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Cognitive Phenomenology

Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (eds)

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The word ‘phenomenology’ as it occurs in the title of this book is a name for the subjective qualitative character of experience. It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory ... More


From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed

Terry Horgan

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The aim of this paper is to set forth some considerations that will bolster the case for cognitive phenomenology. The approach will be informed by two guiding ideas. First, a promising dialectical ... More


Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life

Galen Strawson

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn't just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is ... More


Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content

Uriah Kriegel

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming that ... More


Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?

Adam Pautz

in Phenomenal Intentionality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199764297
eISBN:
9780199932191
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The chapter criticizes the thesis that “cognitive phenomenology” might help ground mental content. Criticisms concern what the chapter calls “altered cognitive qualia cases”, “absent cognitive qualia ... More


The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology

Peter Carruthers and Bénédicte Veillet

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The goal of this chapter is to mount a critique of the claim that cognitive content (that is, the kind of content possessed by our concepts and thoughts) makes a constitutive contribution to the ... More


Which States Can Be Conscious? Cognitive Qualia Reduced

Jesse J. Prinz

in The Conscious Brain

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780195314595
eISBN:
9780199979059
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314595.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The AIR theory of consciousness applies only to perceptual representations, because other kinds of representations, include some used in higher cognition, are not hierarchically organized or amenable ... More


Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries

Galen Strawson

in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199272457
eISBN:
9780191709951
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter glosses the terms ‘naturalism’, ‘physicalism’, ‘intentionality’, ‘aboutness’, ‘mental’, ‘content’, ‘mental content’, ‘representational content’, and so on, in ways that may seem ... More


Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries

Galen Strawson

in Real Materialism: and Other Essays

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199267422
eISBN:
9780191708343
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter glosses ‘naturalism’, ‘physicalism’, ‘intentionality’, ‘aboutness’, ‘mental’, ‘content’, ‘mental content’, ‘representational content’, and so on in ways that may seem unorthodox but ... More


The Phenomenology of Particularity

Michelle Montague

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

We perceive individual physical objects, and we perceive them as individual physical objects—as discrete, numerically distinct, as particulars: it is part of the experiential qualitative character of ... More


Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology

Maja Spener

in Cognitive Phenomenology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199579938
eISBN:
9780191731112
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The debate concerning the phenomenology of thought is marked by severe disagreement about how best to characterize a given conscious thought on the basis of introspective reflecting upon it. In this ... More


Cognitive Phenomenology

Uriah Kriegel

in The Varieties of Consciousness

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199846122
eISBN:
9780190238353
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199846122.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The goal of this chapter is twofold. Part I argues for the very existence of a phenomenology proper to cognitive states—an irreducible cognitive phenomenology. §1 introduces the issue, then §§2–3 ... More


Cognitive Phenomenology: What Is Given in Conscious Thought

Michelle Montague

in The Given: Experience and its Content

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
August 2016
ISBN:
9780198748908
eISBN:
9780191811661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198748908.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 8 argues that conscious thought cannot be adequately characterized without appealing to a distinctive kind of non-sensory cognitive phenomenology. What features must be present for us to ... More


Cognitive Phenomenology, Semantic Qualia, and Luminous Knowledge

Neil Tennant

in Williamson on Knowledge

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199287512
eISBN:
9780191713620
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

This chapter argues that thinkers have cognitive homes with the following minimal chattels: when they are in a state of understanding, with respect to any sentence, that it is meaningful for them (as ... More


The Life of the Mind

Michelle Montague

in Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780198712718
eISBN:
9780191781049
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

What distinguishes a conscious occurrent thought from a non-conscious occurrent thought? This chapter argues that the notion of ‘access-consciousness’ cannot provide a satisfactory answer and that we ... More


On the Phenomenology of Thought

Joseph Levine

in Quality and Content: Essays on Consciousness, Representation, and Modality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
April 2018
ISBN:
9780198800088
eISBN:
9780191839863
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198800088.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In this paper I address the debate over the existence and nature of “cognitive phenomenology,” the alleged contribution to phenomenal consciousness made by non-sensory, cognitive states. I ... More


Intellectual Gestalts

Elijah Chudnoff

in Phenomenal Intentionality

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199764297
eISBN:
9780199932191
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. ... More


Intentionality, Phenomenology, Consciousness, and Content

Michelle Montague

in The Given: Experience and its Content

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
August 2016
ISBN:
9780198748908
eISBN:
9780191811661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198748908.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 1 introduces the four fundamental notions that are the focus of this book: intentionality, phenomenology, consciousness, and content. The author expounds and defends the view that ... More


Perception of Physical Objects: The Phenomenological Particularity Fact

Michelle Montague

in The Given: Experience and its Content

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
August 2016
ISBN:
9780198748908
eISBN:
9780191811661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198748908.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 6 considers object perception, focusing again on visual perception and argues that an adequate theory of object perception must account for the fact that it is part of the phenomenological ... More


Phenomenal Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel (ed.)

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199764297
eISBN:
9780199932191
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Recent work on the nature of intentionality has focused on the connection between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. The notion of phenomenal intentionality, in particular, has surfaced in ... More


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