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This introductory chapter describes the problem studied in the remainder of the book: what happens when a group of agents get together to write one or more agreements. If a subgroup forms a coalition, they act cooperatively by choosing and implementing a joint course of action. However, the actions of different coalitions are chosen independently and non-cooperatively. This book is interested in the equilibrium of coalition formation. Which coalitions will come about? Is there a presumption that such coalition formation will be efficient? If so, under what circumstances will they be efficient? If not, can one place bounds on the extent of inefficiency that may occur?

This chapter discusses the fourth phase of UN involvement in Iraq, in which it was largely sidelined. Negotiations within the Security Council in late 2002 and early 2003 resulted in deadlock, and the decision of a US and UK-led Coalition to overthrow Saddam Hussein forcibly without a Council mandate. The chapter also addresses the early Coalition occupation of Iraq; subsequent decisions by the Security Council to lend this international action a semblance of legal cover (without providing post facto authorization of the use of force against Saddam Hussein); the nascent Sunni-dominated insurgency against Coalition forces and their local allies; and the bombing of UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 that was to traumatize UN staff and inhibit significant UN post-conflict roles on the ground.

This chapter examines events in Iraq during the most recent fifth phase of UN involvement. Having been largely sidelined on Iraq in the fourth phase, the UN underwent a Crisis of Confidence between 2004 and 2005, searching for a means to address its demotion. It is argued that that the deadlock in the Council over Iraq in 2003 had critically undermined the UN’s credibility globally, which no amount of activity elsewhere, notably in Africa, could recover. During this period, under Council resolutions, the UN was meant to be playing a ‘vital’ role in Iraq, but its margin for maneuver was circumscribed on the one hand by the continuing strong guiding hand of the United States in Iraqi affairs and on the other by the dreadful security situation in Iraq, precluding deployment of a large UN international staff. During these years, various aspects of the UN’s earlier activities in Iraq, notably the OFF Program, returned to haunt it, making 2004 Kofi Annan’s ‘annus horribilis’.

The chapter discusses how the state, employers, and organized labor promote and reform early retirement policies. What interests do workers, employers, and workplace representatives have in using early exit? Beyond the workplace, interest coalitions may arise among governments, employer associations, and trade unions to externalize restructuration costs, reduce labor supply, and buy social peace.

Government can and should be actively concerned with the relief of poverty. But there is no ethical principle defining the proper distribution of wealth between occupational or other social groups, nor can it be democratically determined in an orderly manner. Distributional coalitions, such as trade unions, employers, and professional associations, must be discouraged, with the distribution of wealth between groups determined by competition. Where politics is dominated by distributional issues, democracy is likely to break down, and often has. The related subjects of rent seeking and corruption are discussed.

This is the second of two chapters that present a more detailed examination of the ways in which social constructions are produced and negotiated in public politics through the medium of discourse. It looks at discourse versus advocacy coalitions. The first section of the chapter introduces the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) that was developed by Sabatier and his associates, and is perhaps the most widely discussed contribution to the field of policy studies in the past decade. Its aim is to explain policy change empirically through the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions. The next section of the chapter presents Hajer’s critique of the ACF, focusing on his model of discourse coalitions, which, like advocacy coalitions, are designed to explain policy changes generally. The last section looks at the concept of policy learning.

Horowitz's chapter is critical of the consociational aspects of Northern Ireland's Agreement. It views the ‘grand coalition’ executive at the heart of the Agreement as unwieldy because it includes the extremes, particularly Sinn Fein. The chapter describes the commitments contained in the Agreement as maximalists, and argues that these commitments will rebound, when they are not delivered, to the advantage of militants. Horowitz prefers, for Northern Ireland and elsewhere, what he calls an ‘incentives’ approach. The likeliest and most stable coalition resulting from this is one that includes moderates and excludes militants.

Chilean parties have shown a remarkable capacity for survival after years of turbulent ideological polarization followed by a prolonged period of clandestine activity during the Pinochet dictatorship 1973-1990. This chapter argues that this is due to the deep historical and social roots of the parties; their capacity to represent most major social groups; and their efficiency as agents of government. A remarkable characteristic since the return to democracy in 1990 is the electoral success of the same coalition in every Presidential, Congressional, and Municipal election. This is explained because the centre-left coalition encompasses the majority of the electorate, because it is seen as the agent of democracy in the long struggle against dictatorship, and because of its sustained and impressive economic performance.

India is the world’s biggest, and in many respects, most remarkable democracy. Despite vast social and linguistic diversity, its political system has been surprisingly stable and effective. India has a Westminster type parliamentary system with single member plurality elections. In a seemingly major challenge to Duverger’s laws, India has developed a large multiparty system despite its SMP electoral system. Part of the answer is that the extreme multi-party system in the all-India parliament masks the nature of party competition in the electoral districts. Electoral competition can be thought of as a series of different regional level two-party contests.

Given that Italy has had one of the few perfectly bicameral parliamentary systems (in which each house has equal powers), there are two different electoral systems to analyse. These electoral systems are relatively new (dating only to 1993) and are very complex, reflecting compromises between parties with different interests. Lijphart’s prescription that an electoral system should emphasize ‘proportionality and simplicity’ is certainly violated. Italy has changed from list PR (before 1993) to variations of mixed-member majoritarian systems. Both the Chamber and the Senate are composed of 75 per cent of members elected from SMDs, and 25 per cent from lists. Beyond this, the electoral systems vary in a range of important ways. One of the important effects is the ‘proportionalisation of the plurality tier’. Italy is a leading example of the manner in which major electoral reform can have some expected and some very unexpected consequences. There is widespread discontent with the ‘new’ systems, such that electoral reform is very much on the agenda.

New Zealand experienced fundamental electoral system reform in the mid-1990s when voters, in a referendum, decided to replace the single-member plurality system by proportional representation achieved through a mixed compensatory system. This has reinforced the trend towards a multi-party system, and resulted in coalition government becoming the norm. It has also produced a more socio-demographically representative parliament. Some opposition to the mixed system remains, but overall, the effects of the change are perceived as beneficial.

The Finnish electoral system – which will be 100 years old in 2006 – enjoys a high level of legitimacy among voters, and is thus unlikely to be changed. Finland has one of the most candidate-centred electoral systems, with electors casting only one vote for one of a party’s candidates. This preference voting produces heated competition between candidates of the same party. PR in quite large constituencies has produced one of Europe’s largest party systems.

In the ten years of post‐communist transition, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe have passed through several election cycles, providing new evidence of the influence of formal political institutions on transition dynamics. This chapter examines the transitional development of their party systems as a function of institutional choices. Focusing on party systems, it identifies the process of coalition formation as the transmission mechanism by which institutions influence political consolidation at this stage. It addresses the transitional influence of combinations of majoritarian and power‐sharing institutions, suggesting that their interactive effect may undermine or weaken the incentives for party‐building that each of them can separately provide. The article provides supporting evidence from Poland and Romania.

Normally, in a first past the post‐electoral system in which majority single‐party government is the rule, the sovereign has no choice as to who to call to the Palace. But, in cases of emergency—war or economic crisis, as in 1931—the sovereign may enjoy discretion. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to create a coalition government, as in 1915, 1916, 1931, or 1940, and the sovereign's role may then be crucial. The danger is that, in using his or her discretion, the sovereign's actions may appear partisan, and the sovereign's actions will then be labelled `unconstitutional’.