Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the ...
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This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the theoretical framework for the revision of cognitivism. Part II examines the challenge to the revised form of cognitivism developed from two sophisticated forms of non-cognitivist strategy: expressive/projective strategy and non-objectivism. Part III develops proposals for the solution of the problems described in Parts I and II. Part IV focuses on the work of John Rawls.Less
This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the theoretical framework for the revision of cognitivism. Part II examines the challenge to the revised form of cognitivism developed from two sophisticated forms of non-cognitivist strategy: expressive/projective strategy and non-objectivism. Part III develops proposals for the solution of the problems described in Parts I and II. Part IV focuses on the work of John Rawls.
Derek Matravers
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199243167
- eISBN:
- 9780191697227
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243167.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind
This book examines how emotions form a bridge between our experience of art and of life. We often find that a particular poem, painting, or piece of music carries an emotional charge; we may also ...
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This book examines how emotions form a bridge between our experience of art and of life. We often find that a particular poem, painting, or piece of music carries an emotional charge; we may also experience emotions towards, or on behalf of, a particular fictional character. These experiences are philosophically puzzling, for their causes seem quite different from the causes of emotion in the rest of our lives. Using many literary, visual and musical examples, this book shows that what these experiences have in common, and what links them to the expression of emotion in non-artistic cases, is the role played by feeling. It surveys various accounts of the nature of fiction, attacks contemporary cognitivist accounts of expression, and offers an uncompromising defence of a controversial view about musical expression: that music expresses the emotions it causes its listeners to feel. Whilst this book engages with the work of contemporary theorists, it remains accessible to readers without philosophical training.Less
This book examines how emotions form a bridge between our experience of art and of life. We often find that a particular poem, painting, or piece of music carries an emotional charge; we may also experience emotions towards, or on behalf of, a particular fictional character. These experiences are philosophically puzzling, for their causes seem quite different from the causes of emotion in the rest of our lives. Using many literary, visual and musical examples, this book shows that what these experiences have in common, and what links them to the expression of emotion in non-artistic cases, is the role played by feeling. It surveys various accounts of the nature of fiction, attacks contemporary cognitivist accounts of expression, and offers an uncompromising defence of a controversial view about musical expression: that music expresses the emotions it causes its listeners to feel. Whilst this book engages with the work of contemporary theorists, it remains accessible to readers without philosophical training.
Berys Gaut
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263219
- eISBN:
- 9780191718854
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263219.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter and the next develop the cognitive argument for ethicism, based on the doctrine of aesthetic cognitivism. This comprises an epistemic claim that art can convey non-trivial knowledge, and ...
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This chapter and the next develop the cognitive argument for ethicism, based on the doctrine of aesthetic cognitivism. This comprises an epistemic claim that art can convey non-trivial knowledge, and an aesthetic claim that this capacity of art is sometimes an aesthetic merit. One kind of knowledge that art can convey is moral knowledge. The chapter defends the epistemic claim, particularly in the version that artworks can teach us. It is shown that art can teach us by several means, including through guiding our imaginings. Though the chapter criticizes simulation theory, it shows that we can learn through imagination by subjecting it to various kinds of discipline. It then argues that imagination plays an important role in ethical learning, and gives examples of ethical learning through imagination in ordinary life, in philosophical thought experiments, and through the use of William Styron's novel, Sophie's Choice.Less
This chapter and the next develop the cognitive argument for ethicism, based on the doctrine of aesthetic cognitivism. This comprises an epistemic claim that art can convey non-trivial knowledge, and an aesthetic claim that this capacity of art is sometimes an aesthetic merit. One kind of knowledge that art can convey is moral knowledge. The chapter defends the epistemic claim, particularly in the version that artworks can teach us. It is shown that art can teach us by several means, including through guiding our imaginings. Though the chapter criticizes simulation theory, it shows that we can learn through imagination by subjecting it to various kinds of discipline. It then argues that imagination plays an important role in ethical learning, and gives examples of ethical learning through imagination in ordinary life, in philosophical thought experiments, and through the use of William Styron's novel, Sophie's Choice.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A contextualist defence of cognitivism is open to the charge that it cannot supply a convincing theory of error for when moral judgements diverge. This chapter rebuts this concern: conditions have ...
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A contextualist defence of cognitivism is open to the charge that it cannot supply a convincing theory of error for when moral judgements diverge. This chapter rebuts this concern: conditions have been set out for when apparent conflict between moral views really is such, or, alternatively, whether we should accept different diagnoses in any particular case. If a conflict between moral beliefs is genuinely a case of conflict, then various explanations have been supplied for why this might be so that do not, as yet, directly draw on the idea of moral error. This is to make the task facing a theory of moral error more manageable. In developing such a theory, it was argued that it is not a defect of cognitivism but a strength that it can explain moral error. The issue of social criticism was considered and a model described for the criticism of ideological beliefs that was, to a certain extent, independent of the truth of cognitivism.Less
A contextualist defence of cognitivism is open to the charge that it cannot supply a convincing theory of error for when moral judgements diverge. This chapter rebuts this concern: conditions have been set out for when apparent conflict between moral views really is such, or, alternatively, whether we should accept different diagnoses in any particular case. If a conflict between moral beliefs is genuinely a case of conflict, then various explanations have been supplied for why this might be so that do not, as yet, directly draw on the idea of moral error. This is to make the task facing a theory of moral error more manageable. In developing such a theory, it was argued that it is not a defect of cognitivism but a strength that it can explain moral error. The issue of social criticism was considered and a model described for the criticism of ideological beliefs that was, to a certain extent, independent of the truth of cognitivism.
Philippa Foot
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235088
- eISBN:
- 9780191597428
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235089.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and ...
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Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and Foot argues that this is the form of evaluation in moral judgements. Moral evaluations thus share a conceptual structure with evaluations of the characteristics and operations of living things, and can only be understood in these terms. The thesis of the book, then, is that vice is a natural defect, and virtue goodness of will; therefore propositions to do with goodness or badness in human character and action are not to be understood in psychological terms. In Ch. 1, Foot discusses and criticizes the subjectivism and non‐cognitivism that has dominated the past 60 years of analytical moral philosophy. Ch. 2 provides a sketch of an account of natural normativity in plants and animals, while Ch. 3 applies this to human beings, including a discussion of Elizabeth Anscombe's discussion of promising. Ch. 4 exhibits the constraint that this account of natural normativity imparts to any adequate view of practical rationality. Ch. 5 attempts to dissolve any meaningful distinction between the domain of practical rationality and the domain of morality. Ch. 6 deals with the connection between goodness and happiness, while Ch. 7 discusses Nietzsche's immoralism.Less
Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and Foot argues that this is the form of evaluation in moral judgements. Moral evaluations thus share a conceptual structure with evaluations of the characteristics and operations of living things, and can only be understood in these terms. The thesis of the book, then, is that vice is a natural defect, and virtue goodness of will; therefore propositions to do with goodness or badness in human character and action are not to be understood in psychological terms. In Ch. 1, Foot discusses and criticizes the subjectivism and non‐cognitivism that has dominated the past 60 years of analytical moral philosophy. Ch. 2 provides a sketch of an account of natural normativity in plants and animals, while Ch. 3 applies this to human beings, including a discussion of Elizabeth Anscombe's discussion of promising. Ch. 4 exhibits the constraint that this account of natural normativity imparts to any adequate view of practical rationality. Ch. 5 attempts to dissolve any meaningful distinction between the domain of practical rationality and the domain of morality. Ch. 6 deals with the connection between goodness and happiness, while Ch. 7 discusses Nietzsche's immoralism.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the aim of this book, which is the development of a contextualist approach to epistemology. This is followed by a discussion of the ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the aim of this book, which is the development of a contextualist approach to epistemology. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical foundations of this contextualist approach. An overview of the chapters included in this volume is also presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the aim of this book, which is the development of a contextualist approach to epistemology. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical foundations of this contextualist approach. An overview of the chapters included in this volume is also presented.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sets out the position of Wiggins and McDowell. This theory is fatally incomplete, rather than fatally flawed. It is a view of moral truth and enquiry that has been much misunderstood, ...
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This chapter sets out the position of Wiggins and McDowell. This theory is fatally incomplete, rather than fatally flawed. It is a view of moral truth and enquiry that has been much misunderstood, not least because of a failure to appreciate the deep differences between Wiggins and McDowell over the issue of realism. Some important background materials from the work of the later Wittgenstein are examined, followed by discussions on the ways in which cognitivism is grounded in the phenomenology of moral experience and how that phenomenology is best explained.Less
This chapter sets out the position of Wiggins and McDowell. This theory is fatally incomplete, rather than fatally flawed. It is a view of moral truth and enquiry that has been much misunderstood, not least because of a failure to appreciate the deep differences between Wiggins and McDowell over the issue of realism. Some important background materials from the work of the later Wittgenstein are examined, followed by discussions on the ways in which cognitivism is grounded in the phenomenology of moral experience and how that phenomenology is best explained.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter rejects the view that Wiggins’s and McDowell’s theories of moral motivation postulate an objectionable form of inherent normativity in a moral agent’s recognition of value. Their ...
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This chapter rejects the view that Wiggins’s and McDowell’s theories of moral motivation postulate an objectionable form of inherent normativity in a moral agent’s recognition of value. Their position is no worse off in this regard than anyone else’s, specifically Korsgaard’s. McDowell’s position, and the conflation of different considerations in his metaphor of ‘silencing’ and Wiggins’s genealogy of categorical obligations are described.Less
This chapter rejects the view that Wiggins’s and McDowell’s theories of moral motivation postulate an objectionable form of inherent normativity in a moral agent’s recognition of value. Their position is no worse off in this regard than anyone else’s, specifically Korsgaard’s. McDowell’s position, and the conflation of different considerations in his metaphor of ‘silencing’ and Wiggins’s genealogy of categorical obligations are described.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines a proposal concerning the nature of practical reasons: that all such reasons are internal reasons. It is the first obstacle that was placed in the way of the Wittgensteinian ...
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This chapter examines a proposal concerning the nature of practical reasons: that all such reasons are internal reasons. It is the first obstacle that was placed in the way of the Wittgensteinian cognitivists’ position by Bernard Williams. Williams’s arguments are presented in a different light from the way in which they are usually understood. The mention of Humeanism in his initial presentation of his ideas led to Williams being viewed as a representative of someone committed to the Humean theory of motivation, or to a Humean view of the self or of the psychological. Williams’s position is seen as a set of relatively neutral constraints on the very idea of a practical reason.Less
This chapter examines a proposal concerning the nature of practical reasons: that all such reasons are internal reasons. It is the first obstacle that was placed in the way of the Wittgensteinian cognitivists’ position by Bernard Williams. Williams’s arguments are presented in a different light from the way in which they are usually understood. The mention of Humeanism in his initial presentation of his ideas led to Williams being viewed as a representative of someone committed to the Humean theory of motivation, or to a Humean view of the self or of the psychological. Williams’s position is seen as a set of relatively neutral constraints on the very idea of a practical reason.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan ...
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This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan Gibbard) and projectivism (defended by Simon Blackburn), are considered. Both focus on the crucial issue of how we should understand our desire to explain the ethical within a generally naturalistic framework. One way in which the theories discussed in this chapter differ from earlier forms of non-cognitivism is that they are intended to constitute a general theory of normativity, which, while it is supposed to bolster some of the intuitions underlying the prevalent conception of value, does not exactly match the extension of that term. The non-cognitivists discussed in this chapter operate with a descriptive/normative distinction, not a fact/value distinction.Less
This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan Gibbard) and projectivism (defended by Simon Blackburn), are considered. Both focus on the crucial issue of how we should understand our desire to explain the ethical within a generally naturalistic framework. One way in which the theories discussed in this chapter differ from earlier forms of non-cognitivism is that they are intended to constitute a general theory of normativity, which, while it is supposed to bolster some of the intuitions underlying the prevalent conception of value, does not exactly match the extension of that term. The non-cognitivists discussed in this chapter operate with a descriptive/normative distinction, not a fact/value distinction.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the non-objectivist position. The non-objectivist argument emerges from an immanent, transcendental placing of the various ways in which we conceive of different areas of ...
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This chapter discusses the non-objectivist position. The non-objectivist argument emerges from an immanent, transcendental placing of the various ways in which we conceive of different areas of thought or language. Rather than announcing itself as a sceptical conclusion, the sceptical line of reflection that emerges can be allowed, in Tractarian fashion, to show its truth. It is in this way that the non-objectivist critique emerges as the most powerful means of undermining the cognitivist argument traced so far. Underpinned by a worked-out programme in the philosophy of truth, namely minimalism, non-objectivism is also powered by a distinctive vision of a modern society.Less
This chapter discusses the non-objectivist position. The non-objectivist argument emerges from an immanent, transcendental placing of the various ways in which we conceive of different areas of thought or language. Rather than announcing itself as a sceptical conclusion, the sceptical line of reflection that emerges can be allowed, in Tractarian fashion, to show its truth. It is in this way that the non-objectivist critique emerges as the most powerful means of undermining the cognitivist argument traced so far. Underpinned by a worked-out programme in the philosophy of truth, namely minimalism, non-objectivism is also powered by a distinctive vision of a modern society.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops an application of contextualism in the specific case of moral knowledge. The overall aim is the final vindication of a contextualist account of moral justification that supports ...
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This chapter develops an application of contextualism in the specific case of moral knowledge. The overall aim is the final vindication of a contextualist account of moral justification that supports a cognitivist interpretation of morality. It explains how contextualism compares and contrasts with the dominant coherentist model of moral epistemology in contemporary ethics, namely, an understanding of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium as a coherence theory of justification. It argues that contextualism can be seen as arising from Rawls’s methodological assumptions, if one retains the assumption that considered moral judgements retain a direct source of moral justification even when they derive further warrant from their embedding in a context of justification.Less
This chapter develops an application of contextualism in the specific case of moral knowledge. The overall aim is the final vindication of a contextualist account of moral justification that supports a cognitivist interpretation of morality. It explains how contextualism compares and contrasts with the dominant coherentist model of moral epistemology in contemporary ethics, namely, an understanding of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium as a coherence theory of justification. It argues that contextualism can be seen as arising from Rawls’s methodological assumptions, if one retains the assumption that considered moral judgements retain a direct source of moral justification even when they derive further warrant from their embedding in a context of justification.
Berys Gaut
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263219
- eISBN:
- 9780191718854
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263219.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This book investigates the relation of art to morality, a topic that has been of central and recurring interest to the philosophy of art since Plato. The book explores the various positions that have ...
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This book investigates the relation of art to morality, a topic that has been of central and recurring interest to the philosophy of art since Plato. The book explores the various positions that have been taken in this debate, and argues for ethicism — a position that holds that an artwork is always aesthetically flawed insofar as it possesses an ethical demerit that is aesthetically relevant. Three main arguments are developed for this view: these involve showing that moral goodness is a kind of beauty (the moral beauty argument); that art can teach us about morality and thereby often has aesthetic value (the cognitive argument); and that our emotional responses to works are merited in part by ethical considerations (the merited response argument). In the course of its argument for the correctness of ethical criticism of art, the book also develops a new theory of the nature of aesthetic value, explores how art can teach us about the world and what we morally ought to do by guiding our imaginings, and argues that we can have genuine emotions towards people and events that we know are merely fictional. The book also examines several artworks in detail, showing how ethical criticism can yield rich and plausible accounts of works such as Rembrandt's Bathsheba and Nabokov's Lolita.Less
This book investigates the relation of art to morality, a topic that has been of central and recurring interest to the philosophy of art since Plato. The book explores the various positions that have been taken in this debate, and argues for ethicism — a position that holds that an artwork is always aesthetically flawed insofar as it possesses an ethical demerit that is aesthetically relevant. Three main arguments are developed for this view: these involve showing that moral goodness is a kind of beauty (the moral beauty argument); that art can teach us about morality and thereby often has aesthetic value (the cognitive argument); and that our emotional responses to works are merited in part by ethical considerations (the merited response argument). In the course of its argument for the correctness of ethical criticism of art, the book also develops a new theory of the nature of aesthetic value, explores how art can teach us about the world and what we morally ought to do by guiding our imaginings, and argues that we can have genuine emotions towards people and events that we know are merely fictional. The book also examines several artworks in detail, showing how ethical criticism can yield rich and plausible accounts of works such as Rembrandt's Bathsheba and Nabokov's Lolita.
Berys Gaut
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263219
- eISBN:
- 9780191718854
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263219.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter completes the cognitive argument for ethicism by defending the aesthetic claim. It develops the componential and the critical vocabulary arguments in support of the claim. It also ...
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This chapter completes the cognitive argument for ethicism by defending the aesthetic claim. It develops the componential and the critical vocabulary arguments in support of the claim. It also answers autonomist objections due to Stolnitz, Lamarque, and Diffey, and contextualist objections due to Kieran. It then discusses several artistic techniques, such as the use of imagery and the creation of complex characters, and artistic strategies, such as the ethical journey and seduction strategies, which artworks employ to teach us morally and to do so in a way that makes their moral teaching an aesthetic merit in them. The chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of Nabokov's Lolita to illustrate these techniques and strategies in action.Less
This chapter completes the cognitive argument for ethicism by defending the aesthetic claim. It develops the componential and the critical vocabulary arguments in support of the claim. It also answers autonomist objections due to Stolnitz, Lamarque, and Diffey, and contextualist objections due to Kieran. It then discusses several artistic techniques, such as the use of imagery and the creation of complex characters, and artistic strategies, such as the ethical journey and seduction strategies, which artworks employ to teach us morally and to do so in a way that makes their moral teaching an aesthetic merit in them. The chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of Nabokov's Lolita to illustrate these techniques and strategies in action.
John Russell Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313932
- eISBN:
- 9780199871926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313932.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explores the ramifications that the attribution to Berkeley of a use theory of meaning has for the interpretation of the divine language thesis, the relationship between individual ...
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This chapter explores the ramifications that the attribution to Berkeley of a use theory of meaning has for the interpretation of the divine language thesis, the relationship between individual spirits, the nature of spirits themselves. It is shown that the basic relations between spirits are normative in nature. For the purposes of elucidation, Berkeley's approach is compared and contrasted with that of Daniel Dennett's “intentional stance”.Less
This chapter explores the ramifications that the attribution to Berkeley of a use theory of meaning has for the interpretation of the divine language thesis, the relationship between individual spirits, the nature of spirits themselves. It is shown that the basic relations between spirits are normative in nature. For the purposes of elucidation, Berkeley's approach is compared and contrasted with that of Daniel Dennett's “intentional stance”.
Uwe Steinhoff
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199547807
- eISBN:
- 9780191720758
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547807.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
In his preliminary considerations Habermas tries to demonstrate the initial plausibility of his programme of moral justification. He then uses Karl-Otto Apel's “transcendental pragmatics” for ...
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In his preliminary considerations Habermas tries to demonstrate the initial plausibility of his programme of moral justification. He then uses Karl-Otto Apel's “transcendental pragmatics” for identifying rules of discourse. According to transcendental pragmatics, rules or presuppositions of discourse cannot be denied without so-called “performative self-contradictions”. The next step is to derive the fundamental discourse-ethical justification principles U and D from these discovered rules of discourse. According to U and D, only those norms are valid that in an ideal discourse situation would meet with the acceptance of each speaker affected by the norm. An alternative way of justifying U and D would appeal to Habermas' consensus theory of truth and validity. Finally, Habermas tries to show how norms that are justified with help of the principles U and D can reasonably be applied to real situations. The chapter explains and critically discusses each step in Habermas' line of reasoning.Less
In his preliminary considerations Habermas tries to demonstrate the initial plausibility of his programme of moral justification. He then uses Karl-Otto Apel's “transcendental pragmatics” for identifying rules of discourse. According to transcendental pragmatics, rules or presuppositions of discourse cannot be denied without so-called “performative self-contradictions”. The next step is to derive the fundamental discourse-ethical justification principles U and D from these discovered rules of discourse. According to U and D, only those norms are valid that in an ideal discourse situation would meet with the acceptance of each speaker affected by the norm. An alternative way of justifying U and D would appeal to Habermas' consensus theory of truth and validity. Finally, Habermas tries to show how norms that are justified with help of the principles U and D can reasonably be applied to real situations. The chapter explains and critically discusses each step in Habermas' line of reasoning.
Miranda Fricker
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198237907
- eISBN:
- 9780191706844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on ...
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This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on arguments substantiating a parallel between the moral cognitivist account of virtuous perception, and a proposed account of epistemically virtuous perception that the virtuous hearer possesses owing to a well-trained testimonial sensibility. He perceives his interlocutor as more, or less, credible in what she is telling him.Less
This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on arguments substantiating a parallel between the moral cognitivist account of virtuous perception, and a proposed account of epistemically virtuous perception that the virtuous hearer possesses owing to a well-trained testimonial sensibility. He perceives his interlocutor as more, or less, credible in what she is telling him.
Steven Horst
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195317114
- eISBN:
- 9780199871520
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores the metaphysical commitments of Cognitive Pluralism. Cognitive Pluralism, as a cognitivist/pragmatist thesis, is opposed to a native realism that assumes that the world divides ...
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This chapter explores the metaphysical commitments of Cognitive Pluralism. Cognitive Pluralism, as a cognitivist/pragmatist thesis, is opposed to a native realism that assumes that the world divides itself into objects and kinds in a single canonical and mind-independent way, and that it is the job of the mind to accurately reflect how things are in their own right. Cognitivism, by contrast, holds that any way of modeling the world, including our best scientific models, reflects features of the mind's cognitive architecture as well. Cognitivist and pluralist assumptions create further problems for the terms in which contemporary problems in metaphysics of mind are framed. Intuitions about supervenience, the Negative EMC, and even our standard ways of framing issues about modal metaphysics turn out to be problematic. The cognitivist turn also suggests a way in which the psychological gaps are unlike the other gaps, as they are concerned with the relation between subjects and objects, while the others are concerned with relations between two types of objects.Less
This chapter explores the metaphysical commitments of Cognitive Pluralism. Cognitive Pluralism, as a cognitivist/pragmatist thesis, is opposed to a native realism that assumes that the world divides itself into objects and kinds in a single canonical and mind-independent way, and that it is the job of the mind to accurately reflect how things are in their own right. Cognitivism, by contrast, holds that any way of modeling the world, including our best scientific models, reflects features of the mind's cognitive architecture as well. Cognitivist and pluralist assumptions create further problems for the terms in which contemporary problems in metaphysics of mind are framed. Intuitions about supervenience, the Negative EMC, and even our standard ways of framing issues about modal metaphysics turn out to be problematic. The cognitivist turn also suggests a way in which the psychological gaps are unlike the other gaps, as they are concerned with the relation between subjects and objects, while the others are concerned with relations between two types of objects.
Craig Delancey
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195142716
- eISBN:
- 9780199833153
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195142713.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Cognitive theories of emotions are criticized. Cognitivism is shown to have two forms: reductive and doxastic. Each is found inconsistent with a range of important scientific findings about affects. ...
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Cognitive theories of emotions are criticized. Cognitivism is shown to have two forms: reductive and doxastic. Each is found inconsistent with a range of important scientific findings about affects. The affect program theory is consistent with these findings, and is consistent with a weak form of cognitivism. The failure of cognitivism about emotions is also evidence for the hierarchical view of mind.Less
Cognitive theories of emotions are criticized. Cognitivism is shown to have two forms: reductive and doxastic. Each is found inconsistent with a range of important scientific findings about affects. The affect program theory is consistent with these findings, and is consistent with a weak form of cognitivism. The failure of cognitivism about emotions is also evidence for the hierarchical view of mind.
Ulrike Heuer
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599325
- eISBN:
- 9780191741500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In his influential discussion of thick concepts Williams argues that the facts that make judgements, which apply thick concepts correctly, true, provide reasons for action — albeit only for the ...
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In his influential discussion of thick concepts Williams argues that the facts that make judgements, which apply thick concepts correctly, true, provide reasons for action — albeit only for the members of a community who have a disposition to be guided by the concepts in question. His internalism about practical reasons may help to explain this claim: the disposition to be guided by a thick concept provides the link to existing motives that all reasons must have. Understood thus, Williams makes room for explaining and vindicating Oscar Wilde's ‘…not one of my words’-dictum about certain thick concepts. However, the chapter argues that the combination of the account of thick concepts that Williams expounds with reasons internalism leads into a dilemma: either the facts that thick concepts, correctly applied, refer to, do not provide reasons (not even for those who have a disposition to be guided by them) — except perhaps in the way in which any other, non-evaluative fact may provide a reason; or they provide reasons for everyone, independently of the disposition to be guided by the concepts. Getting out of the dilemma requires giving up on reasons internalism or, alternatively, modifying the account of thick concepts that Williams sets out.Less
In his influential discussion of thick concepts Williams argues that the facts that make judgements, which apply thick concepts correctly, true, provide reasons for action — albeit only for the members of a community who have a disposition to be guided by the concepts in question. His internalism about practical reasons may help to explain this claim: the disposition to be guided by a thick concept provides the link to existing motives that all reasons must have. Understood thus, Williams makes room for explaining and vindicating Oscar Wilde's ‘…not one of my words’-dictum about certain thick concepts. However, the chapter argues that the combination of the account of thick concepts that Williams expounds with reasons internalism leads into a dilemma: either the facts that thick concepts, correctly applied, refer to, do not provide reasons (not even for those who have a disposition to be guided by them) — except perhaps in the way in which any other, non-evaluative fact may provide a reason; or they provide reasons for everyone, independently of the disposition to be guided by the concepts. Getting out of the dilemma requires giving up on reasons internalism or, alternatively, modifying the account of thick concepts that Williams sets out.
