Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free ...
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Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.Less
Augustine is a pivotal figure in the history of the concept of will, but what is his ‘theory of will’? This book investigates Augustine’s use of ‘will’ in one particular context, his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, taking seriously its historical and philosophical form. First, it finds that the dialogical nature of On Free Choice of the Will has been missed, as exemplified by the unhistorical and misleading modern attributions of names to the speakers. Secondly, the commonplace that Augustine changed his mind in the course of its composition is shown to be unfounded, and a case is made for its argumentative coherence. Thirdly, it is shown that it is the form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine’s theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a ‘way in to the will’ that itself instantiates a concept of will. At the heart of this structure is a particular argument that depends on an appeal to a first-person perspective, which ties the vocabulary of will to a concept of freedom and responsibility. This appeal is significantly similar to other arguments deployed by Augustine which are significantly similar to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think therefore I am’. The book goes on to investigate how Augustine’s ‘way in’ relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine’s major and most read works, the Confessions, the City of God, and On the Trinity. The relationship of Augustine’s to Descartes’ ‘cogito’ is also discussed. Augustine elucidates, within a particular Platonic theory of knowledge, a ‘theory of will’ that is grounded in a ‘way in’, which takes the conditions and limits of knowledge seriously.
Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, ...
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For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, freedom, and responsibility as the condition for the possibility of knowledge. It is this process that is most cogito-like. However, it is significantly cogito-unlike in that the argument depends on the very possibility of denying that one has will. Augustine’s account of freedom and responsibility is grounded in a deep notion of subjectivity, and the epistemological significance of the first-person perspective.Less
For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, freedom, and responsibility as the condition for the possibility of knowledge. It is this process that is most cogito-like. However, it is significantly cogito-unlike in that the argument depends on the very possibility of denying that one has will. Augustine’s account of freedom and responsibility is grounded in a deep notion of subjectivity, and the epistemological significance of the first-person perspective.
Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
When Descartes published his Meditations, the similarity of his arguments to some found in Augustine was immediately pointed out to him. The most frequently cited and most similar is Augustine’s ...
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When Descartes published his Meditations, the similarity of his arguments to some found in Augustine was immediately pointed out to him. The most frequently cited and most similar is Augustine’s claim that ‘If I doubt, I am’ (City of God 11.26). This chapter discusses this text in detail, and suggests that the relationship with Descartes is illuminating. It identifies three cogito-like arguments in On Free Choice, all of which act as starting points, involve revealing the self-evidence of certain undeniable truths, include an analysis of what is to know something, and incorporate an idea of value.Less
When Descartes published his Meditations, the similarity of his arguments to some found in Augustine was immediately pointed out to him. The most frequently cited and most similar is Augustine’s claim that ‘If I doubt, I am’ (City of God 11.26). This chapter discusses this text in detail, and suggests that the relationship with Descartes is illuminating. It identifies three cogito-like arguments in On Free Choice, all of which act as starting points, involve revealing the self-evidence of certain undeniable truths, include an analysis of what is to know something, and incorporate an idea of value.
Joseph Almog
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195337716
- eISBN:
- 9780199868704
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337716.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter begins with a discussion of Descartes' proposition, Cogito or in English, I think, and his “thinking-man paradox”. It explains the focus of the book, which is the predicate (verb) of the ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of Descartes' proposition, Cogito or in English, I think, and his “thinking-man paradox”. It explains the focus of the book, which is the predicate (verb) of the proposition I think. The book seeks to determine what thinking is and what it is for a human being to be thinking. This chapter also describes the instruction of students about Descartes' thinking-man project.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of Descartes' proposition, Cogito or in English, I think, and his “thinking-man paradox”. It explains the focus of the book, which is the predicate (verb) of the proposition I think. The book seeks to determine what thinking is and what it is for a human being to be thinking. This chapter also describes the instruction of students about Descartes' thinking-man project.
Jonardon Ganeri
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199652365
- eISBN:
- 9780191740718
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy
This chapter contrasts two methodologies for thinking about the nature of self, neither of which are fully satisfactory. The method of philosophical naturalism, which affirms a continuity between ...
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This chapter contrasts two methodologies for thinking about the nature of self, neither of which are fully satisfactory. The method of philosophical naturalism, which affirms a continuity between philosophy and natural science, leads to a conception of self as at best a reducible entity, reducible either simply to the body (Materialism) or else to an interconnected flow of mental particulars (the Humean view). Diametrically opposed to philosophical naturalism is an approach to the study of the self that rests on the use of imagination and intuition. Exercises of imagination lead to the discovery of a different kind of self, a self which consists essentially in thinking. The heart of the method is that if something can be imagined as separated from something else without being destroyed, then that other thing cannot be a part of its essence. This chapter then describes formulations of the cogito in the Islamic philosopher Ibn Sina and the Jaina Prabhācandra (both born in the year 980 ce). We learn from the Indian materialist Payāsi that any temptation to provide an explanation of the behaviour of the self by analogy with the behaviour of some physical entity or phenomenon is a trap, for such an attempt invariably ends up making the self sound like a mysterious crypto‐physical being, a recherché denizen in the physical world.Less
This chapter contrasts two methodologies for thinking about the nature of self, neither of which are fully satisfactory. The method of philosophical naturalism, which affirms a continuity between philosophy and natural science, leads to a conception of self as at best a reducible entity, reducible either simply to the body (Materialism) or else to an interconnected flow of mental particulars (the Humean view). Diametrically opposed to philosophical naturalism is an approach to the study of the self that rests on the use of imagination and intuition. Exercises of imagination lead to the discovery of a different kind of self, a self which consists essentially in thinking. The heart of the method is that if something can be imagined as separated from something else without being destroyed, then that other thing cannot be a part of its essence. This chapter then describes formulations of the cogito in the Islamic philosopher Ibn Sina and the Jaina Prabhācandra (both born in the year 980 ce). We learn from the Indian materialist Payāsi that any temptation to provide an explanation of the behaviour of the self by analogy with the behaviour of some physical entity or phenomenon is a trap, for such an attempt invariably ends up making the self sound like a mysterious crypto‐physical being, a recherché denizen in the physical world.
TYLER BURGE
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199278534
- eISBN:
- 9780191706943
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278534.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter compares Frege's conception of apriority with those of Kant and Leibniz. The oddity (indeed, mistake) in Frege's explaining apriority in terms of derivation from general laws is ...
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This chapter compares Frege's conception of apriority with those of Kant and Leibniz. The oddity (indeed, mistake) in Frege's explaining apriority in terms of derivation from general laws is explained and set in context. Frege's account is shown not to be equivalent with Kant's account of apriority in terms of independence of a justification from sense experience. Frege's attempt to show that his account is compatible with Kant's is criticized. Quite apart from its not explicitly mentioning sense experience, Frege's conception of apriority is not compatible with Kant's view that a singular capacity, pure intuition, underlies many a priori truths or cognitions; in fact, all synthetic a priori truths or cognitions. Frege takes the generality of a justification's (proof's) starting point as the essential kernel of apriority. Although Frege's conception is close to Leibniz's, it dispenses with Leibniz's heavy reliance on modality. Three areas of difficulty for Frege's conception of apriority are discussed: cogito judgments, judgments in geometry, and judgments in arithmetic. In each case, the idea that there is a priori truth or cognition whose justification has an ineliminably singular element is discussed. The problems raised by cogito judgments and judgments in arithmetic are taken to be serious threats to Frege's view that apriority is to be explained in terms of derivation from general propositions. The chapter article concludes by recommending the Kantian idea of fundamentally singular a priori cognition, without resting the idea on the Kantian notion of pure sensible intuition.Less
This chapter compares Frege's conception of apriority with those of Kant and Leibniz. The oddity (indeed, mistake) in Frege's explaining apriority in terms of derivation from general laws is explained and set in context. Frege's account is shown not to be equivalent with Kant's account of apriority in terms of independence of a justification from sense experience. Frege's attempt to show that his account is compatible with Kant's is criticized. Quite apart from its not explicitly mentioning sense experience, Frege's conception of apriority is not compatible with Kant's view that a singular capacity, pure intuition, underlies many a priori truths or cognitions; in fact, all synthetic a priori truths or cognitions. Frege takes the generality of a justification's (proof's) starting point as the essential kernel of apriority. Although Frege's conception is close to Leibniz's, it dispenses with Leibniz's heavy reliance on modality. Three areas of difficulty for Frege's conception of apriority are discussed: cogito judgments, judgments in geometry, and judgments in arithmetic. In each case, the idea that there is a priori truth or cognition whose justification has an ineliminably singular element is discussed. The problems raised by cogito judgments and judgments in arithmetic are taken to be serious threats to Frege's view that apriority is to be explained in terms of derivation from general propositions. The chapter article concludes by recommending the Kantian idea of fundamentally singular a priori cognition, without resting the idea on the Kantian notion of pure sensible intuition.
Patricia Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199754823
- eISBN:
- 9780199855889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter draws on the positive account of apperception that emerges from the transcendental deduction to illuminate the details of Kant’s criticisms of Rational Psychology. It argues that his ...
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This chapter draws on the positive account of apperception that emerges from the transcendental deduction to illuminate the details of Kant’s criticisms of Rational Psychology. It argues that his fundamental objection to the Rational Psychologists is that they failed to recognize that the representation ‘I-think’ is empty. It also considers Kant’s understanding of the relation between his ‘I-think’ and Descartes’ cogito.Less
This chapter draws on the positive account of apperception that emerges from the transcendental deduction to illuminate the details of Kant’s criticisms of Rational Psychology. It argues that his fundamental objection to the Rational Psychologists is that they failed to recognize that the representation ‘I-think’ is empty. It also considers Kant’s understanding of the relation between his ‘I-think’ and Descartes’ cogito.
David Cunning
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195399608
- eISBN:
- 9780199866502
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195399608.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter argues that the Second Meditation result “I am a thinking thing” is not the result “I am an immaterial thing” and is not the result “I am a thinking substance.” Most meditators are not ...
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This chapter argues that the Second Meditation result “I am a thinking thing” is not the result “I am an immaterial thing” and is not the result “I am a thinking substance.” Most meditators are not yet in a position to arrive at the latter two results. The meditator abstracts an idea of mind from his pre-Meditations idea of self, but he does not exclude body from mind; nor does he conclude that minds are substances. The chapter considers theargument from doubt that is offered in Discourse on the Method and other texts and argues that the reason why Descartes is able to advance stronger conclusions in these is that he is in a more advanced epistemic position than his meditator. The Second Meditation meditator can perform abstraction but not exclusion, and as a result the Second Meditation does not include an argument for substance dualism. The chapter also argues that Descartes allows that “I am, I exist” and other claims of the cogito variety are dubitable so long as we are thinking them by way of the imagination. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role and placement of the wax digression.Less
This chapter argues that the Second Meditation result “I am a thinking thing” is not the result “I am an immaterial thing” and is not the result “I am a thinking substance.” Most meditators are not yet in a position to arrive at the latter two results. The meditator abstracts an idea of mind from his pre-Meditations idea of self, but he does not exclude body from mind; nor does he conclude that minds are substances. The chapter considers theargument from doubt that is offered in Discourse on the Method and other texts and argues that the reason why Descartes is able to advance stronger conclusions in these is that he is in a more advanced epistemic position than his meditator. The Second Meditation meditator can perform abstraction but not exclusion, and as a result the Second Meditation does not include an argument for substance dualism. The chapter also argues that Descartes allows that “I am, I exist” and other claims of the cogito variety are dubitable so long as we are thinking them by way of the imagination. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role and placement of the wax digression.
Thomas C. Vinci
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195113297
- eISBN:
- 9780199833825
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195113292.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Written in the tradition of analytic reconstruction, Cartesian Truth provides a systematic reinterpretation of central themes in Descartes's epistemology, metaphysics and ontology, theory of ...
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Written in the tradition of analytic reconstruction, Cartesian Truth provides a systematic reinterpretation of central themes in Descartes's epistemology, metaphysics and ontology, theory of perception, both philosophical and empirical, logic, and doctrine of method. For example, it shows how the intuitive and syllogistic aspects of the cogito relate to one another and that Descartes's case for substance dualism depends on the intuitive cogito. It further argues that Descartes employs a single pattern of reasoning based on the ”rule of truth” in all of his major existential proofs, including the proofs of his own existence, God, and the external world; that the rule of truth can be regarded as a conservative extension of the intuitive cogito. Grounded in a reinterpretation of the theory of ideas and Descartes's notion of cause, a case is made that the causal principle of the objective reality of our ideas can be regarded as a reformulation of the rule of truth. The book also provides a detailed reconstruction of Descartes's doctrine of sense perception, including the difficult doctrine of the material falsity of ideas of the senses (”secondary qualities”) but also arguing that Descartes countenances a phenomenological dimension to the sense experience of primary qualities that he attributes to the faculty of imagination, and that the phenomenology is influenced by reasoning and undergoes development from the experience of the child to that of the adult. A case is made that the phenomenology of experience provides material for the systematic errors of commonsense; but a case is also made that the senses and the imagination provide not only material for error but a sensory foundationalism expressed in the notion (explicitly formulated for the first time in the Principles of Philosophy) of clear but not distinct ideas of the senses. An error theory is an important tool in the inventory of revisionary philosophers, more dialectically potent than Descartes's method of doubt as traditionally understood. In the context of contemporary epistemology, the author shows how Cartesian error theory can function as part of a notion of epistemic responsibility in an effective method for dealing with claims of dogmatic opponents, in a way well illustrated by Descartes's own use of the method against his scholastic and commonsense realist opponents.Less
Written in the tradition of analytic reconstruction, Cartesian Truth provides a systematic reinterpretation of central themes in Descartes's epistemology, metaphysics and ontology, theory of perception, both philosophical and empirical, logic, and doctrine of method. For example, it shows how the intuitive and syllogistic aspects of the cogito relate to one another and that Descartes's case for substance dualism depends on the intuitive cogito. It further argues that Descartes employs a single pattern of reasoning based on the ”rule of truth” in all of his major existential proofs, including the proofs of his own existence, God, and the external world; that the rule of truth can be regarded as a conservative extension of the intuitive cogito. Grounded in a reinterpretation of the theory of ideas and Descartes's notion of cause, a case is made that the causal principle of the objective reality of our ideas can be regarded as a reformulation of the rule of truth. The book also provides a detailed reconstruction of Descartes's doctrine of sense perception, including the difficult doctrine of the material falsity of ideas of the senses (”secondary qualities”) but also arguing that Descartes countenances a phenomenological dimension to the sense experience of primary qualities that he attributes to the faculty of imagination, and that the phenomenology is influenced by reasoning and undergoes development from the experience of the child to that of the adult. A case is made that the phenomenology of experience provides material for the systematic errors of commonsense; but a case is also made that the senses and the imagination provide not only material for error but a sensory foundationalism expressed in the notion (explicitly formulated for the first time in the Principles of Philosophy) of clear but not distinct ideas of the senses. An error theory is an important tool in the inventory of revisionary philosophers, more dialectically potent than Descartes's method of doubt as traditionally understood. In the context of contemporary epistemology, the author shows how Cartesian error theory can function as part of a notion of epistemic responsibility in an effective method for dealing with claims of dogmatic opponents, in a way well illustrated by Descartes's own use of the method against his scholastic and commonsense realist opponents.
Pierre Saint-Amand
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149271
- eISBN:
- 9781400838714
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149271.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses how Pierre Carlet de Marivaux repeatedly mentions laziness as a private dream. Marivaux's laziness is intimately linked to writing, to its constant renegotiation of the future. ...
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This chapter discusses how Pierre Carlet de Marivaux repeatedly mentions laziness as a private dream. Marivaux's laziness is intimately linked to writing, to its constant renegotiation of the future. The chapter examines Marivaux as a journalist, in writings that could well be described as youthful efforts, produced in the interval between his dramatic publications and his law degree. It becomes apparent that the modernity broached by Marivaux is not confined to the aesthetic sphere; it is clearly epistemological. Marivaux's periodical inaugurates a model of philosophical writing in which the author separates himself from Cartesian thought and its mechanical physics. At the dawn of the Enlightenment, proclaiming his modernity, Marivaux refuses systematic and methodical rationality; he proposes instead a sensory cogito, attentive to the real and subjected to the aleatory.Less
This chapter discusses how Pierre Carlet de Marivaux repeatedly mentions laziness as a private dream. Marivaux's laziness is intimately linked to writing, to its constant renegotiation of the future. The chapter examines Marivaux as a journalist, in writings that could well be described as youthful efforts, produced in the interval between his dramatic publications and his law degree. It becomes apparent that the modernity broached by Marivaux is not confined to the aesthetic sphere; it is clearly epistemological. Marivaux's periodical inaugurates a model of philosophical writing in which the author separates himself from Cartesian thought and its mechanical physics. At the dawn of the Enlightenment, proclaiming his modernity, Marivaux refuses systematic and methodical rationality; he proposes instead a sensory cogito, attentive to the real and subjected to the aleatory.
Tad Schmaltz
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103441
- eISBN:
- 9780199833641
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103440.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book considers in the broader context of early modern Cartesianism Malebranche's claim that consciousness of the soul yields knowledge of a nature that is radically inferior in kind to the ...
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This book considers in the broader context of early modern Cartesianism Malebranche's claim that consciousness of the soul yields knowledge of a nature that is radically inferior in kind to the knowledge that Cartesians have of the nature of the body. Though Malebranche accepted Descartes's substance dualism, his claim stands on its head the doctrine in the Meditations that the nature of mind is better known than body. Malebranche insisted against Descartes and more orthodox followers such as Arnauld that what the Cartesians themselves say reveals that they have only a confused consciousness of the soul. The thesis here is that this idiosyncratic conclusion, which Malebranche attempted to defend in several different ways on several different fronts, is essentially correct. The discussion of this conclusion in this book has two parts. Part I focuses on Malebranche's claim that though a consideration of the cogito provides certain knowledge of the existence of the self, it yields only a confused consciousness of the sensory and intellectual modifications of the soul. Part II concerns Malebranche's argument that his negative thesis concerning our knowledge of the soul does not preclude the Cartesian project of constructing clear and evident demonstrations of the three principal properties of the soul, namely, its spirituality, immortality, and freedom.Less
This book considers in the broader context of early modern Cartesianism Malebranche's claim that consciousness of the soul yields knowledge of a nature that is radically inferior in kind to the knowledge that Cartesians have of the nature of the body. Though Malebranche accepted Descartes's substance dualism, his claim stands on its head the doctrine in the Meditations that the nature of mind is better known than body. Malebranche insisted against Descartes and more orthodox followers such as Arnauld that what the Cartesians themselves say reveals that they have only a confused consciousness of the soul. The thesis here is that this idiosyncratic conclusion, which Malebranche attempted to defend in several different ways on several different fronts, is essentially correct. The discussion of this conclusion in this book has two parts. Part I focuses on Malebranche's claim that though a consideration of the cogito provides certain knowledge of the existence of the self, it yields only a confused consciousness of the sensory and intellectual modifications of the soul. Part II concerns Malebranche's argument that his negative thesis concerning our knowledge of the soul does not preclude the Cartesian project of constructing clear and evident demonstrations of the three principal properties of the soul, namely, its spirituality, immortality, and freedom.
Edwin Curley
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195075519
- eISBN:
- 9780199853052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195075519.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines Peter Markie's book, “Descartes Gambit,” Edwin Curley's work titled “Descartes Against the Skeptics” and the exchange of criticisms between the two works. The “gambit” Markie ...
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This chapter examines Peter Markie's book, “Descartes Gambit,” Edwin Curley's work titled “Descartes Against the Skeptics” and the exchange of criticisms between the two works. The “gambit” Markie refers to in his title is Descartes' attempt to deduce a metaphysical theory of the self from premises about his knowledge of himself. The epistemological premises are that “I am certain that I think”, that “I am certain that I exist”, and that “I am uncertain that I have a body.” The metaphysical theory of the self derived from these premises is, roughly, that I am a thinking, nonextended substance capable of existing apart from its body. Markie maintains that Descartes himself held that these metaphysical conclusions could be deduced from these epistemological premises without establishing God's existence and veracity. The point of contention between the two works is on the definition and relationship of three species of Cartesian certainty— psychological, moral, and metaphysical.Less
This chapter examines Peter Markie's book, “Descartes Gambit,” Edwin Curley's work titled “Descartes Against the Skeptics” and the exchange of criticisms between the two works. The “gambit” Markie refers to in his title is Descartes' attempt to deduce a metaphysical theory of the self from premises about his knowledge of himself. The epistemological premises are that “I am certain that I think”, that “I am certain that I exist”, and that “I am uncertain that I have a body.” The metaphysical theory of the self derived from these premises is, roughly, that I am a thinking, nonextended substance capable of existing apart from its body. Markie maintains that Descartes himself held that these metaphysical conclusions could be deduced from these epistemological premises without establishing God's existence and veracity. The point of contention between the two works is on the definition and relationship of three species of Cartesian certainty— psychological, moral, and metaphysical.
Michelle Beyssade
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195075519
- eISBN:
- 9780199853052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195075519.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter describes how Descartes, after having gained the certainty of his existence as a thinking thing, derived from this first knowledge the general rule that allows him to become certain of ...
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This chapter describes how Descartes, after having gained the certainty of his existence as a thinking thing, derived from this first knowledge the general rule that allows him to become certain of anything, that is to say, to recognize truth, the rule which is often called the criterion of truth. The chapter presents truth as indubitable and therefore resisting any form of doubt. It affirms truth by reason of its existence and therefore it can be considered as exception or privileged truth. This chapter also explains that the basis of all truths is the existence of God and that the existence of God is the thing that secures the criterion of truth. The chapter also delves on the nature of the cogito, as something born directly out of metaphysical doubt, its fragile character, its exemplary and exceptional character.Less
This chapter describes how Descartes, after having gained the certainty of his existence as a thinking thing, derived from this first knowledge the general rule that allows him to become certain of anything, that is to say, to recognize truth, the rule which is often called the criterion of truth. The chapter presents truth as indubitable and therefore resisting any form of doubt. It affirms truth by reason of its existence and therefore it can be considered as exception or privileged truth. This chapter also explains that the basis of all truths is the existence of God and that the existence of God is the thing that secures the criterion of truth. The chapter also delves on the nature of the cogito, as something born directly out of metaphysical doubt, its fragile character, its exemplary and exceptional character.
Michel Henry
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195075519
- eISBN:
- 9780199853052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195075519.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter attempts a phenomenological elucidation of what Descartes understood by the soul. In this aim, the presuppositions of classical phenomenology, either Husserlian or post-Husserlian, are ...
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This chapter attempts a phenomenological elucidation of what Descartes understood by the soul. In this aim, the presuppositions of classical phenomenology, either Husserlian or post-Husserlian, are not applied but instead, quite to the contrary, the chapter appropriates the Cartesian concept of the soul and thereby gives the idea of phenomenology a radical meaning. The chapter explains that the existence of the soul is based on the radical existence of the affirmation of Being. Another concept—that of appearing—is discussed. Appearing constitutes the standing-at-the-beginning of the Beginning, not insofar as it fashions the appearing of what appears, but only insofar as it appears first of all itself, in itself. The division between appearing and being is the Cartesian differentiation between soul and body. The soul finds its essence in appearing and properly speaking designates it, whereas the body is, in principle, properly devoid of the power of manifestation. This chapter also explains that the form of any thought is what we call Idea and that knowldege of the soul has primacy over knowledge of the body.Less
This chapter attempts a phenomenological elucidation of what Descartes understood by the soul. In this aim, the presuppositions of classical phenomenology, either Husserlian or post-Husserlian, are not applied but instead, quite to the contrary, the chapter appropriates the Cartesian concept of the soul and thereby gives the idea of phenomenology a radical meaning. The chapter explains that the existence of the soul is based on the radical existence of the affirmation of Being. Another concept—that of appearing—is discussed. Appearing constitutes the standing-at-the-beginning of the Beginning, not insofar as it fashions the appearing of what appears, but only insofar as it appears first of all itself, in itself. The division between appearing and being is the Cartesian differentiation between soul and body. The soul finds its essence in appearing and properly speaking designates it, whereas the body is, in principle, properly devoid of the power of manifestation. This chapter also explains that the form of any thought is what we call Idea and that knowldege of the soul has primacy over knowledge of the body.
Jean-Luc Marion
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195075519
- eISBN:
- 9780199853052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195075519.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter ventures into a deeper interpretation of the concept of cogito, ergo sum. The chapter begins with a presentation of the newly-reborn challenge and contact of Descartes' thoughts to ...
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This chapter ventures into a deeper interpretation of the concept of cogito, ergo sum. The chapter begins with a presentation of the newly-reborn challenge and contact of Descartes' thoughts to contemporary philosophy. One such contact was Henry's use of “material phenomenology” to interpret Descartes' hermeneutic. The chapter emphasizes that this particular line gives access to an original and powerful understanding of the cogito, ergo sum, and not only that its phenomenological repetition pulls the Cartesian ego out of the aporias for which the greatest interpreters—Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger—had opposed it, but above all that this line opens absolutely new perspectives on the whole of Descartes' work. In particular, the chapter argues that it would in this way seem possible to reestablish, in the “I think, therefore I am” which generosity finally effects, the unity long missing between the love of wisdom and the search for truth.Less
This chapter ventures into a deeper interpretation of the concept of cogito, ergo sum. The chapter begins with a presentation of the newly-reborn challenge and contact of Descartes' thoughts to contemporary philosophy. One such contact was Henry's use of “material phenomenology” to interpret Descartes' hermeneutic. The chapter emphasizes that this particular line gives access to an original and powerful understanding of the cogito, ergo sum, and not only that its phenomenological repetition pulls the Cartesian ego out of the aporias for which the greatest interpreters—Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger—had opposed it, but above all that this line opens absolutely new perspectives on the whole of Descartes' work. In particular, the chapter argues that it would in this way seem possible to reestablish, in the “I think, therefore I am” which generosity finally effects, the unity long missing between the love of wisdom and the search for truth.
Jean-marie Beyssade
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195075519
- eISBN:
- 9780199853052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195075519.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The totality of Cartesian science is based on metaphysics, and two fundamental principles intersect within this metaphysics or first philosophy: one is called the cogito (I think, therefore I am; and ...
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The totality of Cartesian science is based on metaphysics, and two fundamental principles intersect within this metaphysics or first philosophy: one is called the cogito (I think, therefore I am; and I am a thinking substance); the other is called the divine veracity (God exists; and he cannot deceive me) This chapter visits what it considers as the most constant thesis in Descartes' metaphysics. The thesis is that the entire methodical structure of scientific knowledge depends on an assured knowledge of God. Descartes believes that he has found how one can demonstrate metaphysical truths in a manner that is more evident than the demonstrations of geometry, how one can demonstrate the existence of God in the same manner as one demonstrates a property of the triangle. The thesis however is a paradox in that it claims that God is asserted to be incomprehensible. It is because God is incomprehensible that the idea of him is also incomprehensible; and it is not even though this idea is incomprehensible, but rather because it is incomprehensible that it is the most clear and the most distinct of all.Less
The totality of Cartesian science is based on metaphysics, and two fundamental principles intersect within this metaphysics or first philosophy: one is called the cogito (I think, therefore I am; and I am a thinking substance); the other is called the divine veracity (God exists; and he cannot deceive me) This chapter visits what it considers as the most constant thesis in Descartes' metaphysics. The thesis is that the entire methodical structure of scientific knowledge depends on an assured knowledge of God. Descartes believes that he has found how one can demonstrate metaphysical truths in a manner that is more evident than the demonstrations of geometry, how one can demonstrate the existence of God in the same manner as one demonstrates a property of the triangle. The thesis however is a paradox in that it claims that God is asserted to be incomprehensible. It is because God is incomprehensible that the idea of him is also incomprehensible; and it is not even though this idea is incomprehensible, but rather because it is incomprehensible that it is the most clear and the most distinct of all.
Stephen I. Wagner
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195075519
- eISBN:
- 9780199853052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195075519.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses a re-emerging topic in Cartesian scholarship—mind and body interaction. A number of thinkers, from his contemporaries onward, have maintained that Descartes' account of his two ...
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This chapter discusses a re-emerging topic in Cartesian scholarship—mind and body interaction. A number of thinkers, from his contemporaries onward, have maintained that Descartes' account of his two substances rules out the possibility of the interaction that he attempted to defend. Often, however, the ground for asserting this impossibility has been left less than explicit. Recent discussion has attempted to clarify the issue by asking whether there can be specified grounds within Descartes' philosophy which are sufficient to rule out mind–body interaction. There are three elements of Descartes' thinking which might seem to create problems for mind–body interaction—his insistence that mind and body are absolutely distinct substances, his own restrictions on possible causal relations, and his views on the freedom of the will. Recent work has focused on the first two of these issues. The chapter's goal is to suggest that an essential element of Descartes' worldview has been overlooked in this recent discussion, and to show that once it is taken into account many of the apparent difficulties about Cartesian interaction can be resolved.Less
This chapter discusses a re-emerging topic in Cartesian scholarship—mind and body interaction. A number of thinkers, from his contemporaries onward, have maintained that Descartes' account of his two substances rules out the possibility of the interaction that he attempted to defend. Often, however, the ground for asserting this impossibility has been left less than explicit. Recent discussion has attempted to clarify the issue by asking whether there can be specified grounds within Descartes' philosophy which are sufficient to rule out mind–body interaction. There are three elements of Descartes' thinking which might seem to create problems for mind–body interaction—his insistence that mind and body are absolutely distinct substances, his own restrictions on possible causal relations, and his views on the freedom of the will. Recent work has focused on the first two of these issues. The chapter's goal is to suggest that an essential element of Descartes' worldview has been overlooked in this recent discussion, and to show that once it is taken into account many of the apparent difficulties about Cartesian interaction can be resolved.
Jean-Luc Nancy
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780823270613
- eISBN:
- 9780823270651
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823270613.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Published in 1979, Ego sum challenges, through a careful and unprecedented reading of Descartes’s writings, the picture of Descartes as the father of modern philosophy: the thinker who founded the ...
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Published in 1979, Ego sum challenges, through a careful and unprecedented reading of Descartes’s writings, the picture of Descartes as the father of modern philosophy: the thinker who founded the edifice of knowledge on the absolute self-certainty of a Subject fully transparent to itself. While other theoretical discourses, such as psychoanalysis, have also attempted to subvert this Subject, Nancy shows how they always inadvertently reconstituted the Subject they were trying to leave behind. Nancy’s wager is that it is by returning to the moment of the foundation of modern subjectivity, a foundation which always already included all the possibilities of its own exhaustion, that another thought of “the subject” is possible. By paying attention the mode of presentation of Descartes’s subject, to the masks, portraits, feints, and fables that populate his writings, Jean-Luc Nancy shows how Descartes’s ego is not the Subject of metaphysics, but a mouth that spaces itself out and distinguishes itself. This “subject” speaks but he is not the speaking subject or the subject of the utterance; he is not even the neuter, impersonal ça of ça parle; it is a mouth that opens and says, in turn: dum scribo, larvatus pro Deo, mundus est fabula, unum quid.Less
Published in 1979, Ego sum challenges, through a careful and unprecedented reading of Descartes’s writings, the picture of Descartes as the father of modern philosophy: the thinker who founded the edifice of knowledge on the absolute self-certainty of a Subject fully transparent to itself. While other theoretical discourses, such as psychoanalysis, have also attempted to subvert this Subject, Nancy shows how they always inadvertently reconstituted the Subject they were trying to leave behind. Nancy’s wager is that it is by returning to the moment of the foundation of modern subjectivity, a foundation which always already included all the possibilities of its own exhaustion, that another thought of “the subject” is possible. By paying attention the mode of presentation of Descartes’s subject, to the masks, portraits, feints, and fables that populate his writings, Jean-Luc Nancy shows how Descartes’s ego is not the Subject of metaphysics, but a mouth that spaces itself out and distinguishes itself. This “subject” speaks but he is not the speaking subject or the subject of the utterance; he is not even the neuter, impersonal ça of ça parle; it is a mouth that opens and says, in turn: dum scribo, larvatus pro Deo, mundus est fabula, unum quid.
Fred Dallmayr
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780813165783
- eISBN:
- 9780813165813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813165783.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The pivotal category of Western modernity is the idea of human freedom anchored in the cogito and typically identified with a self-possessed autonomy. A major issue, given its traditional linkage ...
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The pivotal category of Western modernity is the idea of human freedom anchored in the cogito and typically identified with a self-possessed autonomy. A major issue, given its traditional linkage with self-possession, is how freedom can be reconceived and rendered compatible with the notion of “solidarity.” Many thinkers have wrestled with the task of such reformulation; however, this chapter argues that the most resolute effort to extricate the ideas from their older moorings has been undertaken in the writings of Heidegger. Thus, this chapter explains how Heidegger has relocated freedom from the arena of human possessiveness to a deeper “ontological” level, where it comes to mean the search for truth and the “good life” in a worldly context. In the same way, solidarity cannot just designate an empirical togetherness or collectivist project, so this chapter also discusses how the task for Heidegger (as for Nietzsche) was to find a place of freedom in the midst of sociality.Less
The pivotal category of Western modernity is the idea of human freedom anchored in the cogito and typically identified with a self-possessed autonomy. A major issue, given its traditional linkage with self-possession, is how freedom can be reconceived and rendered compatible with the notion of “solidarity.” Many thinkers have wrestled with the task of such reformulation; however, this chapter argues that the most resolute effort to extricate the ideas from their older moorings has been undertaken in the writings of Heidegger. Thus, this chapter explains how Heidegger has relocated freedom from the arena of human possessiveness to a deeper “ontological” level, where it comes to mean the search for truth and the “good life” in a worldly context. In the same way, solidarity cannot just designate an empirical togetherness or collectivist project, so this chapter also discusses how the task for Heidegger (as for Nietzsche) was to find a place of freedom in the midst of sociality.
Fred Dallmayr
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780813165783
- eISBN:
- 9780813165813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813165783.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Chapter 9 pays specific attention to the correlation between freedom and solidarity. It focuses on distinguished philosopher D. P. Chattopadhyaya, both an eminent thinker and an engaged ...
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Chapter 9 pays specific attention to the correlation between freedom and solidarity. It focuses on distinguished philosopher D. P. Chattopadhyaya, both an eminent thinker and an engaged social-political leader in his native West Bengal who was also thoroughly acquainted with Western and Indian (or Asian) traditions of philosophical and religious thought. As Chattopadhyaya shows, freedom in the modern West is anchored in the thinking ego or subjective agency or both, thus leading to the equation of the term freedom with the liberation of the self or subject. By contrast, in the Indian (and Asian) tradition, freedom is linked with the striving for self-transcendence—that is, with the overcoming of and liberation from the self or subject. As it happens, however, this striving can no longer be grasped in purely cognitive or epistemic terms. Ultimately, chapter 9 purports that this dilemma can be resolved only by a move from cognition (or the cogito) to the realm of engaged social praxis—a move that brings freedom’s intimate relation with solidarity to the fore.Less
Chapter 9 pays specific attention to the correlation between freedom and solidarity. It focuses on distinguished philosopher D. P. Chattopadhyaya, both an eminent thinker and an engaged social-political leader in his native West Bengal who was also thoroughly acquainted with Western and Indian (or Asian) traditions of philosophical and religious thought. As Chattopadhyaya shows, freedom in the modern West is anchored in the thinking ego or subjective agency or both, thus leading to the equation of the term freedom with the liberation of the self or subject. By contrast, in the Indian (and Asian) tradition, freedom is linked with the striving for self-transcendence—that is, with the overcoming of and liberation from the self or subject. As it happens, however, this striving can no longer be grasped in purely cognitive or epistemic terms. Ultimately, chapter 9 purports that this dilemma can be resolved only by a move from cognition (or the cogito) to the realm of engaged social praxis—a move that brings freedom’s intimate relation with solidarity to the fore.
