Search Results

We each at least seem to have a distinctive first-person knowledge of our own experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner observation, and phenomenology is often thought to rely on introspection. But Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction was designed precisely to find a route to knowledge of the structures of consciousness that was independent of any appeal to observation of one's own mental states. This chapter explicates Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction in contemporary terms that (1) show its distance from all inner-observation accounts; (2) exhibit its kinship to and historical influence on outer-observation accounts of self-knowledge popularized by Sellars; and (3) demonstrate that a contemporary ‘cognitive transformation’ view based on Husserl's method may provide a viable contribution to contemporary debates about the source of self-knowledge.

Spatial representations, in technical and biological systems, are characterized by reference frames: Location information is given relative to a reference point. In the nervous system, different spatial representations exist with reference frames defined by the diverse sensory surfaces and effector systems. In order to integrate sensory information, memorize object locations in the world, and use sensory information to plan goal-directed movements, a mechanism is needed to bring these different reference frames together. In dynamic field models, a transformation from one reference frame to another can be implemented using multidimensional fields. This mechanism enables continuous and flexible coupling between different spatial representations. This chapter presents neural findings on spatial reference frames and transformations between them. It then describes a general dynamic field architecture for reference frame transformations and shows how this can be applied for cognitive tasks in the domain of spatial language.

This chapter explores the kind of change that would have to occur in human perspective if we were to undergo a cognitive transformation and learn to “think like a planet.” It first presents an example of an individual transformation, establishing the importance of this cognitive shift, and then generalizes the process of individual cognitive transformation to groups and societies. The chapter concludes by explaining what the acceptance of an important role for cognitive transformations means for our understanding of virtue and virtuous behavior.

This chapter describes women’s perceptions of the pains of prison and their identity development while incarcerated. The 44 women in the sample had histories of substance abuse and felony offending and were from rural, small town, suburban, and urban areas. Interviewers encouraged the women to take the lead in shaping their life stories. Revealing the importance of relationships to the women, inductive analysis of the life stories showed that distress over the inability to fill perceived obligations to relatives and separation from children were the most commonly mentioned pains of incarceration. Relevant to narrative identity theory, increased spirituality was the most common form of making good of negative prison experiences. Relevant to cognitive transformation theory, some incarcerated women pictured themselves in new prosocial roles in their families, grabbed onto hooks for change in the prison, and came to see criminal behavior as negative. Findings suggest that women see themselves as essential to their children and other relatives, and that prisons should strive to provide opportunities for women to not only increase their spirituality, but also to develop agency and communion and to support women’s identity as caregivers and mothers.

This chapter takes a closer look at the notion of prison as a turning point. It demonstrates that the majority of interviewees described having experienced a ‘personal change’, an ‘epiphany’ or a ‘spiritual awakening’. It further details the vehicles for such a cognitive shift. Once these lifers made the decision to move away from their old lives, they described consciously distancing themselves from delinquent peers and surrounding themselves with a supportive and positive social network. This chapter goes deeper into the process underlying this change, and the associated redemption narrative. It shows that this narrative is not necessarily fake, in the sense that interviewees pretend to be someone they are not, but rather a reflection of how they wish to present themselves.

Chapter eleven concludes by exploring the boundaries of two main theoretical models: Life-course theories and theories of cognitive transformation, in explaining success and failure among these lifers. The majority of the interviewed lifers, in a strict sense, desisted from crime, but still experienced great difficulty adjusting to life outside of prison. The chapter discusses ways in which the findings can be put into practical and policy recommendations, to better prepare this unique group of offenders for release to the community: By reclaiming self-efficacy in prison and through employment, by evidence-based programming, and by acknowledging the psychological aftermath of long-term incarceration. The chapter concludes with a discussion on reform in both prison and parole systems for lifers. Providing lifers a fair chance on the job market, adequate programming taking into account the prolonged period of confinement, and a sense of certainty in terms of reasons for recall enables them to start a life beyond bars.

This chapter draws from two predominant criminological theories that have been used to explain desistance from crime: Life-course theories and theories of cognitive transformation. Particular attention is paid to life-course notions including aging out and acquiring new social roles. This chapter also addresses the nature of the homicide and the influence of imprisonment to help us understand how the homicide offenders on which this study was based, fare post-release. Did prison act as a school of crime, as a deterrent, or simply as a ‘deep freeze’, which implies that offenders came out the exact way they came in? Finally, the chapter discusses potential harmful effects of imprisonment, including institutionalization. This chapter serves as a theoretical background in coming to understand the ability of lifers to build a life for themselves before, during, and most importantly, after release.

Chapter ten delves deeper into the factors the interviewees mentioned as key to staying out. These included aging out of crime, a healthy fear for the conditions of parole, and self-efficacy, or having a sense of choice and control over one’s life. Non-incarcerated interviewees, as opposed to re-incarcerated individuals, reflected a strong sense of agency in their narrative. The process of desistance is thus not the result of societal forces, as emphasized by life-course theorists. Nor does it seem to be a resolution of an individual to change, as the vast majority of interviewees said that they underwent a transformation leading to a better version of themselves. What seems to be crucial for lifers in being successful in staying out on parole is a combination of social support structures, having regained a sense of control, and a strong awareness of the restraints that govern their day-to-day life.