Thomas Christiano
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198297475
- eISBN:
- 9780191716867
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198297475.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
This chapter argues that social justice requires that equality be publicly realized. Social justice is realized in social and political institutions that attempt to establish justice. It requires ...
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This chapter argues that social justice requires that equality be publicly realized. Social justice is realized in social and political institutions that attempt to establish justice. It requires that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. In the case of justice as equality, it must not only be the case that people are treated as equals; they must be able to see that they are treated as equals. Hence, social justice requires what is called public equality. It is argued that public equality is grounded on the principle of equality defended in the last chapter and the circumstances of disagreement, diversity, fallibility, and cognitive bias that attend efforts to implement justice in any moderately complex society as well as the fundamental interests of persons in society. This grounds the idea of the egalitarian standpoint from which the justification of political institutions proceeds. That is the first stage of the argument for grounding of democracy on equality.Less
This chapter argues that social justice requires that equality be publicly realized. Social justice is realized in social and political institutions that attempt to establish justice. It requires that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. In the case of justice as equality, it must not only be the case that people are treated as equals; they must be able to see that they are treated as equals. Hence, social justice requires what is called public equality. It is argued that public equality is grounded on the principle of equality defended in the last chapter and the circumstances of disagreement, diversity, fallibility, and cognitive bias that attend efforts to implement justice in any moderately complex society as well as the fundamental interests of persons in society. This grounds the idea of the egalitarian standpoint from which the justification of political institutions proceeds. That is the first stage of the argument for grounding of democracy on equality.
Jenna G. Suway and Nathan A. Fox
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195315455
- eISBN:
- 9780199979066
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315455.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology
Biased social information processing is thought to underlie the development and maintenance of anxiety and depression. Two such biases that have been frequently linked to anxiety and depression are ...
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Biased social information processing is thought to underlie the development and maintenance of anxiety and depression. Two such biases that have been frequently linked to anxiety and depression are selective attention to threatening stimuli, and negative interpretation of ambiguous situations. This chapter covers the basic methodological and conceptual background of attention and interpretive biases to threat and then explores how cognitive bias modification has been used to attenuate these biases and in turn decrease anxiety and, in some cases, depression.Less
Biased social information processing is thought to underlie the development and maintenance of anxiety and depression. Two such biases that have been frequently linked to anxiety and depression are selective attention to threatening stimuli, and negative interpretation of ambiguous situations. This chapter covers the basic methodological and conceptual background of attention and interpretive biases to threat and then explores how cognitive bias modification has been used to attenuate these biases and in turn decrease anxiety and, in some cases, depression.
Gerd Gigerenzer, Klaus Fiedler, and Henrik Olsson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195315448
- eISBN:
- 9780199932429
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315448.003.0025
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Human-Technology Interaction
Cognitive processes and their adaptive functions can hardly be understood if we look exclusively inside the mind, such as when we try to explain behavior with traits, attitudes, or preferences. ...
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Cognitive processes and their adaptive functions can hardly be understood if we look exclusively inside the mind, such as when we try to explain behavior with traits, attitudes, or preferences. Rather, it is essential to analyze the adaptive match between cognitive and ecological structures. This chapter shows that many phenomena that look like cognitive fallacies follow logically from a cognitive system well adapted to its environment. Specifically, the chapter presents an ecological analysis of judgment and choice in terms of the three moments of statistical distributions of information in environments. The chapter demonstrates that phenomena from various areas of psychology can be accounted for by people’s sensitivity to the three moments, and it also describes the implications of these moments in terms of the effect of regression toward the mean, the role of sample size, and the process of sampling.Less
Cognitive processes and their adaptive functions can hardly be understood if we look exclusively inside the mind, such as when we try to explain behavior with traits, attitudes, or preferences. Rather, it is essential to analyze the adaptive match between cognitive and ecological structures. This chapter shows that many phenomena that look like cognitive fallacies follow logically from a cognitive system well adapted to its environment. Specifically, the chapter presents an ecological analysis of judgment and choice in terms of the three moments of statistical distributions of information in environments. The chapter demonstrates that phenomena from various areas of psychology can be accounted for by people’s sensitivity to the three moments, and it also describes the implications of these moments in terms of the effect of regression toward the mean, the role of sample size, and the process of sampling.
Ian H. Gotlib, Eva Gilboa, and Beth Kaplan Sommerfeld
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195133585
- eISBN:
- 9780199847310
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195133585.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Clinical Psychology
This chapter explores the psychiatric disorder of depression and the opening section provides relevant statistics and a brief history of related research on depression. This chapter focuses on ...
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This chapter explores the psychiatric disorder of depression and the opening section provides relevant statistics and a brief history of related research on depression. This chapter focuses on depressive disorder, as opposed to a related mood disorder—bipolar disorder. This chapter examines in detail the parameters, role, and origins of cognitive dysfunction in depression. The related theories on the role of cognition in depression developed by Beck, Bower, and Teasdale are presented. This is followed by a review of existing empirical studies of cognitive function in depression which begins with the crude, early investigations based on self-report questionnaires to more recent studies which employ information-processing methodologies developed by experimental cognitive psychologists. Insights related to the linkage between depression and deficits in attention, memory, and judgment are then presented. The role of these cognitive biases in recovery from depressive episodes are explored and linked with the issues of childhood depression.Less
This chapter explores the psychiatric disorder of depression and the opening section provides relevant statistics and a brief history of related research on depression. This chapter focuses on depressive disorder, as opposed to a related mood disorder—bipolar disorder. This chapter examines in detail the parameters, role, and origins of cognitive dysfunction in depression. The related theories on the role of cognition in depression developed by Beck, Bower, and Teasdale are presented. This is followed by a review of existing empirical studies of cognitive function in depression which begins with the crude, early investigations based on self-report questionnaires to more recent studies which employ information-processing methodologies developed by experimental cognitive psychologists. Insights related to the linkage between depression and deficits in attention, memory, and judgment are then presented. The role of these cognitive biases in recovery from depressive episodes are explored and linked with the issues of childhood depression.
Witham Larry
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195394757
- eISBN:
- 9780199777372
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195394757.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Economics and cognitive psychology have long debated the nature of human rationality. One says humans have a capacity for rational calculation, while the other points to “cognitive bias” in people’s ...
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Economics and cognitive psychology have long debated the nature of human rationality. One says humans have a capacity for rational calculation, while the other points to “cognitive bias” in people’s judgments. Herbert Simon, a psychologist and Nobel Prize winner in economics, offers a consensus view that humans have objective and subjective rationality. The first rationality is consistent behavior toward a goal, while the second is having personal “good reasons” for beliefs and behavior. The historical idea of “economic man” was invented for use in theoretical models, so to end that stereotype, economist are providing richer definitions of rational behavior. Anthropologists have linked religion to the “primitive mind,” while critics of religion say it is irrational. However, not all anthropologists agree. Most people, including the well-educated, adhere to religion, suggesting a “rational choice” for its personal and social usefulness and its explanations of reality.Less
Economics and cognitive psychology have long debated the nature of human rationality. One says humans have a capacity for rational calculation, while the other points to “cognitive bias” in people’s judgments. Herbert Simon, a psychologist and Nobel Prize winner in economics, offers a consensus view that humans have objective and subjective rationality. The first rationality is consistent behavior toward a goal, while the second is having personal “good reasons” for beliefs and behavior. The historical idea of “economic man” was invented for use in theoretical models, so to end that stereotype, economist are providing richer definitions of rational behavior. Anthropologists have linked religion to the “primitive mind,” while critics of religion say it is irrational. However, not all anthropologists agree. Most people, including the well-educated, adhere to religion, suggesting a “rational choice” for its personal and social usefulness and its explanations of reality.
Martha Whitesmith
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781474466349
- eISBN:
- 9781474491112
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474466349.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
Recommendations for future research and best practice for intelligence analysis.
Recommendations for future research and best practice for intelligence analysis.
Martha Whitesmith
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781474466349
- eISBN:
- 9781474491112
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474466349.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
Belief, Bias and Intelligence outlines an approach for reducing the risk of cognitive biases impacting intelligence analysis that draws from experimental research in the social sciences. It critiques ...
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Belief, Bias and Intelligence outlines an approach for reducing the risk of cognitive biases impacting intelligence analysis that draws from experimental research in the social sciences. It critiques the reliance of Western intelligence agencies on the use of a method for intelligence analysis developed by the CIA in the 1990’s, the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). The book shows that the theoretical basis of the ACH method is significantly flawed, and that there is no empirical basis for the use of ACH in mitigating cognitive biases. It puts ACH to the test in an experimental setting against two key cognitive biases with unique empirical research facilitated by UK’s Professional Heads of Intelligence Analysis unit at the Cabinet Office, includes meta-analysis into which analytical factors increase and reduce the risk of cognitive bias and recommends an alternative approach to risk mitigation for intelligence communities. Finally, it proposes alternative models for explaining the underlying causes of cognitive biases, challenging current leading theories in the social sciences.Less
Belief, Bias and Intelligence outlines an approach for reducing the risk of cognitive biases impacting intelligence analysis that draws from experimental research in the social sciences. It critiques the reliance of Western intelligence agencies on the use of a method for intelligence analysis developed by the CIA in the 1990’s, the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). The book shows that the theoretical basis of the ACH method is significantly flawed, and that there is no empirical basis for the use of ACH in mitigating cognitive biases. It puts ACH to the test in an experimental setting against two key cognitive biases with unique empirical research facilitated by UK’s Professional Heads of Intelligence Analysis unit at the Cabinet Office, includes meta-analysis into which analytical factors increase and reduce the risk of cognitive bias and recommends an alternative approach to risk mitigation for intelligence communities. Finally, it proposes alternative models for explaining the underlying causes of cognitive biases, challenging current leading theories in the social sciences.
Dominic D. P. Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780691137452
- eISBN:
- 9780691185606
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691137452.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter presents a summary of the findings and explores the implications of the new evolutionary perspective on cognitive biases for international relations. It concludes that the cognitive ...
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This chapter presents a summary of the findings and explores the implications of the new evolutionary perspective on cognitive biases for international relations. It concludes that the cognitive biases are adaptive in a way that strategic instincts help individuals, state leaders, and nations achieve their goals. It also reviews effective strategies that often differ radically from those predicted by conventional paradigms, such as the rational choice theory. The chapter offers novel interpretations of historical events, especially the American Revolution, the British appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s, and the United States' Pacific campaign in World War II. It examines counterintuitive strategies for leaders and policymakers to exploit strategic instincts among themselves, the public, and other states.Less
This chapter presents a summary of the findings and explores the implications of the new evolutionary perspective on cognitive biases for international relations. It concludes that the cognitive biases are adaptive in a way that strategic instincts help individuals, state leaders, and nations achieve their goals. It also reviews effective strategies that often differ radically from those predicted by conventional paradigms, such as the rational choice theory. The chapter offers novel interpretations of historical events, especially the American Revolution, the British appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s, and the United States' Pacific campaign in World War II. It examines counterintuitive strategies for leaders and policymakers to exploit strategic instincts among themselves, the public, and other states.
Anders Sandberg, Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong, and Julian Savulescu
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199920754
- eISBN:
- 9780199950133
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199920754.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Forensic Psychology
Cognitive performance of the participants has crucial significance for legal trials, sometimes making the difference between fair and unfair verdicts. Jury members are expected to passively listen to ...
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Cognitive performance of the participants has crucial significance for legal trials, sometimes making the difference between fair and unfair verdicts. Jury members are expected to passively listen to long arguments, often about unfamiliar subjects, retain that information and then perform an unbiased deliberation to reach a just verdict. There are many natural cognitive limitations that impair this process: inattention, sleepiness, stress, the fallibility of human memory and our cognitive biases. Could juror cognition be improved, and would this improve the legal process? This chapter compares external aids such as notetaking with biomedical aids such as cognition enhancement drugs. It appears likely that enhancement drugs might improve juror cognition if used well, and in any case at least some jurors are likely already using them. There is also the possibility that some of them might introduce cognitive biases. However, given the low bar required for juror competence these biases might be regarded as acceptable, especially compared to the biases inherent in the deliberation process itself.Less
Cognitive performance of the participants has crucial significance for legal trials, sometimes making the difference between fair and unfair verdicts. Jury members are expected to passively listen to long arguments, often about unfamiliar subjects, retain that information and then perform an unbiased deliberation to reach a just verdict. There are many natural cognitive limitations that impair this process: inattention, sleepiness, stress, the fallibility of human memory and our cognitive biases. Could juror cognition be improved, and would this improve the legal process? This chapter compares external aids such as notetaking with biomedical aids such as cognition enhancement drugs. It appears likely that enhancement drugs might improve juror cognition if used well, and in any case at least some jurors are likely already using them. There is also the possibility that some of them might introduce cognitive biases. However, given the low bar required for juror competence these biases might be regarded as acceptable, especially compared to the biases inherent in the deliberation process itself.
Martha Whitesmith
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781474466349
- eISBN:
- 9781474491112
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474466349.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
The chapter examines the ability of current versions of the structured analytical technique, assessment of competing hypotheses (ACH) to provide theoretically valid methodologies for establishing ...
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The chapter examines the ability of current versions of the structured analytical technique, assessment of competing hypotheses (ACH) to provide theoretically valid methodologies for establishing justified beliefs in intelligence analysis, to cope with the higher risk of epistemic complexity in intelligence analysis, and to mitigate or reduce cognitive bias. It argues that no current version of ACH provides a theoretically valid mechanism to establish justification for beliefs, or to cope with epistemic complexity, but that the method can be adapted to do so. It also argues that no current version of ACH provides a theoretically valid mechanism to mitigate the risk of cognitive bias, but that the method could be adapted to make the occurrence of some cognitive biases visible to peer review.Less
The chapter examines the ability of current versions of the structured analytical technique, assessment of competing hypotheses (ACH) to provide theoretically valid methodologies for establishing justified beliefs in intelligence analysis, to cope with the higher risk of epistemic complexity in intelligence analysis, and to mitigate or reduce cognitive bias. It argues that no current version of ACH provides a theoretically valid mechanism to establish justification for beliefs, or to cope with epistemic complexity, but that the method can be adapted to do so. It also argues that no current version of ACH provides a theoretically valid mechanism to mitigate the risk of cognitive bias, but that the method could be adapted to make the occurrence of some cognitive biases visible to peer review.
Susan A. Gelman
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195154061
- eISBN:
- 9780199786718
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195154061.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This introduction concerns essentialism in everyday thought. Roughly, essentialism is the view that categories have an underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that ...
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This introduction concerns essentialism in everyday thought. Roughly, essentialism is the view that categories have an underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity. According to essentialism, categories (such as “boy,” “girl,” or “intelligence”) are real, in several senses: they are discovered (rather than invented), they are natural (rather than artificial), they predict other properties, and they point to natural discontinuities in the world. The question of whether children are essentialists runs directly against a powerful portrait of children's concepts as perceptually driven, concrete, and atheoretical. This chapter argues that children's concepts are not merely perceptually based, concrete, or built up from specifics, but rather reflect folk theories and a powerful capacity to look beyond the obvious. The discussion focuses on essentialism as an early, domain-specific cognitive bias; children's concepts as embedded in theories; and language as an influence on cognitive development.Less
This introduction concerns essentialism in everyday thought. Roughly, essentialism is the view that categories have an underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity. According to essentialism, categories (such as “boy,” “girl,” or “intelligence”) are real, in several senses: they are discovered (rather than invented), they are natural (rather than artificial), they predict other properties, and they point to natural discontinuities in the world. The question of whether children are essentialists runs directly against a powerful portrait of children's concepts as perceptually driven, concrete, and atheoretical. This chapter argues that children's concepts are not merely perceptually based, concrete, or built up from specifics, but rather reflect folk theories and a powerful capacity to look beyond the obvious. The discussion focuses on essentialism as an early, domain-specific cognitive bias; children's concepts as embedded in theories; and language as an influence on cognitive development.
David J. Teece
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295426
- eISBN:
- 9780191596964
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295421.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
The reluctance to introduce competency‐destroying innovations may be understood as a product of the decision‐making biases of many large firms; some large firms tend to lose their ability and desire ...
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The reluctance to introduce competency‐destroying innovations may be understood as a product of the decision‐making biases of many large firms; some large firms tend to lose their ability and desire to engage in competency‐destroying innovative activities as they grow because of decision‐making biases associated with their size, asset base, business practices, and organizational structure. There are two key behavioural factors that influence and bias decision making in organizations: bounded rationality (and cognitive biases in general), and inconsistent risk aversion. The interaction of these behavioural aspects with the established capabilities, complementary assets, and administrative and organizational routines in firms intensifies decision‐making biases, thereby limiting radical innovation. Implications for managing innovation and change are considered.Less
The reluctance to introduce competency‐destroying innovations may be understood as a product of the decision‐making biases of many large firms; some large firms tend to lose their ability and desire to engage in competency‐destroying innovative activities as they grow because of decision‐making biases associated with their size, asset base, business practices, and organizational structure. There are two key behavioural factors that influence and bias decision making in organizations: bounded rationality (and cognitive biases in general), and inconsistent risk aversion. The interaction of these behavioural aspects with the established capabilities, complementary assets, and administrative and organizational routines in firms intensifies decision‐making biases, thereby limiting radical innovation. Implications for managing innovation and change are considered.
Deborah Kelemen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199730421
- eISBN:
- 9780199949557
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730421.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Developmental Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Natural selection is the process responsible for the functional adaptation of biological organisms. Despite its basic and applied scientific relevance, it remains one of the most widely misunderstood ...
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Natural selection is the process responsible for the functional adaptation of biological organisms. Despite its basic and applied scientific relevance, it remains one of the most widely misunderstood concepts of contemporary science. In this chapter, the conceptual underpinnings of some of these misunderstandings are explored and it is argued that many of them have their roots in cognitive biases that are observable in preschoolers and elementary school children. Central among these is the teleological tendency to explain phenomena by reference to function. The chapter presents developmental work exploring this tendency and also reviews recent findings concerning the possible origins of the bias. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of this and other developmental research for early evolutionary education.Less
Natural selection is the process responsible for the functional adaptation of biological organisms. Despite its basic and applied scientific relevance, it remains one of the most widely misunderstood concepts of contemporary science. In this chapter, the conceptual underpinnings of some of these misunderstandings are explored and it is argued that many of them have their roots in cognitive biases that are observable in preschoolers and elementary school children. Central among these is the teleological tendency to explain phenomena by reference to function. The chapter presents developmental work exploring this tendency and also reviews recent findings concerning the possible origins of the bias. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of this and other developmental research for early evolutionary education.
C. K. Rowland, Tina Traficanti, and Erin Vernon
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195367584
- eISBN:
- 9780199776917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367584.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Forensic Psychology
For decades virtually every scholarly work on trial judges began by lamenting the unfortunate tendency of students of judicial behavior to concentrate almost exclusively on appellate courts generally ...
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For decades virtually every scholarly work on trial judges began by lamenting the unfortunate tendency of students of judicial behavior to concentrate almost exclusively on appellate courts generally and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular. Fortunately, although this imbalance is still present to a degree, a nascent body of research has ameliorated the disparity and enhanced greatly our understanding of civil trial courts, trial judges, and the psychology of trial judging over the last decade. We review this research and conclude, first, that this research collectively suggests a value-based exercise of judicial discretion that may reflect intentional or unintentional bias in trial judging when the dispute involves ideological issues and, second, that when faced with science-based standards, statistical evidence, and other risk-assessment tasks, judges are susceptible to many of the same limits on objectivity and accuracy that plague jurors and all human decision makers faced with difficult judgments.Less
For decades virtually every scholarly work on trial judges began by lamenting the unfortunate tendency of students of judicial behavior to concentrate almost exclusively on appellate courts generally and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular. Fortunately, although this imbalance is still present to a degree, a nascent body of research has ameliorated the disparity and enhanced greatly our understanding of civil trial courts, trial judges, and the psychology of trial judging over the last decade. We review this research and conclude, first, that this research collectively suggests a value-based exercise of judicial discretion that may reflect intentional or unintentional bias in trial judging when the dispute involves ideological issues and, second, that when faced with science-based standards, statistical evidence, and other risk-assessment tasks, judges are susceptible to many of the same limits on objectivity and accuracy that plague jurors and all human decision makers faced with difficult judgments.
Emily Sherwin
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195367584
- eISBN:
- 9780199776917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367584.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Forensic Psychology
Judges confront rules in two ways, as rule-makers and as rule-followers. When a judge decides a case that is not governed by an existing rule, the judge must formulate a rule of decision and ...
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Judges confront rules in two ways, as rule-makers and as rule-followers. When a judge decides a case that is not governed by an existing rule, the judge must formulate a rule of decision and calculate the effects of the rule in future cases. Rule-making is a highly deliberative process, in which the judge must select the rule that will best realize relevant values over the range of cases to which it applies. When a judge decides a case that is governed by a precedent rule, the judge is expected to treat the precedent rule as authoritative. To do this, the judge must follow the rule mechanically, without reflecting on the relationship between the outcome of the rule and the values on which the rule is based. These two tasks — rule-making and rule-following — make different, and possibly conflicting, cognitive demands on judges.Less
Judges confront rules in two ways, as rule-makers and as rule-followers. When a judge decides a case that is not governed by an existing rule, the judge must formulate a rule of decision and calculate the effects of the rule in future cases. Rule-making is a highly deliberative process, in which the judge must select the rule that will best realize relevant values over the range of cases to which it applies. When a judge decides a case that is governed by a precedent rule, the judge is expected to treat the precedent rule as authoritative. To do this, the judge must follow the rule mechanically, without reflecting on the relationship between the outcome of the rule and the values on which the rule is based. These two tasks — rule-making and rule-following — make different, and possibly conflicting, cognitive demands on judges.
ILONA MIELKE
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264195
- eISBN:
- 9780191734540
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264195.003.0013
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Autism is diagnosed through a symptom of clusters known as the diagnostic triad. One of these is the rigid adherence to routines, repetitive activities, and narrowly focused interests which represent ...
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Autism is diagnosed through a symptom of clusters known as the diagnostic triad. One of these is the rigid adherence to routines, repetitive activities, and narrowly focused interests which represent behavioural and cognitive biases due to a lack of imaginative cognition. The other two clusters include impairment in communication and social interaction because of impairments of imagination. These symptoms gave rise to the assumption that autism impairs imagination. Symptoms consistent with this view are prominent throughout the clinical and research profile of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). However, some individuals diagnosed with autism exhibit excellent gifts in the field of creative imagination such as in arts, music, and poetry. Some of these personages who suffered from autism include Samuel Beckett, Albert Einstein, Andy Warhol, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This claim purports that autism is not only compatible with creative imagination but in some sense promotes it. This chapter discusses the evidence for the impairment of the imagination in ASD and shows how these problems align with the key psychological models of autism. It evaluates the evidence for elements of preserved imagination by considering autistic visual arts and autistic spectrum poetry. It also highlights the implications of the relationship of autism and imagination.Less
Autism is diagnosed through a symptom of clusters known as the diagnostic triad. One of these is the rigid adherence to routines, repetitive activities, and narrowly focused interests which represent behavioural and cognitive biases due to a lack of imaginative cognition. The other two clusters include impairment in communication and social interaction because of impairments of imagination. These symptoms gave rise to the assumption that autism impairs imagination. Symptoms consistent with this view are prominent throughout the clinical and research profile of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). However, some individuals diagnosed with autism exhibit excellent gifts in the field of creative imagination such as in arts, music, and poetry. Some of these personages who suffered from autism include Samuel Beckett, Albert Einstein, Andy Warhol, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This claim purports that autism is not only compatible with creative imagination but in some sense promotes it. This chapter discusses the evidence for the impairment of the imagination in ASD and shows how these problems align with the key psychological models of autism. It evaluates the evidence for elements of preserved imagination by considering autistic visual arts and autistic spectrum poetry. It also highlights the implications of the relationship of autism and imagination.
Dominic D. P. Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780691137452
- eISBN:
- 9780691185606
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691137452.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases — quirks of the brain we all share as human beings — are detrimental and responsible for policy ...
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A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases — quirks of the brain we all share as human beings — are detrimental and responsible for policy failures, disasters, and wars. This book challenges this assumption, explaining that these nonrational behaviors can actually support favorable results in international politics and contribute to political and strategic success. By studying past examples, the book considers the ways that cognitive biases act as “strategic instincts,” lending a competitive edge in policy decisions, especially under conditions of unpredictability and imperfect information. Drawing from evolutionary theory and behavioral sciences, the book looks at three influential cognitive biases — overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias. It then examines the advantageous as well as the detrimental effects of these biases through historical case studies of the American Revolution, the Munich Crisis, and the Pacific campaign in World War II. The book acknowledges the dark side of biases — when confidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors become paranoia, and when group bias becomes prejudice. Ultimately, it makes a case for a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive biases and argues that in the complex world of international relations, strategic instincts can, in the right context, guide better performance. The book shows how an evolutionary perspective can offer the crucial next step in bringing psychological insights to bear on foundational questions in international politics.Less
A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases — quirks of the brain we all share as human beings — are detrimental and responsible for policy failures, disasters, and wars. This book challenges this assumption, explaining that these nonrational behaviors can actually support favorable results in international politics and contribute to political and strategic success. By studying past examples, the book considers the ways that cognitive biases act as “strategic instincts,” lending a competitive edge in policy decisions, especially under conditions of unpredictability and imperfect information. Drawing from evolutionary theory and behavioral sciences, the book looks at three influential cognitive biases — overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias. It then examines the advantageous as well as the detrimental effects of these biases through historical case studies of the American Revolution, the Munich Crisis, and the Pacific campaign in World War II. The book acknowledges the dark side of biases — when confidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors become paranoia, and when group bias becomes prejudice. Ultimately, it makes a case for a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive biases and argues that in the complex world of international relations, strategic instincts can, in the right context, guide better performance. The book shows how an evolutionary perspective can offer the crucial next step in bringing psychological insights to bear on foundational questions in international politics.
Eric Beerbohm
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154619
- eISBN:
- 9781400842384
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154619.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter defends a theory of citizenship that recognizes our need to make online decisions under electoral pressures, given our foibles as decision makers. Drawing upon the extensive literature ...
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This chapter defends a theory of citizenship that recognizes our need to make online decisions under electoral pressures, given our foibles as decision makers. Drawing upon the extensive literature on decision and judgment, it examines how fragile citizens are when it comes to decision making. The usual heuristics offered by political scientists suggest that citizens rely on informational shortcuts that are morally irresponsible. If we reconceive the role of the voter in explicitly moral terms, this approach is unsatisfactory in addressing the cognitive biases and defects of citizens. The chapter also considers the notion of cognitive partisanship and argues that it is unavoidable for decision makers to rely on heuristics when they reason about complex decisions. It concludes by emphasizing the task for a democratic ethics of belief: to provide citizens with heuristics that reduce the cognitive burden while respecting the moral obligations to attach to coercive, term-shaping decision making.Less
This chapter defends a theory of citizenship that recognizes our need to make online decisions under electoral pressures, given our foibles as decision makers. Drawing upon the extensive literature on decision and judgment, it examines how fragile citizens are when it comes to decision making. The usual heuristics offered by political scientists suggest that citizens rely on informational shortcuts that are morally irresponsible. If we reconceive the role of the voter in explicitly moral terms, this approach is unsatisfactory in addressing the cognitive biases and defects of citizens. The chapter also considers the notion of cognitive partisanship and argues that it is unavoidable for decision makers to rely on heuristics when they reason about complex decisions. It concludes by emphasizing the task for a democratic ethics of belief: to provide citizens with heuristics that reduce the cognitive burden while respecting the moral obligations to attach to coercive, term-shaping decision making.
Dominic D. P. Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780691137452
- eISBN:
- 9780691185606
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691137452.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter describes strategic instincts as rapid, adaptive decision-making heuristics that all human beings have and are not achieved by accident. It elaborates how strategic instincts keep people ...
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This chapter describes strategic instincts as rapid, adaptive decision-making heuristics that all human beings have and are not achieved by accident. It elaborates how strategic instincts keep people alive and successful over the many millennia of human evolutionary history and in fast-moving situations of uncertainty. It also confirms the continuation of the same strategic instincts that serve as tools of survival for individual human beings and the nations they lead, significantly in times of crisis and war. The chapter focuses on whether and when cognitive biases cause or promote success in the realm of international relations. It discusses the interpretation of cognitive biases that appears to be exacerbated by focusing on disasters and looking at isolated events.Less
This chapter describes strategic instincts as rapid, adaptive decision-making heuristics that all human beings have and are not achieved by accident. It elaborates how strategic instincts keep people alive and successful over the many millennia of human evolutionary history and in fast-moving situations of uncertainty. It also confirms the continuation of the same strategic instincts that serve as tools of survival for individual human beings and the nations they lead, significantly in times of crisis and war. The chapter focuses on whether and when cognitive biases cause or promote success in the realm of international relations. It discusses the interpretation of cognitive biases that appears to be exacerbated by focusing on disasters and looking at isolated events.
James A. Gardner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195392616
- eISBN:
- 9780199855438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195392616.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Could changes to the laws that regulate campaigns improve them? This chapter addresses this question by reviewing the social science literature on how people arrive at political opinions. This ...
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Could changes to the laws that regulate campaigns improve them? This chapter addresses this question by reviewing the social science literature on how people arrive at political opinions. This literature demonstrates dramatically that the actual persuasion of voters plays virtually no meaningful role in American election campaigns because it is next to impossible to persuade voters during an election campaign of anything they do not already believe. Several mutually reinforcing phenomena work to stabilize political beliefs and to insulate their holders against the possibility of short-term persuasion during campaigns. These phenomena include cognitive processes that bias voters' attention and comprehension in favor of beliefs they already hold; social reinforcement effects that, through processes of ordinary social interaction, tend to suppress and punish dissident viewpoints; and cognitive information-processing strategies that reduce voters' incentives to seek out and attend to campaign information, or to change their opinions in response to it.Less
Could changes to the laws that regulate campaigns improve them? This chapter addresses this question by reviewing the social science literature on how people arrive at political opinions. This literature demonstrates dramatically that the actual persuasion of voters plays virtually no meaningful role in American election campaigns because it is next to impossible to persuade voters during an election campaign of anything they do not already believe. Several mutually reinforcing phenomena work to stabilize political beliefs and to insulate their holders against the possibility of short-term persuasion during campaigns. These phenomena include cognitive processes that bias voters' attention and comprehension in favor of beliefs they already hold; social reinforcement effects that, through processes of ordinary social interaction, tend to suppress and punish dissident viewpoints; and cognitive information-processing strategies that reduce voters' incentives to seek out and attend to campaign information, or to change their opinions in response to it.
