Ian Budge and Hans Keman
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198279259
- eISBN:
- 9780191598883
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198279256.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Parties are the central institution through which mass representative democracies now work. This book covers four aspects of their activities at governmental level—the actual formation and ...
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Parties are the central institution through which mass representative democracies now work. This book covers four aspects of their activities at governmental level—the actual formation and termination of governments; the distribution of ministries between parties forming the government; and policymaking. In each area, it proposes theories and models of how parties drive these processes, and checks them against comparative evidence for 20 States from 1946–85. Initial hypotheses are broadly upheld by this evidence, supporting a general theory of democratic functioning described in Chs. 3 and 7. This has considerable implications for the general theory of the State. The evidence used in the book has been updated and extended. It is now published as Jqap Woldendorp, hans E. Keman, and Ian Budge Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–98): Composition, Duration, Personnel.Less
Parties are the central institution through which mass representative democracies now work. This book covers four aspects of their activities at governmental level—the actual formation and termination of governments; the distribution of ministries between parties forming the government; and policymaking. In each area, it proposes theories and models of how parties drive these processes, and checks them against comparative evidence for 20 States from 1946–85. Initial hypotheses are broadly upheld by this evidence, supporting a general theory of democratic functioning described in Chs. 3 and 7. This has considerable implications for the general theory of the State. The evidence used in the book has been updated and extended. It is now published as Jqap Woldendorp, hans E. Keman, and Ian Budge Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–98): Composition, Duration, Personnel.
Debraj Ray
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199207954
- eISBN:
- 9780191709104
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, ...
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The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.Less
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
Debraj Ray
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199207954
- eISBN:
- 9780191709104
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
This introductory chapter describes the problem studied in the remainder of the book: what happens when a group of agents get together to write one or more agreements. If a subgroup forms a ...
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This introductory chapter describes the problem studied in the remainder of the book: what happens when a group of agents get together to write one or more agreements. If a subgroup forms a coalition, they act cooperatively by choosing and implementing a joint course of action. However, the actions of different coalitions are chosen independently and non-cooperatively. This book is interested in the equilibrium of coalition formation. Which coalitions will come about? Is there a presumption that such coalition formation will be efficient? If so, under what circumstances will they be efficient? If not, can one place bounds on the extent of inefficiency that may occur?Less
This introductory chapter describes the problem studied in the remainder of the book: what happens when a group of agents get together to write one or more agreements. If a subgroup forms a coalition, they act cooperatively by choosing and implementing a joint course of action. However, the actions of different coalitions are chosen independently and non-cooperatively. This book is interested in the equilibrium of coalition formation. Which coalitions will come about? Is there a presumption that such coalition formation will be efficient? If so, under what circumstances will they be efficient? If not, can one place bounds on the extent of inefficiency that may occur?
Suresh Tendulkar and T.A. Bhavani
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198085584
- eISBN:
- 9780199082087
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198085584.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This book analyses the background and context of the reforms since 1991, while tracing the remarkable transformation of India from a slow-growing economy to one of the fastest in the world. It ...
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This book analyses the background and context of the reforms since 1991, while tracing the remarkable transformation of India from a slow-growing economy to one of the fastest in the world. It critically analyses the growth strategy under Nehruvian socialism and the slow growth rate of the Indian economy and, thus, draws attention to the factors that led to reforms. It also describes how reforms were sustained in a low-income economy with large diversities and how they successfully survived the emergence of several coalition governments at the centre as well as the increasing regionalization of Indian politics. It shows how reforms unleashed India’s latent entrepreneurship through increasingly liberalized competitive markets and enabled faster and sustained economic growth, which contributed to improved living standards and reduction of abject poverty. It takes stock of specific reforms initiatives undertaken by the government and the challenges that lie ahead.Less
This book analyses the background and context of the reforms since 1991, while tracing the remarkable transformation of India from a slow-growing economy to one of the fastest in the world. It critically analyses the growth strategy under Nehruvian socialism and the slow growth rate of the Indian economy and, thus, draws attention to the factors that led to reforms. It also describes how reforms were sustained in a low-income economy with large diversities and how they successfully survived the emergence of several coalition governments at the centre as well as the increasing regionalization of Indian politics. It shows how reforms unleashed India’s latent entrepreneurship through increasingly liberalized competitive markets and enabled faster and sustained economic growth, which contributed to improved living standards and reduction of abject poverty. It takes stock of specific reforms initiatives undertaken by the government and the challenges that lie ahead.
Lanny W. Martin and Georg Vanberg
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199607884
- eISBN:
- 9780191729676
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199607884.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world’s parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to tensions that are ...
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Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world’s parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to tensions that are largely absent under single-party government. The pressures of electoral competition and the necessity of delegating substantial authority to ministers affiliated with specific parties threaten the compromise agreements that are at the heart of coalition governance. The central argument of this book is that strong legislative institutions play a critical role in allowing parties to deal with these tensions and to enforce coalition bargains. Based on an analysis of roughly 1,300 government bills across five democracies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands), the book paints a detailed picture of the treatment of government legislation in contemporary parliaments. Two central contributions emerge. First, the book forces a reconsideration of the common perception that legislatures are largely irrelevant institutions in European democracies. The data presented here make a compelling case that parliaments that feature strong committee systems play an influential role in shaping policy. Second, the book contributes to the field of coalition governance. While scholars have developed detailed accounts of the birth and death of coalitions, much less is known about the manner in which coalitions govern between these bookend events. This book contributes to a richer understanding of how multiparty governments make policy.Less
Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world’s parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to tensions that are largely absent under single-party government. The pressures of electoral competition and the necessity of delegating substantial authority to ministers affiliated with specific parties threaten the compromise agreements that are at the heart of coalition governance. The central argument of this book is that strong legislative institutions play a critical role in allowing parties to deal with these tensions and to enforce coalition bargains. Based on an analysis of roughly 1,300 government bills across five democracies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands), the book paints a detailed picture of the treatment of government legislation in contemporary parliaments. Two central contributions emerge. First, the book forces a reconsideration of the common perception that legislatures are largely irrelevant institutions in European democracies. The data presented here make a compelling case that parliaments that feature strong committee systems play an influential role in shaping policy. Second, the book contributes to the field of coalition governance. While scholars have developed detailed accounts of the birth and death of coalitions, much less is known about the manner in which coalitions govern between these bookend events. This book contributes to a richer understanding of how multiparty governments make policy.
David M. Malone
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199278572
- eISBN:
- 9780191604119
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199278571.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter discusses the fourth phase of UN involvement in Iraq, in which it was largely sidelined. Negotiations within the Security Council in late 2002 and early 2003 resulted in deadlock, and ...
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This chapter discusses the fourth phase of UN involvement in Iraq, in which it was largely sidelined. Negotiations within the Security Council in late 2002 and early 2003 resulted in deadlock, and the decision of a US and UK-led Coalition to overthrow Saddam Hussein forcibly without a Council mandate. The chapter also addresses the early Coalition occupation of Iraq; subsequent decisions by the Security Council to lend this international action a semblance of legal cover (without providing post facto authorization of the use of force against Saddam Hussein); the nascent Sunni-dominated insurgency against Coalition forces and their local allies; and the bombing of UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 that was to traumatize UN staff and inhibit significant UN post-conflict roles on the ground.Less
This chapter discusses the fourth phase of UN involvement in Iraq, in which it was largely sidelined. Negotiations within the Security Council in late 2002 and early 2003 resulted in deadlock, and the decision of a US and UK-led Coalition to overthrow Saddam Hussein forcibly without a Council mandate. The chapter also addresses the early Coalition occupation of Iraq; subsequent decisions by the Security Council to lend this international action a semblance of legal cover (without providing post facto authorization of the use of force against Saddam Hussein); the nascent Sunni-dominated insurgency against Coalition forces and their local allies; and the bombing of UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 that was to traumatize UN staff and inhibit significant UN post-conflict roles on the ground.
David M. Malone
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199278572
- eISBN:
- 9780191604119
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199278571.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines events in Iraq during the most recent fifth phase of UN involvement. Having been largely sidelined on Iraq in the fourth phase, the UN underwent a Crisis of Confidence between ...
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This chapter examines events in Iraq during the most recent fifth phase of UN involvement. Having been largely sidelined on Iraq in the fourth phase, the UN underwent a Crisis of Confidence between 2004 and 2005, searching for a means to address its demotion. It is argued that that the deadlock in the Council over Iraq in 2003 had critically undermined the UN’s credibility globally, which no amount of activity elsewhere, notably in Africa, could recover. During this period, under Council resolutions, the UN was meant to be playing a ‘vital’ role in Iraq, but its margin for maneuver was circumscribed on the one hand by the continuing strong guiding hand of the United States in Iraqi affairs and on the other by the dreadful security situation in Iraq, precluding deployment of a large UN international staff. During these years, various aspects of the UN’s earlier activities in Iraq, notably the OFF Program, returned to haunt it, making 2004 Kofi Annan’s ‘annus horribilis’.Less
This chapter examines events in Iraq during the most recent fifth phase of UN involvement. Having been largely sidelined on Iraq in the fourth phase, the UN underwent a Crisis of Confidence between 2004 and 2005, searching for a means to address its demotion. It is argued that that the deadlock in the Council over Iraq in 2003 had critically undermined the UN’s credibility globally, which no amount of activity elsewhere, notably in Africa, could recover. During this period, under Council resolutions, the UN was meant to be playing a ‘vital’ role in Iraq, but its margin for maneuver was circumscribed on the one hand by the continuing strong guiding hand of the United States in Iraqi affairs and on the other by the dreadful security situation in Iraq, precluding deployment of a large UN international staff. During these years, various aspects of the UN’s earlier activities in Iraq, notably the OFF Program, returned to haunt it, making 2004 Kofi Annan’s ‘annus horribilis’.
Bernhard Ebbinghaus
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286119
- eISBN:
- 9780191604089
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286116.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The chapter discusses how the state, employers, and organized labor promote and reform early retirement policies. What interests do workers, employers, and workplace representatives have in using ...
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The chapter discusses how the state, employers, and organized labor promote and reform early retirement policies. What interests do workers, employers, and workplace representatives have in using early exit? Beyond the workplace, interest coalitions may arise among governments, employer associations, and trade unions to externalize restructuration costs, reduce labor supply, and buy social peace.Less
The chapter discusses how the state, employers, and organized labor promote and reform early retirement policies. What interests do workers, employers, and workplace representatives have in using early exit? Beyond the workplace, interest coalitions may arise among governments, employer associations, and trade unions to externalize restructuration costs, reduce labor supply, and buy social peace.
Paul Weirich
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195388381
- eISBN:
- 9780199866700
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388381.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
A theory of collective rationality identifies collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for ...
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A theory of collective rationality identifies collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the product of acts its members freely and fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where conditions are ideal for joint action and agents have rationally prepared for coordination. A theory of collective rationality also yields principles concerning solutions to games. One principle requires that a solution constitute an equilibrium among the incentives of the agents in the game. In a cooperative game some agents are coalitions of individuals, and it may be impossible for all agents to pursue all incentives. Because rationality is attainable, the appropriate equilibrium‐standard for cooperative games requires pursuit of an incentive only if it provides a sufficient reason to act. The book's theory of collective rationality supports an attainable equilibrium‐standard for solutions to cooperative games and shows that its realization follows from individuals' rational acts. This book's theory of collective rationality contributes to philosophical projects such as contractarian ethics and to practical projects such as the design of social institutions.Less
A theory of collective rationality identifies collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the product of acts its members freely and fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where conditions are ideal for joint action and agents have rationally prepared for coordination. A theory of collective rationality also yields principles concerning solutions to games. One principle requires that a solution constitute an equilibrium among the incentives of the agents in the game. In a cooperative game some agents are coalitions of individuals, and it may be impossible for all agents to pursue all incentives. Because rationality is attainable, the appropriate equilibrium‐standard for cooperative games requires pursuit of an incentive only if it provides a sufficient reason to act. The book's theory of collective rationality supports an attainable equilibrium‐standard for solutions to cooperative games and shows that its realization follows from individuals' rational acts. This book's theory of collective rationality contributes to philosophical projects such as contractarian ethics and to practical projects such as the design of social institutions.
Ian Malcolm David Little
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199257041
- eISBN:
- 9780191601293
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257043.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Government can and should be actively concerned with the relief of poverty. But there is no ethical principle defining the proper distribution of wealth between occupational or other social groups, ...
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Government can and should be actively concerned with the relief of poverty. But there is no ethical principle defining the proper distribution of wealth between occupational or other social groups, nor can it be democratically determined in an orderly manner. Distributional coalitions, such as trade unions, employers, and professional associations, must be discouraged, with the distribution of wealth between groups determined by competition. Where politics is dominated by distributional issues, democracy is likely to break down, and often has. The related subjects of rent seeking and corruption are discussed.Less
Government can and should be actively concerned with the relief of poverty. But there is no ethical principle defining the proper distribution of wealth between occupational or other social groups, nor can it be democratically determined in an orderly manner. Distributional coalitions, such as trade unions, employers, and professional associations, must be discouraged, with the distribution of wealth between groups determined by competition. Where politics is dominated by distributional issues, democracy is likely to break down, and often has. The related subjects of rent seeking and corruption are discussed.
Frank Fischer
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242641
- eISBN:
- 9780191599255
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924264X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This is the second of two chapters that present a more detailed examination of the ways in which social constructions are produced and negotiated in public politics through the medium of discourse. ...
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This is the second of two chapters that present a more detailed examination of the ways in which social constructions are produced and negotiated in public politics through the medium of discourse. It looks at discourse versus advocacy coalitions. The first section of the chapter introduces the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) that was developed by Sabatier and his associates, and is perhaps the most widely discussed contribution to the field of policy studies in the past decade. Its aim is to explain policy change empirically through the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions. The next section of the chapter presents Hajer’s critique of the ACF, focusing on his model of discourse coalitions, which, like advocacy coalitions, are designed to explain policy changes generally. The last section looks at the concept of policy learning.Less
This is the second of two chapters that present a more detailed examination of the ways in which social constructions are produced and negotiated in public politics through the medium of discourse. It looks at discourse versus advocacy coalitions. The first section of the chapter introduces the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) that was developed by Sabatier and his associates, and is perhaps the most widely discussed contribution to the field of policy studies in the past decade. Its aim is to explain policy change empirically through the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions. The next section of the chapter presents Hajer’s critique of the ACF, focusing on his model of discourse coalitions, which, like advocacy coalitions, are designed to explain policy changes generally. The last section looks at the concept of policy learning.
Donald L. Horowitz
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244348
- eISBN:
- 9780191599866
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199244340.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
Horowitz's chapter is critical of the consociational aspects of Northern Ireland's Agreement. It views the ‘grand coalition’ executive at the heart of the Agreement as unwieldy because it includes ...
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Horowitz's chapter is critical of the consociational aspects of Northern Ireland's Agreement. It views the ‘grand coalition’ executive at the heart of the Agreement as unwieldy because it includes the extremes, particularly Sinn Fein. The chapter describes the commitments contained in the Agreement as maximalists, and argues that these commitments will rebound, when they are not delivered, to the advantage of militants. Horowitz prefers, for Northern Ireland and elsewhere, what he calls an ‘incentives’ approach. The likeliest and most stable coalition resulting from this is one that includes moderates and excludes militants.Less
Horowitz's chapter is critical of the consociational aspects of Northern Ireland's Agreement. It views the ‘grand coalition’ executive at the heart of the Agreement as unwieldy because it includes the extremes, particularly Sinn Fein. The chapter describes the commitments contained in the Agreement as maximalists, and argues that these commitments will rebound, when they are not delivered, to the advantage of militants. Horowitz prefers, for Northern Ireland and elsewhere, what he calls an ‘incentives’ approach. The likeliest and most stable coalition resulting from this is one that includes moderates and excludes militants.
Alan Angell
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199289653
- eISBN:
- 9780191710964
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289653.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Chilean parties have shown a remarkable capacity for survival after years of turbulent ideological polarization followed by a prolonged period of clandestine activity during the Pinochet dictatorship ...
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Chilean parties have shown a remarkable capacity for survival after years of turbulent ideological polarization followed by a prolonged period of clandestine activity during the Pinochet dictatorship 1973-1990. This chapter argues that this is due to the deep historical and social roots of the parties; their capacity to represent most major social groups; and their efficiency as agents of government. A remarkable characteristic since the return to democracy in 1990 is the electoral success of the same coalition in every Presidential, Congressional, and Municipal election. This is explained because the centre-left coalition encompasses the majority of the electorate, because it is seen as the agent of democracy in the long struggle against dictatorship, and because of its sustained and impressive economic performance.Less
Chilean parties have shown a remarkable capacity for survival after years of turbulent ideological polarization followed by a prolonged period of clandestine activity during the Pinochet dictatorship 1973-1990. This chapter argues that this is due to the deep historical and social roots of the parties; their capacity to represent most major social groups; and their efficiency as agents of government. A remarkable characteristic since the return to democracy in 1990 is the electoral success of the same coalition in every Presidential, Congressional, and Municipal election. This is explained because the centre-left coalition encompasses the majority of the electorate, because it is seen as the agent of democracy in the long struggle against dictatorship, and because of its sustained and impressive economic performance.
Thomas Gregory
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780197266830
- eISBN:
- 9780191938160
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197266830.003.0007
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Social and Cultural Anthropology
This chapter examines civilian casualties at coalition checkpoints in Afghanistan and Iraq, focusing on the decision to use lethal force against individuals considered to be hostile. Drawing on the ...
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This chapter examines civilian casualties at coalition checkpoints in Afghanistan and Iraq, focusing on the decision to use lethal force against individuals considered to be hostile. Drawing on the testimony of American soldiers, this chapter argues that the decision to use lethal force can be seen as an affective judgement, with soldiers often resorting to ‘muscle memory’ as they sought to identify potential threats amidst the chaos and confusion of war. It will argue that these affective judgements do not occur within a cultural vacuum but are animated and informed by a set of background assumptions that mark certain populations as dangerous, threatening and hostile before they even arrive on the scene. To understand what made civilians so vulnerable to death and injury at coalition checkpoints, it will be necessary to inquire into the affective schemes of intelligibility that render certain lives disposable and certain bodies profoundly injurable in war.Less
This chapter examines civilian casualties at coalition checkpoints in Afghanistan and Iraq, focusing on the decision to use lethal force against individuals considered to be hostile. Drawing on the testimony of American soldiers, this chapter argues that the decision to use lethal force can be seen as an affective judgement, with soldiers often resorting to ‘muscle memory’ as they sought to identify potential threats amidst the chaos and confusion of war. It will argue that these affective judgements do not occur within a cultural vacuum but are animated and informed by a set of background assumptions that mark certain populations as dangerous, threatening and hostile before they even arrive on the scene. To understand what made civilians so vulnerable to death and injury at coalition checkpoints, it will be necessary to inquire into the affective schemes of intelligibility that render certain lives disposable and certain bodies profoundly injurable in war.
Anthony Heath, Siana Glouharova, and Oliver Heath
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199257560
- eISBN:
- 9780191603280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257566.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
India is the world’s biggest, and in many respects, most remarkable democracy. Despite vast social and linguistic diversity, its political system has been surprisingly stable and effective. India has ...
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India is the world’s biggest, and in many respects, most remarkable democracy. Despite vast social and linguistic diversity, its political system has been surprisingly stable and effective. India has a Westminster type parliamentary system with single member plurality elections. In a seemingly major challenge to Duverger’s laws, India has developed a large multiparty system despite its SMP electoral system. Part of the answer is that the extreme multi-party system in the all-India parliament masks the nature of party competition in the electoral districts. Electoral competition can be thought of as a series of different regional level two-party contests.Less
India is the world’s biggest, and in many respects, most remarkable democracy. Despite vast social and linguistic diversity, its political system has been surprisingly stable and effective. India has a Westminster type parliamentary system with single member plurality elections. In a seemingly major challenge to Duverger’s laws, India has developed a large multiparty system despite its SMP electoral system. Part of the answer is that the extreme multi-party system in the all-India parliament masks the nature of party competition in the electoral districts. Electoral competition can be thought of as a series of different regional level two-party contests.
Roberto D'Alimonte
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199257560
- eISBN:
- 9780191603280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257566.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Given that Italy has had one of the few perfectly bicameral parliamentary systems (in which each house has equal powers), there are two different electoral systems to analyse. These electoral systems ...
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Given that Italy has had one of the few perfectly bicameral parliamentary systems (in which each house has equal powers), there are two different electoral systems to analyse. These electoral systems are relatively new (dating only to 1993) and are very complex, reflecting compromises between parties with different interests. Lijphart’s prescription that an electoral system should emphasize ‘proportionality and simplicity’ is certainly violated. Italy has changed from list PR (before 1993) to variations of mixed-member majoritarian systems. Both the Chamber and the Senate are composed of 75 per cent of members elected from SMDs, and 25 per cent from lists. Beyond this, the electoral systems vary in a range of important ways. One of the important effects is the ‘proportionalisation of the plurality tier’. Italy is a leading example of the manner in which major electoral reform can have some expected and some very unexpected consequences. There is widespread discontent with the ‘new’ systems, such that electoral reform is very much on the agenda.Less
Given that Italy has had one of the few perfectly bicameral parliamentary systems (in which each house has equal powers), there are two different electoral systems to analyse. These electoral systems are relatively new (dating only to 1993) and are very complex, reflecting compromises between parties with different interests. Lijphart’s prescription that an electoral system should emphasize ‘proportionality and simplicity’ is certainly violated. Italy has changed from list PR (before 1993) to variations of mixed-member majoritarian systems. Both the Chamber and the Senate are composed of 75 per cent of members elected from SMDs, and 25 per cent from lists. Beyond this, the electoral systems vary in a range of important ways. One of the important effects is the ‘proportionalisation of the plurality tier’. Italy is a leading example of the manner in which major electoral reform can have some expected and some very unexpected consequences. There is widespread discontent with the ‘new’ systems, such that electoral reform is very much on the agenda.
Jack Vowles
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199257560
- eISBN:
- 9780191603280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257566.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
New Zealand experienced fundamental electoral system reform in the mid-1990s when voters, in a referendum, decided to replace the single-member plurality system by proportional representation ...
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New Zealand experienced fundamental electoral system reform in the mid-1990s when voters, in a referendum, decided to replace the single-member plurality system by proportional representation achieved through a mixed compensatory system. This has reinforced the trend towards a multi-party system, and resulted in coalition government becoming the norm. It has also produced a more socio-demographically representative parliament. Some opposition to the mixed system remains, but overall, the effects of the change are perceived as beneficial.Less
New Zealand experienced fundamental electoral system reform in the mid-1990s when voters, in a referendum, decided to replace the single-member plurality system by proportional representation achieved through a mixed compensatory system. This has reinforced the trend towards a multi-party system, and resulted in coalition government becoming the norm. It has also produced a more socio-demographically representative parliament. Some opposition to the mixed system remains, but overall, the effects of the change are perceived as beneficial.
Tapio Raunio
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199257560
- eISBN:
- 9780191603280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257566.003.0023
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The Finnish electoral system – which will be 100 years old in 2006 – enjoys a high level of legitimacy among voters, and is thus unlikely to be changed. Finland has one of the most candidate-centred ...
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The Finnish electoral system – which will be 100 years old in 2006 – enjoys a high level of legitimacy among voters, and is thus unlikely to be changed. Finland has one of the most candidate-centred electoral systems, with electors casting only one vote for one of a party’s candidates. This preference voting produces heated competition between candidates of the same party. PR in quite large constituencies has produced one of Europe’s largest party systems.Less
The Finnish electoral system – which will be 100 years old in 2006 – enjoys a high level of legitimacy among voters, and is thus unlikely to be changed. Finland has one of the most candidate-centred electoral systems, with electors casting only one vote for one of a party’s candidates. This preference voting produces heated competition between candidates of the same party. PR in quite large constituencies has produced one of Europe’s largest party systems.
Olga Shvetsova
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246465
- eISBN:
- 9780191600135
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246467.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
In the ten years of post‐communist transition, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe have passed through several election cycles, providing new evidence of the influence of formal political ...
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In the ten years of post‐communist transition, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe have passed through several election cycles, providing new evidence of the influence of formal political institutions on transition dynamics. This chapter examines the transitional development of their party systems as a function of institutional choices. Focusing on party systems, it identifies the process of coalition formation as the transmission mechanism by which institutions influence political consolidation at this stage. It addresses the transitional influence of combinations of majoritarian and power‐sharing institutions, suggesting that their interactive effect may undermine or weaken the incentives for party‐building that each of them can separately provide. The article provides supporting evidence from Poland and Romania.Less
In the ten years of post‐communist transition, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe have passed through several election cycles, providing new evidence of the influence of formal political institutions on transition dynamics. This chapter examines the transitional development of their party systems as a function of institutional choices. Focusing on party systems, it identifies the process of coalition formation as the transmission mechanism by which institutions influence political consolidation at this stage. It addresses the transitional influence of combinations of majoritarian and power‐sharing institutions, suggesting that their interactive effect may undermine or weaken the incentives for party‐building that each of them can separately provide. The article provides supporting evidence from Poland and Romania.
Vernon Bogdanor
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293347
- eISBN:
- 9780191598821
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293348.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
Normally, in a first past the post‐electoral system in which majority single‐party government is the rule, the sovereign has no choice as to who to call to the Palace. But, in cases of emergency—war ...
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Normally, in a first past the post‐electoral system in which majority single‐party government is the rule, the sovereign has no choice as to who to call to the Palace. But, in cases of emergency—war or economic crisis, as in 1931—the sovereign may enjoy discretion. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to create a coalition government, as in 1915, 1916, 1931, or 1940, and the sovereign's role may then be crucial. The danger is that, in using his or her discretion, the sovereign's actions may appear partisan, and the sovereign's actions will then be labelled `unconstitutional’.Less
Normally, in a first past the post‐electoral system in which majority single‐party government is the rule, the sovereign has no choice as to who to call to the Palace. But, in cases of emergency—war or economic crisis, as in 1931—the sovereign may enjoy discretion. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to create a coalition government, as in 1915, 1916, 1931, or 1940, and the sovereign's role may then be crucial. The danger is that, in using his or her discretion, the sovereign's actions may appear partisan, and the sovereign's actions will then be labelled `unconstitutional’.
