and others. After Chisholmian internalism, I turn to coherentism, which for classificatory purposes I take as a form of internalism. In the next three chapters, I consider coherentism taken generally (Ch. 4), the specific version of coherentism developed by Laurence BonJour (Ch. 5), and contemporary Bayesian versions of coherentism (Chs. 6 and 7). Next (Ch. 8), there is the more attenuated internalism of John Pollock, which I see as a transition from internalism to externalism. Finally, I examine the reliabilist and externalist views of William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman (Ch. 9), and close with a preview of Warrant and Proper Function (Ch. 10).Less
In this book and in its sequels, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. Contemporary epistemologists seldom focus attention on the nature of warrant; and when they do, they display deplorable diversity: some claim that what turns true belief into knowledge is a matter of epistemic dutifulness, others that it goes by coherence, and still others that it is conferred by reliability. I shall argue that none of these claims is correct, and (in Warrant and Proper Function) suggest a more satisfactory alternative. In the present book, I survey current contributions to the discussion of warrant and neighboring issues. I begin with internalism, looking first at the carefully crafted foundationalist internalism of Roderick Chisholm (Chs. 2 and 3). To better understand Chisholm and other internalists, however, I first make a preliminary excursus (Ch 1) into the classical internalism of Descartes, Locke, and others. After Chisholmian internalism, I turn to coherentism, which for classificatory purposes I take as a form of internalism. In the next three chapters, I consider coherentism taken generally (Ch. 4), the specific version of coherentism developed by Laurence BonJour (Ch. 5), and contemporary Bayesian versions of coherentism (Chs. 6 and 7). Next (Ch. 8), there is the more attenuated internalism of John Pollock, which I see as a transition from internalism to externalism. Finally, I examine the reliabilist and externalist views of William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman (Ch. 9), and close with a preview of Warrant and Proper Function (Ch. 10).
James Griffin
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198752318
- eISBN:
- 9780191597541
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198752318.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book asks how, and how much, we can improve our ethical standards—not lift our behaviour closer to our standards but refine the standards themselves. To answer this question requires answering ...
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The book asks how, and how much, we can improve our ethical standards—not lift our behaviour closer to our standards but refine the standards themselves. To answer this question requires answering most of the major questions of ethics. So the book includes a discussion of what a good life is like, where the bounds of the natural world come, how values relate to that world (e.g. naturalism, realism), how great human capacities—the ones important to ethics—are, and where moral norms come from. Throughout the book, the question of what philosophy can contribute to ethics arises. Philosophical traditions, such as most forms of utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, are, the book contends, too ambitious. Ethics cannot be what philosophers in those traditions expect it to be because agents cannot be what these philosophies require them to be. The book starts by questioning the adequacy of both appeals to intuition and the coherence method of justification in ethics (e.g. wide reflective equilibrium) and ends with a description of the sort of justification available to us.Less
The book asks how, and how much, we can improve our ethical standards—not lift our behaviour closer to our standards but refine the standards themselves. To answer this question requires answering most of the major questions of ethics. So the book includes a discussion of what a good life is like, where the bounds of the natural world come, how values relate to that world (e.g. naturalism, realism), how great human capacities—the ones important to ethics—are, and where moral norms come from. Throughout the book, the question of what philosophy can contribute to ethics arises. Philosophical traditions, such as most forms of utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, are, the book contends, too ambitious. Ethics cannot be what philosophers in those traditions expect it to be because agents cannot be what these philosophies require them to be. The book starts by questioning the adequacy of both appeals to intuition and the coherence method of justification in ethics (e.g. wide reflective equilibrium) and ends with a description of the sort of justification available to us.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge ...
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In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.Less
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195089875
- eISBN:
- 9780199833238
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195089871.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of ...
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This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.Less
This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.
Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.
Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that contextualism should be adopted as the best epistemological theory on the grounds that it represents the most satisfactory response to philosophical scepticism. It sets out ...
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This chapter argues that contextualism should be adopted as the best epistemological theory on the grounds that it represents the most satisfactory response to philosophical scepticism. It sets out distinctive advantages that contextualism has over alternative models of knowledge. It also characterizes the key elements in a contextual model of justification.Less
This chapter argues that contextualism should be adopted as the best epistemological theory on the grounds that it represents the most satisfactory response to philosophical scepticism. It sets out distinctive advantages that contextualism has over alternative models of knowledge. It also characterizes the key elements in a contextual model of justification.
Martin Kusch
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251223
- eISBN:
- 9780191601767
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251223.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Introduces the key question for the discussion of Ch. 7–11: Why is it that the dichotomy ‘rational versus irrational’ can be applied to empirical beliefs? It uses this question in order to develop a ...
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Introduces the key question for the discussion of Ch. 7–11: Why is it that the dichotomy ‘rational versus irrational’ can be applied to empirical beliefs? It uses this question in order to develop a taxonomy of different positions regarding the sources of rational constraints upon beliefs.Less
Introduces the key question for the discussion of Ch. 7–11: Why is it that the dichotomy ‘rational versus irrational’ can be applied to empirical beliefs? It uses this question in order to develop a taxonomy of different positions regarding the sources of rational constraints upon beliefs.
Michael Williams
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a ...
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This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a contextualist picture of justification. Contextualism is said to incorporate the best features of its traditionalist rivals — foundationalism and coherentism — and also to avoid skepticism. It is argued that we should not ask which conception is really true, but instead give up epistemological realism.Less
This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a contextualist picture of justification. Contextualism is said to incorporate the best features of its traditionalist rivals — foundationalism and coherentism — and also to avoid skepticism. It is argued that we should not ask which conception is really true, but instead give up epistemological realism.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay lays out the rationale for two principles — ascent and closure — and shows how they imply further principles of exclusion and of the criterion. These principles lead to the “Pyrrhonian ...
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This essay lays out the rationale for two principles — ascent and closure — and shows how they imply further principles of exclusion and of the criterion. These principles lead to the “Pyrrhonian Problematic”, which foundationalism and coherentism attempt to solve, and also to the clash of intuitions between internalists and externalists. It is argued that the kind of knowledge that externalists and foundationalists claim differs from the kind of knowledge that internalists and coherentists claim, and which Pyrrhonists doubt. This distinction between kinds of knowledge is traced back to Descartes’s distinction between cognitio and scientia. If this is correct, externalism and internalism might both be correct, and Pyrrhonism might turn out to be compatible with externalism.Less
This essay lays out the rationale for two principles — ascent and closure — and shows how they imply further principles of exclusion and of the criterion. These principles lead to the “Pyrrhonian Problematic”, which foundationalism and coherentism attempt to solve, and also to the clash of intuitions between internalists and externalists. It is argued that the kind of knowledge that externalists and foundationalists claim differs from the kind of knowledge that internalists and coherentists claim, and which Pyrrhonists doubt. This distinction between kinds of knowledge is traced back to Descartes’s distinction between cognitio and scientia. If this is correct, externalism and internalism might both be correct, and Pyrrhonism might turn out to be compatible with externalism.
David K. Henderson and Terence Horgan
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199608546
- eISBN:
- 9780191729584
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book argues for several dramatic breaks with the epistemological tradition, while also arguing for significant continuity with epistemology as it has come to be practiced. At important ...
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This book argues for several dramatic breaks with the epistemological tradition, while also arguing for significant continuity with epistemology as it has come to be practiced. At important junctures, the book finds a way of “going between” the commonly conceived epistemological alternatives. The result is both a retentive and a revisionary account of various matters: (i) of the character of a priori reflective inquiry, (ii) of conceptual analysis as a form of a priori inquiry and as a cornerstone of philosophical methodology, (iii) of reliabilism, (iv) of epistemological internalism and epistemological externalism, (v) of epistemically relevant, evidence-sensitive, cognitive processes, (vi) of both epistemic foundationalism and coherentism, and (vii) of the role of a priori, a posteriori, and empirical elements within epistemological theorizing itself. “The epistemological spectrum” comprises inquiry ranging from a priori reflection on concepts such as epistemic justification and knowledge to richly empirical work within cognitive science. The conceptual truths regarding justification (for one example) serve to orient a fitting naturalized epistemology, while empirical information is necessarily involved in arriving at determinate specification of what processes are fitting and justificatory of beliefs. The book argues for this “big-tent” understanding of naturalized epistemology. It also illustrates it while arriving at a distinctive form of reliabilism, an importantly expansive view of the range and character of information on which human epistemic agents can and must rely, and a principled way of reconciling what are commonly thought to be incompatible positions such as foundationalism and coherentism.Less
This book argues for several dramatic breaks with the epistemological tradition, while also arguing for significant continuity with epistemology as it has come to be practiced. At important junctures, the book finds a way of “going between” the commonly conceived epistemological alternatives. The result is both a retentive and a revisionary account of various matters: (i) of the character of a priori reflective inquiry, (ii) of conceptual analysis as a form of a priori inquiry and as a cornerstone of philosophical methodology, (iii) of reliabilism, (iv) of epistemological internalism and epistemological externalism, (v) of epistemically relevant, evidence-sensitive, cognitive processes, (vi) of both epistemic foundationalism and coherentism, and (vii) of the role of a priori, a posteriori, and empirical elements within epistemological theorizing itself. “The epistemological spectrum” comprises inquiry ranging from a priori reflection on concepts such as epistemic justification and knowledge to richly empirical work within cognitive science. The conceptual truths regarding justification (for one example) serve to orient a fitting naturalized epistemology, while empirical information is necessarily involved in arriving at determinate specification of what processes are fitting and justificatory of beliefs. The book argues for this “big-tent” understanding of naturalized epistemology. It also illustrates it while arriving at a distinctive form of reliabilism, an importantly expansive view of the range and character of information on which human epistemic agents can and must rely, and a principled way of reconciling what are commonly thought to be incompatible positions such as foundationalism and coherentism.
Jack C. Lyons
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195373578
- eISBN:
- 9780199871988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sharpen the standard taxonomy of doxastic and nondoxastic theories, invoking two crucially orthogonal principles: the Belief Principle holds that only beliefs can serve as evidence for ...
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This chapter sharpen the standard taxonomy of doxastic and nondoxastic theories, invoking two crucially orthogonal principles: the Belief Principle holds that only beliefs can serve as evidence for beliefs; the Grounds Principle holds that every justified belief must be based on evidence. Though the former principle is often cited as the central slogan of doxastic theories, it is only part of doxasticism and is actually something an externalist can embrace. The famous Sellarsian dilemma, which argues that nondoxastic experience, “the given,” cannot justify beliefs, therefore does not provide an argument for doxasticism. Rejecting doxasticism on independent grounds while accepting the Belief Principle provides a novel argument against the Grounds Principle and therefore in favor of a nonevidentialist epistemology.Less
This chapter sharpen the standard taxonomy of doxastic and nondoxastic theories, invoking two crucially orthogonal principles: the Belief Principle holds that only beliefs can serve as evidence for beliefs; the Grounds Principle holds that every justified belief must be based on evidence. Though the former principle is often cited as the central slogan of doxastic theories, it is only part of doxasticism and is actually something an externalist can embrace. The famous Sellarsian dilemma, which argues that nondoxastic experience, “the given,” cannot justify beliefs, therefore does not provide an argument for doxasticism. Rejecting doxasticism on independent grounds while accepting the Belief Principle provides a novel argument against the Grounds Principle and therefore in favor of a nonevidentialist epistemology.
Jason A. Springs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195395044
- eISBN:
- 9780199866243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Discontinued
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395044.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Chapter 5 addresses the feasibility of Frei's likening his theological approach to the cultural ethnographer's task of "thick description." Some critics claim that Frei's borrowing from cultural ...
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Chapter 5 addresses the feasibility of Frei's likening his theological approach to the cultural ethnographer's task of "thick description." Some critics claim that Frei's borrowing from cultural anthropology results in an overly integrated and unified conception of "the church" and its practices. Others charge that his approach reduces theology to redescription of the logic internal to Christian practices, thereby eliminating the capacity to make truth claims or to correct Christian malpractice. This chapter responds to these charges, demonstrating that, rather than simply mimicking anthropological procedures, Frei's portrayal of the theological task in terms of reflexively ethnographic redescription does not forgo the ability-even the necessity-to make propositional truth claims.Less
Chapter 5 addresses the feasibility of Frei's likening his theological approach to the cultural ethnographer's task of "thick description." Some critics claim that Frei's borrowing from cultural anthropology results in an overly integrated and unified conception of "the church" and its practices. Others charge that his approach reduces theology to redescription of the logic internal to Christian practices, thereby eliminating the capacity to make truth claims or to correct Christian malpractice. This chapter responds to these charges, demonstrating that, rather than simply mimicking anthropological procedures, Frei's portrayal of the theological task in terms of reflexively ethnographic redescription does not forgo the ability-even the necessity-to make propositional truth claims.
Jason A. Springs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195395044
- eISBN:
- 9780199866243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Discontinued
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395044.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Frei's appeals to the "givenness" of revelation-the claim, for instance, that all doctrines or theological assertions are directly or indirectly grounded in faith, or that faith is rational in that ...
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Frei's appeals to the "givenness" of revelation-the claim, for instance, that all doctrines or theological assertions are directly or indirectly grounded in faith, or that faith is rational in that it seeks understanding within a set of reasons afforded by God's revelatory activity in Scripture-incur charges of "revelational foundationalism." Chapter 6 employs recent treatments of epistemic foundationalism in order to dispel charges of "crypto-foundationalism" as well as answering the equally frequent charge that talk of "rationality intrinsic to faith" implicates Frei's thought in a type of fideism.Less
Frei's appeals to the "givenness" of revelation-the claim, for instance, that all doctrines or theological assertions are directly or indirectly grounded in faith, or that faith is rational in that it seeks understanding within a set of reasons afforded by God's revelatory activity in Scripture-incur charges of "revelational foundationalism." Chapter 6 employs recent treatments of epistemic foundationalism in order to dispel charges of "crypto-foundationalism" as well as answering the equally frequent charge that talk of "rationality intrinsic to faith" implicates Frei's thought in a type of fideism.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199655755
- eISBN:
- 9780191742125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655755.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter surveys the relevant recent literature in epistemology with two aims in minds. First, the chapter wishes to show that the account of belief revision is orthogonal to, or invariant across, ...
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The chapter surveys the relevant recent literature in epistemology with two aims in minds. First, the chapter wishes to show that the account of belief revision is orthogonal to, or invariant across, the different ways in which ongoing epistemological debates might be resolved, concerning such matters as the role of experience in founding justifications, and the permissible global patterns of justificatory support (foundationalist, coherentist, or foundherentist?). Secondly, the chapter wishes to show how compatible the new account of belief revision is with various important epistemological accounts that touch on the topic of belief revision, albeit not in any great logical or computational detail. To this end, the chapter examines the writings of Sosa, BonJour, Cornman, Haack, Levi, Quine and Ullian, Harman, Klein and Gupta. This discussion should serve to situate the work for the epistemological readerLess
The chapter surveys the relevant recent literature in epistemology with two aims in minds. First, the chapter wishes to show that the account of belief revision is orthogonal to, or invariant across, the different ways in which ongoing epistemological debates might be resolved, concerning such matters as the role of experience in founding justifications, and the permissible global patterns of justificatory support (foundationalist, coherentist, or foundherentist?). Secondly, the chapter wishes to show how compatible the new account of belief revision is with various important epistemological accounts that touch on the topic of belief revision, albeit not in any great logical or computational detail. To this end, the chapter examines the writings of Sosa, BonJour, Cornman, Haack, Levi, Quine and Ullian, Harman, Klein and Gupta. This discussion should serve to situate the work for the epistemological reader
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198263975
- eISBN:
- 9780191600579
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019826397X.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
The last three chapters have argued that there is no good reasons to doubt the possible historical truth and knowability of the incarnational narrative, but these arguments have been negative in ...
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The last three chapters have argued that there is no good reasons to doubt the possible historical truth and knowability of the incarnational narrative, but these arguments have been negative in character, with the aim of showing only that it is possible to have knowledge of such a narrative. This chapter looks at the positive accounts that might be given of how such knowledge could be actual, and to do this turns to some basic epistemological questions. It was suggested in the first chapter that one of the factors that created difficulties for the historicity of the incarnational narrative was the widespread embracement of Enlightenment epistemological thinking: the epistemologies of modernity. To have a real chance of surmounting the difficulties some sense is needed of what problems there are with the epistemologies of modernity, and what viable options there are today for understanding knowledge and reasonable belief; these issues are enormously complex, so an outline, rather than a comprehensive defence, is presented of the epistemological perspective. The different sections of the chapter are: the task of epistemology; classical foundationalism; realism and anti-realism; knowledge, justification, and warrant; externalism and internalism; foundationalism and coherentism; and epistemological virtues.Less
The last three chapters have argued that there is no good reasons to doubt the possible historical truth and knowability of the incarnational narrative, but these arguments have been negative in character, with the aim of showing only that it is possible to have knowledge of such a narrative. This chapter looks at the positive accounts that might be given of how such knowledge could be actual, and to do this turns to some basic epistemological questions. It was suggested in the first chapter that one of the factors that created difficulties for the historicity of the incarnational narrative was the widespread embracement of Enlightenment epistemological thinking: the epistemologies of modernity. To have a real chance of surmounting the difficulties some sense is needed of what problems there are with the epistemologies of modernity, and what viable options there are today for understanding knowledge and reasonable belief; these issues are enormously complex, so an outline, rather than a comprehensive defence, is presented of the epistemological perspective. The different sections of the chapter are: the task of epistemology; classical foundationalism; realism and anti-realism; knowledge, justification, and warrant; externalism and internalism; foundationalism and coherentism; and epistemological virtues.
Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Ranking theory will be claimed to deliver the first full account of the dynamics of belief and to be the legitimate sister of probability theory. This entails its deep significance for fundamental ...
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Ranking theory will be claimed to deliver the first full account of the dynamics of belief and to be the legitimate sister of probability theory. This entails its deep significance for fundamental issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Therefore this book motivates and introduces the basic notion of a ranking function, which provides a new kind of degrees ob belief that at same time accounts for belief simpliciter. It develops ranking theory in ample detail, up to algorithms of inductive reasoning. It provides a measurement theory for ranking functions. It accounts for auto-epistemology in ranking-theoretic terms. It explicates the basic notion of a (deductive or non-deductive) reason, which is the entry to its rich philosophical applications. Among these are: a new account of lawlikeness, an account of ceteris paribus laws, a new perspective on dispositions, a rich and detailed theory of deterministic causation, an understanding of natural modalities as an objectification of epistemic modalities, an account of the experiential basis of belief, and thus a restructuring of the debate on foundationalism and coherentism (and externalism and contextualism), and finally a revival of fundamental a priori principles of reason fathoming the basics of empiricism and the relation between reason and truth and concluding in a proof of a weak principle of causality. All this is accompanied by thorough-going comparative discussions, on a general level as well as within each topic, and in particular with respect to probability theory that proves to be the major guideline of this book.Less
Ranking theory will be claimed to deliver the first full account of the dynamics of belief and to be the legitimate sister of probability theory. This entails its deep significance for fundamental issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Therefore this book motivates and introduces the basic notion of a ranking function, which provides a new kind of degrees ob belief that at same time accounts for belief simpliciter. It develops ranking theory in ample detail, up to algorithms of inductive reasoning. It provides a measurement theory for ranking functions. It accounts for auto-epistemology in ranking-theoretic terms. It explicates the basic notion of a (deductive or non-deductive) reason, which is the entry to its rich philosophical applications. Among these are: a new account of lawlikeness, an account of ceteris paribus laws, a new perspective on dispositions, a rich and detailed theory of deterministic causation, an understanding of natural modalities as an objectification of epistemic modalities, an account of the experiential basis of belief, and thus a restructuring of the debate on foundationalism and coherentism (and externalism and contextualism), and finally a revival of fundamental a priori principles of reason fathoming the basics of empiricism and the relation between reason and truth and concluding in a proof of a weak principle of causality. All this is accompanied by thorough-going comparative discussions, on a general level as well as within each topic, and in particular with respect to probability theory that proves to be the major guideline of this book.
Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter deals with the Agrippan justification trilemma. First, the account of justification that goes with the ranking-theoretic account of reasons is made explicit and related to various other ...
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This chapter deals with the Agrippan justification trilemma. First, the account of justification that goes with the ranking-theoretic account of reasons is made explicit and related to various other accounts of justification. Thereby it becomes clear how various forms of externalism and contextualism can be accommodated in the ranking-theoretic picture. Then the chapter proceeds to the issue of the experiential belief base. Referring to perception or even direct perception does not really get at this base, since both notions are frame-relative. Hence, the chapter goes on to discuss impressions, appearances, or sense data. They come in two forms. Appearances as if p are argued to be defeasibly a priori reasons for p itself, and vice versa; this is the so-called Schein-Sein principle, which suggests a coherentist construal of the belief base. This form is to be distinguished from the demonstrative form “it appears thus to me”. The latter leads to an investigation of contents of consciousness, which are characterized by the so-called Conscious Essence principle, and of the epistemological role of those contents. The chapter arrives at a peculiar mixture of minimal externalism, strong foundationalism, and coherentism, which, however, is a strict consequence of those two principles within the ranking-theoretic account.Less
This chapter deals with the Agrippan justification trilemma. First, the account of justification that goes with the ranking-theoretic account of reasons is made explicit and related to various other accounts of justification. Thereby it becomes clear how various forms of externalism and contextualism can be accommodated in the ranking-theoretic picture. Then the chapter proceeds to the issue of the experiential belief base. Referring to perception or even direct perception does not really get at this base, since both notions are frame-relative. Hence, the chapter goes on to discuss impressions, appearances, or sense data. They come in two forms. Appearances as if p are argued to be defeasibly a priori reasons for p itself, and vice versa; this is the so-called Schein-Sein principle, which suggests a coherentist construal of the belief base. This form is to be distinguished from the demonstrative form “it appears thus to me”. The latter leads to an investigation of contents of consciousness, which are characterized by the so-called Conscious Essence principle, and of the epistemological role of those contents. The chapter arrives at a peculiar mixture of minimal externalism, strong foundationalism, and coherentism, which, however, is a strict consequence of those two principles within the ranking-theoretic account.
Robert Stern
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199239108
- eISBN:
- 9780191716942
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239108.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter argues that the coherentism of the British Idealism, and in particular of F. H. Bradley, is importantly different from the sort of coherentism familiar in contemporary philosophy. For, ...
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This chapter argues that the coherentism of the British Idealism, and in particular of F. H. Bradley, is importantly different from the sort of coherentism familiar in contemporary philosophy. For, while the latter is largely a theory of justification, holding that the structure of justification does not rest on any intrinsically justified beliefs, by contrast Bradley's coherentism is a test for truth, holding that we can only discover the truth by using coherence as a criterion, because we have no set of infallible beliefs against which others can be tested. It is then argued that with this distinction firmly in mind, certain traditional objections to coherentism can be re-assessed, particularly the role that experience is to play within our acquisition of knowledge.Less
This chapter argues that the coherentism of the British Idealism, and in particular of F. H. Bradley, is importantly different from the sort of coherentism familiar in contemporary philosophy. For, while the latter is largely a theory of justification, holding that the structure of justification does not rest on any intrinsically justified beliefs, by contrast Bradley's coherentism is a test for truth, holding that we can only discover the truth by using coherence as a criterion, because we have no set of infallible beliefs against which others can be tested. It is then argued that with this distinction firmly in mind, certain traditional objections to coherentism can be re-assessed, particularly the role that experience is to play within our acquisition of knowledge.
David Phillips
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199778911
- eISBN:
- 9780199919093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778911.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In this Chapter I do three things: first, I focus on Sidgwick's argument for intuitionism and argue (a) contra Shaver that it is both crucial to Sidgwick and depends crucially on his nonnaturalism, ...
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In this Chapter I do three things: first, I focus on Sidgwick's argument for intuitionism and argue (a) contra Shaver that it is both crucial to Sidgwick and depends crucially on his nonnaturalism, and (b) that it is a powerful argument for intuitionism, though not directly for the form of foundationalism Sidgwick embraces. Then, second, I turn to (what I argue is) the central puzzle in his moral epistemology: the puzzle that Methods IV ii is in a crucial way apparently inconsistent with “The Establishment of Ethical First Principles” and with Methods III. I argue against resolving the puzzle in favor of the material in IV ii and thus taking Sidgwick to be (more of) a coherentist; and I suggest a resolution of the puzzle compatible with my foundationalist reading of Sidgwick. But I suggest that the puzzle is hard to resolve, and that, though previous commentators have not presented it fully, it helps explain the controversy over Sidgwick's moral epistemology. Third, I defend my favored moderate foundationalist interpretation of Sidgwick's moral epistemology.Less
In this Chapter I do three things: first, I focus on Sidgwick's argument for intuitionism and argue (a) contra Shaver that it is both crucial to Sidgwick and depends crucially on his nonnaturalism, and (b) that it is a powerful argument for intuitionism, though not directly for the form of foundationalism Sidgwick embraces. Then, second, I turn to (what I argue is) the central puzzle in his moral epistemology: the puzzle that Methods IV ii is in a crucial way apparently inconsistent with “The Establishment of Ethical First Principles” and with Methods III. I argue against resolving the puzzle in favor of the material in IV ii and thus taking Sidgwick to be (more of) a coherentist; and I suggest a resolution of the puzzle compatible with my foundationalist reading of Sidgwick. But I suggest that the puzzle is hard to resolve, and that, though previous commentators have not presented it fully, it helps explain the controversy over Sidgwick's moral epistemology. Third, I defend my favored moderate foundationalist interpretation of Sidgwick's moral epistemology.